(a) R. Moshe Ashen, the kitchen kashrut mashgi’ach at RIETS, reports that R. Moshe Feinstein was asked whether it is permissible for a Jew to carry coins minted by the United States government into the washroom, when – after all – the coins proudly feature a word which appears identical with the “shem etzem” of HaKadosh Barukh Hu in English (i.e., “G-d”). R. Feinstein consulted with a knowledgeable clergyman of a prestigious church that was located in his own personal neighbourhood (somewhere on the Lower East Side of Manhattan). After discussing the matter with the clergyman, R. Feinstein concluded that word “God” as minted by the United States government does not refer to HaKadosh Barukh Hu, and therefore it is permissible to bring the coins into the washroom.

(b) R. Mordechai Willig, in a 2007 shi’ur digitally recorded at
http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/721164/Rabbi_Mordechai_I._Willig/Is_it_the_Season_to_be_Jolly
discusses the dispute among the poskim whether Noahides are permitted to worship in church. His words are featured from 2:45 until 9:35.
In the end, R. Willig asserts as follows:
“Bottom line is we cannot resolve this issue… too great… the people are too great on each side, whether in fact a Xtian is in violation of one of the seven mitzvos [of the Noahide Code] when he practices Xianity…
“For non-Jews I cannot reach a conclusion.”
[end of citation]

Let’s look forward to seeing the fulfillment of the High Holiday liturgical poem “Vi’ye’etayu kol li’avdekha…”

In the hypothetical event that a contemporary posek will discover that the matter of whether or not the trinity is permissible for Noahides remains a safek, then the question will ipso facto arise whether Noahides are obligated to be stringent regarding safek violations of the Noahide Code. The latter problem is surveyed by R. Yitzchak Yosef in his Yalkut Yosef, Issur Viheter vol. 2, who offers a lengthy appendix in which he calculates some forty-three nafka minot as to whether safek di’oraita lichumra is a matter of Torah law (as the Rashba holds in his novellae on Kiddushin 73a) or a matter of rabbinic law (as the Rambam holds in Hilkhot Tum’at Met 9:12). Nafka minah number nine on the list is this very question: If safek di’oraita lichumra is a matter of Torah law, then Noahides must avoid even doubtful transgressions of the Noahide law. If safek di’oraita likula is a matter of rabbinic law, then Noahides may doubtfully transgress the Noahide Code in good conscience, because rabbinic legislation was never directed to Noahides.
R. Yosef proceeds to advance an additional reason to be lenient vis-a-vis Noahides, as follows. Even if the halakhah follows the Rashba (that safek lichumra di’oraita is a matter of Torah law), perhaps the Rashba’s scriptural source was only directed to Jews and not to Noahides.
Accordingly, R. Yosef’s analysis would seemingly trailblaze a sfek sfeka likula to allow a Noahide to commit a safek violation of the Noahide Code:
(i) Perhaps safek di’oraita lichumra is rabbinic in origin, such that it cannot apply to Noahides.
(ii) Even if safek di’oraita lichumra is biblical in origin, perhaps this was only addressed to Jews and not to Noahides.
Upon further consideration, however, a countervailing stringency arises based upon the words of R. J. David Bleich in the latter’s Benetivot Hahalakhah II pp. 140-143, which obviously was not seen by the Yalkut Yosef. There, R. Bleich asserts that there is indeed a halakhic side to argue that rabbinic legislation does apply even to Noahides, under the rubric of “natural law courts” posited by the Rambam in Hilkhot Melakhim 10:11. If that is correct, then safek likula #1 of the above sfek sfeka is refuted.

4. No, Ehpraimites cannot be gerei toshav, since the Noahide Code requires Noahides to refrain from causing Jews to transgress. Ephraimites should be encouraged to instead occupy themselves with studying the Torah and practicing its mitzvot in those dimensions that relate to the Noadide Code.

“Fourthly, we have not been authorized by our history, sanctified by the martyrdom of millions, to even hint to another faith community that we are mentally ready to revise historical attitudes, to trade favors pertaining to fundamental matters of faith, and to reconcile “some” differences. Such a suggestion would be nothing but a betrayal of our great tradition and heritage and would, furthermore, produce no practical benefits. Let us not forget that the community of the many will not be satisfied with half measures and compromises which are only indicative of a feeling of insecurity and inner emptiness. We cannot command the respect of our confronters by displaying a servile attitude. Only a candid, frank and unequivocal policy reflecting unconditional commitment to our G-d, a sense of dignity, pride and inner joy in being what we are, believing with great passion in the ultimate truthfulness of our views, praying fervently for and expecting confidently the fulfillment of our eschatological vision where our faith will rise from particularity to universality, will impress the peers of the other faith community among whom we have both adversaries and friends.”

Responding to R. Soloveitchik, R. Norman Lamm (Jewish Life, November-December 1964) writes: “A new attitude seems to have crystallized in American Jewish leadership which reflects the fundamental position of Orthodoxy… What cleared the air was the intervention of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, whose immense learning and undisputed Halachic authority lent cogency to his position, which was brilliantly conceived and articulately expounded in the last issue of “Tradition”… It should be understood that “dialogue” is more than polite conversation, even more than a scholarly colloquium. It involves the logos, the fundamental commitment of faith. It is a profound confrontation in which everything is risked, in which the results always remain unforeseen, and from which the two partners in dialogue rarely emerge unchanged. It is because of the unique and intimate nature of the logos, the incommensurability of one faith commitment with another, that we hold theological dialogue to be an absurdity… No, in matters of faith and ultimate commitment the only authentic dialogue is that between G-d and man. Conversation on such matters between members of faith communities… represents a distraction from and not a contribution to the great dialogue.”

Similarly, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is quoted by R. Simchah Bunim Lazerson in his Shulchan Shelomoh, Erkei Refu’ah, vol. 1 (Jerusalem 5766), p. 138: If a Jewish patient is deathly ill, and the only way to medically save his life is by admitting him to a hospital affiliated with the trinity, such that by being a patient in the hospital the Jew is conceding either directly or indirectly to the trinity, the Jewish patient must die rather than enter that hospital for treatment. Even so paramount a mitzvah as piku’ach nefesh does not permit a Jew to grant legitimacy to the trinity.

Likewise, R. Avigdor Neventzal, in his Sichot Lisefer Vayikra, pp. 365-368, prohibits the municipal government of Jerusalem to publicly display – in celebration of the Yom Yerushalayim holiday proclaimed by the Chief Rabbinate of Medinat Yisr’ael – a banner featuring both a Magen David and a cross. R. Neventzal negates such a plan, since he regards it as axiomatic that the trinity is forbidden for Jews.

Therefore, since the Noahide Code effectively forbids non-Jews from trying to cause Jews to transgress (as can be inferred from Rashi to Deuteronomy 23:9), and since it is universally accepted as a matter of practical Halakhah that a Jew can never believe in the trinity, therefore the Noahide Code obligates “Ephraimites” to discontinue their efforts from asking Jews to believe in the falsehood of “oto ha’ish”. Instead, “Ephraimites” can achieve the spiritual greatness and holines for which they legitimately yearn by occupying themselves with the study of the Torah (and championing the mitzvot the Torah) as it pertains to the Noahide Code. This latter proposition is based on the gemara in Avodah Zarah 3a that a non-Jew who occupies himself with the Torah as it pertains to the Noahide Code is catapulted to the spiritual greatness of a Kohen Gadol.

The organisation I work for has published a policy of refusing to have anything to do with people who attempt to bring Jews into belief in oto ha’ish.

Now Rabbi Spira wrote “Thus, a Jew enjoys full moral obligations toward all Noahides, including Noahides who believe in the trinity”.

1. Would that include Messianics who are not actively trying to convert Jews?
2. Would that include Ephraimites?
3. Are Messianics Ger Toshav [according to those who accept ger toshav in our times]?
4. Are Ephraimites Ger Toshav [according to those who accept ger toshav in our times]?

Thank you for your thoughts.

(a) Given the fact that the trinity is erroneous, what is the halakhic status of the trinity as a doctrine for a Jew?
(b) Given the fact that the trinity is erroneous, what is the halakhic status of the trinity as a doctrine for a Noahide?
(c) Given the fact that the trinity is erroneous, what moral obligations does a Jew enjoy toward Noahides who mistakenly believe in the trinity?

The first and the third questions are easy to answer. Regarding the first question: Since the gemara in Sanhedrin 63b and Sukkah 45b as cited by R. Klapper explicitly states that “sheetuf” is prohibited for Jews as avodah zarah, the trinity is forbidden as a doctrine for a Jew even under force majeure. All Rishonim, including Tosafot and the Me’iri, universally agree to this.
Regarding the third question: The Rambam writes in Hilkhot Melakhim 10:12 that Jews are obligated to take care of all the needs of non-Jews, in light of the verses “tov Hashem lakol, richamav al kol ma’asav” as well as “dirakheha darkhei no’am, vikhol netivoteha shalom”. Thus, a Jew enjoys full moral obligations toward all Noahides, including Noahides who believe in the trinity.
By contradistinction, the second question is intricate, and will depend upon the various sources that R. Klapper analyzes.
It is also intriguing to note in this context that Rashi to Tractate Avodah Zarah 10a in the uncensored version (no dibbur hamat’chil; three lines from the bottom) elucidates the gemara to the effect that the latin language, script and books of the Roman catholic church were all actually engineered by the Tanna’im through their Jewish emissaries Yochanan (i.e. John), Paulus (i.e. Paul) and Petros (i.e. Simon Peter), in order to save Klal Yisra’el from the heretical disciples of “oto ha’ish”. This Rashi is published in a cryptic and obviously truncated form in the traditional Vilna Shas, but appears in its fullness in the new Wagshal Shas, and is the subject of a lecture by Dr. Shnayer Leiman at
http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/726352/Dr._Shnayer_Leiman/Jewish_Perspectives_on_Early_Christianity:_Toldot_Yeshu
Dr. Leiman demonstrates that the episode described by Rashi is the basis for the secret reason of the optional fast of the ninth of Tevet, as per Tur/Shulchan Arukh Orach Chaim 580:2. Namely, the 9th of Tevet is the yartzeit of Simon Peter – the first Roman pope who was actually a Jew sent by Chazal to establish a latin language, script and set of books for the heretical disciples of “oto ha’ish”, in order to separate those heretics from Klal Yisra’el, such that Klal Yisra’el will follow the Oral Torah (as it always had since Kabbalat HaTorah at Har Sinai), and – lihavdil – the gentiles will follow the Noahide Code in the form of an organized religion.
Another one of the Rishonim – R. Yehudah Bartzeloni in his commentary to the Sefer Yetzirah (p. 146) – fills in further detail by pointing out that the latin alphabet designed by Chazal possesses the three middle letters “L M N”, which are vocalized as “Ell emm enn” – three Hebrew words meaning “G-d has no mother”. Thus, Chazal encoded in the very alphabet that they formulated for the church a repudiation of the heresy of the disciples of “oto ha’ish” who were worshiping him as [chas vichalilah] a deity.
[Tangentially, this insight of the Rishonim illuminates a subplot in R. J. David Bleich's Bioethical Dilemmas vol. II (Targum Press 2006). On pp. 1-2 and pp. 99-100, R. Bleich cites the Zohar as establishing (based on Genesis 7:11) that Providence will use the advancement of human scientific knowledge that will be triggered in the year 5600 as a vehicle for accelerating the arrival of the ge'ulah shelemah. Yet, on pp. 228-229, R. Bleich cites the Rambam in the uncensored version of Hilkhot Melakhim as establishing that Providence will use the many human beings who have been tricked by the falsehood and silliness of the heretical belief in "oto ha'ish" as a vehicle in order to bring the ge'ulah shelemah (as defined by Torah theology). We now understand that these vehicles are two sides of the same coin: the invention of latin by Chazal was a tool of Providence to accelerate the arrival of the messianic era by both facilitating scientific progress (seeing as latin script is the universal script of science, particularly since the year 5600) and by galvanizing the nations of the world to follow the Noahide Code through the teachings of Simon Peter.]
Arguably, then, one might interpret Rashi to mean that since the entire protocol of the church was actually engineered by Chazal, the church is consistent with the Noahide Code. [Cf. R. Ovadiah Yosef in his Shu"t Yechaveh Da'at IV, no. 45, who marshals a novel proof from Yevamot 47a that the church is consistent with the Noahide Code.] However, such an landmark interpretation of Rashi obviously requires confirmation through a formal halakhic decision, which I will leave to the poskim.

First, the positivists, and especially the verifiability criterion for meaning, are very much out of favor in modern philosophy. On the one hand the analytic/synthetic dichotomy has received heavy criticism, and on the other hand the verifiability criterion has shown itself to be problematic (in Ayer’s original formulation the principle is too permissive). So I don’t think that you need to be concerned about what the positivists would think about this question.

I apologize if I’m still not reading you correctly. You assume that “correspondence-to-traditional-texts is a mode of empirical verification” Is that true? Certainly correspondence-to-traditional texts is a mode of verification for a claim such as “‘the trinity is true’ is avodah zarah.” This might entail, for an Orthodox Jew, that the trinity is false, but the fact that traditional texts find the trinity to be avodah zarah is not verification that it’s false. Rather, the Orthodox Jew would have a principle such as “Halacha doesn’t make me believe false things” or something. (This principle has the interesting consequence that anything that’s assur to believe isn’t meaningless. Another interesting consequence is that the Orthodox scientist should sometimes look towards halacha, if possible, to determine the empirical truth.)

Assuming that the principle is correct, I think I understand your argument. Since “The only way for ‘G-d is divisible into three personalities’ to be avodah zarah is if it contradicts ‘G-d is indivisible’” is true, if the trinity can’t contradict ‘G-d is indivisible’ then it can’t be avodah zarah. This leads to the conclusion that the proposition “‘God is divisible into three personalities’ is avodah zarah” is unverifiable, and hence meaningless. This is far from the main point of your piece, so I’m happy to drop it here.

Did the positivists claim that statements that can’t be falsified are meaningless, or that statements that can’t be verified are meaningless? Ayer (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ayer/#2) said verifiable, I know. Using this criterion Ayer claims that ethical and religious statements are meaningless, so it wouldn’t only be the doctrine of the Trinity that is meaningless.

Admittedly, I’m not familiar with theology surrounding this doctrine. But isn’t the problem with a self-contradictory statement much more direct? Most people accept “reductio ad absurdum” as a principle of logic. That is, suppose P is the case, and that P entails a contradiction (“Q and not Q”); from this we can derive that P is not the case, that P is false. If the trinity is a contradiction, then, formally, anything is true by reductio ad absurdum. This itself is an absurdity, and so we have good reason to doubt contradictory doctrines. So the problem with a contradiction isn’t meaninglessness, but rather chaos.

The position that some contradictions are acceptable is called dialethisim (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/) and remains highly controversial.