The View of Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik zt”l on the Ordination of Women by Aryeh A. Frimer
June 26, 2010 by Aryeh and Dov Frimer
Filed under Halakha, New Posts
I have been avidly following the recent discussion at the RCA Convention and on the various blogs regarding granting women semikha. I was rather surprised, however, that in all the active give and take, there is one opinion that has not been placed center stage. I am referring to the view of Moreinu veRabbeinu haRav Yosef Dov haLevi Soloveitchik zt”l, known by his students as “the Rav”. The reason for this may well be the fact that the Rav never discussed this issue head on. However, there are several solid pieces of evidence which indicate, to my mind, that the Rav would clearly have opposed having women serve as Shul Rabbis and their receiving semikha.
The first piece of evidence is found in the recently published shi’urim of the Rav on Yoreh De’ah.[1] In contradistinction to Rav Soloveitchik’s Talmud shi’urim – which were very lomdish and had a large element of creativity and hiddush – the tone of the Yoreh De’ah shi’urim were halakha le-ma’aseh. The Rav’s primary goal in the latter was to clarify the various views of the Mehaber, Rema and nosei kelim in preparation for semikha exams.[2] In one the first shi’urim, the Rav dealt with the ruling of Rema to the effect that our custom is not to allow female ritual slaughterer (shohatot). The Rav suggests that the reason for this is that nowadays being a ritual slaughterer requires kabala – the authorization/certification of a recognized scholar testifying to the candidate’s knowledge of both the theory and practice of shehita. It should be emphasized that receiving kabala has community wide repercussions since it generally allows the bearer the right to apply for a position of shohet anywhere.
As a result of this certification requirement, appointment as a shohet is to be viewed as a communal appointment (minui kahal), from which women are excluded according to Maimonides. In the Rav’s words: “It seems that since our custom is to receive authorization from a scholar in order to slaughter, therefore slaughtering is no longer merely a simple matter of permitted or forbidden food – that anyone [knowledgeable] can deal with, but has become an appointed communal position. For this reason, we do not allow women to slaughter based on the Rambam (Mishne Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5), who wrote that we do not appoint a woman to a communal position. Since a woman may not be appointed to a communal position, and slaughtering has become a communal position, therefore, it seems that a woman may similarly not be appointed to be a town slaughterer.”[3]
Rabbinic ordination, like kabala, is authorization and certification by a noted scholar or more often by a board of scholars, who verify that the candidate is knowledgeable in theoretical and practical areas of halakha required for rabbinic communal leadership. If, to the Rav’s mind, women are excluded from being appointed a shohetet - because the required kabala certification converts the appointment into one of minui kahal, the same is true regarding her appointment to be a congregational Rabbi which for millennia has required semikha.[4]
Another piece of evidence comes from a ruling the Rav gave on the question of women as synagogue presidents. Between 1983-1984, R. Binyamin Walfish, in his capacity as Executive Director of the R.C.A., met with the Rav in order to receive guidance on a variety of issues relating to women and halakha. During these very important conversations, Rabbi Walfish asked the Rav whether women could serve on shul boards. The Rav responded that he saw no reason why women could not serve as a shul board member. The latter appointment was not serara (discretionary power, vide infra) over the community which Rambam (ibid.) forbids for women, since the final decision was made by the board as a whole – and not by the individual members, which merely had input. The Rav did pasken, however, that women could not be shul presidents. The latter had certain prerogatives that constituted serara. The Rav also felt it unwise – though there was no issur – to have women serve as vice presidents. This is because such an appointment would imply that women could serve as presidents – which to his mind they could not.[5] [This pesak is confirmed by Rav Hershel Shachter who, quoting R. Zevulun Charlap, cites a similar ruling by the Rav.[6]] The Rav also suggested that women serve as mashgihot kashrut (kashrut supervisor) which the Rav said was perfectly mutar. On the contrary, the Rav felt that women, in those areas, may even be better than men.[7]
We note that the Rav did not rule out a woman from being kashrut supervisors, presumably because this does not require authorization like kabala or semikha, merely bona fide knowledge of the relevant halakhot. Nor did the Rav view being a synagogue board member as a minui kahal. This is because being on the synagogue board is a local position and decisions are made by committee. Regarding the synagogue president, however, the Rav cites another consideration, namely serara – the discretionary power to make decisions with which others need to abide. Each Board member has input into decisions made by the committee as a whole; often, however, the president, as the head of the organization, will make on the spot decisions alone. The same is, of course, true for the synagogue rabbi, who is presumably the final word on religious practice in a community. It is true that the rabbi’s contract can be terminated; but until that time, it is his rulings that the community is bidden to follow. This is the kind of discretionary power which Maimonides maintained was forbidden to women.
According to the Rav, the discussion about whether women can serve as community Rabbis is not merely about titles but about the job description – no matter what you call it! Whether you have semikha or not, whether you are called Maharat, Reverend or Rosh Kahal – if you function as, or have the authority and discretionary power of, the community Rabbi, that is serara and such an appointment is assur for women.
Some might argue[8] that a distinction should be drawn between receiving ordination (semikha) and serving as a community Rabbi; it is only the latter which the Rav would have forbidden, they argue. Furthermore, individuals with the title Rabbi serve in a variety of other capacities: in education, counseling and kiruv, and as hospital chaplains, community organizers, or mashgihim. Why should women be precluded from these positions?
Any answer must begin with a clarification of the purpose of semikha. As already noted above, rabbinic ordination is the authorization by a noted scholar, or more often by a board of scholars, who verify that the candidate is knowledgeable in those areas of halakha required for rabbinic communal leadership. Nearly every ketav semikha (ordination certificate) says just that! If the Rav was of the view that women were precluded from rabbinic communal leadership, would it not mihzei ke-shikra (have the appearance of a lie) to give them certification for just such a role? Would you give a driving license to one who is forbidden to drive?
Yet, as noted above, individuals with semikha serve in a variety of professional capacities, many of which do not require rabbinic ordination – though semikha certainly adds to their credibility and the honor of the role. Nevertheless, one could well argue that if a particular occupation requires the authorization and certification of semikha, then to the Rav’s mind this might well be minui kahal and forbidden for women. We need to find the proper honorific title to fit the job description. Certainly, titles like Havera, Mora and Yo’etset Halakha are just such steps in the right direction. Perhaps the honorific title Hakhama should be adopted for women of outstanding Torah knowledge. But, in an attempt to answer a real need, we should not distort the true and simple meaning of semikha.
To this one may counter: How can you explain the fact that the Rav permitted gerim to learn for semikha at RIETS? After all, the Rambam (Yad, Hilkhot Melakhim, 1:4) based on the Sifrei forbids serara for a convert (ger), just as he does for women (Ibid. 1:5).
Regarding gerim, there are important distinctions that can be drawn between converts and women. The Rav, in the lecture on Yoreh De’ah cited above, notes the following: “A convert may be appointed to a communal position, but not a position of communal authority over Jews – and it is for this reason that he may judge a fellow convert (Yevamot 102a). Therefore, since slaughtering is an appointment of importance but not a position of authority, a convert may be appointed to be a slaughterer. However, a woman is excluded from all communal appointments, even those with no discretionary authority, and therefore she may not be appointed a slaughterer.”
According to the Rav, converts are only forbidden from positions of serara - discretionary power and authority over Jews, but not from minui kahal – community-wide appointments per se’. Hence, gerim can be appointed shohatim, as charismatic Rashei Yeshiva, even as judges for the convert community,[9] but not as community Rabbis; women, however, are forbidden from all such roles. RIETS semikha was not intended to allow these ordained converts to serve as community Rabbis[10] – and the handful of rabbinic candidates who were converts could be guided to act in accord with these conditions.
There is yet another source for a fundamental distinction between converts and women to be found in the Ha’amek Davar.[11] R. Naphtali Zvi Judah Berlin (Netziv) cites the case of King Herod the Idumean convert,[12] who was accepted as the legitimate Jewish regent. Clearly, argues the Netziv, the exclusion of converts and those lacking “good Jewish lineage” from serara is only preferable, if possible, but not an absolute prerequisite (le-mitsva im efshar, akhen eino le-ikuva). The appointment of women was barred even le-ikuva. This is clearly grounds for leniency by converts which is not present by women.
Thus we have shown that the Rav believed that women serving as communal rabbis was forbidden both because it is a minui kahal and because it is position of serara. Logic dictates that he would have also opposed rabbinic ordination, whose primary and declared purpose is to certify the suitability of candidates for such a position.
This in no way contravenes the fact that a large cadre of leading poskim have disagreed to varying extents with the Rav’s sole reliance on the Rambam, his analysis of serara, and his distinction between serara and minui kahal. Furthermore, many poskim accept the efficacy of democratic elections (kiblu alayhu) as a means of circumventing serara considerations in other communal leadership positions (such as shul presidency and elected political positions), and they may well feel the same about Rabbinic positions.[13]. Others have invoked a variety of additional factors (inter alia custom, modesty and communal cohesiveness) in the latter case. As a result of all these considerations, it will not be a simple matter to come to a final ruling on the issue of women’s ordination. But despite this controversy between gedolei ha-poskim, as talmidim of Moreinu veRabbeinu haRav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik zt”l, we owe this gadol ha-dor the honor and consideration of involving him in our deliberations.
יהי זכרו ברוך – ויהיו שפתותיו מדובבות בקבר.
*Rabbi Dr. Aryeh A. Frimer is the Ethel and David Resnick Professor of Active Oxygen Chemistry at Bar Ilan University.
[1]. R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Shi’urei haRav al Inyanei Shehita, Meliha, Basar veHalav veTa’arovot, ed. R. Elyakim Koenigsberg
[2]. R. Dov I Frimer, personal communication, June 18, 2010.
[3]. Supra note 1, sec. 1. R. Dov I. Frimer and R. Shalom Carmy were present when this shi’ur was given and confirm the accuracy of its content. Our English translation is that of R. Gil Student, “Women Slaughterers,” Hirhurim, June 18, 2009 available online at: http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2009/06/women-slaughterers.html. In note 7 to Shi’urei haRav, the editor R. Elyakim Koenigsberg indicates that the Rav did not consider women’s leadership over women’s organizations as a problem of serara.
[4]. This argument has been made by R. Gil Student, supra, note 3.
[5]. R. Binyamin Walfish, interviewed by R. Dov I. Frimer; March 10, 1996.
[6]. R. Zvi (Hershel) Schachter, “miPeninei haRav: Kuntres beInyanei Pesak Halakha,” Bet Yitshak, 38 (5766), pp. 21-28, at p. 28;
[7]. Cf R. Moshe Feinstein, Shu”t Iggerot Moshe, Y.D., II. Sec. 44.
[8]. My thanks to Rabbis Michael Broyde and Shlomo Brody for helping clarify the challenges to this thesis.
[9]. As to whether a convert can sit on a Bet Din for conversion, see: R. Michael J. Broyde, “May a Convert be a Member of a Rabbinical Court for Conversion?” Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, Number LIX (Pesach 5770/Spring 2010) pp. 61-78.
[10]. See the related comments of R. Hershel Shachter and R. Aharon Ziegler: R. Kenneth Brander, “Setting The Record Straight: Rav Schachter’s Comments At The RCA Convention,” Hirhurim, May 09, 2010; available online at: http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2010/05/setting-record-straight-Rav-schachters.html; R. Aharon Ziegler, “Halakhic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, II,” Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 2001, pp. 159-160
[11]. R. Naphtali Zvi Judah Berlin, Ha’amek Davar, Devarim 17:15, s.v. lo tuchal. We thank R. Aharon Lichtenstein Shlit”a for bringing this source to our attention.
[12]. Josephus Flavius, Wars of the Jews, Book I, Chap. VIII, parag. 9, indicates that Herod was the second son of Antipater the Idumaean and Cypros an Arabian. In The Antiquities of the Jews, Book 14, Chap. 15, parag. 2, Josephus refers to Herod as a half-Jew and hence unworthy of being King. However, later in Book 15, chapter 7, section 9, he notes that the Jewish leader Hyrcanus had made the Idumeans “receive the Jewish customs and law.” The Netziv clearly assumed that Herod as an Idumaean was a convert or the descendant of converts. The Encyclopedia Judaica (“Herod I”)
[13]. For further discussion, see: (a) Nashim beTafkidim Tsibburiyyim beIdan haModerni (Women in Community Leadership Roles in the Modern Period),” R. Aryeh A. Frimer, In “Afikei Yehudah – Rabbi Yehuda Gershuni zt’l Memorial Volume,” R. Itamar Warhaftig, ed., Ariel Press: Jerusalem, 5765 (2005), pp. 330-354. (b) R. Aryeh A. Frimer, “Women in Community Leadership Roles – Shul Presidents” “Text and Texture,” June 2, 2010.
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It strikes me as a crime against poskim to reconstruct what a posek would have said concerning an issue he didn’t explicitly address in a time when the posek does not live.
To back-off that previous comment a little bit, part of limmud Torah means that we’re in the business of reconstructing positions. We do this all the time, and it’s important. But what I object to is this: “But despite this controversy between gedolei ha-poskim, as talmidim of Moreinu veRabbeinu haRav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik zt”l, we owe this gadol ha-dor the honor and consideration of involving him in our deliberations.”
We don’t owe the Rav anything. When a person dies we no longer have the ability to ask them questions, and so it doesn’t strike me as a great idea to give that person such strong authority from beyond the grave. Better to say that, in your opinion, it’s likely that the Rav would’ve been opposed to the ordination and leave it at that. Those who agree and care will agree and care, and those who don’t will explain why.
Finally, it’s a bad idea for Modern Orthodoxy to be overly concerned with the views of the Rav. It’s not a sign of health for a movement to be overly concerned with its founding figure. Better to keep the debate among the living.
Mike,
IMHO, it is clear from what the Rav DID say regarding Kabala and Shul Presidents, exactly what he would have said regarding Semicha and Women as Shul Rabbis. In such a case it would be a crime against the Rav and a great oversight not to mention his opinion.
Mike,
Talmud Torah is to a large part the analysis and extension of the opinions of deceased Tanaim, amoraim, Rishonim and Aharonim. If the Rav is one of the founders and formulators of modern orthodoxy, we had better understand our roots before we push on. My article is not a plea that we accept the Rav’s position, but that we discuss it and weigh it in our halakhic deliberations. Honesty and respect demand at least that much.
Rabbi Rakefet also quotes the Rav’s view on shul presidents in the context of Maharat
Rabbi Rakefet cites the Rav in the 1970’s being of the view that a woman should not make announcements, tzniut.
Same conclusion, very different reason
I agree with the views of both R Aryeh and R Dov Frimer to a member of a generation Asher Lo Yada Es Yosef. It is quite apparent that the writer who apparently seems like too many of his generation to consign RYBs to an intellectual museum, instead of the RY of RIETS whose views should be seen as paramount on any issue confronting MO in the sense that “Aseh Lcha Rav” entails that one look in the mirror and ask what would my rebbe say on a particular issue.
Fair enough.
I would like to thank the rabbis professors Frimmer for this important and relevant piece. However, I think the Rav’s position on serara needs more clarification. For more than half a century, the Rav’s wife and then his daughter headed the “school committee” at Maimo, a position of significant discretion and power with in the school. How does this square with what the Frimmer’s report?
Moshe,
Thank you for your kind words about the article. I agree that the Rav’s position requires clarification and I hope his closest students, who may have discussed the issue with him, will come forward and help us elucidate it. This was part of my goal in writing this article.
Regarding your specific question, it seems that the Rav did not consider being a school principal a minui Kahal, because it did not demand certification and only affected a limited population. As far as serara was concerned according to many poskim, the serara prohibition does not apply when the elected individual does not enjoy exclusive, final decision-making power. No violation is involved, therefore, when dealing with an appointment to a council which reaches decisions together as a group, such as election to the Knesset (Rabbi Yosef Kafah, Ha-isha Ve-chinukha, Amana, 5740, p. 37), a municipal Religious Council (See my articles cited below), or to a synagogue board (Rav Soloveitchik discussed in Article). Likewise, a position does not qualify as serara if its holder’s decisions require the consent of a higher authoritative body. For example, the decisions of a school principal (such as employing or dismissing teachers) must be approved by the board of education (Rabbi Aryeh Leib Grosenes, Shu”t Lev Aryeh, 2:21).
For further discussion see: “Women in Community Leadership Roles in the Modern Period,” Aryeh A. Frimer, In “Afikei Yehudah – Rabbi Yehuda Gershuni zt’l Memorial Volume,” R. Itamar Warhaftig, ed., Ariel Press: Jerusalem, 5765 (2005), pp. 330-354 (In Hebrew). HTML file available online at http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/mishpach/maamad/nashim-2.htm. See also “Women in Community Leadership Roles – Shul Presidents” “Text and Texture” of the Rabbinical Council of America (June 2, 2010) – available online at http://text.rcarabbis.org/?p=931.
The question imho is not what his position was, but what it would be, given current circumstances (i.e. I doubt R’YBS would’ve been a champion for women’s learning if he were asked the question in Brisk in 1850).
I’m guessing he’d still say no, but it’s a method of analysis rather than a frozen historical fact that would be my concern.
KT
Moshe (Shoshan),
I am uncertain that what the Rav’s wife (or daughter) did necessarily reflects his position. For example, when asked why his wife doesn’t cover her hair, reportedly his answer was “ask her.” Contrary to the apologetics of some, it seems pretty clear that despite knowing the halacha, the Rav did not impose his view on her. I’m not sure if this situation would be any different.
I object to the title of this post by my friend R’Aryeh — “The View of Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik zt”l on the Ordination of Women.” A more correct title would be “R. Aryeh Frimer’s Analysis of the ordination of women based on his understanding of the Rav’s position in related matters.” Perhaps I’m being overly picky, but at a time when so many feel free to say what the Rav “would” say were he alive today and asked a question that had not been asked before — or, indeed, what he would say *today* about a question he *did* opine on — one should be careful not to put words in the Rav’s mouth that he did not utter. R’ Aryeh notes at the very beginning of his piece that “the Rav never discussed this issue head on.” If that is the case (and I don’t think anyone disputs it is), to say “Thus we have shown that the Rav believed that women serving as communal rabbis was forbidden,” is simply wrong. We don’t know what the Rav believed about this issue and, unfortunately, we can never know what he believed. We can only surmise which is what the always thoughtful and erudite R’Aryeh did. I would have hoped that he would have been more careful, in both title and text, to more clearly make this distinction.
Sir Joseph,
Your point is well taken. However, I believe that the evidence I bring is convincing if not conclusive. If you want me to admit that, given the Rav’s creativity, another possibile interpretation of the evidence I bring is feasible – I admit it. But I honestly believe it to be extremely unlikely. Thanks for your insights and comments.
Moshe,
Regarding the Rav’s Wife and Daughter as Head of the School Board at Maimonides:
(1)Either he held that decisions made by committee are not Serara;
(2) or that they were the best suited for that job because they had the Rav’s ear, trust and influence;
(3)better yet, that they were merely the Rav’s representatives – and ultimately, the Rav ran the school.
R. Frimmer
As for you hypothoses I think this needs to be checked with some one’s whose boston credentials are better and deeper than mine. However, it (1) and (3) I simply dont think they are true.
as for (2)- so what if they were the best person for the job, since when is that a heter?
Moshe,
You err. Maimonides School was the Rav and Tanya Soloveitchik’s “baby”. They were personally involved in most aspects of the school – and the Rav set policy. So #3 is probably the most accurate. [I lived in the Boston Area for 5 years as a graduate student at Harvard (1969-74).]
Rabbi Yehuda Gershuni (Mishpat Ha-melukha – Hilkhot Melakhim, chapter 1, halakha 4 and 5; Kol Yehuda, pp. 501, 506.), as well as Rabbi Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron (Shu”t Binyan Av, 1:61), and Rav Aharon Soloveitchik (personal communication from R. Lopatin) maintained that if a convert or woman is the most suitable candidate for a given position, they may be appointed to a serara post. This conclusion is based upon the comments of the Riva (Commentary of Rabbenu Yehuda Ben Rabbi Eliezer, in Raboteinu Ba’alei Ha-Tosefot al Chamisha Chumshei Torah, Shemot 21:1, s.v. lifneihem), who wrote that Shemaya and Avtalyon were appointed to the positions of nasi (“prince,” or rabbinic leader) and av beit din (head of the rabbinical courts) “because there was none in Israel as distinguished as they.”
I am not questioning other sources for the Rav’s position about women rabbis or shul presidents. However, I question the description of his Yoreh Deah shiur and its utilization as a source for how the Rav would have responded to a specific halakhic question on the topic. Having attended a similar shiur from the Rav on Yoreh Deah a decade earlier I have qualms about the characterization of the Yorah deah shiur as fundamentally different from the shiur in gemara. The text used by the Rav was different but the method of analysis the same. The Rama’s position about a woman shochet was against a Mishna and the Rav found a brilliant way to explain it. The introduction of the ruling of the Rambam on serara reflected the Rav’s reluctance to use a sevara that was not clearly found in earlier sources.
Rav Blau,
I realize that issue of the Rav’s tone in the shiur is an important one. That is why I discussed it at length with my brother Dov who was at the later shiur. It is his testimony that I cite in the paper. I also believe that it is telling that the Rav repeated the same comments a decade apart. I don’t believe he would have done so if it was “stam a hiddush” – unless he felt it was halakha le-ma’aseh. Perhaps other Talmidim from both periods could help clarify this issue.
Thinking a bit in the macro – isn’t it a bit striking that discussions about what women are and aren’t allowed to participate in are–for the most part–exclusively discussed by men? The halakha regarding serara doesn’t not preclude a woman from voicing her opinion, does it?
The scholarly Chana Luntz is involved in such a discussion on the Avodah discussion group.
Aryeh – could you please provide a link to that discussion?
Thank you.
Anonymous
Go to http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/ which takes you to the current volume 27 and look at issues Number 135 and 136
So now Rabbis Aryeh and Dov Frimer are channeling the Rav. Isn’t that “doresh el ha-meitim” which is an issur d’orayta (D’varim 18:11)?
It is a fact of life that many, though not all, shul presidents exercise unilateral authority, notwithstanding the existence of a Board. In thirty years, I have been rav of four shuls. In most cases, particularly in smaller shuls that are more informally administered, the shul President makes all decisions and runs the shul. He decides whether there will be a Youth program, whether funds may be allocated for people to have nosherei at shiurim, whether “there is money in the budget” for X or Y or Z — and, indeed, how and whether a budget is drafted or audited. He unilaterally will decide whether the shul may raise funds for building a mikveh, or whether there will be no mikveh because he instead wants a building fund and deems two such campaigns as mutually incompatible. He will decide whether the rav may move towards encouraging the start of a yeshiva day school in the community, or whether the shul will continue to push for a one-community-school-in-the-community day school. Such a President enjoys true s’rarah. Even in larger shuls, a President often decides what to present to the Board, how to shape the agenda, which agenda items are placed on the bottom so they do not get discussed within the time frame designated, which outside experts to invite to discuss a matter. Thus, a Shul president has enormous s’rarah in most shuls — and complete s’rararh in many. As a rav of thirty years, that has been my hands-on experience and that related to me by several dozen of my chaveirim in the pulpit. Rabbonim normally do not express this reality, certainly not in print, because they “haven’t got time for the pain.” Thus, if an halakhic analysis of a Shul President’s role and qualification arises based on a s’rarah focus, the facts are no different today from what they would have been thirty years ago.
Rabbi Fischer
I want to thank you for your candor and I have no doubt that what you say is often true. Did not Kohelet say millenia ago: “ve-hakesef ya’aneh et ha-kol”? But the purpose of my article was to present the Rav zatsa”l’s position. As I tried to show, the Rav believed that women serving as communal rabbis was forbidden for two reasons. Firstly because it is a minui kahal [since it requires semicha] – even if it lacks serara – just as an appointment as a shohetet is assur because it is a minui Kahal [requiring kabala] even though it lacks serara. Alternatively, being Rabbi is a position of serara. Even according to your post, the first reason, minui kahal is still applicable. [This distinction between minui Kahal and Serara, namely that minui kahal is assur even if it lacks serara, I believe is unique to the Rav.]
In your post you argue that a Modern Day Rav has little serara. What you say may be well be true. But as long as the Rav still sets shul religious policy, that’s serara. The Rav still decides as to the propriety of Women’s services or egalitarian/partnership minyanim; He decides whether women will dance on simhat Torah with Sifrei Torah; How twins will celebrate their Bar Mitsva in Shul; What to do for a bat Mitsva in Shul; who gets priority in Aliyyot and a host of other halakhic issues and questions. What he determines is shul policy – that’s serara, and hence, according to the Rav, assur.
I am fairly certain that Rav Aharon Lichtenstein has frequently made the point that, with respect to halachic decisions which turn in part on changing social realities, we cannot assume what the Rov’s position would be more than 25 years after his last discussion of any particular issue; and, indeed, Rav Aharon has gone beyond the Rav’s last word on several of these issues. Rav Yosef Adler recently pointed out that many of the Rov’s decisions in this area were heavily influenced by the mood of the 1950’s and 1960’s, during which it appeared that Orthodoxy might be totally overwhelmed by the rising Conservative movement; that consideration looks a lot different today.
Sheldon beat me to my first point, so I will leave his comment with a hearty “aye”.
Here is another, related point:
Each of Rav Soloveitchik’s categorizations seem reasonable individually, but I do not see how to coherently understand them as a whole. To recap each of these positions:
Semikha–minui kahal
Community rabbi–serara
Shochet–minui kahal
Shul board–neither
Shul president–serara
Kashrut Mashgiach–neither
Rosh Yeshiva–minui kahal
Knesset member–neither
Religious Council member–neither
Principal–neither
I find this approach hard to understand. How can it be that shul board membership is minui kahal but Knesset membership is not? A Knesset member can have much more far-ranging influence and applies to all Israeli citizens; even if you see a shul as a community (which is debatable, at least in some communities), it still has a powerful opt-in/out option that a state does not have (or has to a much lesser extent).
Similarly, selection of principals is hotly debated by communities because the individual can set the educational direction for an entire community; is the minui kahal element there really less powerful than with a shochet? When did your community last debate appointment of a shochet? I know you can bring a formalistic opinion that excludes a principal but includes a shochet, but I have a hard time seeing the underlying logic.
Similar questions can be asked with other examples. Based on the list and the fact that I find it hard to see how the categorizations could be based solely on formal, consistent halakhic criteria of minui kahal/serara, the decisions appear to be made along the lines of tsniut in ritual positions. The visible ritual positions are being defined as either minui kahal or serara, while non-ritual positions or largely invisible ritual positions (kashrut mashgiach) are being defined as neither. Using these categories in this way seems a bit stretched.
Here is an important quote from Rav Frimer’s T&T article quoted above:
“The President of the Yeshivat Har Etsion Alumni Association in Hul is a woman who also speaks at dinners, and nobody at Har Etzion has a really strong objection. However, an alumni organization is not a shul organization. There are a lot of sensitivities: what the shul membership views of itself, how it’s going to affect the shul membership. Fundamentally, it is a public policy decision, which is very important. And there’s no question that there are those who want to be prohibitive, and they have the poskim to rely on, and there are those who want to be lenient, and they have solid poskim to rely on, especially in a shul situation. The cohesiveness of the community should be a major consideration in how to rule in practice.”