Comments on: Our Writers Respond: The Component Issues of a Traditional Jewish Womanhood by Gidon Rothstein

By: Gidon Rothstein

Gidon Rothstein — Tue, 23 Mar 2010 15:16:29 +0000

The reason the focus on a father teaching his daughter (and the Gemara doesn’t generalize it, necessarily, it explains why the act of a father teaching a daughter is a problem) is important is that it suggests–especially in the Rambam’s formulation- that it is that version of TT which is problematic. All the versions you cite, “a woman gets reward, but our Rabbis said a father shouldn’t teach his daughter…” may, at the time they were written, assume that was the only way for it to happen, and seen that as a problem. But what happens if a woman wants to learn on her own? One possibility is that that, too, will teach her tiflut, and if you think that, please feel free to stop learning. But the other possibility is that that was an unconsidered possibility, and that that circumstance would not necessarily lead to tiflut.

I meant that an erech is not the same as the value of a woman– that would be her “shovi,” her marketplace worth. So the Torah is saying something in its erechin amounts, but not something as simple (or sexist) as the actual monetary value it applies to the genders at their various life stages.

The exemption from procreation and marriage is in fact worth discussing, and should be part of a picture of how the Torah sees women.

By: Chana Luntz

Chana Luntz — Tue, 23 Mar 2010 09:38:21 +0000

Um, I hear that you don’t have any more time for this but I cannot really let this pass. The Mishna in Sotah discusses a father and daughter because it starts off with Ben Azzai’s position that a father has an obligation to teach his daughter. Rabbi Eliezer then comes and responds to that in the same terms, as is very common practice in a Mishna. The gemora then explains the Mishna, both in the Yerushalmi and in the Bavli in more general terms. It it is a fairly surprising piece of limud to say that where a mishna expresses something in certain terms, and the gemora explains this, and the codes codify it in the language of the mishna, that means that they are not incorporating the understandings of the gemora. Oh, and schools are generally regarded as being in loco parentis, certainly they are in terms of boys.
It is also rather interesting that your view of Chazal is such that you are relatively comfortable with socialisation once we enter that arena (remembering that everything in relation to davening, for example, is rabbinic).
Not sure I understand your reference to erechin as “a Torah ideal although not of value”. What I was referring to of course is Vayikra 27:2-7 – that the erech of a man from twenty to sixty is 50 shekelim, but of a woman 30, a boy from five until 20 is 20 shekelim, and a girl 10; from one month to five years a boy 5 shekelim and a girl 3, and from from sixty and upwards a man 15 and a woman 10. I am not sure how this relates to your understanding of conditions about monetary issues.
The reason why inheritance is of course a thorny issue is because of it being one of the flashpoints between the Tzaddukim and the Prushim.
And not quite sure why the Torah exemption of women from procreation and the concomitant Torah exemption of them from an obligation to marry is not worthy of conversation.

Regards

Chana

By: Gidon Rothstein

Gidon Rothstein — Tue, 23 Mar 2010 00:36:56 +0000

Chana,

You have, apparently, infinite energy to hash out this issue, but I am sorry to say that I do not. I can only say that in each case regarding Talmud Torah, you are selecting the reading that most clearly goes your way, despite textual evidence pointing the other way. For only one example, if the Mishnah in Sotah refers to a father because that was the context, that is the only context where we’d have to apply that rule. In addition, that rule is Rabbinic and hence certainly somewhat more open to the possibility that it is culture-dependent, especially since it explicitly tells you why it is being said. Where those circumstances don’t apply, you might have the right to see things differently.

As for your examples, some are in fact interesting and worth conversation, such as inheritance and erechin (which I in fact think is a Torah ideal, although not of value); I would note, though, that it is a Torah rule that we are allowed to make conditions about monetary issues, suggesting the Torah itself saw its monetary rules as instrumental rather than necessary.

By: Chana Luntz

Chana Luntz — Mon, 22 Mar 2010 22:56:26 +0000

Oh, and here’s another one for your list – how about erechin? Set values of monetary worth as prescribed in the Torah. Socialogical or Torah ideals of value? Need to build that one in to any internally generated picture of Torah ideal.

Regards

Chana

By: Chana Luntz

Chana Luntz — Mon, 22 Mar 2010 22:47:56 +0000

OK, couple of responses:

- the reason for the distinction between Torah shebichtav and Torah shebaal peh is explained in the Beis Yosef. There is a direct command of Hakel which includes women. And while Chagiga 3a, as quoted by Tosphos, says that women don’t come to learn, they come to listen, still, it is a form of teaching, and so teaching Torah shebichtav cannot be assur. [Note in addition there is a masechet sofrim which says that women are equally obligated in hearing krias haTorah to men, which is also clearly problematic if Torah shebichtav is a problem but the Beis Yosef does not allude to this].
- the reason for the language of father and daughter is because that is how it is written in the Mishna in Sotah, the machlokus there is framed in terms of a man teaching his daughter. It is only from the clarifications in the various gemoros, Bavli and Yerushalmi, does it become clear that Rabbi Eliezer’s position is by no means limited to the father and daughter combination. And note that in the case of the Yerushalmi, the matrona asked a good question, a lumdishe question. So good in fact that the talmudim, once she had left having been rebuffed, wanted to know the answer! And the “mai taima d’rabbi Eliezer” of the Bavli does not in fact suggest a weakness of mind.
And we haven’t even gotten started on the various sources who suggest that the ma’aseh Bruria, as cited by Rashi proves Rabbi Eliezer’s point.

Anyhow this is really all by the by. What I started by trying to point out was that there is out there “a picture of womanhood constructed internally,” that is floating around and which gives strong support to the “boundary pushers” with the argument being that given the sociological realities, the Torah had to allow women more exemptions and freedoms – eg exemptions from eidus, exemptions from mitzvos aseh shehazman grama. That is, for various sociological reasons it was not possible to require women to fulfil all of these mitzvos throughout history. But that when women reached the point in their development that they felt able to take on these obligations, that is a good thing and in fact progress towards the messianic ideal.

What I then tried to point out was that the most difficult sources to reconcile with this socialisation theory are in fact these sources vis a vis women’s learning – because they are so strongly towards the prohibitive, rather than merely exemptive and because of the philosophical implications and individualisation of learning and the nature of the keter torah. But that bizarrely enough, that appears to be the one place where ideas of socialisation are much more widely accepted.
The others are far far less of a jump when one considers that at many times throughout the last four thousand years many many women had access neither to any public spaces at all nor did they have any purchasing power (or indeed acess to any money at all) in circumstances where it is hardly clear that such a lack of access is a Torah ideal. As I mentioned, you may not feel comfortable with a socialisation approach, but all I was trying to say was that it is actually easier to justify such an approach within the sources given the realities of women’s lives over the centuries than a socialisation approach vis a vis either slavery (and by that I am referring primarily to the l’olam tavodu aspect of the eved cnani and other aspects of the halacha vis a vis the eved cnani, and not at all to the eved ivri) or, as I have tried to articulate to women’s learning.

I would also note that there are many many other examples besides the ones on your list. The halacha deals with realities like if a married woman injuries somebody it may be impossible to collect at least immediately. Is that difference a Torah ideal or just due to the reality that in most cases a women’s property was completely tied up in her husband? What about that old thorny one, inheritance? I am surprised that one is not on your list. What about the fact that the Torah obligations within a marriage, aside from the requirement to be faithful (which as you have noted goes only from the woman to the man) goes all the other way? What about the other biggie, pru u’rvu (now that one, to my mind, is truely the most interesting of all)?
I have on various forums in the past attempted to articulate an alternative theory of womenhood based on a concept of reshus and choices. And I do think that is also a possible way to go. But that was not my goal here, my goal here was merely to show that the strong envelope pushers can and do have an alternative internally generated theory that in fact justifies the envelope pushing, based on approaches which are used in other and sometimes more difficult scenarios.

Regards

Chana

By: Gidon Rothstein

Gidon Rothstein — Mon, 22 Mar 2010 15:17:08 +0000

Just briefly, in return: 1) The prohibition against a woman learning Torah, if there is one, is clearly open to the possibility that it is a sociological assumption, not a necessary statement about womanhood. Even if I agree that R. Eliezer and those who follow assume this about the majority of women, that doesn’t mean all women can’t learn Torah, it means we have to approach the issue carefully. That’s especially interesting, to me, considering Rambam’s differentiation between Torah she-Bikhtav and be-Al Peh, but that’s for another time. Just to note: we all know that Rashi’s daughters are reputed to have learned Torah, which would suggest that he, too, was not as categorical as you want him to be.
2) On the issue of being categorical, if everyone was as clear and unequivocal as you want them to be, they’d have prohibited it completely, yet each time, the formulation is the same “even though women get reward for learning, our Rabbis said a man should not teach his daughter” why the switch– why not, “our Rabbis said, a woman should not learn?” that’s not a dvar Torah or a stretch, it’s a question in the simple reading of the text. The answer lies in the proper understanding of what a father teaching his son Torah means, as I noted in my Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society article on the topic of that mitzvah.
There is more to be said, but I don’t feel like belaboring this point– what I will say is that you seem fixed on finding the most stringent reading of those sources, and then showing that tradition is now ignoring them. Maybe you are missing nuances of those readings for back then and also the relevant and important elasticity of texts that allows them to bear truths for different generations in different ways. But that’s true to different extents for different texts: The Torah itself, as I’ve been arguing, is significantly less so in its categorical statements, because it comes from God and is therefore less prone to sociology, etc.
Which is why your whole 2nd post on the history/anthropology of Pakistani/Muslim women is less than relevant to me and my discussion. My job as a student of Torah is to see what the Torah says, what Hazal say, and how that is best applied to the world around me at the time that I am living. All the rest is academics; if it interests you, great, but that’s about as far as it goes.

By: Chana Luntz

Chana Luntz — Mon, 22 Mar 2010 10:16:15 +0000

Just briefly on the other point, as i don’t have a lot of time this morning (although if you want I can try and write more later) – one of the things that has helped me think a lot about this is reading of various anthropological studies that have been done amongst Muslim women, particularly Parkistani women. The Rambam’s society seems very far away and long ago, but these societies continue to exist today, albeit with Western erosions. One of the most fascinating aspects is how the Parkistani traditional code has developed a concept of “kol kovuda bas melech penima” in a very real sense. When they talk about bas melech, their concept of royality is somewhat particular – they generally are referring to those who are considered to be direct descendants of the Prophet (with a capital P). And particularly for those families who pride themselves on this ancestry, the honour of the family dictates that the woman goes out only three times in her lifetime, when she is born, when she marries and goes to her husband’s house and when she dies. The segregation of women in Pakistan is taken so seriously that many houses are surrounded by eight to ten feet high purdah walls. All rooms face inward, with windows on the ground floor either built close to the ceiling or with frosted glass to ensure that the women who live there are never seen by passing male guests or tradesmen. There is usually one room reserved for guests that has direct access to the outside and which is shielded from those inside.
I could go on and on, as the whole area is a truely fascinating one, at least from an anthropological point of view. Whether one recoils in horror, which is the standard Western approach, or wonders whether the Muslims might not have a point (or perhaps have actually understood the pasuk correctly) will depend of course upon your temperament. But if you want to understand the realities of what Jewish women have lived with for at least a thousand years or so, if not more, you do need to truly try and understand such a modus videndi – including how they get food and the realities of windows. And also as to how the obligation would need to be structured to accommodate such circumstances (ie just as the Muslim men are obligated to provide food for these women, parallel to the Jewish obligation, so too would Jewish men need to be obligated to provide lulavim, there are no other alternatives). A rich sense of our history is thus also an important factor in understanding any socialogical claims.

Regards

Chana

By: Chana Luntz

Chana Luntz — Mon, 22 Mar 2010 09:51:24 +0000

You write:

“What an odd circumstance– I am arguing with a woman who is citing source after source to show me that women shouldn’t learn Torah! ישמע אזנך מה שפיך אומרת!”

It is not really such an odd circumstance if you think about it. After all, if you are a woman who learns Torah, you are likely to go into the question perhaps more thoroughly than others perhaps might.

And of course, what you have quoted to me is the “standard learn” today, especially in the kinds of circles you mix in. And of course on one level I “buy” it. That is the reading that has, through, as I have described it, a kind of nes, become accepted today.

But, intellectual honesty should really compel one to understand that that is not the pashut way of reading the sources, and not the one that is in consonant with the way we generally posken halacha. In fact it is a complete deviation from it. The fact that we appear to posken the halacha like this in this case when it is such a deviation from the way we normally do this is extraordinary.

This forces me back to the phrase that I glossed over in your previous response as I wasn’t sure how to deal with it respectfully, but I will try. The statement was:

“(That SA adopts it from Rambam is understandable– that’s what he does).”

Well not exactly. The SA’s official policy is to look at the triumverate, the Rif, the Rambam and the Rosh/Tur and posken like the majority. There are in fact numerous cases where he does not do this, but this is not one of them. Here he has his majority, the Rambam and the Tur (the Tur appears to have the torah shebichtav and torah shebaal peh around the other way, but the Shulchan Aruch understands that as a scribal error), and goes with that.

But there is more to this than that. The Shulchan Aruch is not a stand alone work. It ideally assumes that you have read the Beis Yosef, which is his magnum opus – in which he brings his thinking and a round up of the key rishonim on any given topic.

And his statement on this subject goes like this (Beis Yosef Yoreh Deah siman 246:

ומ”ש ואף על פי שיש לה שכר צוו חכמים שלא ילמד אדם את בתו תורה וכו’. במתניתין פרק היה נוטל (סוטה כ.) פלוגתא דבן עזאי ורבי אליעזר ופסק כרבי אליעזר:

That is, while your drush in the Rambam may be lovely, the Shulchan Aruch does not understand the Rambam like this. He understands it simply as a machlokus between Ben Azzai and Rabbi Eliezer with the psak like Rabbi Eliezer.

And also one needs to take cognisance of the Yerushalmi. Now it is of course generally agreed that if there is a direct contradiction between the Yerushalmi and the Bavli, we posken like the Bavli. But it is also absolutely standard halachic practice to try not to have such a conflict where possible, and where there is no conflict to incorporate the position of the Yerushalmi.

And the Yerushalmi says as follows (Sotah perek 3):

מטורנה שאלה את רבי לעזר מפני מה חט אחת במעשה העגל והן מתים בה שלש מיתות אמר לה אין חכמתה של אשה אלא בפילכה דכתיב וכל אשה חכמת לב בידיה טוו אמ’ לו הורקנוס בנו בשביל שלא להשיבה דבר אחד מן התורה איבדת ממני שלש מאות כור מעשר בכל שנה אמר ליה ישרפו דברי תורה ואל ימסרו לנשים

ie this is the same Rabbi Eliezer that the Shulchan Aruch in his capacity as the Beis Yosef says we posken like, and he says here, “the words of Torah should be burnt and not given over to women”.

And what’s more, just in case you thought this Yerushalmi had disappeared into history, Tosphos quotes it on the Bavli (Sotah 21b):

בן עזאי אומר חייב אדם וכו’ – ירושלמי דבן עזאי דלא כר”א בן עזריה דדריש (חגיגה דף ג.) הקהל את העם האנשים והנשים והטף אנשים באו ללמוד נשים לשמוע ונראה דפי’ דמצוה לשמוע הנשים כדי שידעו לקיים מצוה ולא משום שידעו שזכות תולה, מטרונה שאלה את ר’ אלעזר מפני מה חטא אחת במעשה העגל והן מתין בה ג’ מיתות אמר לה אין אשה חכמה אלא בפלך אמר לו הורקנוס בנו בשביל שלא להשיבה דבר אחד מן התורה אבדת ממני ג’ מאות כור מעשר בכל שנה א”ל ישרפו ד”ת ולא ימסרו דברי תורה לנשים

So, given the way we would normally incorporate the Yerushalmi, and the way we normally interpret Tosphos, you have to incorporate this too. And the Beis Yosef says we posken like Rabbi Eliezer. Not Rabbi Eliezer of the Bavli, Rabbi Eliezer.

BTW, it would generally be unheard of for a Prisha to stand against the kind of weight of rishonic authority that I am bringing you here, but even the Prisha does not get you very far. It may help people like me where one can honestly say that I am majority self taught (although the ability to self teach today in the presence of modern technology is very different to what it was once upon a time). But even the Prisha does not allow for the institutionalised teaching of women that goes on – well across the halachic spectrum (with, officially at least, the notable exception of the Satmar schools).

What I am trying to show you, and I am sorry you cannot hear it, is that if we were to follow all of the normal procedures of determining psak – that we apply across the board, your reading of the Rambam would not fly, in fact it would be laughed out of the beis medresh. It isn’t and that is precisely what is so extraordinary. Even if it is what the Rambam meant, it wouldn’t matter, if this is not how the other Rishonim and the Shulchan Aruch understood both the Rambam and the underlying sugyos. I am not saying I am unhappy that somehow, by a kind of nes, the halacha as accepted by klal yisroel today does not reflect what the rishonim and the Shulchan Aruch (and very influential achronim like the Birchei Yosef) say. But I believe that intellectual honesty should compel us (or at least it compels me) to give a true reading to the sources and not a fudged one. I for one am more comfortable living with the dialectic tension that creates than trying to gloss over the reality of the sources.

Regards

Chana

PS, other point to be covered in another post, I am trying to keep them separate.

By: Gidon Rothstein

Gidon Rothstein — Sun, 21 Mar 2010 23:51:53 +0000

What an odd circumstance– I am arguing with a woman who is citing source after source to show me that women shouldn’t learn Torah! ישמע אזנך מה שפיך אומרת! On the substance, though, Rambam didn’t understand the Gemara nearly the way you understood it, as is clear from reading the 1st chapter of Hilchot Talmud Torah. He opens by saying that women and children are exempt, but that a father’s required to teach his son Torah. After going through a whole chapter, he returns to the topic of women to say they are exempt (doesn’t mention prohibited), but adds that they get reward to do it. After that, he throws in that Hazal didn’t want fathers in general teaching their daughters Torah because of the likelihood that they would misuse the knowledge. Had Rambam meant that as a general prohibition, he could simply have reversed the order of this paragraph, or placed this information at the beginning of the chapter (to contrast what was said about fathers’ requirements to teach their sons). The structure and presentation show that Rambam was noting the Gemara’s *worry* about women learning Torah, not its absolute opposition. Fathers shouldn’t teach their daughters *in general* because of the likelihood that it will turn out badly. Incidentally, I suspect that Rambam here wasn’t talking about the *act* of learning Torah, but the fulfillment of the mitsvah of TT, which is about a lot more than whether or not you sit and learn (as I have demonstrated elsewhere, in the Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society). It is not, therefore, a “lonely Prisha,” it’s a Prisha who shows the simple way to understand what Rambam really meant. As anyone who can read well should have found out on their own.

As for your sociology arguments, it is completely unclear to me what you even mean. However women got food, they could get a lulav; and if you’re really worried about men going into their homes (although their fathers or husbands could chaperone), they could listen at the window while the baal tekiyah stands in the street. And, as for the idea that the Torah had to take into account all sociological possibilities, that’s not the way God legislates in the Torah, not if you read and understand the Torah itself well, and certainly not if you read and understand the Torah She-Be-Al Peh well.

By: Chana Luntz

Chana Luntz — Sun, 21 Mar 2010 23:10:10 +0000

Sorry, that reference to the Birchei Yosef should have said “in the 18th century” not in “the 1800’s)

Regards

Chana