They both gave the lecture? Trei Kalei La nishtamei!

I am surprised that Rabbis Aryeh and Dov Frimer did not mention the no less than four rishonim who explicitly or implicitly deny that women’s aliyot are prohibited because of sexual tension. Explicitly — Sefer haMeorot and R. Manoach write that there is “no peritzut” involved in kevod hatzibur as regards women’s aliyot. Implicitly — Ritva and R. Avraham Min haHar write that it is a matter of me’eirah (and therefore not of peritzut).
See Bnei Banim 4:3,8, inter alia. Even were they to give sufficient prominence to these rishonim in the expanded article — and they trump achronim, none of whom cited them — they are certainly “leading references” and should have been included in the Text and Texture version.

We thank Rav Henkin Shlita for his important comments. The “Sexual Distraction School” is supported by Behag according to Tosafot, Sukka 38a and Sefer haAguda, and perhaps Semag. He is, of course, correct in pointing out that two Rishonim from Narvonna, R. Meir haMe’ili and R. Mano’ah both explicitly state that kevod haTsibbur has nothing to do with pritsut (promiscuity); see: R. Meir haMe’ili, Sefer haMe’orot, Berakhot 45b, and R. Mano’ah on Yad, Hilkhot Berakhot, chap. 5, no. 7. See also R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, “The Significant Role of Habituation in Halakha,” Tradition 34:3 (Fall: 2000), pp. 40-49. These Narvonna Rishonim tell us what – to their mind – kevod haTsibbur is NOT, but not what it IS. Presumably they align themselves with the zilzul haMitzva school of Kevod haTsibbur. This ia also how we also understand Ritva and R. Avraham Min haHar cited by Rav Henkin – but this requires some discussion, which will have to wait for the full article.

[...] Partnership Minyanim by Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer | Text … [...]

Isn’t Kol Isha also a major concern for a woman leading Hallel, assuming she is singing it?

Moshe, It is difficult to forbid a woman from being a Hazanit on the grounds of Kol beIsha Erva alone. This is because many poskim allow a woman’s voice by shirei Kodesh. Similarly, many poskim hold that women chanting the Torah or Megilla with the appropriate notes (ta’amei ha-mikra) is not included in the prohibition of kol be-isha erva. See: R. Jacob Hayyim Sofer, Kaf haHayyim, sec. 689, no. 2, note 13; Resp. Divrei Heifets, cited by R. Hayyim Hezekiah Medini, Sdei Hemed, Klalim, Ma’arekhet kuf, klal 42; R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, Resp. Seridei Eish, II, sec. 8; R. Nahum Tsvi Kornmehl, Resp. Tiferet Tsvi, II, sec. 7; R. Samuel haLevi Wosner, Resp. Shevet haLevi, III, sec. 14 – who indicates that most rishonim are lenient by keriah de-mitsvah; R. Joseph Dov Soloveitchik, cited by R. Howard Jachter, “The Parameters of Kol Isha,” available online at: ^[20]; R. Ovadiah Yosef, Yehave Da’at, III, sec. 51, note, and IV, sec. 15, end of note; R. Ovadiah Yosef, Resp. Yabia Omer, VIII, O.H., sec. 22, no. 10 and IX, O.H., sec. 98, no. 9, and sec. 108, no. 74; R. Ovadiah Yosef, Hazon Ovadiah – Purim, me-Hilkhot Mikra Megilla, no. 4, note 22, p. 59; R. Ovadiah Yosef, Hazon Ovadiah – Tu bi-Shevat, Hilkhot Birkhot haHoda’a, no. 4, note 9, pp. 346-347; R. Ovadiah Yosef, Me’or Yisrael, I, Megilla 4a, s.v. “beTosfot d”h Nashim,” p. 251, and Megilla 23a, s.v. “Tanu Rabbanan, haKol,” p. 279; R. Ovadiah Yosef, Halikhot Olam, II, Ekev, sec. 2, note 2, p. 74; R. Ovadiah Yosef, approbation to R. Hanan haLevi, Imrei Hanan, I (Kefar Hasidim, 5746); R. Ovadiah Yosef, MeShiurei Maran haRishon leZion, Rabbeinu Ovadiah Yosef Shelita, I, Gilyon 19, va-Yeira 5756, sec. 2, p. 73. R. Isaac Yosef, Yalkut Yosef, V, Dinei Keriat Megilla, sec. 12 and notes 19 and 22, and VII, sec. 23, no. 11, end of note 16; R. Isaac Yosef, Yalkut Yosef, Otsar Dinim la-Isha ve-laBat, sec. 24, no. 6; R. Simeon Hirari, “Kol be-Isha Erva ve-Nashim bi-Keriat Megilla”, Or Torah, Adar 5731, sec 123, pp. 289-292 and Nisan 5731, sec. 148, pp. 339-343 – see especially p. 341 s.v. “u-le-Or;” and R. Yehuda Herzl Henkin, Resp. Bnai Vanim, II, sec. 10, III, sec. 1, and IV, sec. 8.

the quote from RYBS that you cited in the past is that a woman can’t read (be baalat koreh) for a man today. a woman can go to the torah, make the brachot and read. a man goes to the torah and makes the brachot, the women or minor child can’t read for him b/c they are at a lesser degree of obligation and this is what rybs says. however if the woman goes to the torah and makes the bracha, why can’t the man at the higher level of obligation read?

cont. the quote from rybs doesn’t say otherwise

for rmf, the problem is shlichut, that an adult can’t make a child a shaliach. he is quoted as saying that in some circumstances a child can make an adult a shaliach and that’s why the child can have an aliya but cant be bal koreh. where do you get the idea that a woman cant make a man a shaliach. i think this entire argument is misguided. the bifurcation of bracaha and reading only works if you argue that the torah doesnt simply need to be read, itself a chidush, as the simple approach is that the torah must simply be read by anyone. even so, even if it must be read by an adult male, youhavent shown that a child or woman cant be oleh latorah and indeed your analysis would apply to children as well as women, and if you were correct, youd have to show why we can give children aliyot – as is in fact done -but not women and you havent done that’

as already discussed in previous discussions on hihurhim, theres nothing in the texts you cite about rampant illiteracy.

here’s the quote that you cited on seforim blog in the past

ת מדרשו של הרב, הלכות קריאת התורה, עמוד ל”א
…אבל בזמן הזה, דבעינן לאתויי לידי דינא דשומע כעונה מהבעל קורא להעולה,…דדין ג’ או ז’ קרואים, הוא שיהיו ז’ קוראים, או על כל פנים שיהיה הקורא הוא המברך. ואם כן בכדי לומר שומע כעונה בעינן מחוייב בדבר, וקטן ואשה פסולים לקרות בזמן הזה מצד הדין, אם לא שמברכים הם על קריאת עצמם

where do you get a problem in the opposite direction? he says a katan and woman cant READ not that they cant make the brachas. indeed children do make the brachas, therefore you have to explain why they can and women cant

an,
The question you ask requires a lengthy analysis of how the ba’al korei reads for the oleh – an analysis of sheme’ah ke’oneh and areivut – which we do in the full article. Briefly, only the oleh is the one who is designated to read and make berakhot on what he/she read. Everyone else is required to hear – and that includes the ba’al korei. So how can the ba’al korei read for the oleh? The answer is that areivut can also be used by those who would have been fully obligated were some external condition fulfilled. They are considered “inherently obligated,” even if the condition has not yet been fulfilled, and can recite the appropriate benediction for their fellows requiring assitance. (See note 1)
Most posekim maintain that one bears no areivut for those who lack any inherent obligation – even though they would like to perform the mitsva optionally. (note 2) Hence, the male ba’al korei cannot be motsi a woman who is not obligated in keri’at haTorah.
Regarding minors, while they are not fully obligated, there is an obligation to educate them (mitsvat Hinukh), and this is sufficient to validate a one-directional transfer from the major to the minor. It is for this reason that a major may recite havdala and other birkhot ha-mitsva to be motsi (assist) a minor. (note 3) This is not the case for women, who bear no obligation whatsoever. The upshot of this is that minor males may be able to receive aliyyot and have others read for them, but women may not.

Notes
1. Shulhan Arukh haRav, O.H., sec. 197, no. 6. For review, see R. Moses Levi, Birkat haShem, V (Jerusalem: Makhon Ish Matsliah, 5756), chap. 3, secs. 3-5 and notes 12-22 thereto.

2. At the crux of the issue is the ruling of Rama, O.H., sec. 589, no. 6 that a man who has heard
the shofar (a time-determined and, hence, optional mitsva for women), may sound the shofar for women, but may not recite the appropriate benediction for them. [Ashkenazi women recite the berakha for themselves, while sefardi women tend to refrain from reciting all optional benedictions; for further discussion see: Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, “Women's Prayer Services: Theory and Practice. Part 1 - Theory,” Tradition, 32:2, pp. 5-118 (Winter 1998)] – available online at ^[21] In discussing this ruling, most posekim maintain that one Jew bears no areivut for those who would like to perform an optional mitsva. On blowing shofar for women, see: Ritva, Hilkhot Berakhot, sec. 5, no. 2, and novella to Rosh haShana 29b; Tur, O.H., sec. 589, Darkei Moshe, no. 2; R. Abraham Danzig, Hayyei Adam, sec. 141, no. 7 – see also comments of R. Aaron Joseph Bloch thereto, Lev Adam (Monticello, NY: 1967), II, p. 510; R. Jehiel Michel Tucazinsky, Lu’ah leErets Yisrael, Tishrei, Kelaim laTeki’ot, no. 10 (p. 10, end of note 1 in the Jerusalem 5767 edition of R. Nissan Aaron Tucazinsky); R. Abraham Judah Farbstein, Kenesset Avraham, sec. 1; Halikhot Beita, sec 20, no. 9; R. Moses Mordechai Karp, Hilkhot Hag be-Hag – Yamim Noraim, sec. , no. 3, note 13;. On Shulhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 589, no. 6, see: Rama; Hezekiah ben David da Silva, Peri Hadash, no. 6; R. Elijah Kramer of Vilna (Gra), Bei’ur haGra, s.v. “Aval aherim;” R. Menahem Mendel Auerbach, Ateret Zekenim; Shulhan Arukh haRav, no. 2; R. Ephraim Zalman Margaliot, Mateh Efrayyim, no. 12; Mishna Berura, note 11. On making havdala for women, on Shulhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 296, no. 8, see the following: Magen Avraham, note 11; Eliya Rabba, note 18; Shulhan Arukh haRav, no. 19; Mishna Berura, note 36; Kitzur Shuhan Arukh, sec. 96, no. 14; Resp. Yabia Omer, O.H., sec. 24; Halikhot Beita, sec 15, no. 31. On reciting leishev ba-sukka for women, see: on Shulhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 640, no. 1, Magen Avraham, note 1 and Mishna Berura, note 1; Halikhot Beita, sec 22, no. 6. Hence, in the case of tekiat shofar by one who has already fulfilled his obligation, he is forbidden to recite the relevant berakha. Nevertheless, hearing the shofar is unique for various reasons, and one who is not obligated may do so even when the shofar is blown by one who has already fulfilled their obligation. For further discussion, see: R. Zussman Sofer, comments to R. Jacob Alfandri, Resp. Mutsal meEish, sec. 12; R. Zvi Pesah Frank, Mikra’ei Kodesh, Yamim Nora’im, secs. 25; R. Aryeh Tsvi Fromer, Si’ah haSadeh, Sha’ar Birkhat HaShem, sec. 4, no. 19; R. Moshe Sternbuch, Moadim uZemanim, I, sec. 2 and additions to this discussion at the beginning of VIII; R. Abraham Judah Farbstein, Kenesset Avraham, sec. 1; Halikhot Beita, sec. 20, no. 9, note 17; R. Meir haKohen, Shabbat keHalakha, Kuntress Or haShabbat, sec. 2, no. 5.

3. See: Magen Avraham, O.H., sec. 273, no. 7 and Mishna Berura, no. 16 (re’ kiddush and havdala); Mateh Efrayyim, O.H., sec. 625, no. 59 (re’ sukkah); haKatan veHilkhotav, I, chap. 13, no. 2 and note 2.

“Now, if a woman is obligated to fulfill a particular personal ritual, such as reciting birkat ha-gomel or saying Kaddish yatom, many gedolei ha-poskim see no problem, for this is her individual obligation.”
As a woman who is currently saying kaddish and is not one to attend the partnership minyanim of which you write (but who has often been told to just go to one of those minyanim if I want to feel comfortable saying kaddish and who has been asked to leave a regular Orthodox shul on occasion for saying kaddish along with a man), I was both surprised and impressed to see that you make this subtle but critical distinction which many people don’t bother to make. I’ve been at many lectures on feminism and Orthodoxy where rabbis have spoken about women saying kaddish in the same way they speak about women reading from the Torah (or even writing sifrei Torah). In today’s polarized climate, it is tempting (and perhaps easier) even for people who are otherwise talmidei chachamim to put everything that connects to women acting publically in shul into the same category of “feminist” and “not halakhic.” I am grateful to the authors for maintaining the honestly with the sources of our tradition to make the distinction that they make in this instance.
Could you post some of the sources to which you refer, regarding women reciting kaddish yatom?

Yetoma in Yerushalayim,

Thank you for you comments.
Regarding secondary sources on Kaddish Yetoma, see the notes to pp. 101-103 of “Guarding the Treasure: A Review of Tamar Ross, Expanding the Palace of the King –Orthodoxy and Feminism, Brandeis University Press, Waltham 2004, xxiv + 342 pp.,” Aryeh A. Frimer, BDD – Journal of Torah and Scholarship, 18, English section, pp. 67-106 (April 2007). PDF file available online at ^[22]

In this regard, allow me to quote from two outstanding gedolim. The first is Rav Ahron Soloveichik zatsa”l (Od Yisrael Yosef Beni Hai, end of sec. 32, p. 100) who comments regarding kaddish yetoma:

“Nowadays, when there are Jews fighting for equality for men and women in matters such as aliyot, if Orthodox rabbis prevent women from saying kaddish when there is a possibility for allowing it, it will strengthen the influence of Reform and Conservative rabbis. It is, therefore, forbidden to prevent women from saying kaddish.”

In a similar spirit, the outstanding American posek, R. Joseph Elijah Henkin (Kitvei haGri Henkin, II, Teshuvot Ibra, sec. 4, no. 1) writes:

“It is known that were it not for kaddish, many would refrain from teaching prayer to their sons and would not come to synagogue. When they come because of kaddish, they also come a bit closer to Judaism the rest of the year; and for that reason itself, one should not rebuff the na’arot [girls] either, since it fosters closeness to Judaism.”

Nevertheless, there are many halachic and public policy considerations – and each communal Rabbi has to determine what is the best for his community. That’s why he’s there.

My condolences on your loss. Min haShamayyim tenuhami.

R. Frimer, thank you for the detailed response. Since Kol Isha is not an absolute prohibition here, does that mean the only bar to women doing kabalat shabbat is kvod tzibur? Similarly, Hallel on Rosh Chodesh (which is a just a minhag and so obligation doesn’t come into play) is also mainly about kvod tzibur? Since Chazal did not even know of kabalat shabbat when they made the takana of kvod tzibur, how does this work? How does the prohibition of kvod tzibur get extended to beyond what Chazal themselves applied it to?

Moshe,
I said that it was difficult to prohibit hazzaniyot based on Kol beIsha Erva because of the sizable number of poskim I cited which matir shirei kodesh. However, many if not most poskim assur, of course. R. Isaac ben Aba Mari, Asseret haDibrot gives Kol beIsha erva as the reason for prohibiting women from reading Megillat Esther for men, even though they share equal obligation. Various aharonim invoke “kol be-isha erva” in regard to the question of women chanting the Torah. See, inter alia: R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Resp. Tsits Eliezer, XX, sec. 36, nos. 2 and 3; R. Joseph Messas, Mayyim Hayyim, II, O.H., sec. 140; R. Hayyim David haLevi, Resp. Asei leKha Rav, V, sec. 97; R. Efraim Greenblatt, Resp. Rivevot Efrayyim, I, sec. 449; R. Shlomo Yosef Elyashiv and R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, cited in R. Abraham-Sofer Abraham, Nishemat Avraham, V, Y.D., sec. 195, p. 76-77.

The poskim we cited in this article (R. Aharon Lichtenstein and R. Moshe Mordechai Karp) maintain that any prayer customarily recited as part of public prayer, and for whose recitation we regularly appoint a Hazzan – involves kevod haTsibbur. As we note in the article, the source and nature of this communal obligation is not critical. It may be biblical, rabbinic, custom or mitsva min ha-muvhar. The recitation of the megillot, kaballat Shabbat and certainly pesukei de-zimra in shul – is a long standing communal minhag of at least hundreds of years. Indeed, R. Saadya Gaon holds that the role of the shaliah tsibbur begins before pesukei de-zimra, and that is our minhag. In a shul context, it is the men who are obligated in performing and running public prayer. To have women fulfill these communal obligations would reveal that the men-folk do not value their halakhic responsibilities and obligations, and that is a serious issue of zilzul or bizayon ha-mitsva. Again there is no kevod ha-tsibbur by a katan because of Hinukh.

Has public prayer undergone an evolution, most definitely. Kabbalat Shabbat is a classic example. But once it it is part of the regular ritual – kevod haTsibbur applies.

”
an,
The question you ask requires a lengthy analysis of how the ba’al korei reads for the oleh – an analysis of sheme’ah ke’oneh and areivut – which we do in the full article. Briefly, only the oleh is the one who is designated to read and make berakhot on what he/she read. Everyone else is required to hear – and that includes the ba’al korei. So how can the ba’al korei read for the oleh? The answer is that areivut can also be used by those who would have been fully obligated were some external condition fulfilled. They are considered “inherently obligated,” even if the condition has not yet been fulfilled, and can recite the appropriate benediction for their fellows requiring assitance. (See note 1)
Most posekim maintain that one bears no areivut for those who lack any inherent obligation – even though they would like to perform the mitsva optionally. (note 2) Hence, the male ba’al korei cannot be motsi a woman who is not obligated in keri’at haTorah.
Regarding minors, while they are not fully obligated, there is an obligation to educate them (mitsvat Hinukh), and this is sufficient to validate a one-directional transfer from the major to the minor. It is for this reason that a major may recite havdala and other birkhot ha-mitsva to be motsi (assist) a minor. (note 3) This is not the case for women, who bear no obligation whatsoever. The upshot of this is that minor males may be able to receive aliyyot and have others read for them, but women may not.”

All the baal koreh is doing is reading. She’s the one making the bracha. if she can make the bracha herself for her own kriah, then she is making the bracha, and he is reading. Again, your source from RYBS did NOT say that the woman can’t make the bracha and be the oleh, only that she can’t be the bal koreh. You introduce the idea that she can’t be the oleh either but haven’t justified it. Please do. Regarding shlichut,pls. note that RMF rejects the idea that shomeah k’oneh is operant (and therefore ought to make RYBS’ argument moot for RMF) and says the issue is shlichut, which a minor may not effect, but a woman can – what evidence is there that one need be obligated to effect shlichut? I think there is none and RMF himself says a minor might be able to effect shlichut (even if not be the shliach) even though he is not obligated. It seems to me that you have jumped from the idea that the woman cant be baalat koreh to that she cant be oleh without justifying the leap.

further, it seems to me that acc. to RMF, even if not acc. to RYBS, the woman could be the baalat koreh also, as the argument from shlichut would not seem to apply to women at all

I just want to add that I’m opposed to women’s aliyot. However, I have not seen a proper response to R Shapiro’s article. Your approach has been to argue from the sources for a clear issur – if that’s doable, I’d like to see it, but I don’t see how you have made an argument for bracha levatala when the woman is the oleh and someone reads for her, and just insisting this is so isn’t sufficient. In addition, you have to deal with the claim that R Henkin zt”l said the barrier to women’s aliyot is being machzik ydei overi averea. Surely a great gaon like R Henkin knew about the issue of bracha levalala. On seforim blog, you said that one simply can’t argue that our practice doesn’t follow the bavli since we have a baal koreh and hence kovod hatzibur doesnt apply, by asserting that the language of the bavli re kovod hatzibur is copied even once the insitution of baal koreh was in effect (I think that was your argument). Well – why did R Henkin zt”l not know that? He’s quoted by R Shapiro as saying that the entire issue of kovod hatzibur no longer applies now that we have baalei koreh. When those who introduce aliyos follow R Henkin’s ANALYSIS (not his bottom line to asser!), the arguments against have to be strong. Why not simply say that the issue is being machznik ydei overi averah, changing tradition etc? If you argue its ossur on the merits before we get to such issues, then surely you have to deal with the quote from R Henkin zt”l who apparently disagreeed with your analysis. Are you trying to argue that R Henkin zt”l was wrong? Or do you dispute the quote from him, or what?

Most of the 7 concerns you had with Professor Sperber’s argument are based on poor or circular logic.

With #1 and #2, you are claiming that Kavod Habriyot can’t override kavod hatzibur because there’s a concern of kavod hatzibur – but what if that community is OK with it? Why do you assume it will be considered a dishonor to the community?

With #3, if it’s a real issue of Kavod Habriyot, why would we only allow a temporary fix? If the problem is going to persist, why wouldn’t we want to allow a more permanent correction?

#4 fits things like aliyot (although it’s hard to argue that exclusion from services isn’t an insult to people), but it wouldn’t apply to Mechitza which is an active form of separation and discrimination.

With #5, it is quite presumptuous and insulting to imply that only certain hypersensitive people are troubled by the denial of aliyot for women. There are large groups of people who feel this way, and entire communities who find this discrimination troubling.

Maybe you just did a poor job of explaining #6, but it doesn’t make much sense. The only thing it does tell me is that #7 must not be that good of a refutation: if only those four categories work with kavod habriyot, then that should be the reason not to sew clothing on yom tov. Who would care about “all understand”?

An,
In you first and second post you err as to the job of the Oleh and the possibilities of shlihut. The oleh’s function is to read from the Torah aloud to the Tsibbur and make berakhot on what he reads. According to the vast vast majority of poskim (see full paper), the oleh is the only one in that congregation with that job. If he doesn’t do both parts of his job – the birkot hamitsva on the ma’aseh mitsva, the berakhot are berakhot levatalah.

Once there was bifurcation of the Oleh’s function – with the oleh making berakhot and ba’al korei reading, the only way to prevent a berakhah levatala is to transfer the ba’al korei’s action to the oleh. According to the vast majority of Poskim (see full article), the mechanism for that is shome’ah keoneh. Some poskim (like Rav Moshe Feinstein) invoke shelihut. But in either case, both the mashmi’ah/Shali’ah and the Shomei’a/shole’ah need to be OBLIGATED – otherwise there is no transfer/shelihut. These are the basic rules of Shome’ah ke-oneh or shelihut (see full article). Hence, when either the ba’al korei or the oleh is not obligated (e.g., a woman), there cannot be a transfer of the ma’aseh mitsva to the mevarekh, and berakha is rendered a berakha levatala.

Regarding your third post, I highly respect Rav Yehuda Herzl Henkin shelit”a, who I’ve known from my college days. We have corresponded a great deal over the years, and sometimes disagree. Our analyses of keri’at haTorah differ, even to our understanding of his grandfather zatsal’s position (see the full paper). He doesn’t need me – by any means – to defend his position, and he is easily accessible. I only ask that you pass judgment after you read the full documented paper.

Yes, Dov and I believe that there is fundamental problem me-ikkar ha-din with women receiving aliyyot or serving as ba’alot keri’a – if they do only half the job. If a woman both reads and makes the berakhot – that is the case of the Baraita in Megilla, and it is where the issue of kevod ha-tsibbur kicks in.

(Dov, is presently in the Hu”l; otherwise he would speak eloquently for himself).

Aaron, I don’t mind criticism or disagreement, but your tone was a bit disrespectful.

In points #1 and #2, IT IS THE MEIRI who is arguing kevod ha-beriyyot can’t override kevod ha-tsibbur. Whether a community can wave kevod ha-tsibbur is unrelated separate issue, which we dealt with earlier in the paper in a separate section.

Regarding #3, generally speaking kevod ha-beriyyot should not be able to set aside anything (as is the case for biblical ordinances). It was Hazal themselves who indicated that, in the case of rabbinic ordinances, they would allow their gezerot and takanot to be set aside in a case of kevod ha-beriyyot. The Yerushalmi makes it clear kevod ha-beriyyot, can only temporarily do so. Those are the rules that Hazal set up. I’m sorry you don’t approve.

Re’ #4 – I thought it was aliyyot that was under discussion in this section.

Re’ #5, I simply disagree with your analysis. There is an important difference between preferring it would be otherwise and being insulted. I would prefer to be a Kohen, but I’m not insulted that I can’t duchen, do Pidyon haBen, need to defer to a kohen in birkat ha-mazon etc. The Halakha is clear as to the rights and responsibilities of Kohenim vs Yisraelim, and as a halakhic Jew I have chosen to live by it, despite the fact that I really would like to duchen from time to time. The Halakha is also clear that women are not obligated in keri’at haTorah – which is the crux of kevod haTsibbur. Many women would prefer it otherwise, but most understand the halakhic priorities and choose to live by it.

Regarding #6 and #7, I’m sorry you disagree with poskim.

I would like to remind the reader that only one of the 7 (many more in the full paper) rules we cite has to be correct for R. Sperbers argument to fall.

re if Orthodox rabbis prevent women from saying kaddish when there is a possibility for allowing it, it will strengthen the influence of Reform and Conservative rabbis -Rav Ahron Soloveichik zt”l

This is an interesting argument. Can it be applied in other areas? (unfortunately the only example I can think of is women Rabbis)

Yisroel,
In the case of Women saying Kaddish, major league poskim came out in support of this innovation. The same is not at all true regarding women getting semicha.

Thank you Rabbi Aryeh Frimer

(Women’s smicha is not my issue just example)

I was wondering if there is any other application of Rav Ahron Soloveichik zt”l’s powerful words. More often than not I see the opposite logic applied.

Yisroel,

See my comments on pp. 101-103 of “Guarding the Treasure: A Review of Tamar Ross, Expanding the Palace of the King –Orthodoxy and Feminism, Brandeis University Press, Waltham 2004, xxiv + 342 pp.,” Aryeh A. Frimer, BDD – Journal of Torah and Scholarship, 18, English section, pp. 67-106 (April 2007). PDF file available online at ^[22] I briefly discuss Women’s Zimmun, Birkat haGomel, Kaddish Yetoma and Women’s Megilla reading for women.

Thanks for a tremendous article, and looking forward to seeing the full manuscript soon.

You mentioned as an aside at the end the fact that there is now a shift to rely on texts to create a society of leniency, as opposed to stricture; do you know if anyone has written about this more thoroughly?

do you have any response to the question about R Henkin’s position

“In the case of Women saying Kaddish, major league poskim came out in support of this innovation. The same is not at all true regarding women getting semicha.”

Here’s the problem as I see it. If you can prove that it’s ossur to give women aliyot, then the case is closed.
However, if the quote from R Henkin zt”l is legitimate – that’s enough to raise the question of whether circumstances have changed since his day.

Gary,
I’m afraid I do not know anything serious. See, however, the following: “Feminist Innovations in Orthodoxy Today: Is Everything in Halakha – Halakhic?” Aryeh A. Frimer, JOFA Journal, 5:2, pp. 3-5 (Summer 2004/Tammuz 5764). PDF file available online at: ^[23]
I discuss the growing phenomenon of citing a makor here and a da’at yahid there to reach a predetermined goal – rather than an honest search for the truth.

An,
You’ll have to contact Rav Yehuda Herzl Henkin and ask him yourself. He’s easily accessible by email. But I believe that as long as there is a bifurcation of roles, where either the oleh or the ba’al korei is a woman, the berakha is le-vatala me-ikkar ha-din. An analysis of kevod ha-tsibbur only kicks in when a woman does both parts: reads her aliyya and makes the nerakhot on her ma’aseh mitsva.

Response to the Frimers

Though Maimonides ruled ((הלכות תפילין ומזוזה וספר תורה י’ ה’ that a sefer Torah that is missing even one letter or has one extra letter, and certainly whose parchment is not prepared properly, is not fit to be read from in public and is like a humash that is used to teach children, we find a relaxation to this restriction in a responsum (פאר הדור ט) about sifrei Torah that are pesulim. Maimonides is asked whether it is permitted to say the blessings when reading from a sefer Torah that is not made properly or when the parchment is such that the sefer is clearly pasul.

In his response, he states that it is permitted to recite the blessings and explains that the reason given (see גטין ס.) for not being permitted to read from a humash in the public reading is because of kevod ha-tzibbur. He states that there is no greater example of paslanut than a humash. “Why was the reason given – because of kevod ha-tzibbur – that one cannot read from a humash? They should have given the reason that it is because it is pasul [if it would be forbidden to read from it]!” Maimonides explains that it is clear that the statement not to read from a humash is referring to the public reading of seven or three aliyot, and that the reason one may not read the public reading from a humash is because of kevod ha-tzibbur and not because of a blessing that would be said in vain. And he concludes “All the people in the West relied on this and they would read from sefarim of parchment that had no [proper] processing, and they would bless before and after before ge’onei olam”.

It should be noted that Maimonides presumes that a restriction due to kevod ha-tzibbur can be ignored, without even the slightest hint of a justification or the need for one.

On the matter of men’s obligation in public prayer (vs. women’s lack of such obligation) – this is an old debate, which can be found between R. Dr. Michael Broyde and R. Dr. Judith Hauptman in the pages of Judaism in 1993. I maintain that Professor Hauptman is correct in asserting that there is no such obligation on men. In fact, other than some quite late and minor reference to such (which can be found in Aryeh Frimer’s article from years ago on minyan) one is quite pressed to find any textual foundation (i.e., the Talmud or the codes) for an actual obligation for men, and I believe that this idea was promoted to encourage attendance at minyan, to reduce the amount of talking during the repetition of the amida, and, most cynically, to find excuses for why women cannot serve as prayer leaders (though Professor Hauptman gives the Orthodox world too much credit – way too many Orthodox Jews do not realize that women really are obligated in the amida and that the Magen Avraham was just melamed zekhut and does not present Maimonides’ actual view).

Let us return to Maimonides, who attempted a different solution to the talking during the repetition of the amida in the Young Israel of Fustat. He simply instituted its elimination. In several responsa, Maimonides explains that the situation during the repetition of the amida is appalling. Those who have already said the amida either talk, spit, or go out, and those who are ignoramuses and must hear the repetition, cannot hear it because of all the talking. Rather, the leader should say the amida out loud (only), with the knowledgeable people mumbling along with him quietly, and the ignoramuses can then hear and fulfill their obligation. Maimonides clearly states that the only reason that the leader stands at the amud is to enable the ignoramuses to fulfill their obligation. (See for example Maimonides responsa 256 and 258). He does not suggest in any way, shape, or form, that there is an additional obligation in public prayer. The Tur (או”ח הלכות תפילה סי’ קכד) also states that the leader prays out loud to fulfill the obligation on behalf of those who are ignorant and to say kedusha (which is not obligatory for anyone – Rashi says it is a custom because people are fond of it; see, for example, Rashi’s responsum 92). The Arukh HaShulhan adds that the Tur could have also added that the repetition is said so that birkat Kohanim can be said. Reading the Arukh HaShulhan there (סעיף ג’), it becomes quite clear that from the days of Rabban Gamliel and on, the answer to the question as to why the leader repeats the amida is because the Sages implemented this and that it was originally for those who were ignorant, and if there are no ignoramuses any more (especially these days, given the easy access to siddurim), then nevertheless for kedusha and birkat Kohanim it serves a purpose. If the obligation in public prayer for men were so obvious, would we not see a hint of such obligation in any of these sources? Were not women – who are also among the obligated in the amida – also, perhaps, among the ignorant who might have relied upon a leader? Or were only men ignorant? I strongly recommend reading Arukh HaShulhan, there.

A final comment on the following statement (and the many like it):
“To have women fulfill these communal obligations would reveal that the men-folk do not value their halakhic responsibilities and obligations, and that is a serious issue of zilzul or bizayon ha-mitsva.”
It is curious why this was never a concern when women help their children (including their sons, who are obligated to learn, unlike the daughters) with their humash or, these days, gemara homework. After all, the men are obligated to teach their sons – the women are not. I suppose that all of the fathers who leave this work to their wives do not value their halakhic responsibilities and obligations, that there is a serious issue of zilzul or bizayon ha-mitzva. The working mothers should make sure not to spend any of their income on their sons’ yeshiva tuition, either, for the same reason. It indeed is time that men took their halakhic obligations seriously.

It is my sincere hope that articles of the nature that the Frimers’ have so graciously shared with us will help bring about the much needed (and sometimes forecast) split between the Orthodox and those who can no longer tolerate such zilzul and bizayon of women and the value of their contribution to and participation in kiyyum mitzvot. In fact, not only are we looking at zilzul and bizayon of women, but of the Kadosh Barukh Hu, Himself, in Whose image women were created, and Who certainly hears and answers their prayers, both public and private, as much as He hears and answers the prayers of men.

A formerly Orthodox woman

Are you interested in reading more about the issues involved in the debate over women’s participation in the Torah service? Rabbi Professor Sperber’s book, mentioned in the above article, is translated into English and included within JOFA’s new publication, Women and Men in Communal Prayer: Halakhic Perspectives. The book also includes Rabbi Shapiro’s article and articles by Rabbi Riskin and Professor Shochetman that express opposition. For more information about the book, visit ^[24]

I read the posting by the Frimers on partnership minyanim with great interest. I am encouraged by the ongoing discussion about this topic and am confident that in the words of Tamar Ross, it will expand the palace of the Torah. In this brief response, I highlight three points to consider.

1. I am struck by the historical analysis that the Frimers apply to the text in Megilla 23a. They assert that women were never part of the mitzva of q’eriat ha-Torah. Instead, they were included to address the problem of insufficient people who could read the Torah and fulfill the mitzva due to widespread illiteracy. This is a plausible interpretation but one that has to be considered a hypothesis. There is no definitive proof for this proposal from the words themselves. In addition, it seems a bit odd to think that the Rabbis would have turned to women, a group that based on traditional views was less educated than men, to address a practical problem created by illiteracy. Having opened the door to historical solutions, I would offer an alternative to the one offered by the Frimers. I suggest that women were as educated as men and were, in fact, full partners in the mitzva of q’eriat Ha-Torah. As Rabbi Shapiro demonstrates, it was a communal obligation incumbent on men and women equally. The language of including women and children evokes the mitzva of Hakhel which was also a communal mitzva and which included all segments of the population. Later, out of concerns of kevod hatzibbur, the Rabbis chose to exclude women. My analysis is also credible and consistent with the text. Moreover, it eliminates the primary objection that the Frimers have against including women in q’eriat Ha-Torah because of the halakhic principle that an unobligated person cannot fulfill the obligation of one who is obligated

2. The Frimers have taken a very narrow view of kevod ha-beriot. They ignore the seminal case that is the point of departure for Rabbi Sperber’s discussion, namely the allowance of women to perform smikha on a sacrifice. The Rabbis were looking at mitzvot in a much broader way than simply avoiding embarrassment during the performance of a commandment. Instead, they were sensitive to doing what they could to maximize people’s sincere desire for full participation and spiritual engagement with ritual practice. Whether the case uses the term kevod ha-beriot specifically, I think Rabbi Sperber is right to focus on this circumstance. It indicates that kevod ha-beriot is a concept with wider provenance that the four issues defined by the Frimers namely honor of the deceased, personal hygiene, undress, and sanctity of the family unit.

3. In any legal system that is bound by founding documents, the meaning of key phrases will always be the subject of dispute. The arguments between Justices Scalia and Stevens on “original intent” underscore this point. The Frimers restrict kevod ha-tzibbur in the context of q’eriat ha-Torah to tzniut and zilzul mitzva. However, one has to wonder whether the Rabbis would have been satisfied with such a static view of a social term in its application over the next 2000 years after its initial definition. Moreover, there are men who see inclusion of their wives and daughters in tefilla in halakhically feasible ways as a creative expansion of traditional Judaism, consonant with their view of women in general and their loved ones in particular. Disrespect to the mitzva of q’eriat Ha-Torah or promotion of sexual impropriety is the farthest thing from their mind. The analyses of scholars like rabbis Shapiro and Sperber creates a potential space that is well within halakhic discourse. Not everyone may want to enter. But I think it is a mistake to consider it a betrayal or abandonment of the tradition.

The pain and anger expressed by “A Formerly Orthodox Woman” stems from the fact that our article and the opinions of leading poskim expressed therein fundamentally undermines the halakhic legitimacy of partnership minyanim. We feel for her disappointment, and continue to search for ways to increase women’s involvement in Jewish spiritual and ritual life. But our highest commitment is to the integrity of Halakha.

In an attempt to undermine our scholarship, she cites the view of Rambam permitting the recitation of birkot keri’at haTorah on a Pasul Sefer Torah, despite a violation of kevod ha-tsibbur. Her understanding of the Rambam is in error, since he was talking about a she’at ha-dehak situation, where no other sefer Torah was available – and otherwise the takanat Hazal of keri’at haTorah would perforce be cancelled (See discussion of R. Judah Leib Graubart, Resp. Havalim baNe’imim, I, sec. 28). Indeed many poskim like Rav Yoel Sirkis (Bah, Tur, O.H. sec. 144, s.v. “Medalgin beNavi.”) agree that kevod ha-tsibbur does not obtain in she’at ha-dehak situations. Secondly, the Rashba notes that this responsum was written in Maimonides youth and he later retracted this lenient position, as codified in the Yad. Indeed, as R. David Yosef notes in his edition of Maimonides Responsa Pe’er haDor, there are TWO responsa of Maimonides on this issue, with the latter agreeing to the stringent position of the Yad. Indeed, Jewish law rejects the lenient view of the first teshuva of Rambam, maintaining that no berakha may be recited on a passul sefer Torah. Most importantly, however, our argument was that after bifurcation of the roles of the Oleh, in the normative instance in partnership minyanim where a woman only leins as the ba’alat keri’a or only makes the berakhot as the Olah – the berakhot are levatala. This argument has nothing to do with kevod ha-tsibbur, and is me-ikkar ha-din, for the reasons we make clear in the article.

It is intriguing and revealing that “A Formerly Orthodox Woman” views the question of whether women are obligated in public prayer – as a dispute between Rabbi Michael Broyde and Prof. Judith Hauptman. Actually, our articles on Women and Minyan and Women’s Services document scores and scores of leading poskim to the effect that women are exempt from tefilla be-tsibbur. See: “Women and Minyan,” Aryeh A. Frimer, Tradition, 23:4, 54-77 (Summer 1988) at notes 26-29. PDF File available online at: ^[25]; “Women’s Prayer Services: Theory and Practice. Part 1 – Theory,” Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, Tradition, 32:2, pp. 5-118 (Winter 1998) at note 85. PDF File available online at: ^[26]).

Neither “A Formerly Orthodox Woman” nor Dr. Hauptman feel bound by the halakhic process or halakhic precedent. Their very selective use of Halakha and halakhic arguments is discussed in my article “Feminist Innovations in Orthodoxy Today: Is Everything in Halakha – Halakhic?” Aryeh A. Frimer, JOFA Journal, 5:2, pp. 3-5 (Summer 2004/Tammuz 5764). PDF file available online at: ^[23].

The final paragraphs, are the coup de grace of this “Response to the Frimers”. I certainly think the author should be guarded about prophetically invoking the Creator Himself to her side. This is particularly true considering that the distinction between the genders in Jewish law stems from the exemption of women from mitsvot asei she-ha-zeman gramman. This exemption is derived in the Oral Law through the use of the hermeneutical principles (Kiddushin 34a), and is therefore deemed to be biblical in origin. This must be the case since the Rabbis lack the authority to completely and permanently exempt women from commandments that the Torah itself obligates them to perform. Thus, if women are exempt from performing time-bound mitsvot, as Jewish law indeed maintains, then obviously the exemption itself must be Toraidic. Moreover, Maimonides cogently argues that this exemption is rooted in ancient oral tradition (Maimonides, Commentary to Mishna, Kiddushin 1:7). The bottom line, then, is that halakhic Judaism maintains that God Himself ordained and commanded non-identical roles for men and women. This clearly does not sit well with feminists.

For further discussion see: “Guarding the Treasure: A Review of Tamar Ross, Expanding the Palace of the King –Orthodoxy and Feminism, Brandeis University Press, Waltham 2004, xxiv + 342 pp.,” A.A. Frimer, BDD – Journal of Torah and Scholarship, 18, English section, pp. 67-106 (April 2007). PDF file of the as published article available online at ^[22]

Thank you for the thought provoking article, especially the discussion of the meaning of k’vod ha tzibbur. A few questions:
1- Is the Oleh latorah obligated to read along with the ba’al koreh and if he doesn’t is it a bracha levattala?
2- In bedikat chametz if the ba’al habayit makes the bracha and his son does the bedika, is this similar to the din of the oleh latorah and the ba’al koreh?
3-Are not the same tzniyut issues relevant to a woman saying birkat ha gomel betzibbur as in kriyat ha torah, shlichat tzibbur etc. ( Rav Naphtali Bar-Ilan instructed my wife not to say hagomel betzibbur)
4- I do not remember the source but IIRC there is a concept of a tzibbur of women for witnessing kiddush (or chillul) ha shem. Could this be applied to women saying birkat ha gomel?

Dr. Chaim Trachtman

1. We are flattered that Dr. Trachtman attributes the suggestion that Hazal considered the possibility of allowing women to receive aliyot because of rampant illiteracy to “The Frimers.” In actuality it is not ours, but that of the renowned 14th century Rishon, R. Isaac Bar Sheshet Perfet in a heavily cited responsum (Resp. Rivash, sec. 326). It is true that Torah reading is referred to as hovat ha-tsibbur, but the community referred to is the community of males who are generally obligated in Communal prayer rituals and specifically Keri’at haTorah. That women are exempted from Keri’at haTorah is the unanimous ruling of the Rishonim and near unanimous opinion of leading Aharonim.
Rishonim: Tosafot, Rosh haShana 33a, s.v. “Ha”; Rosh, Kiddushin 31a; Meiri and Ran on Rif, Megilla 23a, s.v. “haKol Olin”; R. David ben Joseph Abudarham, Sefer Abudarham, Sha’ar haShelishi, s.v. “Katav haRambam zal”; Sefer haBatim, Bet Tefilla, Sha’arei Keri’at haTorah 2:6.
Aharonim: inter alia Bet Yosef, O.H. sec. 28, s.v. “haKol;” Derisha O.H. sec. 28; R. Hayyim (ben Menahem) Algazi, Resp. Banei Hayyei, sec. 566; R. Jacob Reisha, Resp. Shevut Ya’akov, O.H. I, sec. 40; R. Elijah Kramer, the Gaon of Vilna (Gra), Alim liTerufa, Aram Tsova (Syria) 5626 (1856) edition; Resp. Orah laTsadik 3; R. Shalom Mordechai haKohen Shvadron, Resp. Maharsham, I, end of sec. 158; R. Judah Ayash, Resp. Mate Yehuda, sec. 282, no. 7; Hida, Kisei Rahamim (complete edition, Jerusalem: 1959), Masekhet Soferim 14:14 Tosafot s.v. “sheMitsvah” and 18:4, Tosafot s.v. “she-haNashim”; R. Jacob Emden, Mor uKetsiah, O.H., sec. 417; R. Joseph Te’omim, Rosh Yosef, Megilla 23a, s.v. “Leima”; Arukh haShulhan, O.H. sec. 282, no. 11; Resp. Yabia Omer, VII, O.H., sec. 17, no. 4 and VIII, O.H., sec. 54, no. 7; Resp. Yehave Da’at, IV, sec. 23, note 1; Yalkut Yosef, II, Hiyyuv Keri’at haTorah veTiltul haSefer Torah, sec. 9 and footnotes 6 and 11; R. Isaac Yosef, Kitsur Shulhan Arukh Yalkut Yosef, O.H. sec. 135, no. 9; R. Moses Stern (the Debriciner Rov), Resp. Be’er Moshe, VIII, sec. 85; R. Efrayyim Greenblatt, Resp. Rivevot Ephrayyim, VI, sec. 153, no. 21

The suggestion that women were as knowledgeable as men of the period simply flies in the face of all the scholarship done on the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman periods. (See for example: Bonner, Stanly F. [1977]. Education in Ancient Rome. University of California Press, p. 27) Any attempt to compare Keri’at haTorah to Hakhel is unrealistic. Hakhel is a once-in-seven-years ritual – in which the masses were totally passive. Keri’at haTorah by contrast, is a four-times a week ritual, in which up to 7 readers were required. This demands substantial literacy which was not always prevalent in ancient times even among the men-folk. The fact that a particular suggestion is theoretically credible is generally deemed insufficient within the framework of the Halakhic process, unless the suggestion can be supported by the weight of Halakhic tradition and legal discourse. In this particular case, Dr. Trachtman’s suggestion lacks both the historical foundation and the critical Halakhic rooting.

2. R. Sperber attempts to equate between kevod ha-beriyyot (human dignity) and nahat ruah (spiritual satisfaction). Truth is, however, that there are very fundamental and important differences between the two. The former involves human dignity and is invoked in situations where shame or deep emotional stress would accrue as a result of the fulfillment of a religious obligation. In bona fide cases where kevod ha-beriyyot is challenged, rabbinic prohibitions and obligations may be set aside (following the guidelines discussed in our article and full paper).

Nahat ruah, on the other hand, describes women’s desire to be more involved spiritually than the law requires. It is this category, not kevod ha-beriyyot, which in fact relates to the desire of some women to take a greater part in religious ritual. In such cases, we find that Rabbinic prohibitions were NOT set aside, though Hazal did indeed permit certain special dispensations for women. But, as the vast majority of Rishonim indicate, these dispensations involved very minor infractions, if at all, of Jewish custom and legal concerns. Generally speaking, these dispensations included: (1) Hazal’s decision to refrain from instituting a prohibition of marit ha-ayin – even though the desired permitted act “looks like” a forbidden one; (2) Hazal’s decision to refrain from prohibiting a permissible act that might lead to a prohibited one; and (3) setting aside unnecessarily stringent customs.

3. Any legal system, certainly systems like Halakha which are rooted in text, has a legal tradition which guides us in how the seminal documents are to be understood and interpreted. To suggest hypothetical interpretations that radically break with the flow of this legal tradition – especially when we are dealing with a tradition of hundreds of years – is clearly problematic and therefore usually shunned by the Halakhic process. For this very reason, we make every effort to thoroughly document our published articles. It is this Halakhic tradition and mesorat ha-pesak that generally defines what is and what is not within the parameters of halakha le-ma’aseh – not merely the theoretical possibility of interpretation. Moreover, it is for this very reason that we all too often, find that the creative thinking of those who are attempting to “push the envelope”, comes at the cost of the intellectual and analytic integrity of the Halakhic system itself.

David Tzohar,
Thank you for your kind comments and thought provoking questions.

1.R. Yoseph Caro rules according to Rabbenu Asher (Rosh, Megilla, Chapter 3, no. 1; Resp. haRosh, part 3, sec. 12) and others that even in the presence of a ba’al korei, the oleh is obligated to read along quietly with the reader, lest the oleh’s berakhot be considered in vain. Indeed, Rabbi Caro (Shulhan Arukh, O.H., sec 139, nos. 2 and 3, and sec. 141, no 2) rules, as a result, that a blind or illiterate person is precluded from receiving an aliyya. R. Moses Isserlish (Rama, Darkei Moshe, Tur, O.H., sec. 135, no.4 and sec. 141, no 1) concurs that normative halakha requires the oleh to read along with the reader; however, he cites the leniency of R. Jacob Molin (Maharil, Sefer Maharil – Minhagim, Jerusalem: Machon Yeushalayim, 5749, Hilkhot Keri’at haTorah, end of sec. 3) and others) as permitting a blind or illiterate person to receive an aliyya, even though neither can read along with the ba’al korei from the Torah parchment.

R. Soloveitchik (miBet Midrasho Shel haRav, Hilkhot Keri’at ha-Torah, sec. 135, no. 13, p. 50; Shiurei haGrid zatsa”l – Inyanei Tsitsit, Tefillen u-Keri’at haTorah, R. Zvi Schachter, ed. (Jerusalem, 5763), Hilkhot Keri’at ha-Torah, sec. 135, no. 13, p. 157) notes, while we advise olim le-khatkhila to read along quietly following the Rosh, in practice, we rule like Maharil. Thus, it is a widespread custom, both amongst ashkenazim and sefaradim to call to the Torah the blind, untrained and illiterate, who clearly cannot or will not read along from the scroll; see: Mishna Berura, O.H., sec. 139, no. 13. In addition, notes the Rov, if one is called to the Torah while he is in the midst of birkhot keri’at shema, the halakhic consensus is to accept the aliyya and recite the blessings, but not to read along with the ba’al korei – again relying on Maharil; see: Mishna Berura, O.H., sec. 66, no. 26. I

2. By bedikat hametz the poskim rule that if the Ba’al haBayit made the berakha he should START the bedika (do some of the ma’aseh ha-mitzva – so the berakha can take hold), which the son or shali’ah can complete. If the Ba’al haBayit does absolutely nothing, then the Shaliah makes the Berakha and does the ma’aseh ha-mitzva. The same is true by circumcision, that the birkat ha-mitzva “al ha-mila” is made by the mohel who does the ma’aseh ha-mitzva, not by the father. The father does make the birkat ha-shevah of “le-hakhniso” which is not connected directly to the ma’aseh ha-mitzva, but the outcome.

3. Some poskim clearly believe that the same tzni’ut issues relevant to a woman saying kri’at ha-Torah, shlihat tsibbur etc. also apply to birkat ha gomel betsibbur. However, as we stated in the article, many poskim disagree and maintain the kevod ha-tsibbur only applies to communal prayer ritual – not personal obligations (like birkat haGomel, kaddish yetoma and Kiddush) recited in a minyan or tsibbur.

4. In our article on Women and Minyan [Tradition, 23:4, 54-77 (Summer 1988); PDF File available online at: ^[25] we demonstrate that many poskim hold the since women are obligated in martyrdom, they count for a minyan by Kiddush Hashem. We also discuss Birkat haGomel at length and cite many poskim who indicate that women count for a minyan for this as well, though others dissent.

sorry for not responding earlier but I didn’t see your response until now (they didn’t show up on my screen last week for some reason).

“An,
In you first and second post you err as to the job of the Oleh and the possibilities of shlihut. The oleh’s function is to read from the Torah aloud to the Tsibbur and make berakhot on what he reads. According to the vast vast majority of poskim (see full paper), the oleh is the only one in that congregation with that job. If he doesn’t do both parts of his job – the birkot hamitsva on the ma’aseh mitsva, the berakhot are berakhot levatalah.

Once there was bifurcation of the Oleh’s function – with the oleh making berakhot and ba’al korei reading, the only way to prevent a berakhah levatala is to transfer the ba’al korei’s action to the oleh. According to the vast majority of Poskim (see full article), the mechanism for that is shome’ah keoneh. Some poskim (like Rav Moshe Feinstein) invoke shelihut. But in either case, both the mashmi’ah/Shali’ah and the Shomei’a/shole’ah need to be OBLIGATED – otherwise there is no transfer/shelihut. These are the basic rules of Shome’ah ke-oneh or shelihut (see full article). Hence, when either the ba’al korei or the oleh is not obligated (e.g., a woman), there cannot be a transfer of the ma’aseh mitsva to the mevarekh, and berakha is rendered a berakha levatala.”

I’m sorry but you keep making this assertion, yet it is not in the quote you cite. Again, you agree that the woman can make the bracha and read (i.e. the problem is kovod hatzibur, not bracha levatala). You have a quote from RYBS that says that the woman and child can not today READ. However, you have extrapolated that she also can’t bless. If the woman and man are at different levels of obligation in kriat hatorah, then it follows that the woman can’t read when the man recites the bracha. However, you have not demonstrated that the man can’t read for her – if his level of obligation is higher, and she can bless and read for herself, surely he can red for her. You therefore are assuming a communal obligation to hear the brachot from a man who is obligated and not just from a woman. This is not related to shomea koneh, b/c shomea koneh applies to the individual woman who makes the blessing and is being yotze the reading part from a man who can clearly do so if she herself could read. You must be positing that the tzibur must hear not only the actual kriah from a man who is obligated but also the brachot. What basis is there for this assumption? On the contrary, there could be one bracha at the beginning and end and brachot for intermediary aliyot were insituted for pedagogical reasons, proof that there is no need for the tzibur to be yotze the brachot per se, certzainly not for middle aliyot.

“Regarding your third post, I highly respect Rav Yehuda Herzl Henkin shelit”a, who I’ve known from my college days. We have corresponded a great deal over the years, and sometimes disagree. Our analyses of keri’at haTorah differ, even to our understanding of his grandfather zatsal’s position (see the full paper). He doesn’t need me – by any means – to defend his position, and he is easily accessible. I only ask that you pass judgment after you read the full documented paper.”

Is his grandfather’s position in writing outside of RYHH’s teshuvos. you can ask this question about others e.g. ROYosef, why doesnt he say theres a question of bracha levatala but instead says don’t change the minhag, dont encourage assimiliationists etc

“An,
You’ll have to contact Rav Yehuda Herzl Henkin and ask him yourself. He’s easily accessible by email. But I believe that as long as there is a bifurcation of roles, where either the oleh or the ba’al korei is a woman, the berakha is le-vatala me-ikkar ha-din. An analysis of kevod ha-tsibbur only kicks in when a woman does both parts: reads her aliyya and makes the nerakhot on her ma’aseh mitsva.”

Again, you have provided a source that says the woman can’t read when a man makes the bracha, not the other way around, and you have yet to bring any source that says the tzibur must be yotze the bracha, only the reading, and the woman is yotze the bracha if the man reads. Indeed, according to RYBS a minor may not read maftir. , וקטן ואשה פסולים לקרות בזמן הזה מצד הדין, אם לא שמברכים הם על קריאת עצמם
Does RYBS continue to say But the minor can make the bracha because of chinuch? Correct me if I am wrong, but I don’t remember seeing any such quote. According to RYBS, the minor cannot read. However, our practice is that minors can and do make the bracha. You have asserted this is due to chinuch, but if the principle worked both ways = the person who can’t read also can’t make the bracha – then RYBS would have to give an explanation for why the minor can make the bracha even though he cant read, or else allow the minor to read. Clearly, there is a difference in his opinion between reading and making the bracha. Alternatively, he opposed the practice of minors having aliyas (but didn’t note this?!) and we dont pasken like him. If I’m mistaken, and RYBS does make a distinction between the minor reading (which he assers) and the minor making the bracha, I would appreciate it if you woudl provide the quote in which he does this.

“In actuality it is not ours, but that of the renowned 14th century Rishon, R. Isaac Bar Sheshet Perfet in a heavily cited responsum (Resp. Rivash, sec. 326)”

actually, this was already discussed on hirhurim, where it was pointed out that the rivash does not speak of rampant illiteracy. What evidence is there that the takana of RYBGamla was not effective? I see secular folk talkign about the amazing jewish accomplishment in promoting adult male literacy, why deny us this accomplishment? Back in the day, there were lots of small towns and manuscripts were expensive. Not everyone got a tikun before their bar mitzva. And people traveled and so on, and they couldnt necessarily prepare to read the torah with trup. indeed, with reference to kol isha, there are those who extrapolate that kol isha doesnt apply for kriat hatorah and/or all shirei kodesh because meikar hadin women can read the torah and the poskim assume this is with teamim. however R Jachter (here: ^[27]) cites poskim who disagree and say the gemara may simply mean that women family members or young girls were reading the torah. How would the women going up to the torah be family members? I say, small towns, where many of the women were related to the men in the minyan. REgardless, whther there was rampant illiteracy or a problem only in small towns, due to travel and etc, you see these poskim assuming that we are discussing family members which indicates that they think women were reading the torah for small minyanim and not assuming the general case of lots of people in shul who are unrelated to any given woman oleh, which argues against your understanding of the situation.

and how are young girls reaading when tyhere is rampant illiteracy among adults? etc IMO these poskim are not assuming rampant illiteracy, but a different situation, of not enough people around, small minyanim etc

an,
This is what the Rivash writes:

שו”ת הריב”ש סימן שכו
אלא מפני שאין הכל בקיאין בקריאת התורה, לא הטריחו הצבור להביא שבעה גדולים היודעים לקרות בתורה. וכשהתקינו שיהיו שבעה קורין בתורה, היתה התקנה שהקטן היודע לקרות יעלה למנין ז’, כדי שלא להטריח הצבור להיות כל הז’ גדולים, ואולי לא ימצאום יודעים לקרות. ואפי’ אשה התירו מטעם זה, אם לא מפני כבוד הצבור; ומכל מקום, בכלן קטנים לא התירו.

The Rivash clearly states that they were afraid that they wouldn’t be able to find 7 male adults WHO COULD READ the Torah. So they allowed for calling knowledgeable minors and women (were it not for kevod haTsibbur). They obviously have Ten people (a minyan) otherwise the Keriat haTorah could not have occurred – and minors (and women – who are also not obligated) don’t count for this minyan as the Rivash says earlier in the Responsum. So it’s not that they didn’t have enough people, as you want to suggest. Does it make sense that HAZAL would have allowed those not obligated to read if the only problem was T’amei haMikra (notes?). Clearly, they were having a literacy problem where adults simply couldn’t read!

I know what the rivash says – eynan bekiin likros. Of course they have ten people, otherwise they wouldn’t have a minyan at all. I said small towns- not that there aren’t enough for a minyan, of course there are or there would be no question. Surely you are familiar with the discussion in the sources of the takana of RYBGamla. Having some people from small towns who are not educated, coupled with other difficulties such as not having handy books, makes for a situation where outside of large centers, you wll not always have ten people prepared to lein. But that is not the same as rampant illiteracy. Why might there be children and women who read btw if there’s rampant illiteracy? Because the conditions of the time were different than they are today, and there were lots of educated people around, including women and children, as well as ppl. in small towns, or who’d moved to them, travel issues and etc. The rivash doesnt say there was rampant illiteracy – and IMO you imposed that on his words.

is it just longer comments that have to pass thru moderation?

i guess so…:) I left a comment on june 2 that is awaiting moderation

an,
Perhaps you are correct and the choice of the word “rampant” in the above lecture was inexact or not sufficiently justified. What was lacking was “sufficient” literacy for a proper keri’at haTorah. This involves not only basic reading skills which many may have, but reading it properly despite the absence of vocalization (nekudot) and punctuation, and being able to do so with the cantillations (ta’amei hamikra). Here is how it is phrased in the full paper:

But keri’at haTorah is different than reading the Megilla [where a minor cannot read for a major]. Here you need not one knowledgeable individual to read but seven! The 14th century scholar R. Isaac Perfet (Rivash) indicates that the Rabbis of the Talmud were concerned by the difficulty of finding sufficient olim who were literate, knowledgeable, able and willing to read from the Sefer Torah. Seven individuals are required with sufficient literacy, knowledge and preparation to read from the Torah properly despite the absence of vocalization (nekudot) and punctuation, and to do so with the cantillations (ta’amei hamikra). As a result, they considered widening the pool of eligible olim by formulating the keri’at haTorah obligation more leniently.

Readers may find of interest the website of the Tiferet Moshe Synagogue – Rabbi Jacob Berman Community Center which contains a series of 80 shiurim on “Women and Halakha,” given from 1997-2000 by the author (AAF). The website contains audio files, source material and unedited lecture notes nd is available online at ^[28] or ^[29].

An (June 2 4:48 PM),
As I pointed out before, only one person in the shul has the responsibility to read and that is the oleh – Not the tsibbur, not even the ba’al korei – and according to the vast majority of Rishonim the berakhot are only or primarily for the oleh’s action of reading. As far as the tsibbur is concerned, they are yotsei even if one not obligated reads. This is either because keriat haTorah is a Hovat haTsibbur and anyone present can read; or because it is a Hovat shemi’a – and no matter who reads, each congregant hears for him/herself.

But we are NOT focusing on the interaction between the ba’al Korei and the TSIBBUR – as you seem to misunderstand, but between the ba’al Korei and the OLEH. The oleh can only make his berakha if he also does the proper ma’aseh mitsva, that is to read. If he doesn’t do a complete action – it is a berakha levatala. But the Oleh is NOT reading, it is the ba’al korei! We need the ba’al korei to transfer his action to the Oleh. But, the ba’al korei is himself NOT obligated to read – so how can he be motsi the oleh?!

The answer is that the rules of Areivut indicate that if you are inherently hayyav, i.e., if you would be hayyav if you were in the Oleh’s position – that is sufficient for areivut to kick in. (This is documented in the complete article; see: Shulhan Arukh haRav, O.H., sec. 197, no. 6.) But areivut can only kick in if BOTH the oleh and the ba’al korei are inherently Hayyavim. Women are not hayyavot at all – they have no obligation whatsoever. You are correct that Rav Soloveitchik is only dealing with the case where the Ba’al korei is the one not Hayyav, but the rules are the same when it is the Oleh who is not Hayyav.

R. Joseph Elijah Henkin brings his view in Eidut leYisrael, “beInyan Keri’at haTorah,” sec. 67, p. 164;

A minor and Woman who make the berakha and read have no problem with a transfer mechanism because they are doing both the berakha and the ma’aseh mitsva.

If my comments are still not clear, you’ll have to wait for the full paper with all its nuances and documentation.

Thank you for a very thorough and informative article.

One issue that has been raised is the connection between kavod hatzibbur and tircha d’tzibbur. The following example is given: It is preferable to have more than 1 sefer Torah so that there is no tircha due to rolling it from one section to another (e.g. on yom tov for maftir). We also take other elaborate steps to avoid tircha (making sure it is rolled before services start, etc). Yet, when they are taken out in the wrong order, the issue of tircha is overridden by kavod hatorah: rather than just switch at the bimah, we roll both sifrei torah, causing 2 instances of tircha. Is tircha d’tzibur in the same category as kavod hatzibur? If so, can tircha/kavod hatzibur be set aside when other values come into conflict with it? The corollary is which values would overcome tircha/kavod hatzibur?

A second issue is does kavod hatzibbur only apply to the 7 primary aliyot, what about aliyot after the first seven. In particular, once the entire parsha has been read, what principle prevents women from being called up for maftir/haftorah?

Michael,
Thank you for your kind words.
As will be demonstrated in the full paper, each case of kevod haTsibbur needs to be judged based on the reason behind the injunction. In the case of women’s aliyyot we described two possible reasons suggest by the poskim: Zilzul haMitsva and Tsni’ut. One has to be very careful not to mix or compare different cases of Kevof ha-tsibbur. Hence the issues you raise are not related to the specific issue of Aliyyot for women.

Based on our conversations with various gedolim (two of whom were cited in the article) – as long as the aliyyot are part of the public prayer ritual (as are hosafot on Simhat Torah) – kevod haTsibbur is still applicable. As we show, the issue of kevod ha-tsibbur has little to do with whether the ritual is obligatory or not. It is true that Rav Yehudah Herzl Henkin has suggested that the hosafot on Simhat Torah are different. Most poskim we have consulted disagree.

Finally, in the full paper there will be a substantial discussion of Maftir/Haftara. Nevertheless, kevod ha-tsibbur, however it is to be interpreted, remains a central problem in the case of reading the haftara, as it is in keri’at haTorah.

“Here is how it is phrased in the full paper”

i think that’s better:)

“but the rules are the same when it is the Oleh who is not Hayyav.”

why?! of course i understand that the relationship you are discussing is between the oleh and the bal koreh. however, if the oleh can make the bracha and read, why can’t the bal koreh make the bracha for the oleh if the bal koreh is at a higher level of obligation, that should be no more bracha levatala than if the oleh reads after the bracha. the oleh can make the bracha and read herself (or himself if a minor) OR hear someone else read. What transfer mechanism can’t “kick in” – it should be no different than any other maase mitzva where the woman is not nec. chayav and she makes the bracha and a man can do the action for her if he is at a higher level of obligation. You keep asserting this relationship is necessary but I haven’t seen an explanation for why you claim this except for the situation where the koreh is at a lower level of obligation than the mevarech but not for the reverse. For the reverse you should need the koreh to be at the same level of obliation as the oleh or higher just as for any other mitzvos. or are you claiming that this is not the case for other mitzvos?
I will bl”n try to look up R Henkin

i looked up the source in R Henkin’s edut lyisrael. he says nothing about bracha levatala for the oleh. Can you pls. cite a source for bracha levatala for the *oleh* when the baal koreh is an adult male. Otherwise, pls. cite a source that says a person who is permitted to make a bracha can’t be yotze with the action performed by someone at a higher level of obligation. I believe the logic doesn’t hold when the person making the bracha is at the lower level of obligation, being that if they can do the action themselves, someone who is at a higher level of obligation should certainly be able to do it for them, provided it’s an action they may do without a bracha (as kriyat hatorah is for someone who already made birkat hatorah, its simply reading torah.) Surely you aren’t arguing otherwise without a single source??

An,
THe full paper will carry a lenthy discussion of shome’ah ke-oneh and areivut. Briefly, the only case where we find that one can be motsi another Jew who is not obligated at all, is if he/she is simultaneously being motsi himself or another Jew who is obligated. In this way the berakha the mevarekh e is making is not a Berakha levatala. Then the one who is not obligated can be yotsei via shomei’a ke-oneh. But if the one making the berakha is doing so ONLY to be motsi one who is not obligated at all, the berakha is a berakha le-vatala. Now, for someone who IS obligated, one who has already fulfilled his obligation can make the berakhot for them because of Areivut (which imparts a renewed obligation to the mevarekh); but there is no areivut to (or from) one who is not obligated.

Thus the Rama paskens that if women want to hear tekiat Shofar from a Ba’al tokei’a who has alradey been yotsei, the women have to make the berakhot themselves, since the ba’al tokei’a cannot be motsi them in the berakhot. (As far as how he can be motsi them in the tekiot is a lengthy discussion beyond the scope of this discussion). Similarly, Rama Rules that a man who made Havdala in shul should not make Havdala for his wife at home (she should do so herself) because we are hoshesh for the view that women are peturot from Havdala.

On blowing shofar for women, see: Ritva, Hilkhot Berakhot, sec. 5, no. 2, and novella to Rosh haShana 29b; Tur, O.H., sec. 589, Darkei Moshe, no. 2; R. Abraham Danzig, Hayyei Adam, sec. 141, no. 7 – see also comments of R. Aaron Joseph Bloch thereto, Lev Adam (Monticello, NY: 1967), II, p. 510; R. Jehiel Michel Tucazinsky, Lu’ah leErets Yisrael, Tishrei, Kelaim laTeki’ot, no. 10 (p. 10, end of note 1 in the Jerusalem 5767 edition of R. Nissan Aaron Tucazinsky); R. Abraham Judah Farbstein, Kenesset Avraham, sec. 1; Halikhot Beita, sec 20, no. 9; R. Moses Mordechai Karp, Hilkhot Hag be-Hag – Yamim Noraim, sec., no. 3, note 13;. On Shulhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 589, no. 6, see: Rama; Hezekiah ben David da Silva, Peri Hadash, no. 6; R. Elijah Kramer of Vilna (Gra), Bei’ur haGra, s.v. “Aval aherim;” R. Menahem Mendel Auerbach, Ateret Zekenim; Shulhan Arukh haRav, no. 2; R. Ephraim Zalman Margaliot, Mateh Efrayyim, no. 12; Mishna Berura, note 11.

On making havdala for women, on Shulhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 296, no. 8, see the following: Magen Avraham, note 11; Eliya Rabba, note 18; Shulhan Arukh haRav, no. 19; Mishna Berura, note 36; Kitzur Shuhan Arukh, sec. 96, no. 14; Resp. Yabia Omer, O.H., sec. 24; Halikhot Beita, sec 15, no. 31.

On reciting leishev ba-sukka for women, see: on Shulhan Arukh, O.H., sec. 640, no. 1, Magen Avraham, note 1 and Mishna Berura, note 1; Halikhot Beita, sec 22, no. 6. Hence, in the case of tekiat shofar by one who has already fulfilled his obligation, he is forbidden to recite the relevant berakha. Nevertheless, hearing the shofar is unique for various reasons, and one who is not obligated may do so even when the shofar is blown by one who has already fulfilled their obligation.

Further delineation is beyond the scope of these comments; see, however: R. Zussman Sofer, comments to R. Jacob Alfandri, Resp. Mutsal meEish, sec. 12; R. Zvi Pesah Frank, Mikra’ei Kodesh, Yamim Nora’im, secs. 25; R. Aryeh Tsvi Fromer, Si’ah haSadeh, Sha’ar Birkhat HaShem, sec. 4, no. 19; R. Moshe Sternbuch, Moadim uZemanim, I, sec. 2 and additions to this discussion at the beginning of VIII; R. Abraham Judah Farbstein, Kenesset Avraham, sec. 1; Halikhot Beita, sec. 20, no. 9, note 17; R. Meir haKohen, Shabbat keHalakha, Kuntress Or haShabbat, sec. 2, no. 5

the reference to SAHarav is also to someone who is not obligated being motzi others and not someone who is not obligated/lower level of obligation making a bracha and being yotze thru someone who is obligated. The example of birkas hamazon is instructive as it’s questionable if women are obligated mdoreisa or mdrabbonon and so she should not be motzi a man obligated mdoreisa, and this is what SAHarav writes in siman 186. however, he doesn’t say a man can’t be motzi her – in fact he can acc to SAHarav even when his obligation is mdrabbonon (and hers may be mdoreisa) just as he can for men who are obligated mdoreisa when he is only obligated mdrabbonon. So this would seem the opposite of your argument.

i’m sorry – you keep giving material about making a bracha for someone who isn’t obligated. That’s not the situation here. Rather the person making the bracha is at a lower level of obligation, and the one at the higher level of obligation is simply doing the act for them. The bracha levatala would be for the one at the lower level of obligation. If this person can do the act themselves and the bracha isnt levatala, who says the bracha is levatala if the person at a higher level of obligation does the act. I’m only interested in references that address this question.

“But if the one making the berakha is doing so ONLY to be motsi one who is not obligated at all, the berakha is a berakha le-vatala”

That’s not the situation here. Rather, the person making the bracha is being motzi him/herself, and your claim is that if a person at a higher level of obligation does the act, the person at the lower level of obligation has made a bracha levatala.

“(As far as how he can be motsi them in the tekiot is a lengthy discussion beyond the scope of this discussion).”

how is it beyond the scope of the discussion? It IS the discussion. I’m not asking where you get the idea that the bal koreh shouldnt be a woman/minor for an oleh who is an adult male. ONLY the source for the claim that if the bal koreh is an adult male, a woman oleh would be making a bracha levatala.
Do you have a source for this claim? or not?

An,
I’ve done my best. You’ll just have to wait for the complete article, where all the rules are delineated and documented. In the meantime you’ll just have to trust me, or not. Please read the sources I cite in the last paragraph of my last post at 6:10 am. From there you will see that these poskim see no difference between making a Berakha for one who is not Hayyav or a Ma’aseh mitsva for one who is not Hayyav. The rules are the same! They maintain for a variety of reasons that tekiat Shofar is a unique case, however.

I look forward to the full article. When will it be available and where?

Also, have you abandoned Pt.2 of WTG?

Michael

i’ll bl’n see if I can get ahold of those sources and look them up. thank you and have a good shabbat

Michael
Actually Women’s Prayer Services Part 2 is about 85% done, but I dropped everything to master keri’at haTorah and Partnership Minyanim. Good solid work takes a lot of time. Besides I’m a Prof. of Chemistry by trade. I will be on Sabbatical this coming year and will B”N return to it shortly. Thanks for your interest.

[...] As Rabbis Aryeh and Dov Frimer discuss at length (link, section labeled “Kevod haTsibbur and Partnership Minyanim”), a woman may not lead the [...]

[...] For more on this, see http://text.rcarabbis.org/?p=909. [...]

Rabbis Frimer cite Behag in Tosafot as subscribing to a sexual distraction explanation. This is in no way explicit in Behag (or any other rishon) and is a, to me, unwaranted reading. Furthermore, their discussion of women;s non-obligation as regards being motzi men, is nullified by the Rashba to Rosh Hashanah 33a (from ms., ed. Dimitrovsky p. 187) who explains that kriat haTorah is a special case.
Rather, as I wrote ten years ago in response to R’ Shapiro:
“Where does all this leave us? Regardless of the arguments that can be proferred to permit women’s alliyot today – that kevod hatzibbur can be waved, that it does not apply today when everyone is literate, that it does not apply when the olim rely on the ba’al qeri’ah and do not themselves read – women’s alliyot remain outside the consensus, and a congregation that institutes them is not Orthodox in name and will not long remain Orthodox in practice.”

[...] Text and Texture (Rabbinical Council of America), May 23, 2010 – available online at ^[30]. [4] Indeed, a respected friend of mine wryly commented, “Who would’ve thunk it, [...]

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