Praying for One to Die: Philosophical Considerations
December 1, 2009 by Ezra Schwartz
Filed under Halakha, Philosophy, Prayer
Praying for One to Die: Philosophical Considerations
by Ezra Schwartz
There is a great deal of literature about treating a terminally ill patient. However, the question most relevant for family members, namely how they should pray, remains mired in obscurity. Although Ran in Nedarim 40a, basing himself of Ketubot 104a, teaches that one should pray for the terminally ill patient who is undergoing a great deal of suffering to expire, this position is left out of Shulchan Aruch. Consequently, contemporary poskim are divided as how one should daven. Should they continue to daven for the patient to survive despite the obvious pain that he or she is in? Or should they follow the Ran and daven for the patient to expire? There are three schools of thought among poskim. Some completely endorse the Ran’s position; others reject it entirely, yet others in theory endorse the Ran’s position but in practice hold that it is not applicable.
The Makhloket Ha-Poskim
Advocates of the first approach – those who accept the Ran – include the Aruch HaShulchan (YD 335:3); the Tifferet Yisrael (Yoma 8:7), Rav Chaim Kanievsky (cited by Rav Shmuel Eliezer Stern in Siach Tefilla page 719), Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo vol. 1 #91, 24), and Rav Ovadia Yosef (see later editions of Yalkut Yosef YD 335). In contrast, Tzitz Eliezer (Volume 5 #5) completely rejects the Ran.
Rav Moshe Feinstein (CM vol. 2 #74,1) takes the middle approach. He maintains that in theory one may daven for a person to die; however this is only as a last resort. After all the tefillot for the person to live came up short, then one may daven for the person to die. Since in our day, people are no longer expert to daven, in practice one can never daven for a person to expire. Rav Wosner (Siach Halacha page 772) arrives at a similar conclusion to Rav Moshe, but for a slightly different reason. Rav Wosner maintains that in theory we may daven to end the life of a person who has no hope of recovery. However, today we are never certain when and if a person arrives at that state. Therefore, in practice, Rav Moshe and Rav Wosner maintain that one can never daven to end a person’s life.
The Nature of Prayer: Active or Passive Intervention?
It seems that the dispute whether or not to accept the Ran’s principle may be based on a fundamental question regarding the nature of prayer. To what extent is a person who prayed for a particular outcome viewed as being responsible for that outcome? In other words, do we view a person who prays as a passive party who bears no direct responsibility for the outcome, which was caused solely by G-d? Or do we view prayer like an active mechanism to manipulate Divine intervention?
Rama in Yore Deah (339:1) teaches that one never actively do something which will shorten a person’s life. However, he permits passive intervention, including preventing an external noise which is protracting a person’s life. Based on this distinction between active and passive acts, it is possible to explain the dispute between Ran and the other poskim. If prayer is viewed as an active form of intervention, it would be forbidden to daven for an ill person to expire. If, however, davening is considered passive intervention, it would be permitted to daven for one to expire based on the guidelines set down by Rama[1].
In this respect this dispute is connected to the machloket among poskim as to whether one may pray for Yirat Shamayim. The Gemara (Berachot 33) teaches that all aspects of one’s life is b’yidei Shamayim, in the hands of G-d, with the exception of Yirat Shamayim. It is therefore questionable if one is permitted to pray for increased levels of Yirat Shamayim. Some maintain that such prayer is permitted because since man is praying, the consequent Yirat Shamayim is due to his actions[2].
Praying for Miracles
Philosophically many are bothered by the Ran’s approach. Why does the Ran teach that we should daven for the person to expire. Clearly, the omnipotent G-d is capable of healing the person. Why then should we not aspire to greater heights and pray for the person to live?
Rav Hershel Schachter once explained that the reason we pray for the terminally ill person to die, rather than live, is because we must not pray for miracles. This principle is asserted in the Gemara, Berachot 54a, which teaches that one may not beseech G-d that the fetus his wife is pregnant with should be a boy. Changing the sex of the fetus is a miracle, and prayer is limited to ordinary Divine interventions, not miraculous ones.
Despite the Gemara’s opposition to praying for miracles, Rama (Orach Chayim 187) rules that one who omits al hanisim on Chanukka or Purim should add a special harachaman at the end of birchat hamazon. The text that should be inserted reads that just as G-d performed miracles for our fathers, He should perform miracles for us. Shaarei Teshuva is bothered how it is possible to recite this harachaman in light of the Gemara’s prohibition to pray for miracles. He quotes Bechor Shor who offers two explanations. The first explanation is that it is forbidden to pray only for miracles that will benefit an individual. However, one is allowed to daven for a miracle that will impact the entire tzibur. The second explanation he offers is that it is forbidden to pray for a miracle that cannot come about through natural means, but one is permitted for a miracle that can be explained through natural means.
It would seem that the reason Ran tells us to pray for a person to expire rather than for that same person to survive is because he considers the person surviving to be a miraculous occurrence for which we may not pray. Those who argue on Ran would maintain that since in the event the patient does survive, it will without doubt be attributed to medical, rational interventions, and therefore it is permitted to daven. In short the question of whether we should daven for an ill person to recover or to perish seems to hinge on the two explanations offered by Bechor Shor.
[1] This analysis was suggested by Rabbi Mordechai Carlebach in his Chavatzelet HaSharon, Beraishit, page 190. I am indebted to Rabbi Daniel Feldman for directing me to this source.
[2] See Maharsha in Berachot 10a on the story of Bruria.
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I am very very uncomfortable with Ezra Schwartz’s approach. In my view this approach blurs the critical distinction between prayer and direct physical intervention. All agree that one who actively hastens the death of a suffering terminally ill person is guilty of murder. Would even those who say that should not pray for the death of such a person make the same judgement!?
I am also troubled by the assumption that those who maintain the view that one is not allowed to pray that a suffering terminally ill person expire are necessarily committed to the, in my view, overly mechnanical and theologically problematic concept of prayer that Rabbi Schwartz attributes to them.
Nor is Rabbi Schawrz’s analogy to praying for increased yirat shamayim convincing. As I believe should be evident, praying for increased yirat shamayyim is, even without appealing to the mechanical notion of prayer, an integral part of attaining increased yirat shammayim. By contrast, praying for the death of someone is NOT an intergral part of bringing about his death.
I would like to tentatively suggest that the issue here is whether a peerson can or cannot make make the judgment that a life of unrelieved suffering on the part of a terminally ill person is worse than death. Those who object to praying for such person argue that even such a life is better than no life at all, or, at the very least, that we cannot make a judgement about this. Those who say that we can pray for the death of such a person are of the view that we can make the judgment that such a life is not worse than death, and, therefore, while we cannot do any thing directly to end the life, we can pray to God to end it. This analysis would explain the view of Rav Moshe Feinstein that once one is allowed –or perhaps even mandated — to pray for the death of a suffering terminally ill person, there is no longer any obigation to prolong his life.
In my post above, 5th -4th lines from bottom: Change “not worse than death” to “worse than death.”
Rabbi Schwartz: Let’s get a discussion going. Would you care to comment on my critical remarks and my alternative suggestion?
I want to thank Dr. Kaplan for so carefully reading my post and offering insightful criticism. I believe however, that Dr. Kaplan is conflating the question of active vs. passive with the question of what is halachically considered to be murder. Praying for one to die may be active; it is in no way however to be considered murder. Rav Chaim famously explained, as was interpreted by Rav Hershel Schachter in B’Ikvei HaTzon page 46, that murder is measured by a different yardstick than other halachic activities. To be obligated for murder, it is not enough to be active, one needs to perform what Rav Chayim termed a koach gavra. According to this distinction it is easy to understand why even if praying for one to expire is considered an action, it would not be the type of action that is classified as murder.
I appreciate very much Rabbi Schwratz’s kind remarks and thoughtful response. His point that even if praying for someone to die is considered a form of active intervention, it still cannot be considered halakhically murder, since (to paraphrase his argument) it is a form of spiritual intervention, is well taken. Still, however, even if technically not murder, it should be viewed, on this basis, as “spiritual murder.” This seems difficult to accept.
Be this as it may, Rabbi Schwartz does not address my theological objection to his view that that those forbid praying for someome to die “view prayer like an active mechanism to manipulate divine intervention.” “Manipulate divine intervention”? “MANIPULATE”?! Shomu shammayyim! We have a word for such manipulation. No, not prayer– MAGIC!
Moreover, Rabbi Schwartz does not adress my criticism of the analogy he draws between praying for somene to die and praying for increased yirat shammayim. Finally, he does not address my alternative analysis of the mahloket.
I hope to check out the responsum of Rav Moshe Feinstein I referred to in my first post and present it more fully. Meanwhile, the 200 or so people who vist this blog daily are invited to choose between my analysis and that of R. Schwartz. Perhaps some will even be moved to comment.
Once again I thank Dr. Kaplan for responding to my post. I appreciate his comments although I believe he is misunderstanding my position.
The larger question we are grappling with is whether the change that occurs through prayer is ultimately considered an act of man or an act of G-d. I do not understand how this question can be confused with magic. Magic appeals to forces other than G-d, is most often a private act, and most importantly is expected to be effective each time it is invoked. Prayer differs on each of these counts. I do concede however that the expression “manipulate Divine intervention” was poorly chosen. I would have been better suited to writing that “change accomplished through prayer is ultimately attributed to human acts”.
Even if the change accomplished through prayer is ultimately considered to be the act of man, (as Chazon Ish at the end of Orach Chayim clearly assumes) nevertheless praying for one to expire cannot possibly be considered murder, or even spiritual murder. As I wrote earlier, the level of activity required to be termed murder is far beyond the level required to be considered an action in other areas of halacha.
It is worth noting that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach maintained that even when one prays for a person to expire, all measures to preserve the life of that person, including overriding the Shabbos must be taken. Rabbi Daniel Feldman, correctly notes that Rav Shlomo Zalman clearly assumes that the change which comes about as the result of prayer is not considered to be an act of man. This position is clearly at odds with the one you cite fro Rav Moshe.
I did not address the question of whether a life of pain is better or worse than death because the simple interpretation of psukim including Tehillim 118 is that one would prefer a life of pain. I am aware however that this is a very large question that touches upon the propriety of the death penalty among other things.
Rabbi Schwartz: Again, thank you for you thoughtful response. I am glad you realized that your choice of language was problemtic, and have modified it accordingly. Even with your modification, I still find
the active conception of prayer problematic, and, if not magic, too close to magic for comfort, but I’ll let the readers decide.
The nub of the difference between us is whether we should understand the debate about the legitimacy of praying for a suffering, terminally ill person as a debate over the nature of prayer or a debate over the value of that life. As for your remarks about prefering a life of pain, we are not talking here about a life of pain in general, but about the life of a terminally ill person suffering a great deal of pain.
Anyone knowledgeable readers care to comment?
Allow me another possible explanation. Perhaps the debate is neither about the nature of prayer nor about the value of this life, but about the nature of the action of God we are praying for. To return to the Rema, the disctinction re the goses is not so much between active and passive intervention, but between directly hastening death and removing an external impediment. So when we are praying to God that a terminally ill persan in great pain should expire, how do we view this. Do we see God as an external impediment, artificially prolonging the persom’s life and are asking him to stop doing so, in which case the prayer would be permitted. Or do we view the prayer as asking God to directly hasten the person’s death, in which case it would be forbidden. I still gretly prefer my original explanation, but am suggesting this one for consideration.
While this article is about “philosophical considerations,” I would add that there is a practical alternative. Davening for someone’s recovery from a terminal illness vs davening for a hasty, “merciful,” death are the only options discussed. I would offer as a “l’maseh” one can pray for a relief from suffering. How that relief is obtained is of secondary consideration. If the patient recovers, good; if the patient expires and is no longer afflicted in this world, gom zu latova.