Did Rav Karo Absorb Kabbalah into Halakhic Discourse?  The Zohar as Deciding Factor

In his monograph on Karo, R. J. Zwi Werblowsky broadly contended that Karo’s works displayed a “well-known unwillingness to allow kabbalistic considerations or mystical experiences to influence halakhic decisions, which, he felt, should be arrived at exclusively by the traditional methods of rabbinic dialectic” (Werblowsky 184).  Werblowsky claimed that while theologically and emotionally significant, the Zohar and personal revelations played no role in Karo’s halakhic thought.  As proof, he cited a responsum from R. Shmuel Vital, who similarly asserted that Karo adjudicated according to “pshat,” with no non-legal influences.

Jacob Katz, however, showed that Karo did absorb mystical literary texts into Halakhic considerations.  Indeed, in his introduction to the Bet Yosef, Karo cited the Zohar in his long list of sources.  Moreover, Katz cites multiple cases in the Bet Yosef where Karo weighed the halakhic value of Zoharic prescriptions and later integrated them into the Shulchan Aruch (Katz 52-55).  Kabbalistic considerations primarily impacted the realm of common religious rites (Orach Chaim).  Regarding “hand-washing in the morning,” for example, the rishonim disagreed whether it represented a formal ritual with minute details (Rashba), or a mere hygienic device in the morning (Rosh).  Karo cites the Zohar to prove the former, and further notes:

ועוד כתובים שם בנטילת ידים שחרית חידושין שאינם נמצאים בפוסקים

Karo coolly incorporated these new rituals into his Shulchan Aruch (4:7-11), such as the requirement of pouring the water over another vessel and not directly unto the ground.

With regard to hand-washing, one might argue that the Zohar played an ancillary role in the decision.  The Zohar merely buttressed the opinion of the Rashba, while the additional requirements represent recommended but not necessary embellishments.  Yet in B.Y. O.C. 141, Karo gives decisive weight to the Zohar, noting its admonition that the oleh should not read the Torah along with the shaliach tzibbur.  Giving it primacy over the Rosh’s concern for a bracha le-vatala, he writes,

ומתוך לשון הרא”ש שכתב רבינו יתבאר לך שצריך העולה לקרות בנחת עם שליח ציבור כדי שלא תהא ברכתו לבטלה וכן כתבו התוספות… ורבינו הגדול מהר”י אבוהב ז”ל כתב שמעתי שכתוב בספר הזוהר שאין לקרות כלל אלא אחד וראוי לחוש לדבריו אם האמת הוא כך שאני לא ראיתיו כתוב אלא ששמעתיו עכ”ל ואני הכותב זכיתי למוצאו והוא בפרשת ויקהל (רב:) וז”ל ואסיר למיקרי באורייתא בר חד בלחודוי ושתקין ושמעין מלה מפומיה כאילו קבלין לה האי שעתא מטורא דסיני…וכיון דלדברי הזוהר אסור לקרות אלא אחד לבד ועכשיו שנהגו ששליח ציבור הוא הקורא העולה אסור לקרות אע”פ שלדברי הפוסקים צריך לקרות ואם לא יקרא כתבו דהוי ברכה לבטלה מאחר שלא נזכר זה בתלמוד בהדיא לא שבקינן דברי הזוהר מפני דברי הפוסקים. ועוד דהא איכא למימר דכל שהעולה שומע מה ששליח ציבור קורא ומכוין לבו לדבריו הרי הוא כקורא דשומע כעונה (סוכה לח:) הילכך צריך ליזהר העולה מלקרות עם שליח ציבור. ומיהו אפשר שאפילו לדברי הזוהר רשאי לקרות והוא שלא ישמיע לאזניו

Karo strikingly justifies his argument by noting that as long as the Zohar does not contradict an explicit Talmudic text, then it can gain precedence over other poskim.   Although Karo later finds a method of reconciling the Zohar’s admonition with the rishonim’s position, he clearly empowers the kabbalistic text with legal significance.

In other halakhot, Karo further develops his position that the Zohar cannot override a Talmudic ruling but can take primacy in medieval debates.  He employs this rule, for example, to follow, against some rishonim, the Zohar’s adamant proscription from donning tefillin on Chol Ha-Moed.  Noting that the Babylonian Talmud does not explicitly rule on the issue, he states,

ומאחר שבתלמודא דידן לא נתבאר דין זה בפירוש מי יערב לבו לגשת לעבור בקום עשה על דברי רבי שמעון בן יוחי המפליג כל כך באיסור הנחתן

If, on the other hand, Talmudic sources can be culled to refute the Zohar’s position, however, one can reject R. Shimon bar Yochai’s position.  Thus he rejects the Agur’s bewilderment how poskim disputed the Zohar’s position that only one blessing should be recited while donning tefillin, noting that his interlocutors have ample Talmudic support.

ואיני יודע למה תמה על זה יותר מכמה דינים שמצינו שכתב רבי שמעון בן יוחאי בספר הזוהר היפך ממסקנא דתלמודא ואין הפוסקים כותבים אלא מסקנא דתלמודא וטעמא משום דאפילו אם היו יודעים דברי רבי שמעון בן יוחאי לא הוו חיישי להו במקום דפליג אתלמודא דידן והמפרשים דלעולם צריך לברך שתים משמע להו דבהדיא קאמר תלמודא הכי ולפיכך פסקו כן כל שכן שבימי הפוסקים עדיין לא נגלה ספר המאור הקדוש בעולם

Karo plainly reasons that just as the Talmud frequently rejects R. Shimon b. Yochai’s position, so too can his position be rejected when it is found in the Zohar.  Be that is it may, Katz undoubtedly proves that Kabbalistic literature plays a role in Karo’s legal decisions.

Different Strategies of Incorporation

The scope and nature of this influence requires nuance and differentiation.  In a study detailing the numerous occasions that kabalistic sources influenced Karo’s halakha, Moshe Halamish showed the various ways in which Karo used the Zohar and other mystical sources, such as Recanti.  Sometimes the Zohar will serve to strengthen the side of the argument toward which Karo was leaning (Halamish 90-91).  In other cases, it will serve as a primary textual source for a law or minhag, such as requirement for levi’im to wash the hands of kohanim before nesiat kapa’im (OC 128) or for women to abstain from attending funerals (YD 359).  Bet Yosef will also include examples of minhagim in the Zohar that fill lacunae in the halakha, such as how many windows a synagogue should contain (OC 32), or the details of hand-washing in the morning, noted earlier.  In certain circumstances, however, Karo ignores or rules against the Zohar, even if there is no explicit contradictory Talmudic source (Halamish 95-96).  The Shulchan Aruch rejects, for example, the Zohar’s proscription of consuming meat for one hour after eating milk (YD 69:2), and its admonition from benefiting of the gid ha-nesheh (YD 65:10).  Karo empowers the Zohar with the legal status of other non-Talmudic rabbinic texts (even if he assumes it to be written in antiquity).  Its practices cannot override the Babylonian Talmud, and its ordinances are weighed against competing rabbinic arguments and medieval practices.  As Katz notes (53-54, footnotes), in a number of circumstances, Karo handles the Zohar in the same manner as he would other halakhic sources.

Relative Weight of Different Laws in Shulchan Aruch

Katz and Halamish, however, both overemphasize the significance of Karo’s inclusion of a Zohar practice in his code.  Katz, followed by Chalamish, assert that Karo made all prescriptions in Shulchan Aruch “binding for all Israel,” unless otherwise explicitly noted with terms such as “It is commendable to take care…”  (Katz 54, Halamish 91).  Katz’s bases himself on a paragraph in the introduction to the Bet Yosef where Karo admonishes his readers not to accept his lenient opinions if the local practice is to prohibit the action.   According to Katz, this caveat allowed Karo to codify in a social vacuum and “measure the merits of the literary sources” according to halakhic reasoning alone (Katz 53).  As such, all conclusions drawn in the Shulchan Aruch derive from the same methodology and enjoy equally binding status.

Yet Katz misreads Karo’s statement in his introduction to the Bet Yosef.  Karo refers the reader to Pesachim 51a, in which the Talmud asserts that a community that has taken upon itself a stringent practice cannot simply switch to the more lenient opinion.  As Karo himself codifies in Yoreh Deah 214:1, the stringent practice transforms into a neder that cannot easily be changed, if at all.  Yet this does not mean that Karo dismissed the significance of contemporary practice.  In a previous paragraph, he explain that where widespread practice goes against his the consensus of his three primary poskim – Rif, Rosh, and Rambam –he will rule according to the minhag ha-olam (contemporary practice).  Karo understood that social factors played a role in psak halakha (halakhic adjudication), and as we shall see, played a significant role in his literary agenda.

More significantly, Karo’s statement does not shed any light on the relative weight each of his rulings.  Even if Karo entirely based his rulings through halakhic analysis of literary sources, that does not mean that he attributed the same weight to each se’if (section) in Shulchan Aruch.  Some laws stem from the Talmud and are explicated by all of its major commentators.  They are entrenched in the halakhic discourse and have been accepted, in one form or another, throughout the Jewish world.  Other laws, however, clearly do not enjoy such a rich tradition.  They are local minhagim, or fine details within the law, and lack the antiquity and pervasiveness of other laws.  Surely there is a difference, both in severity and obligation, between the mitzvah of eating on erev Yom Kippur (604:1, based on a Talmudic drasha), reciting a vidui before the seudat mafseket (606:1, based on a Talmudic din), and going to the mikvah or receiving lashes (606:7, 607:6, based on Ashkenazic minhagim).  Yet all are included in Hilchot Yom Ha-Kippurim of the Shulchan Aruch.  Karo achieved literary greatness precisely because he wrote a code (Shulchan Aruch) that organized his rulings from the sources culled in Bet Yosef.  Through both resources, the scholar could easily understand the relative weight behind each law within the code.

The Shulchan Aruch’s presentation of the morning hand-washing laws, cited above, display the distinction in the weight of the laws.  When resolving the dispute between Rashba and Rosh regarding hand-washing in the morning, Karo moderates the force of his ruling by introducing it as a praiseworthy vigilance  (OC 4:7).

טוב להקפיד בנטילת ידים שחרית בכל הדברים המעכבים בנטילת ידים לסעודה

Yet when ruling with regard to proper washing order with the right hand, Karo authoritatively states (4:10),

נוטל כלי של מים ביד ימינו, ונותנו ליד שמאלו, כדי שיריק מים על ימינו תחילה

Halamish believes that in the former case, he moderates his tone because the Zohar tips the scales in a disputed ruling.  In the latter case, however, where the Zohar serves as the source of the (textually) uncontested practice, it was “accepted in the Shulchan Aruch as an obligatory ruling” (Halamish 91).

Halamish’s example, however, does not convince and seemingly proves the opposite conclusions.  For starters, the necessity for washing in the proper order (4:10) stems from his conclusion in 4:7 that morning hand-washing deserves the treatment of a proper ritual.  As such, the law can only attain the status of the “hakpadah” required in by his earlier ruling.  Moreover, Halamish himself later acknowledges that he cannot find a consistent formula for Karo’s literary devices.  He introduces Zohar-based laws with modifying language like “yesh omrim,” “ha-minhag ha-nachon,” “tov la-hakpid,” but in other places simply states the law (Halamish 91-92).  The precise intention (if he had one) and legal significance behind Karo’s different word selections remains elusive.  Yet the very fact that he frequently uses such modifying language indicates that he believed that the minhagim or ordinances found in the Zohar do not always achieve an unequivocal normative status.[1]

Rav Karo’s Literary Agenda and the Inclusion of a Broad Range of Sources

This distinction between the relative obligatory nature of different se’ifim in Shulchan Aruch dovetails nicely with Yisrael Ta-Shma’s analysis of Karo’s literary agenda.  The Magid Mesharim makes clear that Karo desired that his magnum opus, the Bet Yosef, would turn his works into authoritative codes not only in Eretz Yisrael but throughout the world.  As the magid tells him (Magid 5),

ואמרין מאן ההוא גברא דמלך מלכי המלכים חפץ ביקרו הא הוא תנא סבא דארץ ישראל האי הוא ריש מתיבתא דארץ ישראל, הא הוא מחברא רבא דארץ ישראל וגם אם תתנהג ע”פ מנהגותי אזכך לגמור כל חיבורך ופרושיך ופמקותיך מכל שגיאה וטעות ולהדפיסם ולפשטם בכל גבול ישראל

In order to achieve this goal, however, Karo needed to include sources well beyond his own background of Spain and Eretz Yisrael.  As such, his works included not only Sephardic pillars such as Rambam, Rif, and Rosh, but also the writings of Ashkenazic poskim.  While Karo favored the former (although not exclusively) in areas of dispute, he included in the latter’s ruling in areas where the Sephardic poskim disagreed, to fill in the details of laws, or in a large number of minhagim where matters were uncontested.  As Ta-Shma pithily writes, “R. Yosef Karo’s rulings were Sephardic in quality and Ashkenazic in quantity” (Ta-Shma 158).   That is to say, while the Sephardic tradition received priority in the fundamentals of halakhic practice, many of the details or minhagim codified in the Shulchan Aruch, which have relatively lesser halakhic value, stemmed from Ashkenazic origin.  This made the work more attractive to Ashkenic readers, who expected their poskim and practices in any halakhic handbook.

In this regard, Karo used the Zohar in a similar fashion.  At times it helped to decide disagreements, on other occasions it provided details to certain rituals, and frequently it established new minhagim.  His inclusion of the Zohar helped the Shulchan Aruch gain acceptance not only in the emerging Kabbalistic centers in Turkey and Safed, but also in Greece, where the Zohar had achieved halakhic status unprecedented in the world (Ta-Shma 163-169).  Nonetheless, the work did not achieve the decisive status of more classical halakhic works such as Alfasi’s Haghot or Rambam’s Mishneh Torah, and its rulings were weighted accordingly.

Although the Zohar might not have achieved superior status in Karo’s hierarchy of halakhic texts, its very inclusion into the world of authoritative sources represented a major revolution.  The Sephardic world had just begun to cite the Zohar in Halakhic contexts, with major figures such as a R. David Ibn Zimra and R Jacob ben Habib sporadically quoting it, sometimes even without seeing the text inside (Katz 43).  In Eastern Europe, moreover, poskim entirely ignored the Zohar (since many of them had not seen the work), and even after the publication of the Shulchan Aruch, major figures such as the Maharshal viciously opposed its inclusion in the halakhic canon (Ta-Shma 161).  Karo empowered the Zohar with halakhic significance, quoting it (and other Kabbalistic works) dozens of times.  The inclusion of the Zohar in his writings significantly impacted the influence of Kabbalistic teachings for centuries.

The Evidence from Magid Mesharim

While Karo’s incorporation of the Zohar in halakhic discourse is readily apparent in the Bet Yosef and Shulchan Aruch, only in his Magid Mesharim does he reveal the personal significance of this achievement.  Long neglected by rabbis and academics alike as a forgery, R. J. Zwi Werblowsky conclusively proved that Karo penned this diary of mystical revelations from his personal magid, or angel.  Werblowsky, and more recently, Rachel Elior, extensively detailed the theological and mystical teachings in this work.  Our comments will focus on the significance of the magid on Karo’s legal works and his view of the relationship of halakha and kabbalah.

A quick purview of Magid Mesharim immediately reveals Karo’s obsession with completing his composition of the Bet Yosef and receiving scholarly approval for it.  The magid repeatedly assures him that the great sages of previous centuries and the heavenly hosts bless his work, and through proper concentration and behavior, he will produce a flawless work (Elior 677).  His rulings, the magid assures, even receive divine sanction, as he emphatically states (Magid 381),

חזק ואמץ אל תירא ואל תחת כי כל אשר אתה עושה ה, מצליח וכל אשר עשית והורית עד היום הזה ה’ מצליח בידך וכן מסכימים במתיבתא דרקיעא חי ה’ כי פסק זה אמת ויציב הלכה למשה מסיני הלכה כוותך … לכן חזק ואמץ אל תירא כי כל אשר עשית והורית עד היום הזה ה’ מצליח ומסכים בו וכן כל מה שתעשה ותורה מכאן והלאה הב”ה יצליח ויסכי’ על ידך

The magid goes on to condone Karo for constantly scrutinizing his ruling, but assures him that he need not fear his continued success.

ולמה חרדת על הפסק ההוא הלא נתן ה’ לך לב לדעת ולהכיר כי דברך אמת וצדק כי אעפ”י שאתה תמיד חושד סברתיך וזו מדה טובה היא מ”מ נכרים דברי אמת וע”כ אל יפול לבך עליו כלל כי במתיבתא דדקיעא מסכימים לדבריך כאשר אמרתי והלא לך למנד’ דמן שמיא משגיחי’ בך

Karo’s diary thus reveals the tremendous psychological strain to produce Bet Yosef and the significant role these mystical revelations played in prodding Karo to complete it.

Equally significantly, Magid Mesharim reveals the religio-political and theological goals behind Karo’s magnum opus.  In the introduction to Bet Yosef, Karo mourns the geopolitical status of the Jewish people following the expulsion from Spain.

With the Jews scattered throughout the world, he writes, halakhic practice has splintered into local rites, with “multiple Torot” being observed.  His composition seeks to transcend the geopolitical crisis and create a “virtual nation” centered around his codification.  He lists the poskim from the entire Jewish world that he cites to assure the book’s users that his “torah” can unify the Jewish people.

The Strain to Unify the Worlds of Halakha and Kabbalah

Yet as the Magid Mesharim shows, Karo’s goals extended beyond the unification of halakhic practice.  On numerous occasions, the magid lauds Karo for unifying the worlds of halakha and kabbalah.  Karo’s inclusion of the Zohar and other Kabbalistic texts attempted not only to encompass the full range of ritual practice, but also to unite the theological and legal orbits that he inhabited (Ta-Shma 162).  The following passage (Magid 258) particularly highlights this goal.

ואת כי תדבק בי ובתורתי וביראתי ומשניותי ולא תפריד אפילו רגע אחד ואתן לך מהלכים בין העומדים האלה ואזכך לגמו’ כל חיבורך בלי שו’ טעו’ ולהדפיסם ולפשטם בכל גבול ישראל עמי ואגדלה שמך בתלמידים יותר מיצחק אבואב בחירי לכן חזק ואמץ בתורתך כאשר אתה עושה בתורה במשנה בגמ’ רש”י ותוספות ובפסק ובקבל’ כי אתה מקשר אותם זה בזה וכל מלאכי מרום דורשים שלומך וטובתך ואל תצטער במזונות כי כבר אמרתי לך פעמים אין מספר כי פרנסתך מזומנת לא תחסר דבר כי אתה מושגח מאד בכל ענייניך רק כי תדבק בי ובתורתי ויראתי ועבודתי

Physical needs, the magid exhorts Karo, should not be your concern, since your flawless composition will spread throughout the world as you unite the worlds of psak and kabbalah.

Karo understood the significance of his project and believe that his efforts would include him within the chain of great composers in halakhic history.  In one of the first revelations, the magid tells Karo that the dynasty of writers that culled all of Torah She-Ba’al Peh, including R. Yehuda Ha-Nasi and Maimonides, support his endeavors (Magid, 7)

והא מימות משה רבן של כל הנביאים לא איכתיבא אורייתא דבעל פה עד יומי רבי מיומוי לא אתפרש כלא משנה עד דאתא רב אשי וליקט וחיבר ופירש ופסק. ומיומוי לא הות הלכתא אלא קצת מהלכות כגון הלכות פסוקות וכו’. עד דאתא הרי”ף והרמב”ם והרא”ש ופסקו הלכות בכוליה גמרא והרמב”ם הפליא לעשות למללא על כל אורייתא ומאז ועד השתא לא אתעורר חד ללקט מילי כולהו כמה דאתעוררת אתה

The example of R. Yehuda Ha-Nasi seems particularly significant since Karo’s revelations always took place during his study of mishna.  As a posek, one would expect Karo to primarily study gemara and its commentators and not the mishna, from which one cannot derive normative halakha.  Undoubtedly, the ability to study the realm of kodshim, which can only be manifested in Messianic times, influenced Karo.  Yet one wonders whether Karo heard the magid’s voice specifically while studying the text of the sage who first compiled all of Torah She-Ba’al Peh in a time of geopolitical uncertainty.  Only the study of his predecessor could strengthen him to accomplish his lofty goals of codification and unification.

The other sage on this list who composed an independent work that codified all of Torah She-Ba’al Peh, of course, was Rambam.[2] Karo decided to compose Bet Yosef as a commentary on the Tur, and not Mishne Torah, because the former included a variety of opinions while the latter represented the psak of one figure alone.  Nonetheless, Karo always discusses Rambam’s positions at length in Bet Yosef, and frequently quotes him verbatim in Shulchan Aruch.[3]

A comparison of these two codifiers and their larger projects might shed light on how to read Magid Mesharim.  Like Karo, Rambam engaged in both the realms of theology (in Rambam’s case, philosophy, in Karo’s case, kabbalah) and halakha.  As such, he devotes a significant portion of the Moreh Nevuchim to philosophically interpreting the Torah’s mitzvot (ta’amei ha-mitzvot).  While the impact of Rambam’s philosophy on his halakah is disputed amongst scholars, it is clear that he included elements of his philosophy in his code (e.g. Sefer Ha-Madda), yet espoused other philosophical ideas in his Moreh Nevuchim without embracing their halakhic implications in Mishne Torah.  In other words, Rambam represented a codifier whose works represent a careful (if not delineated) balance between philosophy and halakha.[4]

Magid Mesharim reveals that the balance between law and kabbalah similarly strained Karo.  As we have seen, Karo pioneered the mass use of the Zohar in his code, a project for which the magid extensively praises him.  Magid Mesharim also reveals some of the mystical considerations that Karo included in his rulings.  As Werblowsky noted (185-187), many of the magid’s references to Karo’s discussions in Bet Yosef only sought to encourage him, but did not impact his actual ruling.  For example, regarding the laws of ritual immersion, he writes (Magid 194),

פירוש נמי דמפרש הרמב”ם הרוב קושטא אינון ובההיא דצפורן שפרשת וכתבת שני דרכים חייך דקב”ה חייך בפלפולא דילך אבל אורחא בתראה הוא ברירו דמלה ומ”מ לא תמחוק קדמאה דיקריה דקב”ה סליק מיניה אף על גב דלאו קושטא איהו כיון דאיהו חריפא דוגמת נפחא דבטש בפרזלא ונצוצין מתנציצין לכל עבר

The Magid praises Karo for his learned deliberation on two different opinions yet affirms the divine validity of Karo’s final conclusion.  In this case, the magid represents a mere psychological promoter.

Yet in the same passage, the magid’s Kabbalistic teachings relate to the content of Karo’s psak.  Regarding the year-round use of a river as a mikveh, the magid forbids its use in the early spring (because of the excessive amount of “dripping water”) in accordance with the opinion of Rosh and R. Isaac of Dampierre and against Rabbenu Tam.  However, he justifies his opinion because this was the position of R. Meir of Rothenburg, whose pious death in prison made him pure and unblemished (Magid 196).  Karo does not always follow the ruling of R. Meir of Rothenburg.  This seems to be an example where Karo’s own desire for a “pure death” of martyrdom, well documented throughout the Magid (Elior 673-675), impacted his deliberations.  Yet the magid continues that post facto, one can rely on the opinion of R. Tam, and remarkably justifies this distinction based on Kabbalistic teachings (Magid 197).

ומהשתא תנדע דלכתחילה אין לטבול בנהרות באתר דמתפשטי מחמת גשמים משום דרמיז לחסד וגבורה דמסאבי סחרי לון, ומ”מ אי טבלה בדיעבד סלקא לה טבילה משום דאף ע”ג דמסאבי סחרי לון לית רשו להעלא ולקרבא לון כלל הלכך בדיעבד עלתה לה טבילה

In this remarkable passage, kabbalistic factors dictate direct halakhic implications.

This text, however, remains unique in its broad use of mystical considerations for direct legal consequences.  Moreover, as Werblowsky notes (173), the post factum leniency, while implied in the Tur, does not appear in Bet Yosef, and thus it remains unclear to what extent Karo fully embraced this distinction.  Nonetheless, the text remains revealing because it highlights one of Magid Meisharim’s larger goals of kabbalisticly interpreting halakha.  In many occasions, this represents a form of classical ta’amei ha-mitzvot.  Karo examines a mitzvah, such as yibum (Magid 261) or taharat metzora (226), and kabbalisticly interprets its significance.  On other occasions, however, the subject of interpretation is not a mitzvah of the Torah, but a particular law discussed by Chazal, such as mayim acharonim (281) or semichat geula le-tefilla, the prohibition of interruptions between birkot keriat shema and the Amidah.[5] Indeed, the magid’s elucidation of minutia in rabbinic halakha characterizes much of the uniqueness of the text.  The legal significance of the text stems from its mystical interpretations, not its halakhic innovations.  In Moreh Nevukhim, rabbinic Judaism confronted medieval philosophy, and a rationalistic divine law emerged.  In Magid Mesharim, the scholarly Karo confronts the magid’s world of symbolism and reveals a rich and learned Kabbalistic halakha.

Magid Mesharim as Journal of Spiritual Journey

Above all, however, Magid Mesharim represents a deeply intimate and meandering spiritual journey.  Unlike the systematic and thoroughly edited Moreh, Karo’s diary, published posthumously and possibly against his wishes, rambles loosely from topic to topic.  The revelations are not published chronologically, and seem to be incomplete (Benayahu 401-402).[6] Most importantly, the content itself does not seem to have undergone revision by Karo (presumably because it was not intended to be published), but rather stemmed from ecstatic revelations.  Much of the work details the magid’s exhortations to Karo for great spiritual punctiliousness, and never omits the most intimate of sins or harshest criticisms.[7] Mordechai Pachter has gone so far as to claim that one should read the book as a sefer mussar, full of rites of prayer, asceticism, and repentance.  This designation, however, might obfuscate the deeply personal nature of the exhortation, and Elior’s classification as an autobiographical spiritual journey seems more accurate.

The personal nature of the work helps explain the discrepancies between the magid’s halakha and Karo’s rulings in Bet Yosef.  In Shulchan Aruch (OC 597), for example, Karo ordains that one who fasts on the first day of Rosh Hashanah following a fateful dream must continue for their rest of their lives to fast on both days of the holiday.  The magid, however, seems to dictate that Karo should only fast on the first day after a he himself experiences a fearful dream (Magid 375).  A similarly small discrepancy exists regarding the requirement to review the weekly parasha (Magid 403, OC, Greenwald).  These types of inconsistencies, however, appear particularly natural when one recognizes the unpredictable nature of Karo’s revelations and their ad hoc recordings.  Karo similarly takes upon himself certain stringencies, such as not making any interruptions or skipping any letters in prayer (Magid 276), even though he allows both under certain circumstances in Shulchan Aruch (Halamish 89).  These exhortations, however, clearly exemplify individual punctiliousness aimed at unique spiritual ascension.[8] Halakhic fastidiousness and individual reproaches characterize mystical revelations and precisely serve to distinguish spiritual autobiographies from normative codes.

In his haskamah to the most recent edition of Magid Mesharim, Rabbi S. Deblinski of Bnei Brak quotes a tradition in the name of R. Chaim Volozhin that revelations from a magid do not happen in a vacuum.  Rather, they reflect the spiritual aspirations of the receiver that stem from the depth of his soul, and the revelations from above only help him to the extent that he desires it.  R. Yosef Karo desired to unite the worlds of halakha and kabbalah in a harmonious union.  Through both his codes and spiritual diary, we see how much he accomplished.

Works Cited

Benayahu, Meir, Yosef Behiri:  Maran Rebbi Yosef Karo (Hebrew), Jerusalem:  Yad Harav Nissim, 5751.

Elior, Rachel,  “R. Yosef Karo ve-R. Yisrael Ba’al Shem Tov,” Tarbiz 65:4 (5756), p. 671-709.

Halamish, Moshe, “Kabbalah Be-Pesikah Shel R. Yosef Karo,” Da’at 21 (5747-48), p. 85-102.

Karo, Yosef, Sefer Magid Mesharim Le-Maran Rebbi Yosef Karo, ed. Yehiel Bar Lev, Petah Tikva: no publisher listed, 1990.

Katz, Jacob,  Divine Law in Human Hands:  Case Studies in Halakhic Flexibility, Jerusalem:  Magnes Press, 1998.

Pachter, Mordechai, “Sefer ‘Magid Meisharim’ le-R. Yosef Karo Ke-Sefer Mussar,” Da’at 21 (5747-48), p. 57-83.

Ta-Shma, Yisrael, “Rebbi Yosef Karo Bein Ashkenaz Le-Sefard,” Tarbiz 59 (5750), p. 153-170.

Werblowsky, R.J. Zvi, Joseph Karo:  Lawyer and Mystic, JPS, 1977.

Gruenwald, Yekutiel (Leopold), Ha-Rav R. Yosef Karo U-Zmano, New York:  Feldheim, 1953.

Works Consulted

Tamar, David, “Dinim Ha-Meyuchasim Al Ha-Zohar Ve-Al Ha-Kabbalah Be-Shulchan Aruch U-Bet Yosef,” Sinai 115 (5755)

Arbel, Vita Daphna, Beholders of Divine Secrets, Albany:  SUNY, 2004

Urbach, Ephraim, “The Tradition about Torat Ha-Sod in the Tannaitic Period” (Hebrew), Studies in Mysticism and Religion Presented to Gershom G. Scholem on His Seventieth Birthday by Pupils, Colleagues, and Friends, ed. Ephraim Urbach et al, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967.

[2] The works of Rav Ashi, Rif, and Rosh encompassed much or all of Torah She-Ba’al Peh, but were commentaries not written in a systematic, codifying manner.  Significantly, in his introduction to Mishne Torah, Rambam as well justified his bold codification of halakha by citing the precedent of R. Yehuda Ha-Nasi, who, like the Rambam and Karo, felt obligated to write his code because of geopolitical exigencies.

[3] Later in life, of course, he also wrote a commentary to Mishne Torah that provided the sources for Rambam’s rulings.

[4] There obviously exist many differences between Rambam and Karo.  The comparison merely serves as an analogy to help understand the legal significance of Magid Mesharim.

[5] Chalamish (87-88) notes that the magid’s exhortation of Karo for failing in this requirement deeply impacted him to the point where he repeats this law three times in Bet Yosef.  Yet as Chalamish himself ntoes, Karo introduces the din as a case when common practice has demanded punctiliousness (pashat ha-minhag”), and not that the law bears tremendous significance.  Once again, the influence of the magid’s ruling remains ambiguous.

[6] It is possible that the work is organized around the parshiyot, and not chronologically, because the publisher viewed its most significant contribution to be its novel interpretations of halakha.

[7] Including for suffering and sexual sins.

[8] Halamish (90) incorrectly attributes to the magid the extreme Kabbalistic position prohibiting conversion.  A careful examination of the passage (Magid 391) clearly indicates that Karo forbids conversion when the prospective convert desires to marry a Jew, as SA Y.D. 268:12 ordains.

Below is a rough English translation of the first page, which does not include some of the halakhic argumentation provided on the 2nd page of the original Hebrew.  For all scholarly and halakhic purposes, and purposes of citation, only the original Hebrew letter should be seen as the authoritative writing of Rabbi Rosen.

- Shlomo Brody

To Rabbi David Mescheloff, 21st of Elul 5771,09/20/11

Subject: Kosher Switch for Shabbat

In response to your request, I shall refer to the electric switch presented as the ‘Kosher Switch’, and to the website link you sent me, which explains the Halachic background, and even appends a long list of rabbis who have expressed a blessing or support.

The following is my position:

A. Truth be told, I was amazed how easy it is to receive endorsement letters from rabbis. It is apparent that one relies on the other, without taking personal responsibility, and with the fall of the foundation the entire house falls. I do not know what was explained to the rabbis that ’signed’; however it is clear to any reasonable halachic man that there is no way to permit prohibitions of Shabbat (D’Oraita or D’Rabbanan), not even with Halachic tricks or acrobatics.

B. The whole proposed story relies on the leniency of ‘Gramma’, which no consensus rabbi would permit L’chatchila for domestic and personal use.  All ‘Gramma’ or similar halakhic arrangements carried out by the Zomet Institute or Technology Institute in Jerusalem were permitted solely for medical, security and similar needs.  Even if they added to the ‘Gramma’ additional apparatuses, and even if there is a one in a thousand chance that the action will not occur, I have received from my rabbis (R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Shaul Yisraeli) that this does not change in any way the halakhic status of regular ‘Gramma’ (just like Gramma D’Gramma and other artificial arrangements).

C. Even if the method of operation is non-active from the point of view of the agent, i.e. because he merely removes the “preventing element,”  Rabbi S. Z. Auerbach and others wrote that this remains forbidden and is treated like it was done directly by the person, since the action occurs immediately after the human intervention/action.   Even if the result comes only after a delay caused by an additional factor, this is plain Gramma, which is still not permitted L’chatchila.

D. And here is the main part of my remarks: Yesterday I went to my teacher and rabbi HaGaon Rabbi Yehoshua Neuwirth, Shlita, and I asked him whether he permitted to use this switch to activate electricity on Shabbat for the purposes of Oneg Shabbat, etc… He was really shocked and said he never permitted that.  When I showed him the endorsement letter, he added in his handwriting: “Only for medicine and security” (see photo in attached Hebrew article).   Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzahl Shlita, who signed a similar letter, also told me yesterday that he does not recall ever signing anything like that, and expressed the opinion that there is no place for this and was puzzled about the whole thing.

I suppose that whoever managed to get the signatures of important rabbis ’sold’ them an invention that is a kind of a complex Gramma used for the purpose of medicine or security, and succeeded in skipping this condition when they signed.

E. With regard to the the claim, written in their accompanying halachic responsum, that it is permitted to use this Gramma switch to minimize the prohibition of those who willfully the violate the Shabbat, we have never heard of such rabbis who permit this. I am sure that those who ‘agreed’ did not see this argument, and this is an argument that should not be stated.

With prayer L’Ktiva Vachatima Tova to all of Israel,

Rabbi Yisrael Rosen, Head of the Zomet Institute

In his study, Rabbi Grumet explores the wider overtones of Moshe’s discussions with his father-in-law.  What is the subtext of Moshe’s appeal, particularly his second appeal, to Hovav to remain with the people?  Does Hovav accept, and on what basis?  Why is Hovav resisting the invitation at all?   For Rabbi Grumet, the pivotal issue centers around a painful limit to the acceptance of the proselyte into the society; he joins the covenantal community, but he is not given a portion of land among the tribes in the Promised Land.

Told in this way, the story of Hovav and Moshe explores a critical aspect of conversion that is not reflected in the Rut story.  An automatic portion of land is not a given for most women, and they will normally presume that they will find sustenance and security in a husband’s inherited land.  This is no different for the converted woman than it is for the Jewish-born woman.  But in a man’s conversion, he would seem fundamentally limited by this weighty exclusion, effectively leaving him no recourse to livelihood but through mandated welfare.  Rabbi Grumet records the Rabbinic tradition that the people voluntarily dedicated the city of Yerikho to Hovav’s family.  But we are left to wonder, what could be done for the average convert, who was not as prominent and influential as Yitro?  And what, if any, are the lasting implications for a non-agrarian economy?

- Yonatan Kohn

 Rabbi Dr. Levine was widely respected as a first-rate talmid hakham, an exceptional academic scholar, and a noble, humble leader and personality. He wrote many scholarly articles in a number of different publications and several books for the wider community, and 11 entries for Tradition. Here, we highlight three of his Tradition articles, including a study of the foundational concept of hakkarat hatov, a book review essay, and an overview of the halakhot that govern employee-employer relations in the business office. This last article, “The Mean Boss” explores a wide range of challenges in trust, responsibility, and property rights that arise daily in the workplace. With colorful illustrative scenarios, Dr. Levine clearly delineates the halakhic and economic dynamics of office relationships, even for those with no background in principles of economics. The article highlights the balance between a rigid conceptual framework of rights and responsibilities and a dynamic reality heavily informed by office environment and culture and the delicate psychological balance of power in employer-employee relations.

HAKKRAT HATOV (GRATITUDE) AND THE MORAL PERSONALITY http://www.traditiononline.org/news/originals/Volume%2025/No.%202/Hakkarat%20Hatov.pdf

Review Essay JEWISH BUSINESS ETHICS AND THE MODERN MARKETPLACE http://www.traditiononline.org/news/_pdfs/78-97%20Levine.pdf

The Mean Boss  

 http://www.traditiononline.org/news/originals/Volume%2035/No.%201/The%20Mean%20Boss.pdf

- Yonatan Kohn

In the past several years, Rabbi Michael Broyde has engaged in online discussions regarding what he considers a limud zechut (post facto justification) for women not to cover their hair.  These discussions culminated in a masterful article by Rabbi Broyde, “Hair Covering and Jewish Law: Biblical and Objective (Dat Moshe) or Rabbinic and Subjective (Dat Yehudit)?”, Tradition 42:3, Fall 2009.  (This article is available for free downloading here)

Included in Rabbi Broyde’s limud zechut is a citation of the work Chukei Nashim (חוקי נשים – Laws for Women) by Rabbi Yosef Haim (1832-1909, Baghdad), author of Ben Ish Chai and one of  the leading poskim and kabbalists of the Middle East during the last half of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century.  The stature of the בן איש חי as one of the preeminent poskim is indisputable and gives his position a measure of legitimacy.  Having recently rediscovered the works of the Ben Ish Chai in the context of a research paper on another topic, I found this alleged limmud zechut difficult to believe, especially given his general stringency regarding these matters and his kabbalistic leanings. I was therefore not satisfied to let R’ Broyde “read into” a particular phrase of the Ben Ish Chai a radical opinion, even if just as a limud zechut, and therefore went to examine the actual source itself.

Origins of Chukei Nashim

In the common edition of Chukei Nashim (available here),  Rabbi Yosef Haim (as cited by R’ Broyde) writes as follows (English translation provided below):

והביטו הנשים על אנשי אירופה, מנהגם לא להסתר מפני זרים, ובכל זאת מלבושיהם מסודרים, לא מתגלה מגופם, רק פניהם וצוארם, כפות ידיהם וראשם. ואמת נכון מגולה שערם, ולפי הדין שלנו אסור הדבר, אבל יש להם איזה התנצלות, כי אומרים לא נתיישב המנהג הזה אצל כל נשותיהם, מבנות אומתם וחוץ לאומתם, נעשה גילוי השער, כמו גילוי פניהם וכפות ידיהם, ואינו גורם הרהור אצל האנשים, במבט עיניהם                                      

The quote cited by Rabbi Broyde is found in the sefer חוקי נשים, published in 1950 by the Machon Ben Ish Chai. What R’ Broyde fails to mention in his bibliography is that the sefer חוקי נשים was not written by the Ben Ish Chai.  It is, rather, Rabbi Ben Zion Mutzafi’s[1] translation of the Qanun-al-Nissa (קאנון אל נסא), published by the Ben Ish Chai in 1906 and written in Judaeo-Arabic.[2] Much like the Judaeo-Arabic translation of the Ten Commandments that is attributed to Saadia Gaon and other Arabic writings, the Qanun is written in a poetic metre/rhyme that is lost in translation. 

Changes in the Hebrew Edition

I had suspected that the original version would prove Rabbi Mutzafi wrong or at least add context to his quote.  In fact, I proved to be wrong.  What I found was that (1) rather than it be melamed zechut, the original paragraph was more of an endorsement of the practice of uncovering hair than Rabbi Mutzafi allows; and, (2) the final line of the paragraph was omitted from the Hebrew translation. 

The relevant section (available here) of the Qanun reads:

ושופו נסוואן אהל אירופא. סלוכהום מא יתכבון מן אל גרבא. ומע האדה חוואסהום מרתבא. מא יביין מן גסמהום. גיר פקט וגהום וחלקהום. וכפופהום וראסהום. וצחיח מכשוף שערהום. ומוגב דייאנתנא לם יגוז הל מסלך להום. לאכן אכו פרד עצר ענדהום. יקולון מא זאל האדה מסלך גמיע נסוואן בלאדהום. במלתהום וכארג מלתהום. סאר שוף שערהום. מתל שוף וגהום ואידיהום. מא בקאלו שעשעה ענד אל רייאגיל. בשוף עינהום. האדא כלאמהום. אלדי יגאוובון עלא האדה מסלכהום. ומא ענדנא גוואב נגרח להאדא גוואבהום

What follows is a side by side comparison of the relevant paragraph, in translation: 

What is clear is that the בן איש חי ’s opinion is more than a limud zechut.  He firmly establishes as incontrovertible the sociological nature of the obligation to cover hair.  While not alone in the Sephardic world, the existence of such an opinion by a posek and mekubbal of his stature is, indeed, remarkable.  Coupled with his well-known lenient views on abortion[7] and not so well known lenient views on women’s Torah study[8], such a view is noteworthy.

Changes in the English Edition

Recently, an English translation of the Qanun, published by Salem Books of Jerusalem, was prepared by Moshe Schapiro and edited by S.D. Kaplan.  Whereas the publisher does not indicate whether the translation was based on the original Qanun or Rabbi Mutzafi’s Hebrew translation, it bears a closer resemblance to the latter.  Nonetheless, the English translation is glaringly divergent with the first and last sentence of the relevant paragraph (in bold below) not found anywhere in Rabbi Mutzafi’s translation, let alone the original.  The additional sentences are seemingly aimed at further minimizing the scope of the Ben Ish Hai’s lenient treatment of the matter.  The English translation reads (emphasis added): [9]

One should not think that this law [to dress modestly] is only binding in Islamic countries, where custom dictates that women must not be seen by strangers.  Even in Europe, where it is acceptable for women to speak to strangers, Jewish women, nevertheless, dress in accordance with the above-mentioned guidelines.  And although it is true that many of their women do not cover their hair, which is strictly prohibited according to Torah Law, they claim in their defense that uncovered hair is not considered any more immodest than the hands or the feet, since it does not cause Jewish men in Europe to think unclean thoughts.  Thus, we see that even those who are lenient about covering the hair agree in principle that a woman must dress modestly, and that other parts of her body must remain covered.[10]

Jacob Sasson is an attorney residing in New York City.

[2] A copy of the Qanun has been digitized by the JNUL and can be accessed here.

[3] It should be noted that in various presentations (both print and online) of his argument, Rabbi Broyde has slightly changed his English rendition of the text. 

[4] The word יתכבון is related to the Hebrew word נחבא. 

[5] The Hebrew reading “lo nityashev” may have created difficulty for Rabbi Broyde.  On the one hand, “this custom” must mean the custom to go with hair uncovered as this is the custom under discussion.  Yet, it makes little sense to say that the custom to go with hair uncovered was not accepted by the general population.  That would run contrary to the argument put forth.  Hence, the different translations of the Mutzafi text.  The Arabic portion reads: Ma Zal hada…. The Arabic ma plays a role similar to the Hebrew lo which may have caused Mutzafi to translate it as “lo nityashev“.  Nonetheless, the expression ma zal literally means, “has not ceased”, or colloquially, “yet, still”.

[6] The last line, explicitly permitting the practice, reads in the original:

האדה כלאמהום אלדי יגאוובון עלא האדה מסלכהום ומא ענדנא גוואב נגרח להאדא גוואבהום

[7] See Rav Pealim (1: EH4) as well as the Tzitz Eliezer (13:102).

[8] See the recently published Ilan H. Fuchs, “‘Sephardic’ Halakhah? The Attitude of Sephardic Decisors to Women’s Torah Study: A Test Case,” in Leib Moscovitz, ed., The Manchester Conference Volume [=Jewish Law Association Studies XX] (Liverpool: The Jewish Law Association, 2010), 43-74, in which he cites the Ben Ish Hai’s permissive attitude toward women studying Talmud, noting how his own grandmother studied 18 chapters of Mishnayot a day!

[9] Rabbi Yosef Chaim, Laws for Women, translated into English by Moshe Schapiro, edited by S.D. Kaplan.  Published by Yeshoua Salem [sic], Salem Books, 108 Jaffa St. 5771 – Jerusalem.  Page 96.  Telefax: 972 2 5389176

[10] Parenthetically, for another example of  censorship of the Ben Ish Hai, see Rabbi Yaakov Hillel’s Vayashov Hayam (1:14), in which he advocates for the censorship of a particular responsum of the Ben Ish Hai (Rav Pealim helek 4 kuntras Sod Yesharim siman 5).  Note, however, Or Lesion 3 (17:6) by the late Porat Yosef Rosh Yeshiva, Rabbi Ben Zion Abba Shaul, who cites the responsum approvingly.

• Responses to Jewish Statehood (Fall 1982) 
  by Immanuel Jakobovits

In his article, the late Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth, z”l, seeks to identify the different streams of Orthodox Jewry in relation to their stance on the modern State of Israel.  His survey, anchored in robust print sources, outlines the major perspectives on the position of Medinat Yisrael in Jewish thought.  His is an effective overview of the various points on the specturm. 

In this article, Rabbi Jakobovits does not make impassioned argument for support of the State, nor does he present a dreamy reflection on its superlative significance.  But he identifies the remarkably stable elements of discourse that remain viable today, almost 30 years after he wrote the article.  Indeed, details have changed in the ideological battlefield.  Israel has endured two intafadas; signed the Oslo Accords; withdrawn from Lebanon, and then from Gaza and parts of Samaria; and all these have taken their toll on the political landscape.  All the while, the core issues and perspectives have changed very little.

“Shabbat” appears in every book of the Tora,[1] and prior to Parashat Emor in VaYikra, where we read the following,

VaYikra 23:3

Six days you shall do creative activity, and on the seventh day “Shabbat Shabbaton”, a holy convocation, all creative activity you shall not do. It is Shabbat to HaShem in all of your dwellings,

we have already been told about “Shabbat” several times:

Beraishit 2:3
And God Blessed the seventh day and Sanctified it because in it He Rested from all of His Creative Activity that God Created to do.

Shemot 16:23

And he (Moshe) said to them: This is what HaShem has Spoken, Shabbaton (a rest day), a holy Shabbat for HaShem tomorrow. What you want to bake, bake (today) and what you want to cook, cook (today), and whatever is left over (from the double portion of Manna that will fall on Fridays) put away for yourselves as a safekeeping until the morning.

Shemot 20:8-11

Remember the Shabbat day to keep it holy. Six days you will work and do all of your creative activity. And on the seventh day a Shabbat to the Lord your God, you shall not do any creative activity, you, your son, your daughter, your male servant, your female servant, and your animal and your sojourner that is in your gates.  Because for six days did HaShem Make the heavens and the earth, the sea and all that is in it, and He Rested on the seventh day. For this reason HaShem Blessed the day of the Shabbat and He Sanctified it.

Shemot 23:12

Six days you will do your activities and on the seventh day you will rest, in order that your ox and your donkey will rest and the son of your handmaiden and the sojourner will rest.

Shemot 31:13-17

You (Moshe) shall speak to the Jewish people saying: You will certainly observe My Shabbatot because it is a sign between Me and between you for your generations, to know that I am HaShem Who Sanctifies you. And you will observe Shabbat because it is holy to you; those who profane it will surely die, because anyone who performs in it creative activity and that soul will be cut off from the midst of its people. Six days will creative activity be done, and on the seventh day Shabbat Shabbaton holy to HaShem. Whoever does creative activity on the day of Shabbat will surely die. And the Children of Israel will observe the Shabbat, to do Shabbat down through their generations, an eternal covenant. Between Me and the Children of Israel it is a sign forever, because in six days HaShem Made the Heavens and the earth and on the seventh day He Rested.

Shemot 34:21

Six days you shall work and on the seventh day you shall rest, you will rest from ploughing and harvesting.

Shemot 35:2-3

Six days will creative activity be done, and on the seventh day it will be to you holy, Shabbat Shabbaton to HaShem. Whoever does creative activity in it, will die. You shall not ignite a fire in all of your habitations on the day of Shabbat.

VaYikra 19:3

An individual should fear his mother and his father and My Shabbatot he should observe, I am HaShem.

VaYikra 19:30

My Shabbatot you shall observe, and My Tabernacle/Temple you shall fear, I am HaShem.

Accounting for these numerous references to Shabbat.

While it is conceivable that the reason for the many repetitions of this Commandment is in order to emphasize its centrality and importance in comparison with other Mitzvot,[2] some commentators attempt to attribute to each new iteration of Shabbat a specific intent and emphasis, in order to avoid the impression of the Tora containing simple superfluity.

Rabbi S.R. Hirsch on VaYikra 23:3

…The “Shabbat” law appears repeatedly in the Tora, and always with reference to a different phase of Jewish life, to which indeed Shabbat forms the fundamental institution. Thus we find:

                a)  the Shabbat of Creation (Gen. 2:1);

b)  the Shabbat of the Wilderness, in connection with the struggle for existence, for obtaining food (Shem. 16:22);

c)   the Shabbat of the Decalogue, as evidence of the whole Jewish consciousness of God (Shem. 20:8);

d)   Shabbat re its effect on human and social life (Shem. 23:12);

e)   the sanctity of Shabbat in its relationship to the Temple  (Shem. 31:13 ff.; 35:2 ff.)

Linking a comment in Parashat Emor  to one in Parashat BeShalach.

R. Hirsch’s explanation for the Tora’s repetition of the Mitzva of Shabbat is intriguing on at least two counts. Firstly, he contends that Shabbat is “the fundamental institution of Jewish life.” This premise is reflected in earlier comments that R. Hirsch makes regarding the double portion of Manna that fell in the desert on Erev Shabbat (the day preceding Shabbat, i.e., Friday), in order to compensate for Manna’s not being found at the outskirts of the encampment on Shabbat itself.  The commentator wishes to explain why HaShem Wished that the people “stay at home” on Shabbat, rather than going out to gather food as they had to do on the other days of the week.

Rabbi S.R. Hirsch on Shemot 16:23

…In inhibiting his activity—Shabbaton[3]—the Jew is first of all to show his submission to God in his activity in seeking his livelihood (gathering the Manna was the means by which the Jews acquired their requisite food during the 40 years of wandering in the desert, hence how they sought their “livelihood” during that period of time)—that first and mightiest incitement to conquer the world,[4] and just as the Shabbat of God impresses the seal of God’s Creation on the world,[5] so does the Shabbat of man impress the seal of the authority of God on Man’s efforts at creation.[6]  With Shabbat, man places himself and his work in the service of God[7]…

The greater implications of not performing Melacha one day each week.

According to R. Hirsch, the reason why Shabbat is the fundamental institution of Jewish life independent of the specific conditions in which Jews find themselves down through the ages, is because its observance in terms of the willing cessation by a Jew of the pursuit of his livelihood[8] demonstrates an individual’s devotion to and sacrifice for God playing a more central role in his life than any consideration of personal advancement or fulfillment.

Shabbat as a manifestation of sacrifice.

The centrality of sacrifice and self-discipline as a means by which one indicates the degree to which he is beholden to God and His Tora, is a theme that R. J.B. Soloveitchik, ZaTzaL, often invoked in his writing. However, he sees the cessation of pro-active creative activity as only one side of a two-sided coin with regard to God’s Expectations of man:

                R. J.B. Soloveitchik, “Catharsis” in Tradition, 17:2, 1978.

…What is heroism in the Halacha?

…One must perform the dialectical[9] movement. The Halachic catharsis expresses itself in paradoxical movement in two opposite directions—in surging forward boldly and retreating humbly. Man’s heroic experience is a polar, antithetic one. Man drives forward, only to retreat and to reverse, subsequently, the direction of his movement.

The Tora wants man who is bold and adventurous in his quest for opportunities, to act heroically, and at the final moment, when it appears that victory is within reach, to stop short, turn around and retreat. At the most exalted moment of triumph and fulfillment, man must forego the ecstasy of victory and take defeat at his own hands…

…”U’Malu Et HaAretz VeKivshuha” (and fill the earth and conquer it). Man was called upon to defy opposition on the part of nature and to march to victory. Biblical man is out to subdue his environment. Yet when conquest is within man’s reach and the road to realization has been cleared of all hindrances, man-victor, who needs only to reach out and grab everything that his heart has desired, must change his course and begin to withdraw. When victory is near, man must invite defeat and surrender the spoils that he had quested for so long. The movement is dialectical: the forward marching ends in retreat, which in turn leads to a resumption of the forward march…

According to the Rav’s formulation, it is just as important for a person to resume his activities following a periodic withdrawal from them, as is mandated by the observance of Shabbat, as it is to withdraw from them in the first place. As inappropriate as it would be for a Jew not to observe Shabbat at all, it would also be improper for him to approach every day as if it was Shabbat.[10] R. Soloveitchik maintains that complete submission to God resulting in failure to engage in the world of the work-week would be as injurious to the dialectic that God Envisions for man as would be an immersion in creative activity that leaves no room for acknowledgement of God’s Place in one’s life. [11]

Do the dynamics of the dialectic change along with the unfolding of Jewish history?

Returning to R. Hirsch’s original comments on VaYikra 23:3, the second intriguing aspect of his approach is the suggestion that “Shabbat”, while remaining central and fundamental to Judaism, nevertheless takes on different connotations during different periods of the Jewish experience: a) Creation, b) the struggle for food in the wilderness, c) the receiving of the Tora at Sinai, d) as part of the general social contract that informs Jewish social interactions, and e) in relationship with the Temple.  Assuming that R. Hirsch is correct in his categorizations, it would be reasonable to assume that in each of these periods, one might have thought that Shabbat would not be applicable had the Tora not specifically stated otherwise. Perhaps one might have thought that the desert conditions that brought into question where food and drink would be obtained entailed Pikuach Nefesh (the endangerment of life) and therefore perhaps certain aspects of Shabbat would be deferred until more normal conditions would be encountered.  As for receiving the Tora at Sinai, it was important to emphasize how Shabbat takes its place among the first five[12] of the Ten Commandments, Mitzvot that stress man’s relationship with HaShem. Yet when the rules mainly governing interpersonal relationships are set forth, Shabbat is again mentioned, leading us to reflect upon the social aspects of this observance, i.e., allowing slaves to rest, deemphasizing once a week the pursuit of material possessions, allowing people to come together to share prayer, study, food and good fellowship, etc. The Temple service involves some ostensible suspensions of Shabbat prohibitions, e.g., slaughtering, cutting, burning public sacrifices; but by mentioning Shabbat in juxtaposition with the sacrificial service, the Tora calls attention to the rest of the rules governing the cessation of Melacha remaining in effect even within the Temple precincts.

But R. Hirsch does not appear to include all of the instances where Shabbat is mentioned in the Tora within his categorization scheme. Perhaps VaYikra 19:3 can be accounted for as part of a reformulation of the Ten Commandments in alternate form and order,[13] therefore paralleling Shabbat of the Decalogue. However, explaining the “unique phase of Jewish life” suggested by Shemot 34:21 where Shabbat is mentioned in the middle of the other holy days,[14] and VaYikra 23:3 where it is listed first with respect to other holy days,[15] appears to be more challenging. It is possible that the experience of Shabbat prior to the institution of additional holy days, such as the Pilgrimage Festivals of Pesach, Shavuot and Sukko as well as the Yamim Noraim (days of awe) which also call for the cessation of Melacha at least to some degree,[16] was unique, and the manner in which Jews approach Shabbat becomes altered once other days of the year are also designated for the cessation of the pursuit of one’s livelihood. Furthermore, the symbolism of Shabbat which originally exclusively represented our acknowledgement of God’s Completion of Creation, changes with the evolution of the Jewish people and its history—in the version of the Ten Commandments recorded in Shemot 20:10 “Shabbat” is associated with the theme of God Resting is invoked, while Devarim 5:14 emphasizes Shabbat’s reflecting the lessons learned from the enslavement in Egypt. Could the Tora’s invocation of Shabbat within the context of other Jewish holy days in Shemot 34 and VaYikra 23 emphasize the differences and similarities intrinsic to these respective days, i.e., the common denominator between them is a commitment to sacrificially set aside personal pursuit of livelihood and self-advancement in order to demonstrate and reflect upon our devotion to God, even as the focus of our  contemplation during these various days are different spiritual themes—our creaturehood in light of God’s Creation (Shabbat), God’s Intervention in Jewish history (Moadim), and the necessity for us to reflect upon our merits and demerits and strive to improve our level of Mitzva performance and relationship to the Divine (Yamim Noraim)?

[2] Tosafot on Kiddushin 70b, d.h. “Kashim Geirim” notes that the Tora states in 24 (alternate readings substitute “36” or “46” for this number) places that one is not to oppress Geirim  (lit. sojourners; in this context, converts to Judaism). From such repeated insistence it can be inferred that observing this Mitzva is simultaneously important and challenging—if it were so easy to comply with this directive, why does it have to be revisited again and again? By implication, a similar conclusion could be reached regarding the observance of Shabbat.

[3] R. Hirsch’s focusing upon the term Shabbaton is given particular resonance in light of RaMBaN’s comments on VaYikra 23:24, partially cited in fn. 8 below, where the medieval commentator defines this word as representing the positive Commandment that is fulfilled on Shabbat by not doing Melacha.

[4] R. Hirsch’s terminology with regard to man’s mandate to conquer the world stems from one of the blessings Bestowed by God upon Adam and Chava:

Beraishit 1:28

And God Blessed them and He Said to them: Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and conquer it, and rule over the fish of the sea and over the bird of the air and over every living thing that moves on the earth.

Although following the Flood, man is given permission to rule over animal life to the point where even its consumption as food becomes possible, 

Beraishit 9:3

Every moving thing that lives, it will be food for you, like the green grass I have Given to you everything,

at the time of Beraishit 1:28, only plant life was permitted to be eaten. Consequently, R. Hirsch had to originally define “conquest” in a more limited manner, than what it eventually could be interpreted to connote:

Rabbi S.R. Hirsch on Beraishit 1:28

“Kivshuha” (and conquer it) is property: the mastering, appropriating and transforming the earth and its products for human purposes (short of treating animal life as food). This acquirement of property is a preliminary necessity for the preceding tasks of home and society which require it as the means for accomplishing them. This makes the acquisition of property itself into a moral duty. But as this preliminary duty is mentioned last (“Peru” [be fruitful] = marriage; “Revu” [multiply] = children, family; “Milu” [fill] = society) it gives it its limitation as having a moral meaning and importance only if it is devoted to the preceding purposes; only if fortune is sought and acquired to found family and further the needs of social work. But not if the order is reversed and one looks upon marriage and society as the means to acquire property and riches.

[5] By God Deciding that the Creation was completed, and therefore an entire “day” was set aside during which no further creation of aspects of the universe would occur, He Demonstrates that rather than simply Setting into motion the forces of Nature, He Maintains control over them to the extent that He Decides when to initiate their functioning and the consequent progress of Creation, and when to call a halt to them.

[6] Rather than man deciding when to engage in his own creative acts, which serve as a microcosm of God’s Creating the universe, he defers to God’s Schedule and Commandments, also calling a weekly halt to his activities.

[7] Although in a finite sense, observing Shabbat only incorporates adherence to God’s Directives with respect to activities which a person might engage in during the 24+ hour period between Friday evening and Saturday night, R. Hirsch suggests that it symbolizes man’s acceptance of God’s Authority vis-a-vis his activities during the other six days of the week as well. Consequently, it becomes the most overarching statement of man’s readiness to subject himself to God’s Law and Will.

[8] It is interesting that R. Hirsch understands the significance of Shabbat with regard to what he considers its centrality in Jewish life from the negative rather than positive perspective, i.e., more important than the positive aspects of Shabbat observance, e.g., Kiddush, Seudot (festive meals), Zemirot (songs of praise), Neirot (lit candles), Tefilla (prayer) etc., is the prohibition against performing creative activity. And although the considerable sacrifice entailed in desisting from one’s profession or occupation for an entire day each week is certainly obvious, from another perspective a case could be made that Mitzvot Aseh (positive Commandments) trump Mitzvot Lo Ta’aseh (negative Commandments) in terms of their respective spiritual significance. One commentator makes such a claim in his presentation of the Commandment of Shabbat:

RaMBaN on Shemot 20:8

…It is also true that the attribute of Zachor (remembering; this is the language that is used in the first version of the Ten Commandments in Shemot 20:8) is represented by a positive Commandment (“remembering” suggests positive pro-action rather than avoidance of objectionable action implied by “guard against”) and issues forth from the emotion of love extending to the attribute of mercy, for he who does his master’s command is beloved by him and his master shows him mercy. But the attribute of Shamor (observing, Devarim 5:12) is represented by a negative Commandment, which extends to the attribute of justice and issues forth from the emotion of fear, for he who guards himself from doing anything which does not please his master does so out of fear of him. It is for this reason that a positive Commandment is greater than a negative Commandment, just as love is greater than fear, for he who fulfills and observes the will of his master with his body and his possessions is greater than he who guards himself from doing that which is not pleasing to him. This is why the Rabbis have said (Shabbat 132b, etc.) that a positive Commandment overrides a negative Commandment (when both are inherent in the same action—a classic example discussed in Yevamot 4b is the reason why the Commandment of not wearing Sha’atnez [mixtures of wool and linen] is placed immediately next to the Command to wear Tzitzit [Devarim 22:12-13]. The Talmud suggests that the juxtaposition [Semichut HaParshiot] of these two Commandments comes to teach that in the event that one has a linen four-cornered garment and woolen fringes, one can attach the fringes to the garment despite the prohibition against Sha’atnez since the positive Commandment of wearing Tzitzit overpowers the negative Commandment of avoiding Sha’atnez)…

Extending RaMBaN’s understanding of the spiritual significance of positive as opposed to negative Commandments to the Mitzva of Shabbat, one would then conclude that it is not the avoidance of Melacha, i.e., the negative aspect of Shabbat, that is key, but rather all of the positive actions that are associated with Shabbat that contain Shabbat’s true spiritual meaning.

Perhaps R. Hirsch would respond that the negative Commandment of Shamor  that is associated with Shabbat  is intrinsically different from other negative Commandments designed to separate a Jew from particular objects or activities. Whereas one could contend that non-Kosher foods might have something about them that is at least metaphysically objectionable, and that the act of stealing another’s property is inherently an evil act, performing Melacha in the pursuit of one’s livelihood is not only devoid of such negative connotations, but is even a Mitzva, i.e., a religiously positive act, most of the time—the Tora’s statements to the effect that “Six days you shall work, perform creative activity” (see the verses dealing with “Shabbat” cited at the beginning of this essay) could be viewed not only as the granting of permission to engage in productive labor, but as a Commandment to do so! Therefore when one is told to cease doing Melacha on Shabbat, it is not so much to separate from something evil, as to create the context whereby the positive Commandments of Shabbat can be performed that much more fully and meaningfully. Furthermore, not performing Melacha on Shabbat is viewed by RaMBaN as being interdicted by both a negative as well as a positive Commandment. 

RaMBaN on VaYikra 23:24   (The commentator is accounting for the usage in the verse of “Shabbaton” by itself, as opposed to the more typical “Shabbat Shabbaton”.)

That it will be a day of cessation of Melacha to rest in it. And the Rabbis interpret (Shabbat 24a): “’Shabbaton’ is a positive Commandment.”  And behold a person who performs “Melacha” on “Yom Tov” transgresses a negative Commandment as well as fails to fulfill a positive Commandment. And one who rests on it, fulfills a positive Commandment…

Although RaMBaN is commenting above on a verse that deals with Rosh HaShana, his citation of Shabbat 24a, combined with the term “Shabbaton” appearing in verses that concern Shabbat rather than Yom Tov (see Shemot 16:23; 31:15; 35:2) allow one to understand resting on Shabbat as also the fulfillment of both types of Commandments. Whenever a Mitzva manifests itself in both positive and negative forms, it is an indication of its centrality and significance.

Naturally there is an element of paradox when one conceptualizes the absence of action as not only compliance with instructions to desist from action, but also as a “positive fulfillment” of some kind. With respect to Shabbat, we confront an instance of a Mitzvat Aseh that is accomplished by doing nothing! Nevertheless, such a definition allows us to avoid pitting the prohibition against doing Melacha against the obligation to make Kiddush, light candles, etc. and rather see it as a complete entity in itself, encompassing both positive and negative elements simultaneously.

[9] “Dialectic”—…the method of logic used by Hegel and adapted by Marx to his materialist philosophy; it is based on the concept of the contradiction of opposites (thesis and antithesis) and their continual resolution using dialectic. (Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition, The World Publishing Co., Cleveland, 1966, p. 404.)

[10] A distinction ought to be made between actually observing the laws of Shabbat each weekday, and keeping Shabbat in mind throughout the week. The Rabbis mention two different manifestations of how one should keep Shabbat in mind continually:

Beitza 16a

It was taught: They related concerning Shammai, the Elder [that] all his life he ate in honor of the Sabbath. [Thus] if he found a well-favored animal he said, Let this be for the Sabbath. [If afterwards] he found one better favored he put aside the second [for the Sabbath] and ate the first. But Hillel the Elder had a different trait, for all his works were for the sake of heaven, for it is said: (Tehillim 68:20) “Blessed be the Lord, day by day.” It was likewise taught: Beth Shammai say: From the first day of the week [prepare] for the Sabbath; but Beth Hillel say: “Blessed be the Lord, day by day.”

Mechilta on Shemot 20:8

R. Yitzchak says: You should not count the days of the week as others count them. Rather you should count them with reference to Shabbat.

                RaMBaN on Shemot 20:8

…The meaning of this is that other nations count the days of the week in such a manner that each is independent of the other. Thus they call each day by a separate name…But Israel counts all of the days with reference to Shabbat “one day after the Shabbat”, “two days after the Shabbat”…

Consequently, even though one only actually avoids Melacha, as well as fulfills positive Commandments such as lighting candles, reciting Kiddush etc., on one day each week, Shabbat should nevertheless remain on one’s mind throughout. Perhaps one can say that this goes beyond simply physically preparing for Shabbat and invoking Shabbat in one’s conversation, but also remaining conscious of Shabbat’s symbolism and implications, not only when one actually rests, but even while one is engaged in creative work.

[11] A support for the dialectical approach that the Rav suggests can be found in the Midrash Halacha on the Ten Commandments in Shemot:

Mechilta D’Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai on Shemot 20:9 (cited in R. Menachem Kasher, Tora Shleima, Parshat Yitro, p. 69, and further explicated in the addendum to that volume, p. 242 ff.)

“Six days you will work”—Rebbe says: This is another decree (i.e., Divine Directive, Mitzva). Just as Israel is commanded regarding the positive Commandment of  Shabbat,* so too it is commanded with respect to “Melacha” (i.e., that there is a positive Commandment to engage in creative activity when it is not Shabbat).**

* This would appear to be a reference to the positive aspect of the act of desisting from “Melacha”, i.e., “Shabbaton”, discussed by RaMBaN, and cited in fn. 8 above.

** In his addendum essay, “Sheishet Yamim Ta’avod” (Tora Shleima, Parshat Yitro, Section 14, p. 142) R. Kasher suggests that the reason why Rebbe interpreted “Six days you shall work” in this manner is because it is otherwise difficult to account for the repetition of this phrase 8 different times: Shemot 16:26; 20:9-10; 23:12; 31:15; 34:21; 35:2; VaYikra 23:3; Devarim 5:13. It’s one thing to repeat the Commandment of “Shabbat” but why stress so many times the idea of working for six days, unless this too is a Commandment.

[12] 1) Belief in God; 2) Prohibition against idolatry; 3) Prohibition against taking God’s Name in vein; 4) Remembering Shabbat; 5) Respecting parents.

[13]             Shemot 20; Devarim 5                                                       VaYikra 19

                1) Belief in God                                                                    19:2

                2) Prohibition against idolatry                                           19:4

                3) Prohibition against taking God’s Name in vein           19:12

                4) Remembering/Observing “Shabbat”                           19:3

                5) Respecting parents                                                         19:3

                6) Do not murder                                                                 19:16                                                                    

                7) Do not engage in sexual immorality                             19:20, 29

8) Do not steal                                                                      19:11

9) Do not testify falsely                                                       19:11

10) Do not covet                                                                  19:18(?)

[14] Shemot 34:18 ff.              Pesach

                   34:21                   Shabbat

                   34:22                   Shavuot, Sukkot

[15] VaYikra  23:3                     Shabbat

                    23:5 ff.                Pesach

                    23:16 ff.              Shavuot

                    23:24 ff.              Rosh HaShana

                    23:27 ff.              Yom HaKippurim

                    23:34 ff.              Sukkot

[16] Although most Melacha is prohibited on these days, the prohibition is not as all-inclusive as on Shabbat. With the exception of Yom HaKippurim when the restrictions are identical to those of Shabbat, activities that are deemed necessary for Ochel Nefesh (lit. consumption of the soul; certain actions involved in food preparation) as well as carrying from one domain to another or within a public domain, and transferring fire, are permitted.

Rabbi Prof. Daniel Sperber’s book, On Changes in Jewish Liturgy: Options and Limitations (Urim Publications, 2010) is a thought-provoking work on the history and development of the text of Jewish liturgy.  Prof. Sperber’s basic thesis is that a careful examination of tefilla reveals that the prayer text has evolved greatly over the centuries (including the post-Talmudic era), and that we therefore should be open to changes within our current text. (His specific agenda relates to feminist sensitivities, although his general analysis is interesting for other reasons as well).  Sperber writes as an erudite scholar, with detailed footnotes, which are very stimulating, although at times the text becomes a little convoluted, with footnotes extending for many pages, and detailed bibliographical material sometimes included in the body of the text.  I also found that on a few occasions, the sources cited did not necessarily lead to the broader conclusion that Rabbi Sperber wanted to draw from that given text.  Nonetheless, it remains an important work worthy of serious study, and warrants a response from those who are against such liturgical changes. 

Rabbi Dr. Barry Freundel has penned a unique book on the history of Jewish prayer which combines his considerable skills as both a scholar and a pulpit rabbi.  Why We Pray What We Pray (Urim Publications) is a scholarly historical analysis of six prayers (Shema, Nishmat, Birkat HaHodesh, Anim Zemirot, Aleinu and Kaddish) that is presented in an accessible manner to a lay audience.  All major texts are provided with line-by-line English translations, and are presented in a clear format to allow for detailed, systematic analysis.  Two important unique contributions are a) his use of the Heikhalot literature in analyzing the development of these prayers, and b) his ability to make this development interesting and significant to the average reader.  The chapters are lengthy, and would have benefited from sub-section headings that would make the flow and thesis clearer.  Yet the work remains accessible, and will help people better appreciate the meaning of these fascinating prayers.  

Rabbi Prof. Michael Broyde’s Innovation in Jewish Law (Urim) is a monograph on the history of the prayer Havineinu, an abridged version of the daily prayer used in pressing situations.  While the prayer itself is an interesting topic, Rabbi Broyde uses this study as a larger reflection on the power of chiddush (innovative textual interpretations) to cause changes in Jewish law, especially in the wake of technological and social changes.  The analysis is sharp and clear, and provides a good example of a non-controversial topic which highlights a significant way in which Jewish law evolves. 

Rabbi David Brofsky’s Hilchot Tefilla – A Guide to Daily Prayer (Ktav/OU Press) is a welcome addition to the library of English book on practical halakha.  Originally composed as a series for the Virtual Beit Midrash website, Brofsky has crafted these short essays into a comprehensive book on daily prayer, covering everything from handwashing in the morning to Kriyat Shema before bed.  His analysis, which begins with Talmudic texts and ultimately concludes with contemporary rulings, remains sufficiently comprehensive without becoming overly detailed or dense.  I hope that Rabbi Brofsky will followup with a 2^nd book detailing prayer laws relating to Shabbat and the festivals.

Readers will also be interested in a recent Hebrew work on Hilchot Tefilla (Bet El Library) by Rabbis Eli Taragin and Michael Rubinstein.  Following the style of their teacher, Rabbi Yosef Tzvi Rimon, the two authors provide a detailed presentation of the laws of tefilla.  Yet unlike Brofsky’s work, which follows the order of the day, Rabbis Taragin and Rubinstein structure their work around a philosophical presentation of various concepts of tefilla.  Volume 1 is intended for the lay reader, while volume 2 is written for those looking for more detailed scholarly analysis.  An impressive work by two young rabbinic scholars.    

-          Shlomo Brody

The Use of Anesthesia in Circumcision:  A Re-Evaluation of the Halakhic Sources by Edward Reichman and Fred Rosner

Hypospadias and Circumcision by Rabbi J. David Bleich

The Making of Metzitzah – 1972 by Yehuda Pesach Shields

- Shlomo Brody