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Individual and Communal Quests for Holiness: Kollelim, Modern Orthodoxy, and Intellectual Elitism
Posted By Aryeh Klapper On September 2, 2009 @ 1:38 pm In Jewish Culture,Philosophy | 9 Comments
By Aryeh Klapper
Aspiring Saints?
Judaism has a natural antipathy to exceptional religious ambition. Law by its nature, Maimonides explains in the Guide (3:34), aims for the good of the majority rather than of the exceptional, and thus the centrality of Halakhah in Judaism is a major challenge to many of the religiously gifted. Halakhah itself provides outlets for apparently excessive religious energy – the vow of the Nazirite, for example, enables wannabe ascetics to find their place within the system. Halakhah even apparently suspends itself, in very limited circumstances, for the benefit of those overflowing with religious zeal. But these are plausibly regarded as begrudging concessions to, rather than as endorsements of, the aspiration to sainthood.
It seems reasonable, then, for aspiring saints to focus their spiritual efforts on areas which Halakhah, for one reason or another, does not saturate. Perhaps the most famous such space is created by Ramban in his commentary on “And you must be holy” (Vayikra 19:2) . Ramban argues that Halakhah simply cannot adequately encompass the drive for holiness (in other places he extends this idea to ethics and Shabbat). Thus he famously asserts that it is possible to be a “naval birshut haTorah”, a disgusting person who acts within the authority of Halakhah, and that one should strive “lekadesh atzmekha bamittar lakh”, to sanctify oneself via (abstaining from) actions that are not legally prohibited, such as excessive eating or the use of vulgar language. Ramban’s conception of holiness, then, offers a promising avenue for those whose who feel their spiritual aspirations constrained by Halakhah.1 [1]. The question is whether leaving that avenue open runs the risk of undoing the good that Halakhah’s careful balancing act does for the majority.
Rav Yehonasan Eibeschetz on “You Shall Be Holy” – Universal Ambitions
It is in response to this issue that Rav Yehonasan Eibeschetz writes a fascinating essay in his commentary Tif’eret Yehonatan. Rav Eibeschuetz’s utilizes characteristically brilliant exegesis to argue that holiness is linked to indivisibility, and that the verse “and you shall be holy” is therefore addressed to the entire community of the Children of Israel because it can only be fulfilled as a united community. Rather than using this as a springboard for a sermon on the need to put aside grievances, he argues that this means that a spiritual goal or practice must be universalizable to be positive. In other words, he believes that there is no room for saints in a community unless a community composed entirely of saints would be sustainable.
“Now Ramban expounded at length on the interpretation “’You must be holy’ – sanctify yourself in that which is permitted to you (by abstaining from it)”. However, I have already explained regarding this that to be more stringent than the law of the Torah is a distant possibility, as Josippon ben Gurion2 [2] already wrote in his book for the Romans that during the Second Temple there were men who would dwell in the forests in isolation, and literally ate nothing but fruits of the forest and withheld themselves from all matters of the world and the like, to the point that they were literally separated from matters of the world, but the Perushim were not at all pleased about this, because the complete servant of Hashem must make his matters and activities pleasing to Heaven and to people, and not obstruct the nomos of settling the world and human society and political administration, whereas if everyone were withheld like those, the nomos would not endure, nor the natural order, and it would nearly be that the world would end and the national bond and physical survival on the earth would be lost in accordance with the natural order. Chazal hint at this when they say “Best is Torah with Derekh Eretz”.
Therefore any abstinences that a person does properly fall within this class, that they have the possibility for an entire nation to fulfill it without nullifying itself, but an abstinence that is possible only for an individual, and not to the nation in its entirety, is not within the confines of completion and praiseworthy abstinence, and such matters were distanced by the Sages of Israel. This is the intent of the midrash “This unit of Torah was said with the community gathered”, meaning as I wrote above that the “sanctification within what is permitted to you” must be something that is appropriate for the community . . .”
The reference to “yafeh Talmud Torah im Derekh Eretz”, while quoting Avot 2:2, is presumably a reference to the dispute between the tannaim Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai (Berakhot 35b) as to whether the ideal Jewish life includes anything other than Torah study. The Talmud’s conclusion, expressed by Abbayyei, is that “Many acted like Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai (and sought to engage in full-time Torah study) but did not succeed, whereas many acted like Rabbi Yishmael and they did succeed.” Rabbi Eibescheutz reads this as suggesting not that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai set a laudable goal that was regrettably not achievable by the masses, but rather that its failure on a mass level demonstrates that it is not laudable even for individuals.
American Orthodoxy, Kollelim, and Intellectual Elitism
In the past several decades, American Orthodoxy has debated the extent to which it can and should support full-time Torah students. When that discussion has been framed in traditional language, support is often framed by pointing to Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai as an ideal, whereas opposition is often expressed as a belief that we have unwisely reached the point of seeking to implement his ideal on the mass level. Rabbi Eibeschuetz’s position could be read as justifying opposition to an attempt to implement Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai’s position even by individuals, and thus to shut down all lifetime membership kollels.
I wonder, though, whether his position is compelling, whether it is in fact necessary for the halakhic community to oppose non-universalizable quests to achieve holiness. Rambam (Hilkhot Deot 1:5) distinguishes between the “chakham”, who follows the Golden Mean, and the “chasid”, who adopts at least some extremes. I think a community of Maimonidean chasidim would be a volatile cauldron with a severely limited life expectancy – and yet I wonder whether a community composed entirely of Maimonidean chakahamim is likely to maintain any kind of spiritual vitality. Perhaps, in direct contrast to Tif’eret Yehonatan, we should see our communal interest in encouraging the development of idiosyncratic religious greatness, and despite the risk of falling into modern cant, see diversity as strength.
Here an important qualifier is needed. It is not only, or perhaps even especially, the position of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai that runs not difficulty when it is universalized. The position of Rabbi Yishmael, if understood as an ideal rather than as a concession, is at least equally challenging. How many of us can sustain our G-d-consciousness while engaged in derekh eretz, whether in the simple sense of employment or in the broader sense of cultural engagement? Indeed, a standard critique of Modern Orthodoxy is precisely this, that the masses are incapable of maintaining their religious commitment once they acknowledge that value can be found outside of Torah.
Perhaps the debate between enclave and open Orthodoxy has been miscast, and ironically, those who carry the banners of Torah UMada or Torah im Derekh Eretz are the true followers of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. They – we – are the ones who believe that one can be religiously conscious the entire day, rather than dividing the world into secular and mundane realms. I suggest, therefore, a modification of Tife’eret Yehonatan’s position. Individual quests for holiness, when non-universalizable, should be conducted in awareness of that limit, and must make sure to see themselves as an effort to enrich the community rather than to transcend it. Chasidim must recognize the equal value of chakhamim, even if the life of the chakham would leave them unfulfilled, and must find ways of convincing the chakham that the presence of chasidut is necessary and invaluable. This realization has, I believe, been central to the successful transformation of the American charedi kollel into a community education center over the past decade, and perhaps it can yet save serious American Modern Orthodoxy from the sociological dead end of intellectual elitism.
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9 Comments To "Individual and Communal Quests for Holiness: Kollelim, Modern Orthodoxy, and Intellectual Elitism"
#1 Comment By Dov On September 8, 2009 @ 9:54 am
“Rambam (Hilkhot Deot 1:5) distinguishes between the “chakham”, who follows the Golden Mean, and the “chasid”, who adopts at least some extremes”
Mechila me’kevodo, but I don’t think this is correct. Rambam states clearly in 1:5 that the chasid deviates only “me’at” (a little) from the golden mean. He does then describe a case of truly going to the extreme, but specifically about the midah of humility. And humility, along with the avoidance of anger, must be taken to the extreme by everybody – chakham and chasid alike (2:3).
It is only to those people with character traits in need of correction that the Rambam actually recommends going to extremes beyond what is required of everyone, and even then only as a temporary measure designed to return them to the middle path (2:2).
In short, there is no evidence that the Rambam recommends a life-long ideal course of action for anyone that could not successfully be followed by everyone. (at least in Hilchot Deot)
Also, in the 2nd to last paragraph, the 2nd word on the 2nd line should be “into” not “not”
#2 Comment By Aryeh Klapper On September 9, 2009 @ 8:19 pm
My dear friend Dov is of course right about the typo – ‘into’ is correct.
On the substance, I need to clarify that I did not mean to suggest that Maimonides unequivocally endorses those whom he describes as chasidim – his attitude both in Hilkhot Deot and in his commentary to Avot Chapter 5 might best be described as grudgingly accepting. I suggest that this ambivalence is why he sometimes refers to the positive chasid (as opposed to the chasid shoteh) as one who veers slightly from the middle, and in others as one who adopts an extreme – see for example his comment to Avot 5:10, where he describes as a Chasid one who “adds endurance to the point where he utterly lacks the experience of humiliation”.
I do not see 1:5 and 2:3 as using the terms extreme and middle in the same way with regard to anavah – 2:3 forbids adopting the middle path, and 1:5 calls it the way of the chakham, and these postions are incompatible for Maimonides.
I also think Maimonides’ description of Chasidim in 1:5 as going lifnim mishurat hadin suggests a lifetime practice rather than a bedieved corrective.
#3 Comment By Dov On September 11, 2009 @ 7:17 am
“I do not see 1:5 and 2:3 as using the terms extreme and middle in the same way with regard to anavah – 2:3 forbids adopting the middle path, and 1:5 calls it the way of the chakham, and these postions are incompatible for Maimonides.”
I’m not sure I follow this – are you suggesting that we have as stirah in the Rambam? It seems much easier to understand anavah as the exception to the rule of following the golden path, as the Rambam himself clearly says.
“I also think Maimonides’ description of Chasidim in 1:5 as going lifnim mishurat hadin suggests a lifetime practice rather than a bedieved corrective.”
Yes, of course. But only insofar as they vary “a little” from the golden path. It is the wild variation (apart from anger and pride, as explained above) which is only to be employed as a temporary corrective.
Again, to make a legitimate contrast to Rav Yehonasan Eibeschetz, you need to show that the Rambam’s chasid could not be successfully adopted by all people. It is this that I fail to see. Wether or not the Rambam would actually encourage us to do so is a different issue.
Shabbat Shalom
#4 Comment By Gidon Rothstein On September 14, 2009 @ 4:59 pm
I find it interesting that R. Yonasan Eibeschuetz was discussing universalizability as a standard for measuring conduct right around when Kant was articulating an admittedly more famous version of that idea.
#5 Comment By Sholom On September 16, 2009 @ 2:11 pm
“Thus he [Ramban] famously asserts that it is possible to be a “naval birshut haTorah”, a disgusting person who acts within the authority of Halakhah … Ramban’s conception of holiness, then, offers a promising avenue for those whose who feel their spiritual aspirations constrained by Halakhah.”
I don’t think the Ramban is gearing this recommendation only to the spiritually exceptional. I have a hard time imagining a great Torah leader prescribing “disgusting” behavior as an acceptable normative standard for the Jewish masses. There would in any event be halachic problems ramifications (i.e. Hillul Hashem, the prohibition against making oneself repulsive) even if this was his prescription for the general public.
#6 Comment By Noam Shapiro On September 17, 2009 @ 1:53 pm
Yasher koach, R’ Klapper, from a long-time-ago talmid! It struck me as I was reading that fascinating passage from R’ Eibeschetz that his comments may be pertinent to the discussion of the role of Halakha in a modern Jewish state. His contention is that an individual’s behavior beyond the realm of Halakha must in theory be viable for the whole community in order for it to be valid. What about situations where Halakhic solutions (WITHIN the normal realm of Halakha) are NOT viable for an independent community? For example, would selling Jewish-owned land in Israel to Arabs during shemitta be a valid approach according to this? How about employing gentiles to run elecrtical plants? Etc, etc.
Do you think his ideas might play a role in that conversation?
#7 Comment By Aryeh Klapper On September 22, 2009 @ 10:52 am
Many thanks to everyone – colleagues/friends/talmidim/new acquaintances – for their comments.
Regarding Dov’s post –
1) I think that prima facie the Rambam certainly contradicts himself on this issue; the question is how to resolve the contradictions. But for our purposes, the issue seems to me semantic – the Rambam clearly describes as a chasid someone who is more extreme than the chakham, and he strongly urges the standard person to follow the path of the chakham. My best guess is that he recognized that some people are not fit for the life of chakhmah, i.e. for absolute moderation, but are nonetheless capable of a somewhat distorted form of greatness which deserves some appreciation, but should not be set up as a model for general emulation.
2) Even if I were to grant that the chasid goes to extreme extremes only with regard to anger and humility (and I don’t), it does not follow that the chasid’s behavior is universalizable. To conclude that from Rambam’s prescribing the Chasid’s tactic for souls that have slightly strayed from the middle is the same as saying that his willingness to prescribe medicines for the sick meant that he did not see them as toxic for the healthy.
There is an irony here in any case, as Rambam believed that the path of the chakham, in the stronger sense of intellectual achievement rather than behavior, was a path that only an elite could follow.
Regarding Sholom’s post –
Ramban’s creation of the category “naval birshut haTorah” entails a definition of holiness that means something other than “fully halakhically observant”. I contend that this means more than “halakhically observant and also doesn’t do disgusting things”, but rather that it means that there are aspects of holiness not fully addressed by Halakhah. For example: a naval uses profanity regularly, but does that mean that the only questions one can ask with regard to speech are a) is it assur b) is it disgusting? Can one not also ask whether it is refined speech? In general, it seems to me that there is a bright line below which everything is nevalah and above which there is no differentiation.
Regarding my coblogger Rabbi Rothstein’s post –
I find this interesting as well, and Tif’eret Yehonatan precedes Kant’s major publications, but I have found no evidence for influence one way or the other, and am unaware of a common source. But I am a rank amateur at this, and would love it if someone more knowledgeable and skilled in the area demonstrated or even supposed otherwise.
Regarding Noam Shapiro’s post – It’s wonderful to hear from you, and I think your argument is very interesting. The easiest way for me to respond is to say that just as I wish to allow room for the nonuniversalizable chasid, so too I would like to leave room for community-ideosyncratic psak. But this has become much, much harder with the advent of the internet, as knowledge of a local psak, especially lekulla, spreads instantly and without regard for communal boundaries.
#8 Comment By Dov On September 23, 2009 @ 7:33 am
“2) Even if I were to grant that the chasid goes to extreme extremes only with regard to anger and humility (and I don’t), it does not follow that the chasid’s behavior is universalizable. To conclude that from Rambam’s prescribing the Chasid’s tactic for souls that have slightly strayed from the middle is the same as saying that his willingness to prescribe medicines for the sick meant that he did not see them as toxic for the healthy.”
I am beginning to wonder if we might have different girsaot in the Rambam…
In 2:3 the Rambam very clearly states regarding anger and humility that “assur lo le’adam linhog ba’hem be’benoniut, ela itrachek ad ha’katze ha’acher.” This means everybody – the chacham, the chasid, the sick, and the healthy. It is not a “tactic” taken from the chasid’s playbook aimed at straying souls, it is a universal requirement to go to the extreme regarding these two middot.
Although I am not convinced, I do see how you could read the very end of this halacha as implying that the chasid takes this requirement even further than the others, but I’m hard-pressed to understand that as implying that such behavior is not universalizable in theory. Rather it seems to me just another example of the chasid going “a bit” beyond what is required of the chacham in any given case.
#9 Comment By alanl j. yuter On September 26, 2009 @ 5:05 pm
while sanctifying oneself be mutar lach has been understood as bein extra strict, we should consider that it means by restricting oneself to he permitted, which regards qedusha as the consequence of mitsva, i.e., qaddeshenu be mitsvotecha, seeing the tsitsit remembering and doing the commandments and becoming holy there by, and asher qiddeshanu be mitsvotav.
ay