Individuals experiencing and expressing doubts concerning their religious beliefs are mentioned in a  number of anecdotes found in the Bible.[1] Such questions of faith, however, are virtually absent in the portions of the Tora devoted to Halacha. Consequently, it is quite remarkable to encounter the following articulated lack of faith in the middle of a discussion of the Mitzva of Shmitta (the Sabbatical year) in Parashat Behar:

Vayikra 25:20

And if you shall say:[2] What will we eat during the seventh year? Behold we cannot sow (new plants) or harvest[3] (that which will grow by itself without cultivation)!

The individual quoted in this verse is wondering how the Commandment in VaYikra 25:4-6[4] can realistically be fulfilled. By his reckoning, the cultivated food produced during the sixth year of the Sabbatical year cycle, will hardly be sufficient to satisfy his needs during the sixth, seventh and eighth years.[5] And as for the subsequent verses that appear to be designed to specifically allay such a fear,

Ibid., 21-22

And I will Command My Blessing upon you in the sixth year, and it (the land) shall bring forth fruit for three years. And you shall sow in the eighth year, and eat of old food until the ninth year, until its (the eighth year’s) produce is ready you shall eat from the food from the previous harvest

the principle Ein Somchin Al HaNes (one should not depend upon the performance of a miracle) would seem to countermand absolute reliance on something that cannot be empirically verified, even after an explicit Divine Promise.

Is such questioning in fact natural to all people?

MaLBIM appears to intensify the challenge of understanding this verse when he draws a distinction between the adverb “Ki” (when) and the conjunction “Im” (if). Whereas according to this commentator, the latter word “Im” suggests merely a possible future scenario, the former “Ki” implies that what follows is inevitable.[6] And since VaYikra 25:20 begins, “VeCHI Tomru Mah Nochal BaShana HaShevi’it…”, MaLBIM contends that HaShem’s Certainty regarding this question being posed by Jews results from His being all too well Acquainted with human nature in general, and the propensities of the Jewish people in particular.[7] It appears that the implication of MaLBIM’s assertion is that not only a small number of individuals possessing relatively weak faith in HaShem, but rather EVERYONE will be asking this question at one point or another. One can further wonder whether the specific Commandment of Shmitta should be viewed as representative of an entire class of Mitzvot that   in order to fulfill them, delayed gratification and significant sacrifice are required, which in turn will generate these types of doubts and questions.[8]

Another Commandment that directly challenges personal faith and trust in HaShem.

A Commandment that in many ways closely parallels the challenges to faith posed by the observance of Shmitta, and that has to be fulfilled several times each year, is the need to journey to Yerushalayim for Pesach, Shavuot and Sukkot (Shemot 23:17; 34:23; Devarim 16:16)

e.g., 34:23

Three times per year all of your men should appear before the Face of the Master, HaShem, God of Israel.

Although in the instance of Aliya LeRegel (going up [to Yerushalayim] as a pilgrim), the individual who is Commanded does not explicitly articulate his concern, these thoughts can be readily inferred from the subsequent verse:

34:24

When I will Cause you to inherit nations from before you, and I                 will Expand your borders, NO MAN WILL COVET YOUR LAND, when you go up to see the Face of HaShem your God three times each year.

It would be quite reasonable for an individual to fear that while away from his home for a prolonged period,[9] others might be tempted to come and wreak havoc with his possessions.  R. Eliemelch Bar Shaul[10] points out that the obligation to fulfill this particular Commandment applies exclusively to landholders, suggesting that while spending Yom Tov in the presence of the Temple along with all of its pomp and circumstance, was obviously a very spiritual experience, the actual fulfillment of the Commandment had to be fraught with considerable insecurity and concern[11]—another test of faith. Aliya LeRegel is not so much about whether there will be ENOUGH food for the future, but rather whether there will be ANYTHING at all to eat, should thievery and/or vandalism occur while one’s home, farm and food stores remained unguarded.

The challenges inherent in Shmitta are present in all Commandments concerning agriculture.

On further reflection, one comes to realize that on an existential level not just the Mitzva of Shmitta, but the entire agricultural enterprise in the land of Israel is in effect a long series of tests of faith. The Tora draws a clear distinction between the lands of Egypt and Israel, not only in terms of the religious practices and morality of the respective cultures,[12] but also in terms of the manner in which crops are normally grown in the two locales.

Devarim 11:10-11

Because the land that you are coming there to inherit, is not like the land of Egypt, from which you went out, where you sow your seeds and water by foot (you carry the water from the Nile to the fields which you desire to irrigate), like a green garden.The land that you are crossing (the Jordan river) there to inherit

is a land of mountains and valleys, by means of the rain from the heavens it drinks water.

RaShI and RaShBaM emphasize positive and negative aspects of depending upon rain rather than upon the Nile as a source for irrigation.

RaShI

…In Egypt, you had to be disturbed from your sleep in order to work;

only the lower areas would be naturally watered as opposed to the higher elevations, and you would therefore have to physically carry the water from the lower to the higher places;

But in this case (the land of Israel)… you can stay asleep in your bed,

and the Holy One, Blessed be He, Waters both the lower and higher places (by means of rain),

that which is exposed (and therefore accessible to man) and that which is not,

simultaneously.

RaShBaM

…You have to observe the Commandments of HaShem,

because this land is better (than Egypt) for those who are observant,

but worse than all of the lands for those who do not observe,

…the land of Egypt, all people, good and evil, as long as they are willing to take the trouble, will be able to water their fields and they will have food to eat,

but as for the land of Israel, only if you observe the Commandments will (v. 12) “the Lord your God seek its welfare constantly; the Eyes of the Lord your God will be upon it from the beginning of the year until the end of the year” to provide you with rain in times of need.[13]

Consequently, just as the Jewish people had to depend upon exceptional productivity of their fields during the sixth year to see them through the three years[14] that would follow,[15] each individual year of the Sabbatical year cycle in terms of itself also carried with it a considerable challenge and therefore cause for insecurity and angst. The farmer would have to ask himself annually: Would the Jewish people be Deemed by HaShem sufficiently deserving to earn the requisite amount of rain for their crops to get us through not only the extreme scenario of the sixth, seventh and eighth year combination, but also the first, second, third, fourth and fifth years, independent of one another?[16]

“Man” served as the introduction to the concept that man is dependent upon God for his food.

The lesson of the profound tentativeness of one’s food supply and the extent to which it would be controlled by HaShem in accordance with whether the people were judged deserving, is initially impressed upon the Jewish people with regard to the Manna that they consumed in the desert soon after the Exodus from Egypt. Klee Yakar, in order to try to explain why the Jews appeared to be extremely concerned already in the sixth year of the Sabbatical year cycle, references the description of the people’s experience with the Manna, as summarized by Moshe in Sefer Devarim.

Devarim 8:3

And He Humbled you, and Caused you to be hungry, and Fed you Manna, with which you were unfamiliar, neither had your fathers experienced it before, in order that He could Make you know that man does not live by bread alone, but rather by every Word that issues from the Mouth of the Lord does man live.

Klee Yakar wonders: if Manna fell every day, why did the Jews experience hunger?

He responds: Since they were constantly unsure about whether there would be additional Manna the next day, however much they ate today was undercut by their continual insecurity regarding their food supply. Consequently, they experienced psychological starvation, even if physiologically their needs were being more than met. That hunger was apparently designed to motivate the Jews, via either positive or negative reinforcement, to comply with the Commandments of the Tora. Shemot 16:4 states quite unambiguously: “…Behold I will Cause to rain down upon you bread from the heavens, and the people will go out daily to gather it so that I can Test them whether they will walk in accordance with My Tora or not.” RaShBaM, paralleling his comment on Devarim 11:10, understands the Divine Test inherent within the Manna experience as designed to train the people to adhere to not only the specific rules governing the Manna, e.g., don’t try to horde it from day to day,[17] don’t go out on Shabbat in order to try to find extra portions,[18] etc., but to instill a sense of the importance of complying with all Mitzvot called for in the Tora. Through the manner in which the Manna is delivered and distributed, the individual Jew is called upon to recognize that if s/he will depend to such an extreme degree upon HaShem for food, it would be extremely prudent to carry out God’s Will in all areas possible.

Is depending upon rain tantamount to relying on miracles for one’s existence?

And as for the issue of Ein Somchin Al HaNes, perhaps a distinction must be drawn between an individual undertaking a course of action that is inherently more dangerous than ordinary day-to-day existence, e.g., volunteering to fight in an optional war, undergoing elective surgery, driving during an ice storm, etc., and the  realities of the human condition. We tend to deny, perhaps in order to not become overly paralyzed with fear, that everyday life is fundamentally uncertain and that we are in far less control of our circumstances than we would like to think we are. Which brings us to Commandments like Shmitta and Aliya LeRegel: Because of our constant sense of physical and economic insecurity, as noted by Klee Yakar, some of us think that we never can devote significant time to devoting ourselves to the development of our souls. Could these types of Commandments, as well as the need for Shabbat observance and generously supporting various religious institutions be designed to remind us that our OWN PHYSICAL needs are not all to which  we need to devote time and energy; our SPIRITUAL needs are also of great importance. To live a total Jewish life, success with regard to PARNASA (financial concerns), which we are taught to believe is so much in God’s Hands, becomes a function of not only how skilled and innovative we are and how hard and long we work, but also how spiritually engaged and deeply believing we manage to be.

Applying the lessons of the “Man” to contemporary experience.

Finally, should a contemporary Jew be tempted to dismiss the theme of direct extreme dependency upon God for physical sustenance as applicable to only the generation of the Exodus from Egypt and/or those working the land in Israel proper, he should keep in mind as much as possible the dictum of Pesachim 116b which is quoted in the Pesach Haggada: “A person is obligated to view him/herself as if s/he has left Egypt.” While a simple reading of this principle would suggest an extremely limited application to Pesach night when one consumes Matza, Maror, drinks four cups of wine and recounts the Exodus, thereby vicariously experiencing the transition from servitude to freedom, it is possible that it is religiously significant to maintain such a mindset throughout the year. A support for such an assertion could be supplied by the great number of references made to the Egyptian Exodus not only during Pesach, but daily, within contexts such as the Shema and the various Kiddush prayers for Shabbat and Yom Tov.  In addition to remembering Yetziat Mitzrayim as indicative of HaShem’s Involvement in the affairs of man and His Omnipotence, the theological lessons associated with the Manna must clearly not be forgotten. Recalling the manner in which Jews were given food by HaShem during their forty years of desert wanderings should enable them to not only face with equanimity the seventh and eighth years of the Shmitta cycle even when the Heter Mechira (the legal loophole of “selling the land of Israel” and thereby circumventing the need to allow the land to lie fallow) is not in effect,[19] but also develop a general perspective on the interrelationship between the efforts that they expend in order to achieve personal success and advancement, and the degree to which they should recognize how HaShem has a Hand in just these matters.

[2] Halacha draws a distinction between that which is merely thought, in the spirit of the statement in the Shabbat hymn, Hirhurim Mutarim  (random, non-premeditated thoughts do not render the individual entertaining them culpable to punishment) and Devarim SheBeLev Einam Devarim (thoughts that are confined to the heart are not considered significant to the point where they will have any effect on one’s status or interaction with others), as opposed to what is actually said, the assumption being that thoughts may be uninvited, but most normal individuals have control over what they say and do not say.

[3] While it is permitted during Shmitta to go out into the fields and take whatever is necessary for one’s needs, harvesting in order to stock up for the future is prohibited. And if food has been stored in that manner, once the type of vegetable, fruit, grain, etc. is no longer freely available in the fields, it must be removed from the storage site and placed in the open so that anyone who is in need can gain access to it.

[4] “But in the seventh year shall be a Shabbat of solemn rest for the land, a Shabbat for HaShem. You shall not sow your field nor shall you prune your vineyard. Whatever grows by itself you shall not harvest, nor gather the grapes of your untended vine, for it shall be a year of rest for the land. And the Shabbat produce of the land will be food for you, for you and your servant, for your maid and your hired worker, for the stranger who sojourns with you, for your cattle and for the beast in your land, shall all its produce serve as food.”

[5] Since nothing can be cultivated or formally harvested during the seventh year, whatever is produced during the sixth year will have to satisfy that year’s needs, the demands of the seventh year during which the land has be left to its own devices, as well as what is required for the eighth year since at least at the outset of that year, it will take some time before crops that are planted at the conclusion of the Sabbatical year will be ready for harvest.

Some commentators, such as RaMBaN and Da’at Zekeinim MiBa’alei HaTosafot,  focus upon the fact that fear should not actually set in until well into the seventh year when food first begins to run short, and therefore 25:20 should be read in a “reversed” fashion: “And if you shall say DURING THE SEVENTH YEAR ‘What shall we eat…?’” See Klee Yakar’s  explanation later in this essay for an interpretation that allows for keeping the order of the verse intact.

[6] MaLBIM’s position regarding this matter appears to be in conflict with a passage in Rosh HaShana 3a that R. Menachem Kasher cites in his work, Tora Shleima, p. 52, in association with our verse in VaYikra 25:20 :

Said Reish Lakish: “Ki” can have four different connotations—“if”, “perhaps”, “but”, “that behold”…

“perhaps” as it is said, (VaYikra 25:20) “ ‘VeChi’ you will say, ‘What will we eat in the seventh year’?”

Consequently it would appear from Reish Lakish’s understanding that the Tora is suggesting with far less certitude than implied by MaLBIM that this question will be asked. A possible reconciliation of the commentator’s view with that of this Amora would involve speculating how widespread such questioning might be. It is possible that there will certainly be some percentage of the Jewish population that will pose challenges to faith in the Divine. Yet, unless a significant overall portion of the people ask the question, it is still possible to consider such doubt as less than inevitable and indicative of a lack of faith on the part of everyone.

[7] Food plays a major role in reflecting lack of belief in God and His Directives, not only in the Garden of Eden story (Beraishit 3), but also with respect to drinking water (Shemot 15:23-5; 17:1-7; BaMidbar 20:1-13), the “Man” (Shemot 16; BaMidbar 21:5-9) and meat (Shemot 16; BaMidbar 11:31-35).

[8] Mitzvot that appear to parallel the type of sacrifice entailed by Shmitta include:

a) giving charity and tithing, particularly the assumption that one tenth of one’s income (“Ma’aser”) is the proper amount to give annually;

b) the prohibition against working on Shabbat and Yom Tov despite such observances possibly interfering with responsibilities of and potential for earning a living;

c) purchasing costly obligatory sacrifices associated with festivals as well as those required for atoning from inadvertent sin.

d) outlays for Shabbat and Yom Tov expenses.

With regard to living the religious lifestyle in general, R. Shimon bar Yochai in Berachot 35b voices the view that engaging in any agricultural activity, and by extension, other forms of work that are relatively open-ended, will be all-consuming to the point that Tora study will be negatively impacted, and therefore in order to assure high spiritual standards, all involvement in the world of work should be rejected. Although this is a minority view that is not upheld as normative, implicit in the attitude is the assumption that an adversarial rather than complimentary relationship could be seen to exist between the dedication to support oneself and one’s family on the one hand, and being an intense and consistent  spiritual personality on the other.

[9] It should be kept in mind that not only will the individual be required to spend a significant period of time in Yerushalayim, but traveling there and back, certainly during the Biblical period, when the options available were walking, riding an animal, or riding in a vehicle powered by an animal, required a serious additional time commitment to the period spent in Yerushalayim proper.

[10] Mitzva VaLev, Avraham Tzioni, Tel Aviv, 1967, p. 19.

[11] One who owns no land risks nothing, as compared to a landowner, when he goes up to Yerushalayim.

[12] See e.g.,

a) Shemot 22:17 in light of the role of magicians in Egyptian life as in Beraishit 41:24; Shemot      8:3, 14, 15; 9:11; Shemot 8:22;

b) VaYikra 18:3;

c)  Devarim 23:8-9 (the fact that an Egyptian has to wait three generations after conversion in                     order to marry into the Jewish people suggests that there is some degree of separation,                                       even if it is not as absolute as the separation applying to Amon and Moav in 23:4-5).

[13] The context of this verse bears out RaShBaM’s contention in light of the verses that immediately follow (which comprise the second paragraph of the Shema prayer):

11:13-17

And if you will surely listen to My Commandments that I am Commanding you today, to love the Lord your God and serve Him with all of your heart and all of your soul,

And I will Give rain to your land in its proper time, softer and harder rain, and you will gather your grain, your wine and your oil.

And I will Give grass in your fields for your animals, and you will eat and be satiated.

Be careful lest your hearts be turned, and you turn aside and serve other gods and bow down to them.

And the Anger of HaShem will be Ignited against you, and He will Stop the heavens, and there will not be rain, and the land will not give forth its bounty, and you will be lost quickly from upon this good land and HaShem Gave to you.

[14] Commentators point out that when the Jubilee year occurred, then the sixth year would have to provide food for four years, i.e., the sixth, the seventh (Sabbatical year), the eighth (Jubilee year) and the ninth!

[15] How much will grow during the sixth year in excess of the immediate needs of that year would also in all likelihood be dependent upon conformity to God’s Law, as noted by RaShBaM.

[16] This is the sense of the Mishna in Rosh HaShana (1:2) “…On Chag (Sukkot) they are judged concerning water.”

[17] Shemot 16:19.

[18] Shemot 16:25-26, 29.

[19] Does the current state of the Israeli economy still necessitate reliance on a leniency which circumvents a law that has extremely significant implications for the way in which people go about their lives? There are some who are lobbying to now reject relying on this leniency.

One of the major topics in the Parasha is the necessity for sacrifices as well as those who offer them, to meet certain objective criteria with regard to outward appearance.[1] While the rationale for offering only physically perfect specimens of animal and plant life can be understood in light of the following prophetic statement:

Malachi 1:7, 8

Ye offer polluted bread upon Mine Altar. And ye say: ‘Wherein have we polluted Thee?’ In that ye say: ‘The Table of the LORD (the altar in the Temple) is contemptible.’ And when ye offer the blind for sacrifice, is it no evil? And when ye offer the lame and sick, is it no evil? Present it now unto thy governor; will he be pleased with thee? or will he accept thy person? Saith the LORD of hosts.

and strongly implied in the biblical story of the first sacrifice:

Beraishit 4:3-5.

And in process of time it came to pass, that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offering unto the LORD. And Abel, he also brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof. And the LORD had respect unto Abel and to his offering; but unto Cain and to his offering He had not respect. And Cain was very wroth, and his countenance fell.

it is more difficult to comprehend the demand that the Kohanim engaged in the Divine Service must also be of a certain “perfect” appearance. When it comes to people attempting to come close to HaShem (the word “Korban” derives from “Karov”—close) the Psalmist appears to suggest that, on the contrary,  God is Interested in the person’s appropriate internal qualities and intentions, feelings that are more likely to be engendered by physical limitations than not, more than anything else:

Tehillim 51:18-9

For Thou Delightest not in sacrifice, else would I give it; Thou hast no Pleasure in burnt-offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, Thou wilt not Despise.[2]

RaDaK’s interpretation of this verse appears to sharpen the question further:

…And the essential reason for sacrifices is that God Commanded that you engage in such a practice in order to “break” the heart and to mitigate the bodily passions from one’s heart. And by means of the burning of the limbs, there is a metaphor for the burning of the animalistic passions…

By extension, wouldn’t the ideal type of human beings to facilitate these sacrifices reinforce the symbolism of the sacrifices themselves if the people offering the sacrifices physically “imperfect” and as a result, humble of spirit? (See fn. 2.) While the “perfect” Kohen parallels the animal prior to its being offered, if the essence of the sacrifice is its burning on the altar, wouldn’t that state be more congruous with the “broken” Kohen?

An hypothesis that redirects the focus from the Kohanim to others who are part of the drama of sacrifice.

Sefer HaChinuch #275, “A Kohen Possessing a Blemish Should not Serve in the Temple” offers the following rationale for the Tora’s requirement:

The roots of this Commandment include the idea that most human actions are acceptable to the hearts of the onlookers in accordance with the importance of the ones carrying out the actions, for when a person is important in terms of his appearance and good in his actions, he will find favor and understanding for all that he does in the eyes of all that watch him. Conversely, if there are shortcomings in his form and irregularity in his limbs, and if he is not righteous in his actions, what he does will not be deemed so pleasant in the hearts of the onlookers. Therefore truly, it is appropriate for the surrogate upon whom atonement is dependent to be a person inspiring grace, of good form and appearance and pleasant in all of his actions, in order that the thoughts of all people become attached to him. And aside from this, it is possible that with regard to the wholeness of his form, there are hints of things, that by means of reflecting on them, he will purify his soul and be exalted. Therefore it is inappropriate that there be in any way an irregularity in any aspect of his form, less there be distracted the soul of the contemplator as a result of the irregularity and he will digress from the desirable (state of mind.)

On the one hand, it is notable that the Chinuch assumes that perfection of physical form also includes righteousness of actions (see the underlined phrases). There is no indication in the Tora text (see fn. 1 VaYikra 21:16-23) of such a requirement.[3] [4] Although a figurative interpretation of the term “blemish” could suggest an additional moral, religious standard, and that would certainly be in accordance with the spirit of the law, yet that does not appear to be the simple literal meaning of the term, particularly in light of the numerous specific examples cited by the text in VaYikra 21.

More striking is the suggestion by the Chinuch that there is an element of “performance art” in the service carried out by the Kohanim. In addition to the need to be precise in all they do and think, their appearance during the Avoda, not only in terms of the “uniform”, i.e., the simple clothing that they wear, but also their physical appearance, will either add to or detract from the experience of the “audience” who have come to be spiritually inspired by virtue of the entire pomp and circumstance entailed in the offerings. Since it is the onlookers for whom the service is intended, their sensibilities must be considered, regardless of whether we feel they are credible, appropriate, even respectful of all types and forms of humanity. A tension appears to be created between what should ideally be a person’s positive, spiritual reaction when he encounters human physical deformity—respect, empathy, even a blessing of God[5] —and the unfortunate reality of how people typically react to those who are externally different. Apparently the need for the sacrificial service to have the maximum effect upon those who are watching trumps considerations of egalitarianism with respect to which Kohanim will be able to take an active role in the service.

Even if the psychology of the onlookers is the basis for the physical standards for Kohanim, perhaps it is what sacrifices represent in general rather than any specific act of offering that is being addressed.

Whereas the Chinuch’s argument focuses upon the immediate psychological effects of the Temple service upon those who are watching, R. S.R. Hirsch conceptualizes the requirement for the Kohanim to be without physical blemish as a conscious effort to make an ideological and theological statement regarding the focal point of Judaism in general and the Divine Service in particular:

R. S.R. Hirsch on VaYikra 21:17

…It is not the afflicted and the infirm, not the blind and the lame, the disfigured and crippled, the broken and the sick, for whom the Jewish Altar is erected, so that weary, burdened humanity can drag itself up to it to find compassionate consolation or even miraculous healing. It is life in its completeness, in its freshness and strength, which there is to gain consecration to an active life of God-serving deeds, and thereby acquire the everlasting freshness of youth and unbroken forces of life. Life and strength, not death and weakness, live at the Altars of God…

Like the Chinuch, R. Hirsch also appears to be concerned about the associations that onlookers will make should they see Kohanim with physical aberrations conducting the services. However, he goes beyond the immediate visceral reaction of the onlooker and reflects upon what the impression that will be left regarding what usually takes place in the Temple and the role of religion in life in general. It is typical that men’s minds turn to religion, thoughts of accountability and the afterlife, when they come up against their mortality. Pilgrims to holy places are often afflicted by all sorts of maladies and are in search of a cure for their ailments. God is viewed by some as a “last resort” when all other measures for recovery have proven ineffective. By having vigorous, vital, healthy human beings associated with the Temple service, suggests R. Hirsch, a different impression will be imparted, i.e., religion is a mindset and series of practices which is to be associated with the prime of life,[6] when all possibilities remain open, and the individual is in need of structure and direction. While spiritual activities can provide comfort to those in physical need, particularly when they approach the end of life, it should not be viewed exclusively as such. And the active roles of a certain Kohen whose look is healthy and vigorous, to the exclusion of others who might not engender such thoughts, will go far to make the desired positive impression.[7]

Conclusion.

Both the Chinuch and R. Hirsch attempt to account for the physical standards applied to Kohanim who wish to serve in the Temple as a function not so much the Kohanim themselves, as of those who will witness the offering of sacrifices. The discussion becomes one centering upon human nature—what will make the deepest, most lasting, most positive impression when individuals come to Yerushalayim and participate in communal worship of HaShem.

And the LORD Spoke unto Moses, saying: Speak unto Aaron, saying: Whosoever he be of thy seed throughout their generations that hath a blemish, let him not approach to offer the bread of his God. For whatsoever man he be that hath a blemish, he shall not approach: 1) a blind man, or 2) a lame, or he that hath 3) anything maimed, or 4) anything too long, or a man that is 5) broken-footed, or 6) broken-handed, or 7) crook-backed, or 8) a dwarf, or that hath his 9) eye overspread, or is 10) scabbed, or 11) scurvy, or hath his 12) stones crushed; no man of the seed of Aaron the priest, that hath a blemish, shall come nigh to offer the offerings of the LORD made by fire; he hath a blemish; he shall not come nigh to offer the bread of his God. He may eat the bread of his God, both of the most holy, and of the holy. Only he shall not go in unto the veil, nor come nigh unto the altar, because he hath a blemish; that he profane not My holy places; for I Am the LORD Who Sanctify them.

Ibid. 22:17-24

And the LORD Spoke unto Moses, saying: Speak unto Aaron, and to his sons, and unto all the children of Israel, and say unto them: Whosoever he be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel, that bringeth his offering, whether it be any of their vows, or any of their free-will-offerings, which are brought unto the LORD for a burnt-offering; that ye may be accepted, ye shall offer a male without blemish, of the cows, of the sheep, or of the goats. But whatsoever hath a blemish, that shall ye not bring; for it shall not be acceptable for you. And whosoever brings a sacrifice of peace-offerings unto the LORD in fulfillment of a vow clearly uttered, or for a freewill-offering, of the herd or of the flock, it shall be perfect to be accepted; there shall be no blemish therein. 1) Blind, or 2) broken, or 3) maimed, or 4) having a wen, or 5) scabbed, or 6) scurvy, ye shall not offer these unto the LORD, nor make an offering by fire of them upon the altar unto the LORD. Either a bullock or a lamb that hath 7) anything too long or 8) too short, that mayest thou offer for a freewill-offering; but for a vow it shall not be accepted. That which hath 9) its stones bruised, or 10) crushed, or 11) torn, or 12) cut, ye shall not offer unto the LORD; neither shall ye do thus in your land.

[2] During the period when worshipping God centers upon the synagogue and the prayer quorum in the absence of the Temple, it could be maintained that the role of “Kohen” is occupied essentially by the Shliach Tzibbur (the representative of the community) who leads the service. Just as in the Temple only the Kohen was allowed to carry out the sacrificial service from after the ritual slaughter of the animal and onwards, for those members of the congregation who are unable to pray on their own, as well as for parts of the service that are recited only in the presence of a Minyan, e.g., Kaddish, Kedusha, Chazarat HaShaTz, etc., the ShaTz not only coordinates the speed of the service but even literally does for the Tzibbur (congregation) what it cannot do for itself. (On those days when “Birchat Kohanim” [the Priestly Blessing] is not only read by the Shliach Tzibbur, but is actually enacted by the Kohanim in attendance at the service—in the Diaspora on Festivals; in Israel every day—the contrast between the ShaTz and the Kohanim is starkly experienced. Yet even then, when the Shliach Tzibbur leads the Kohanim line by line in their recitation, one could say that he is acting as a “Kohen” for the actual Kohanim. The counterpoint between them takes on another dimension when the ShaTz happens to be a Kohen himself. Then someone else, typically the Rabbi or Gabbai, becomes the honorary “Kohen”.) The essential difference between the “quasi-Kehuna” of the Shliach Tzibbur and the actual Kohanim is reflected in the Mishna Berura’s clear statement to the effect that physical characteristics do not enter into the determination of who can serve as the ShaTz, at least not “MeiIkar HaDin” (according to the essential Halacha):

Mishna Berura on Shulchan Aruch, Orech Chayim 53 #13 d.h. Hagun

…Physical defects disqualify only Kohanim, not the ShaTz. On the contrary, (Tehillim 51:19) “…A broken and a contrite heart, O God, Thou wilt not Despise.” (The ironic implication is that one with physical problems, which in turn result in personal humility and a powerful sense of human limitations, is not only not disqualified, but might be even better qualified to serve as ShaTz then one who is physically “perfect”.) And there are those who are strict about this apriori when there is one who is also worthy and appropriate. (This is the view of Magen Avraham who follows Chavot Yair with respect to a blind individual. However, Chavot Yair makes his comment only in terms of the Days of Awe—[as opposed to the services of the rest of the year.]) See later #41 with respect to a blind person (serving as ShaTz).

Shulchan Aruch, Orech Chayim 53:14

A blind person can serve as a Shliach Tzibbur as long as he does not read the Tora (Ba’al Koreh) because of the rule (Gittin 60b) “Things that were transmitted in written form (the Written Tradition) one does not have permission to recite them from memory” (and a blind person will obviously not be able to read the words.)

Mishna Berura #53

…And in the responsa Chavot Yair #176, he states that despite this (the view of the Shulchan Aruch) a blind person should not serve as ShaTz during the Days of Awe, even if he is blind in only one of his eyes as long as there is another who is worthy and appropriate like him, look there for his reasoning, Eliyahu Rabba #10 disagrees with him. It seems to him that even according to Chavot Yair, it is only apriori that one should not appoint a blind person for this role, but one must not remove a blind person from his role (it is usually a matter of livelihood with the ShaTz having been at some previous point hired for this role) should he afterwards become blind. Concerning a ShaTz who is completely deaf, it is concluded in the Novella of R. Akiva Eiger that he should not be the Shliach Tzibbur, that although when one cannot hear what he says he is considered to have fulfilled his Mitzva, since apriori he should hear what he says, he cannot fulfill the Mitzvot of others apriori.

While it could be contended that the Kohanim performing the Sacrificial service neither had to read or hear anything, in contrast to the ShaTz, and it is furthermore possible for blind and deaf individuals to appear “perfect” if their “defects” were due to internal physiological causes rather than external ones, RaMBaM does list blindness (Mishneh Tora, Hilchot Biat HaMikdash 7:5) as a disqualification for both man and animal in the Temple Service. Deafness, on the other hand, is not listed by him.

With respect to Birkat Kohanim itself from the perspective of the Kohanim (as opposed to the ShaTz who leads their recitation that was discussed above), the Talmud in Ta’anit 27a clearly distinguishes between the rules governing who is qualified to enact the service in the Temple and Birkat Kohanim. Among the Rishonim, whereas RaMBaM (Hilchot Tefilla U’Nesiat Kapayim 15:3-4) appears to equate the rules for both, Tosafot (Ta’anit 27a) distinguishes between them. So even according to those who view Birkat Kohanim today as at Tora mandated law, and it is a practice that originally took place in the Temple, whether the standards regarding the Kohanim transfer today is a matter of dispute.

[3] The Midrash Halacha includes a category derived from inference that could represent the need to disqualify a Kohen who behaves badly:

Sifra, Emor 3:3

The only cases (of disqualification) are these (listed explicitly in VaYikra 21:18-20). From where do we know to include other physical blemishes? The text states “Mum” “Mum”  (the term appears five times in 21:16-23) as an inclusionary derivation. (Due to the superfluity of the word for “blemish”, the Rabbis saw fit to include other categories of physical deformities in addition to those explicitly listed in the text.)

From where do we know to define as disqualified 1) the dark-skinnned, 2) the lame, 3) the albino, 4) the exceedingly tall, 5) the dwarf, 6) the deaf and dumb, 7) the drunk, and 8) one afflicted with skin afflictions that are declared ritually pure? The text states “Ish” “Ish” (a redundancy of the word “man”, appearing five times in VaYikra 21:16-23, leading to the conclusion that additional categories of types of people who are not considered blemished per se—someone who has dark skin cannot be said to be “blemished”; furthermore in a society where everyone is dark, it would be considered the height of normality!—are  to be disqualified.)

Of the eight specific cases listed in the second portion of this Midrash, only the seventh, “the drunk”, is a condition that the individual willingly takes upon himself which could lead to improper behavior. Yet the presence of this element on the list appears problematic in light of VaYikra 10:9 “’Drink no wine nor strong drink, thou, nor thy sons with thee, when ye go into the tent of meeting, that ye die not; it shall be a statute forever throughout your generations.”  Could it be said that the earlier verse prohibits entering the Heichal in a state of inebriation—Nadav and Avihu brought a strange fire, i.e., Ketoret (incense) and that can only be offered on the golden altar within the Heichal—while performing the sacrificial service on the Mizbeach HaZahav, the outer altar upon which animals and other sacrifices were offered is only covered by the hermeneutic interpretation from “Ish” “Ish”?

[4] Just as we have suggested a contrast between the Kohen and the Shliach Tzibbur with respect to physical blemishes (see fn. 2), an interesting parallel between them, particularly during the Days of Awe appears in the Codes:

RaMA, Shulchan Aruch, Orech Chayim 581:1

And they should be careful to search for a Shliach Tzibbur who is the most appropriate and the most accomplished in Tora and good deeds that it is possible to find, that he should lead the services for Selichot and the Days of Awe. He should be at least thirty years old, he should also be married. Nevertheless all of Israel are worthy, as long as he is acceptable to the congregation…

It would seem that an individual who draws undo attention to himself for whatever reason, could become someone who will be unsettling to the congregation and therefore will not be able to carry out his mission. Whether or not we feel that it is appropriate for the congregation to be distracted, if a significant percentage—or even a small minority—is disturbed, it would appear that this individual is not the proper choice. According to the Chinuch, it would seem that a similar calculus is being applied to the reason why blemished Kohanim are disqualified from the Temple service.

[5] Berachot 58b

R. Joshua b. Levi said: On seeing pock-marked persons one says: Blessed be He who makes strange creatures. An objection was raised: If one sees a negro, a very red or very white person, a hunchback, a dwarf or a dropsical person, he says: Blessed be He who makes strange creatures. If he sees one with an amputated limb, or blind, or flatheaded, or lame, or smitten with boils, or pock-marked, he says: Blessed be the true Judge! — There is no contradiction; one blessing is said if he is so from birth, the other if he became so afterwards. A proof of this is that he is placed in the same category as one with an amputated limb; this proves it.

It would appear from the contrast of the two blessings that only the second, i.e., Baruch Dayan HaEmet, is a negative reaction, reflecting sorrow for the changed condition of the individual who once had been “whole” and no longer is, whereas the former, i.e., Meshaneh Et HaBriyot is a positive comment comparable to other blessings made when seeing a remarkable phenomenon, e.g., a rainbow, lightning, a scholar, fruit trees in bloom, etc.

[6] R. Hirsch presents a parallel interpretation when discussing the symbolism of ritual purity and impurity on Shemot 28:38. He contends that since impurity associated with a dead human body is the Avi Avot Shel Tuma (the archetype, quintessential form) therefore all forms of ritual impurity are associated in one way or another with death. The strong emphasis that Tuma not be associated with the Temple, sacrifices, Kohanim, etc. constitutes a life-affirming dimension of Judaism which starkly contrasts with some other religions which emphasize death and other-worldliness.

[7] It is interesting to reflect on such ideas in light of the ever-increasing concern within our society to insure that disabled individuals not feel unduly discriminated against. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Americans_with_Disabilities_Act_of_1990 ) constitutes an attempt to define the rights of such individuals as within the rubric of civil rights. Should it then be concluded that Judaism as manifest in an essentially “discriminatory” policy regarding who can serve as Kohen in the Temple, is not sensitive to such considerations? Individual rights and sensitivities regarding handicapped and disabled individuals is pitted against rituals and practices that are communal and social in essence. Is it possible for someone dedicated to these types of individual rights to make peace with the laws governing which Kohanim are qualified for Temple service? For those who believe that the Tora is given for all time, and is not reflective of a perspective that can be “dated”, how ought one to understand these requirements? I would be happy to receive views addressing this question.

Chapter 19 of Parashat Kedoshim contains a particularly inordinate number of verses listing various individual Commandments,[1] each concluding with the words “Ani HaShem” (I am God) or “Ani HaShem Elokeichem” (I am God, your Lord):

VaYikra 19:3 

An individual should fear his mother and father, and My Shabbatot he should observe “Ani HaShem Elokeichem”.

Ibid. 4

Do not turn unto the false gods and do not make for yourself molten gods, “Ani HaShem Elokeichem”.

Ibid. 10

You shall not glean your vineyard nor shall you gather the single grapes of your vineyard. You will leave them for the poor and the stranger “Ani HaShem Elokeichem”.

Ibid. 12

Do not swear by My Name falsely, for then you would be profaning the Name of your God, “Ani HaShem”.

Ibid. 14

Do not curse a deaf individual, and before a blind person do not place a stumbling block, and you will fear from before your God, “Ani HaShem”.

Ibid. 16

Do not go as a tale bearer among your people; do not stand idly by when your friend’s blood is being spilled, “Ani HaShem”.

Ibid. 18

You shall not take revenge and you will not hold a grudge the children of your nation, and you will love your friend as yourself, “Ani HaShem”.

Ibid. 25

And in the fifth year you will eat its fruit in order to add to you your harvest, “Ani HaShem Elokeichem”.

Ibid. 28

You shall not make any cuttings in your flesh for the dead, nor print any marks upon you, “Ani HaShem”.

Ibid. 30

And My Shabbatot you shall observe, and my Temple you shall fear, “Ani HaShem”.

Ibid. 31

You shall not turn to mediums or wizards, nor seek to be defiled by them, “Ani HaShem Elokeichem”.

Ibid. 32

You will stand before the hoary head (a person with white hair, i.e., elderly), and honor the face of the old man, and you will fear your God, “Ani HaShem”.

Ibid. 34

                But the stranger that dwells with you shall be as one born among you, and you shall love him as yourself, because you were sojourners in the land of Egypt, “Ani HaShem Elokeichem”.

Ibid. 36

Just balances, just weights, a just Epha and a just Hin, shall you have, “Ani HaShem Elokeichem” Who Brought you out of the land of Egypt.

A rationale for explaining why in VaYikra 19 there are so many instances of this particular phrase.

The concentration of verses ending with a form of this particular phrase within a single chapter of VaYikra suggests that in addition to each of these topics individually being enhanced in terms of its importance and religious significance by a direct reference to God as the source of the topic,[2] that there is some common theme that links them all together. R. David Tzvi Hoffmann[3] suggests an approach by which the verses in question can be organized into a cohesive whole.[4]

These fifteen statements[5] are divided into three groups: The first consists of three verses (19:2-4),[6] the second of five verses (19:9-18),[7]^,[8] and the third seven verses (19:23-36…)[9]

Between each group, a section is inserted that does not end in “Ani HaShem”. Between the first and second groups the laws of “Pigul”[10] and “Notar”[11] are inserted (19:5-8), and between the second and third groups the laws of “Kilaim”[12] and “Shifcha Charufa”[13] are inserted (19:20-22)…

The division into three groups can be explained as follows: The first group (19:2-4) with the three-word ending “Ani HaShem Elokeichem” constitutes the introduction, followed by a formulation of statutes that themselves are divided into two groups:

The first group (19:9-18) include Commandments between man and man, “Mishpatim” (rational laws that comprise a social contract) and which reach a climax with the exalted Commandment (19:18) “And you shall love your friend as yourself”.

The second group (appearing within the framework of 19:23-36, but specifically 19:33-36) concerns Commandments that require one to conduct oneself with righteousness and love towards the stranger, as well as the need to act justly in all business dealings.

According to the reason that is given for these (latter) Commandments (19:33-36), i.e., that God Acted compassionately towards Israel with respect to the Exodus from Egypt (19:34), these laws take on the status of “Chukim” (lit. statutes; laws that are not rational, but rather “Decrees of the King”), behaviors that God Demands from His People, as a result of His having Freed them from a house of bondage. Therefore at the beginning of this second group (19:23-36), the text includes the phrase (19:22) “My Statutes you shall observe”, with the entire presentation concluding most appropriately with the words (19:37) “And you will observe all My Statutes and all My Laws and you will do them, ‘Ani HaShem’”…

R. Hoffmann therefore contends that the repetition of “Ani HaShem” both divides the list of Commandments in VaYikra 19 and simultaneously connects them with one another. They are divided in terms of the different finite actions that we have to perform in order to fulfill them, but they are also of a piece in the sense that the basic reason why we are obligated to comply with all of them is the same, i.e., because God Ordered the Jewish people to do these things. Particularly with regard to the Commandments that are “Bein Adam LeChaveiro” (between man and man), when Mitzvot appear to be no more than logical and socially utilitarian, there is always a significant danger that an individual will come to think that he is above the law, that one or more specific Divine Directives do not apply to him since he takes issue with the perceived rationale underlying the Commandments. Therefore, according to R. Hoffmann, repeating the phrase “Ani HaShem” after all types of Mitzvot serves the purpose to stress what one should be thinking during the course of a Commandment’s fulfillment. In the same manner that one approaches “Chukim” (lit. statutes; generally Commandments between man and God), i.e., with faith and trust in the Lawgiver, so too must one carry out the “Mishpatim” (laws between man and man) without calling them and their rationales into question.

Difficulties with R. Hoffmann’s hypothesis.

Yet, while R. Hoffmann’s point is well-taken, whether he has adequately accounted for the occurrences of the phrase “Ani HaShem” is questionable. Why does the phrase appear in some instances after a single verse, while in others, only after 2 or 3? Why do certain Mitzvot have the phrase attached to them, while others do not? Is it merely a literary matter in the sense that “Ani HaShem” had to be scattered throughout VaYikra 19 in almost random fashion to make R. Hoffmann’s point? While the rule (e.g., Brachot 31b) “Dibra Tora K’Lashon Bnai Adam” (the Tora speaks in the language of people, i.e., literary conventions could be the basis for the usage of certain terminology or repetitions of words), nevertheless, a more comprehensive explanation that accounted for when and when not the phrase is appropriate would have been welcome.

An alternative hypotheis.

An earlier approach that does not attempt to group together the Commandments in light of the usage of “Ani HaShem”, but nevertheless offers an evocative perspective for understanding the phrase’s implications each time it is used, particularly in light of VaYikra 19, is found in the commentary of Rabbeinu Bachya on VaYikra 19:4:

After each of three consecutive verses (19:2-4) (the phrase) “Ani HaShem Elokeichem” appears. Similarly regarding the Commandments of the stranger (19:34), the Commandments concerning fair weights and measures (19:36) and a few other Mitzvot. And the reason for this is that all of the Commandments are reflections of God, and all Commandments requiring action are testimonies regarding God’s Existence. And for this reason, the Rabbis have said, (Avoda Zora 17b) “Anyone who only studies Tora (to the exclusion of carrying out what has been studied) is like one who has no God.”[14] Because a person who studies Tora constantly but does not pursue the opportunity to engage in practical Mitzvot, is not whole, and it is tantamount to his denying God’s Existence, since he does not provide testimony via his actions of God’s Existence. True beliefs are only concretized and fulfilled by means of actions. And it is for this reason that the Tora constantly cites in connection to some Commandments “I am the Lord, your God” (i.e., you give testimony to Who I Am only if you carry out, rather than merely study, this as well as all other Commandments).

Questions that arise from Rabbeinu Bachya’s approach.

Although one could still wonder, based upon Rabbeinu Bachya’s explanation, why this phrase is attached to some Mitzvot and not others, as well as why there is such a heavy concentration of such verses in Parashat Kedoshim, Rabbeinu Bachya’s overarching principle—that unless a person actively pursues the opportunity to fulfill Commandments, he is imperfect and perhaps even heretical—is an important one, and has a number of practical implications. Not all Tora that is studied is necessarily “Le’Ma’aseh” (for practical enactment). Would Rabbeinu Bachya then claim that to study the Orders[15] of “Kodshim” (dealing with the Temple Service and Sacrifices) or “Taharot” (dealing with ritual purity and impurity) is inappropriate since the vast majority of the contents of these cannot be carried out today in the absence of the Temple and the impossibility of gaining purity from ritual defilement by means of a dead human body due to the impossibility of preparing the “Para Aduma” (the red heifer, whose ashes are needed for mixing in water and sprinkling the mixture upon the person who has been made impure via contact with a dead human)? Furthermore, should Kohanim study only material that pertains to them, just as Yisraelim should not attempt to understand the responsibilities of a Kohen? Must men and women only study material that is gender specific in order that the maximum of what is learned can be personally applied? Would Rabbeinu Bachya then support those who although not in need of baby birds or birds eggs, nevertheless scour the forest for a nest so that they can “fulfill” this Commandment rather than just studying it? And what about Talmud study that is not focused upon identifying and carrying out the “Halacha LeMa’aseh” (the practical Halachic application)? Perhaps, if we take the liberty of speaking on behalf of this commentator, Rabbeinu Bachya would suggest some sort of balance between practical and theoretical, in order that the scope of Tora study does not become overly narrow were it to confine itself exclusively to practical scenarios, and yet can also bring the student to an understanding of the theological and philosophical underpinnings of his tradition and religion.

e.g.,   VaYikra 18:4    You shall do My Laws, and you will observe My Statutes to go in them, “Ani  HaShem Elokeichem”;

Ibid. 18:5       And you will observe My Statutes, and My Laws that a person does them and lives through them, “Ani HaShem”;

Ibid. 18:30     And you will observe My Statutes, that you commit not any of these abominable actions, which were practiced before you, and that you not defile yourselves in them, “Ani  HaShem Elokeichem”;

Ibid. 19:37,     And you will observe all of My Statutes and all of My Laws, and you will do them, “Ani HaShem”;

Ibid. 20:7       And you will sanctify yourselves and you will be holy because “Ani  HaShem Elokeichem”;  

Ibid. 24:22     You shall have one manner of law, the same for the stranger as one of your own country, because “Ani  HaShem Elokeichem”;

Ibid. 25:55     For to Me are the children of Israel servants, they are My Servants whom I Brought out of the land of Egypt, “Ani  HaShem Elokeichem”; 

behaviors required specifically of Kohanim,

e.g.,   Ibid. 21:12      Neither shall he go out of the Sanctuary, nor profane the Sanctuary of His God, for the crown of the anointing oil of his God is upon him, “Ani HaShem”;

          Ibid. 22:2      Speak to Aharon and his sons, that they separate themselves from the holy things of the children of Israel that they hallow to me, and they profane not My Holy Name, “Ani HaShem”;

          Ibid. 22:3      Say to them: Whomever he be of all your seed throughout all the generations who approaches the holy things which the children of Isarel hallow to the Lord, having his ritual uncleanness upon him, the soul shall be cut off from My Presence, “Ani HaShem”;

or Commandments that are singularly listed, independent of any concentrated group of other Commandments,

e.g.,   Ibid. 18:6       No person shall approach to any that is near of kin to him to uncover his nakedness, “Ani HaShem”;

Ibid. 18:21     And you shall not allow any of your seed to pass through (the fire) to Molech, neither shall you profane the Name of your God “Ani HaShem”;

Ibid. 23:22     And when you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not completely remove the corners of your field when you reap nor shall you gather any gleaning of your harvest. You shall leave them to the poor and the stranger, “Ani  HaShem Elokeichem”;

Ibid. 25:17     You shall not defraud one another, but you shall fear your God, for “Ani  HaShem Elokeichem”;

Ibid. 26:1       You shall make no idols nor shall you erect a carved idol, or a pillar nor shall you install a figured stone in your land to bow down upon it, because “Ani HaShem Elokeichem”.

With respect to verses that encompass all Commandments, it is not remarkable that they should conclude with HaShem Identifying Himself as the Origin of these Mitzvot. Despite their apparent diversity, i.e., Statutes, Laws, Commemorations, Testimonies, etc., they all emanate from a single source and a Single Will. As for Commandments that apply to Kohanim in particular, HaShem clearly States that His Intent is that (BaMidbar 30:45) “…they (the members of the tribe of Levi) shall be to Me”. While no human being can become one with HaShem, to the extent that He has Designated the Kohanim for His special Service, and they therefore are required to act in a more holy manner than the rest of the Jews, Commandments that apply to the Priests understandably contain an extra dimension of sanctity, indicated by the phrase “Ani HaShem”. Finally, when an isolated Commandment appearing in some other section of the Tora ends with the phrase in question, the words can be interpreted in a manner similar to the interpretations offered by the Biblical commentators with regard to the concentration of verses in Parashat Kedoshim; nevertheless, the fourteen instances within a thirty-seven verse span is striking and draws attention to itself. Why does the Tora engage in creating this “mantra” for the individual Commandments appearing in this Parasha?

[2] Examples of interpretations of the phrase when looking at a particular verse in its own right, as opposed of trying to link together all of the verses in which “Ani HaShem” appears, include:

a)   RaMBaN, Rabbeinu Bachya on 19:2 If we are holy we have the possibility of clinging to HaShem, becoming one with Him.

b)   RaShI on 19:3 The authority of a parent comes from HaShem and therefore a parent cannot order a child to transgress against the Tora.

c)   Ibn Ezra on 19:3 Emulate Me by resting on Shabbat.

d)   Ibn Ezra on 19:4 I am the only God for you and therefore do not follow other gods.

e)   RaShI on 19:10 HaShem Punishes and Collects souls.

f)    RaShI on 19:14 Even if an individual can mislead others,  HaShem Knows what his intention is when he does an action that could be looked upon either positively or negatively.

g)   Ibn Ezra on 19:14 HaShem can Bring you to the same position as someone vulnerable of whom you have taken advantage.

[3] Sefer VaYikra, Vol. 2, Mosad HaRav Kook, Yerushalayim, 5714, pp. 26-27.

[4] R. S.R. Hirsch (The Pentateuch, VaYikra 2, p. 500) also groups the verses in question, but in a far more perfunctory and, in my opinion, less insightful manner:

The verses in this chapter are quite clearly divided into groups by the concluding words: “Ani HaShem Elokeichem”, in v. 2, 3, 4, 10, 25, 31, 34, and 36, of which groups 11-25 and 26-31 are subdivided by certain sentences being made into separate paragraphs by the concluding words: “Ani HaShem”.

Three fundamental sentences form the basic pillars of our rendering ourselves holy. They deal with: a) parents and Shabbat (v.3); b) the purity of our conception of God (v. 4); c) the purity of and the social results of our relationship to God (v. 5-10).

Aside from personal preference, R. Hirsch does not indicate any sort of textual cue why these verses and concepts are more important than the others, particularly in light of so many verses concluding with “Ani HaShem”.

[5] R. Hoffmann includes the introductory verse of Parashat Kedoshim—VaYikra 19:2 “Speak to the entire congregation of Israel and say to them: Be holy ‘Ki Kadosh Ani HaShem Elokeichem’—with the verses that follow, since the last three words constitute one of the two forms of closing shared by the other fourteen. I would not include it not only because it discusses Mitzvot in general or an overall approach to religion (see the first category of verses that I exclude in fn. 1) but also because syntactically 19:2 should be read, “Ki Kadosh Ani (because I am Holy), the Lord your God”, i.e., the first person pronoun “Ani” is the subject of the previous adjectival phrase “Ki Kadosh”, and therefore separated from “HaShem Elokeichem”, in contrast the other manifestations of “Ani HaShem Elokeichem” in VaYikra 19.

(“*” indicates that the phrase “Ani HaShem” or “Ani HaShem Elokeichem” appears at the end of the verse.)

[6] *19:2 The Commandment to be holy.

  *19:3 Fearing parents, observing Shabbat.

  *19:4 Do not worship idols or manufacture molten gods.

à    These Commandments restate the primary themes found among the first five of the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:2-12; Devarim 5:6-16), i.e., believing in and respecting God/refraining from idol worship; observing Shabbat; honoring parents. 

[7] *19:9-10 Leave corners of fields for the poor; allow for gleaning of fields and vineyards by the poor.

    19:11 Do not steal, deal falsely, lie.

  *19:12 Do not swear falsely by God’s Name; do not desecrate HaShem’s Name.

    19:13 Do not defraud, rob, fail to pay wages to neighbor.

  *19:14 Do not curse the deaf; do not put stumbling block in front of the blind.

    19:15 Judge fairly without showing favoritism neither to the poor nor the rich.

  *19:16 Do not be a tale bearer; do not stand idly by when another is endangered.

    19:17 Do not hate your neighbor in your heart; rebuke your neighbor.

  *19:18 Do not take revenge or bear a grudge; love your neighbor as yourself.

à    These Commandments all deal with interpersonal relationships. One can see how the phrase “Ani HaShem” marks a transition from one category of interpersonal Mitzva to another. While they all fit under a general rubric, each is a specific manifestation of a singular aspect of this area of Tora observance:

      9-10 Extending compassion to the poor

11-12 Improper utilization of speech.

13-14 Taking advantage of the weak and disabled.

15-16   When in a position of power or potential assistance, do the right and just thing.

17-18   Promote love and avoid hatred between people.

[8] Within this second section (19:9-18), the occurrence of “Ani HaShem” is quite symmetrical, with each two verses being completed by the phrase. Such an orderly pattern is not repeated in the third section (19:23-26) where the intervals of the phrase are extremely inconsistent.

[9] *19:23-25 Laws pertaining to when one can begin to benefit from the fruit of newly planted fruit trees.

    19:26 Do not consume blood, engage in magic.

    19:27 Men are not to use a straight edge to cut parts of their hair, beards.

  *19:28 Do not mutilate yourself as part of mourning; do not create tattoos.

    19:29 Do not prostitute your daughter.

  *19:30 Observe Shabbat; show respect for the Sanctuary.

  *19:31 Do not engage in necromancy.

  *19:32 Give honor to the elderly.

  *19:33-34 Treat strangers in your land respectfully.

  *19:35-36 Be righteous in judgment and in all weights and measures.

à   Most of these Commandments deal with means by which an individual shows his fealty to God. 

23-25   Self-control and deference to the rules imposed by HaShem, as in all Kashrut issues (see VaYikra 11:44).

26-28   Prohibitions against cultish, magical behavior.

29-30   Respect  holiness of time, place and human beings.

31         Avoiding a particular form of idolatry.

However, 32-36 appear to revert to the types of Commandments found in 19:9-18, listed in fn. 4 above. It is this apparent inconsistency which serves as the basis for R. Hoffmann’s comment.

[10] “Pigul” is a sacrifice that is rendered unfit due to the Kohen who offered it thinking incorrect thoughts regarding what sort of sacrifice it is, where it is to be sacrificed, for how long it is to be eaten, etc.

[11] A sacrifice’s permitted meat is rendered “Notar” (left over) when the designated time for its consumption passes. At that point, the meat can only be burned, and should someone eat it, he would be punished by “Karet” (ritual excision).

[12] The term “Kilayim” is applied to forbidden mixtures, e.g., linen and wool, a donkey bred with a horse resulting in a mule, grapes crossed with wheat, etc.

[13] The case of the “engaged female servant” is explained in the Oral Tradition to be dealing with a non-Jewish female slave who was owned in partnership by two masters, one of whom has freed her, while the other has not. Consequently she is in “marital limbo” since she can marry neither a male servant since she is partially free, nor a male freeman because she is partially enslaved. In the event that someone would try to take advantage of her by rationalizing that since she is not free to marry anyone, therefore she may be desperate and susceptible to improper behavior, the Tora in these verses indicates the consequences in store for the perpetrator of such untoward activity.

[14] Yeshayahu Leibowitz (Seven Years of Discourses on the Weekly Tora Reading, Keter, Israel, 2000, p. 534) states the following regarding Rabbeinu Bachya’s concept and the source in Avoda Zora 17b which he cites as a proof text:

…The intent of the Talmudic passage is that if a person engages in Tora study from a purely theoretical perspective, e.g., he studies Tora and his entire religious universe is a matter of absorbing cognitively the material contained therein, one could say that the knowledge provided by the Tora and the acquisition of information is more important than this individual’s faith, and therefore he is as one without a God.

Such an individual is contrasted to someone “who has a God” if his religious awareness obligates him to concretize something in his life in a practical manner. Therefore with regard to all of those practical Mitzvot that are delineated within this Parasha, e.g., the fear of parents, observing of Shabbat, the prohibition against idolatry, avoiding engaging in tale bearing and so many other similar Commandments, in as much as a Jew actually fulfills them in reality, then for each of these can be said, “Ani HaShem” or “Ani HaShem Elokeichem”…

[15] The Mishna is divided into six “Orders”, the other four being: “Zeraim” (lit. seeds; agricultural matters); “Moed” (lit. appointed time; holidays); “Nashim” (lit. women; matters of marriage, divorce, etc.); “Nezikin” (lit. damages; monetary matters).

According to Jewish tradition,[1] the various plagues[2] that fall under the rubric of Tzora’at are brought about by sins of various types.[3] If Tzora’at is to be understood as a form of Divine Censure for objectionable actions and character traits, to be “cured” only after sincere repentance, it follows that these various conditions are not inevitable, but rather precipitated exclusively in response to human behaviors that individuals have the choice to either engage in, or refrain from. It is therefore entirely consistent when each Tora section dealing with the various forms of Tzora’at begins with a conditional form of the phrase containing the state-of-being verb:

Human skin (VaYikra 13:1 ff.)—“A person, ‘Ki Yihyeh’ (if/when there will be) in the skin of his flesh…” 

Hair (Ibid. 13:29 ff.)—“ A man or a woman ‘Ki Yihyeh Bo’ a plague on the head or the beard”

Clothing (Ibid. 13:47 ff.)—“And the garment ‘Ki Yihyeh Bo’ a plague…”

Furniture (Ibid. 13:48)—“…In an animal skin or anything made of leather.”

A noticeable change in the literary pattern.

But there is a key exception to the linguistic pattern established for the types of Tzora’at being discussed in these passages of VaYikra:

VaYikra 14:34

When you come to the land of Canaan that I Give to you for a possession, “VeNatati” (and I—HaShem—Will Place) a plague of Tzora’at in a house of the land of your possession.[4]

Suddenly it appears that Tzora’at, at least as far as one’s home in the land of Israel is concerned, is not something that might or might not happen; but rather it is a certainty that occurs as a result of God’s Will, independent of any human shortcomings. The inconsistency in language when the case of the plagued house is compared with the other manifestations of Tzora’at, leads the Midrash, duly paraphrased by RaShI, to suggest that if the house is ultimately destroyed—not every instance of a plagued home leads to its demolition, as indicated in VaYikra 14:48 ff.—it is because God Desired to Enrich its inhabitants rather than Cause them a loss.

VaYikra Rabba 17:6; Yalkut Shimoni VaYikra #563

R. Shimon bar Yochai taught: When the Canaanites heard that the Jews were coming to fight them, they hid their valuables in their houses and fields. Said the Holy One, Blessed Be He, “I Promised their forbearers that I would Bring their descendants into a land filled with all goodness, as it is said,

(Devarim 6:10-11)

And it will be that when the Lord, your God shall Bring you to the land that He Swore to your fathers, to Avraham, to Yitzchak and to Yaakov, to give you great and goodly cities that you did not build, and houses full of all good things that you did not fill, and hewn-out wells that you did not dig, vineyards and olive trees that you did not plant, when you shall eat and be satiated.

What did the Holy One, Blessed Be He, Do? He Sent plagues against his (the Jew’s) house, resulting in his destroying it and finding the hidden treasure.

RaShI on VaYikra 14:34

This was an announcement to them that the plagues would come upon them (inevitably), because the Emorites (?)[5] concealed treasures of gold in the walls of their houses during the whole forty years the Israelites were in the desert, and as a result of the plague they would destroy the house and discover them.[6]

Questions that arise in association with this Rabbinic assertion.

Although this Midrashic interpretation accounts for the change in the introductory phrase containing the state-of-being verb from a conditional context to one of certainty, nevertheless several technical as well as philosophical and theological problems are generated by such an approach.

Firstly, not every time there is Tzora’at in a house, is it necessarily destroyed. Scenarios that result in less than total destruction of the effected building include the explicit statement that only the contaminated stones have to be removed and the house repaired and replastered (14:39ff.), as well as the implicit suggestion that if the original plague is not observed by the Kohen to have spread on his return visit seven days later, not even replacement of the stones and plastering is required. In the former case, unless one says that the treasure is hidden directly behind the affected stones, the new Jewish owners will not be led to discover any hidden valuables, and as for the latter case, if nothing is destroyed, then obviously nothing will be discovered.

But even more fundamentally, it is difficult to maintain that despite the Tora’s employing the same language of “Tzora’at” for plagues affecting one’s body and inanimate possessions, that in only the majority of cases is the disease to be viewed as some form of miraculous punishment similar to what Miriam experiences after speaking badly about her brother Moshe, whereas the same phenomenon—the Tzora’at of houses—serves as a means to provide Jews with a windfall reward and a punishment to the Canaanites in the sense that not only their homes and fields are being acquired by the Jewish newcomers, but that their hidden wealth is also being acquired by another nation.

Interpretations intended to account for these difficulties.

Consequently, several commentaries devoted to explicating RaShI seek to incorporate both the punishment and the reward dimensions in their approach to Tzora’at that affects houses.

One approach contends that the role of Tzora’at affecting a house varied at different points in Jewish history.

Maskil LeDavid

…The Biblical verse (14:34) suggests that a particular message was being delivered to Israel (concerning the inevitability of Tzora’at affecting houses when they first enter the land), and although plagues will (eventually) affect houses as a form of punishment, and as we have said, the Master of Souls will not attack these souls initially, but rather the plagues will first affect the houses (before they directly attack an individual’s person),[7] nevertheless when the Jews first came to the land of Israel, these plagues were not the result of punishment, but rather a form of reward, and that is what is hinted in this verse.

According to this view, one wonders when the transition from reward to punishment took place. It is possible to imagine that at least for a short period of time, when people would see Tzora’at on the walls of their homes, they would eagerly anticipate finding valuables as everyone had in the past, only to be disappointed, because Tzora’at of the house had entered into a new phase. Furthermore, wouldn’t some people be tempted to destroy Canaanite homes that they come upon even without Tzora’at, once it is presumed that more often than not treasure was to be found?

A second interpretation suggests that the association between plagues and treasure symbolizes that inherent within any punishment is always something positive.

Divrei David on VaYikra 14:34

…Certainly the plague that attacks houses is the result of transgression. Yet this is an act of compassion on the part of the Blessed God, by virtue of the possibility that Tova MeiEin Ra’ah (good which arises from the essence of the punishment), i.e., that the treasures will be found.

Divrei David appears to suggest that the loss of one’s home is one of the most devastating tragedies that an individual can suffer with respect to his possessions. Clothing and furniture can either be replaced or done without far more easily than one’s shelter against the elements and the outside world. Consequently, by means of the discovery of hidden treasure, HaShem had Compassion on individuals who on the one hand deserve to be punished for their previous improper behavior, and yet are perhaps in danger of becoming so disconsolate as a result of their loss that they will not strive to correct their iniquity in order to be able to repent and move forward.[8]  We should keep in mind that the treasure is found only after the house’s owners are forced to resign themselves to their home’s destruction. The trauma has already had its effect, and the newfound wealth cannot necessarily make up for the sense of loss that is originally experienced when the Kohen pronounces that the house must be demolished. The Jews who finally arrive in Canaan after forty years of wandering, probably particularly valued finally having a permanent roof over their heads. All things being equal, it is likely that the house’s inhabitants would have preferred to have neither their home destroyed nor finding unanticipated treasure. Nevertheless, if one believes that the “Punisher” does so out of love and concern for the improvement of the “punish-ee”, he will be able to better tolerate what has happened to him and understand it in a positive context.

R. Shlomo Kluger (cited in Matityahu Blum’s Tora LaDa’at, Vol. 2, Kew Garden Hills, NY, 5744, pp. 80-81) essentially reverses Divrei David’s perspective:

…Even discovering golden treasures, if they are acquired via plagues, it is to be considered a punishment, because if the individual was truly worthy, he would receive the wealth in a dignified manner rather than by means of suffering. 

But couldn’t it also be said that if HaShem Wished to truly punish the individual, He would Do so without providing any form of reward? It would appear that the difference between Divrei David and R. Shlomo Kluger is one of emphasis, i.e., when an inherently contradictory phenomenon, such as simultaneous punishment and reward, occurs, should I emphasize the reward in spite of the punishment or vice versa? Does the reward mitigate the bitterness of the punishment, or does the punishment taint the pleasure of the reward?

A third approach could possibly be extrapolated from comments by R. S.R. Hirsch on the reason why the calamity of having one’s house destroyed due to Tzora’at happens in the first place.

The Gemora, Yoma 2b, finds in these very words a hint of the kind of social misbehavior which called for the proclamation by a Nega of God’s Displeasure with the inhabitant of the house: (14:35) “Asher Lo HaBayit” (lit. that to him is a house), so it says there (in the Talmud) “Mi SheMeyached Beito Lo” (a person who retains the house exclusively for himself), that he does not wish to lend his utensils, and therefore says that he does not have the article requested, the lies of such a man God Exposes to the public by having his house cleared out into the street…

While R. Hirsch does not cite the Midrash’s/RaShI’s contention that the destruction leads to the discovery of hidden treasure, and therefore could be understood to reject such a situation, we could speculate that perhaps the finding of the treasure allows the individual a second chance, i.e., he can rebuild his house, repurchase the utensils that he lost and this time share his abode as well as his possessions with those in need. In that case, it is not so much a reward that comes along with the punishment, but rather an opportunity for redemption, an opportunity to demonstrate that the lesson has been learned.

Conclusion.

                While Tzora’at in general, and Tzora’at that would affect one’s home leading to its destruction, are not phenomena with which we have to cope today, reflecting upon what these conditions might have been like, and the emotions they may have engendered during the biblical period can lead to our looking upon ourselves and our possessions in a new spiritual light.

[2] Tzora’at  can affect human skin (VaYikra 13:1 ff.), hair (Ibid. 13:29 ff.), clothing (Ibid. 13:47 ff.) furniture (Ibid. 13:48), and houses (Ibid. 14:34 ff.)

[3] R. S.R. Hirsch (The Pentateuch, trans. and explained by S.R. Hirsch, Vol. 3, Part 1, trans. into English by Isaac Levy, Judaica Press, Gateshead, England, 1976, p. 359), as part of a lengthy essay on Tzora’at at the end of VaYikra 13 summarizes several primary sources in the Oral Tradition that associate this phenomenon not only with slander as in the case of Miriam (see fn. 1), but with a wide variety of transgressions and character failings:

Arachin 16a—Seven sins bring about Tzora’at:

1)   Lashon HaRa (speaking badly about another, even if the report is accurate)

2)   Shfichat Damim (the spilling of blood) 

3)   Shevuat Shav (an oath that is needless)

4)   Gilui Arayot (sexual impropriety)

5)   Gasut HaRuach (arrogance, crudity)

6)   Gezel (thievery)

7)   Tzorat HaAyin (cupidity, unkind selfishness)

Arachin 16b—The Metzora causes separation between man and wife, friend and friend. Therefore it is only proper that, in turn, a separation be imposed upon him and the community in general.

                        His sin offering includes a bird because he was guilty of “chattering” like a bird.

VaYikra Rabba 16:1—Eight evil character traits and actions are causes for Tzora’at:

                                    1)   Einayim Ramot (lit. proud eyes; arrogance)

                                    2)   Lashon Sheker (lit. a lying tongue; lies)

3)    VeYadayim Shofchot Dam Naki (hands that spill innocent blood)

4)    Lev Choresh Machshevet Avon (a heart that constantly is considering iniquity)

5)    Raglayim Memaharot LaRutz LaRa’a (feet that are rushing off to do evil) 

6)    Mishloach Madanim Bein Achim (intentionally aims to cause discord among brothers)

                                    7)    Yafiach Kezavim (spreads falsehoods)

                                    8)    Eid Sheker (false witness)

VaYikra Rabba 16:6—The Metzora transgresses the prohibition of Motzee Shem Ra” (casting false aspersions on another).   (The Midrash is engaging in word play, breaking up the word Metzora into Motzee and Ra.)

[4] The Talmud in Horiyot 10a notes this change in language re Tzora’at during the course of analyzing a similar linguistic variation in another context:

Our Rabbis taught: (VaYikra 4:22) “’Asher Nasi Yechta’ (when a ruler sins)…”

(This phrase is being contrasted with the Tora’s introductions to other instances where a sin offering must be brought:

4:2 “’Nefesh Ki Techta B’Shegaga…’ [a soul if it sins inadvertently]”

4:3 “’Im HaKohen HaMashiach Yechta…’ [if the priest that is anointed sins]”

4:13 “’VeIm Kol Adat Yisrael Yishgu…’ [and if the entire congregation of Israel sins]”

4:27 “’VeIm Nefesh Achat Techeta B’Shegaga MeiAm HaAretz…’ [and if one of the common people sins inadvertently]”)

this might have been taken as a Decree (the ruler is fated by Heaven to sin). Therefore the text stated, (4:3) “If the priest that is anointed sins…” Just as in the latter case, the text means “if and when” so too in the former case (despite the use of “Asher”).

It was said in passing: “It might have been taken as a Decree”. But could one imagine such a thing (i.e., how is it conceivable that given our belief in free choice, someone could be made to sin by Divine Fiat)?

Yes!

(The assumption that free will is suspended and transgressions are decreed from Above [aside from specific exceptional cases such as Pharoah, the sons of Eli, Mipiboshet and Avner] is roundly rejected by R. Yaakov Abuav, compiler of Ein Yaakov and author of the commentary, “HaBoneh” on the Gemora in Horiyot 10a.

Broad free will is a gift of God to man, whereby His Knowledge does not coerce a person to do or not do a particular thing, since, [Avot 3:15]: “Everything is foreseen, and yet permission is given.” [See RaShI on Berachot 33b]: It is not decreed regarding a particular person at the time of his conception, independent of his being wise or unintelligent, wealthy or poor, whether he will be righteous or evil, and it is also not determined that he will be controlled by a planet or a constellation. For this is what the prophet said, [Yeshayahu 40:26] “Lift up your eyes to the Heavens, and see Who Created these.” [As opposed to believing that one is controlled by the Heavenly Bodies] it is a Commandment to calculate the orbits and seasons of the stars and planets, thereby to understand the greatness of their Creator, [Ibid.] “Who Takes our their hosts according to number, to each one He Calls a name.” Even after their [the stars’ and planets’] creation, He Knows them and Guides them in every detail. However not by means of this [engaging in such calculations—including astrological chartings] are they to be viewed as controlling the free choice of man, [Ibid.] “because despite their [the stars’] great power and massive strength, no individual person will be left behind,”   in terms of his own great power and massive strength to make his own decisions and be responsible for himself, no one will be left behind and subjected to such coercion, as it is written, [Shoftim 12:3; I Shmuel 28:21] “My soul is in my hand always”, i.e., my soul and my will is always in my hand and under my control, so that a person can conduct his affairs in accordance with what appears right in his eyes…)

For we find it is written, (VaYikra 14:34) “…And I—HaShem—Will Place a plague of Tzora’at in a house of the land of your possession.” This is an announcement to them that they will be visited by plagues (and therefore have no choice in the matter)—these are the words of R. Yehuda… Now just as R. Yehuda declared that the Biblical text is an announcement (regarding the inevitability of plagues breaking out in houses) so too it could have been assumed that regarding the sin of the ruler it is inevitable. Therefore “If” had to be written in the next instance.   

It is to be noted that R. Yehuda’s method for removing the question from the case of the sinning ruler, is not available to us with regard to Tzora’at affecting houses. In the sequence of instances of Tzora’at, the case of a plague in a house is not only the last instance of plague that the Tora deals with, but it is set off from the other instances by the beginning of Chapt. 14 which deals with purification from the ritual impurity generated by Tzora’at. Consequenly, the implication of inevitability suggested by “And I will Place a plague” is not subject to modification by subsequent examples of parallel situations.

[5] The change in RaShI from the original Midrash is curious. The Emori are one of the ten nations originally enumerated to Avraham at the Brit Bein HaBetarim (Beraishit 15:21) and the seven specified just before the Jews enter Israel (Devarim 7:1). Whereas “Canaani” is an umbrella phrase including at least all of the seven nations, “Emori” is typically not used in this manner. The Emorites are singled out in Rabbinic tradition in two chapters of the Tosefta (Shabbat Chapt. 7,8) as well as in the Talmud, e.g., Sanhedrin 52b; Avoda Zora 11a, as involved in superstitious practices that are not quite defined as idolatry—“Serach Avoda Zora”—and are primarily associated with divination, incantations and cures for disease.

The assumption that the Emorites secreted valuables within the walls of their homes calls to mind discussions regarding the manner in which Bedikat Chametz (the search for leavening on the eve of Pesach) is to take place when it entails extending one’s arm into a crack in the wall which separates the abodes of a Jew and a non-Jew:

Pesachim 8a-b

It was taught in a Baraita: We do not obligate him to extend his hand into holes and cracks (in the wall) because of danger.

What is the “danger”?

…R. Nachman bar Yitzchak said: Because of danger associated with non-Jews.

And the Baraita follows the view of Polimo, as it is  taught:

A hole (in the wall) between (the residences) of a Jew and an Aramean, one searches (for leavening) up to the point where one’s hand reaches, and regarding whatever remains, he cancels it in his heart.

Polimo said: One does not check at all because of the danger.

            (RaShI–…So that the non-Jew does not say that the Jew is engaging in witchcraft against him.

What danger is there?

If one says that the Jew (who is skulking around at night by the light of a candle) will be suspected for engaging in witchcraft, when he does this, what does he do?

There, where it is permitted, since it is daytime and there is natural light, the non-Jew will harbor no such suspicions; at night, when the search is done by the light of a candle, there is cause for suspicion.

This view is cited in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 433:7, and Mishna Berura #30 states that even if he Jew did not search at night, he should do so during the day when he will be above suspicion.

Is it possible that since some of these Emorite practices involved putting into their walls not only valuables, but also other objects of religious significance, therefore RaShI substituted “Emori” for “Canaani” in his Biblical commentary?

[6] Eliezer Brody, in his collection of biblical commentaries, Pi HaBe’er (Ashdod, 5761, pp. 223-4) poses the intriguing question, which blessing would one make upon discovering Tzora’at on the wall of his home? Ignoring the possible anachronism that these Berachot may have been legislated by the Rabbis at a later point, and following the dictum in the Mishna Berachot 9:2, “…upon receiving good news, one blesses, ‘Blessed…Who is Good and Does Good’; upon receiving bad news, one blesses, ‘Blessed…the True Judge’”, does one respond to the disturbing and disruptive possibility of having to take apart and perhaps even destroy his home, or, in anticipation of new-found riches, would one invoke the celebratory blessing? In response, R. Brody cites Shulchan Aruch, Orech Chayim 222:4 “One blesses ‘Blessed…Who is Good and Does Good’ even when one fears that a bad result might come from it…And similarly, one blesses ‘Blessed…the True Judge’ even if good might eventually come from it…” Dr. Lisi Levisohn, a psychologist, commented that the Halacha apparently feels it is important that one acknowledges their immediate feelings without mitigating them with possible eventualities. Consequently, whatever may lie within the walls of the home that had previously been occupied by the Emori, my initial reaction to seeing Tzora’at even before calling in the Priest, is dread and worry, requiring a Tzidduk HaDin (a justification of the judgment) on my part.

[7] RaMBaM, Mishna Tora, Hilchot Tumat Tzora’at 16:10

…And this change that is reported concerning clothing and houses that the Tora calls Tzora’at using the same term (that applies to particular human diseases) is not in accordance with natural law but is a sign and a wonder among Israel to warn them concerning Evil Speech, for an individual who engages in Evil Speech, the walls of his house change. (Although in the Tora the plague that affects the house is listed last, according to RaMBaM it is the first stage of a series of events that are intended to put pressure upon the sinner to change his ways.) If he repents, the walls of his house will be purified. But if he continues to engage in sin to the point where his house is destroyed, then the leather implements upon which he sits and reclines in his house change. If he repents, they are purified. But if he persists to the point where they have to be burnt, then the clothes that he is wearing change. If he repents they are purified. If he persists to the point where they have to be burnt, his skin changes and he is afflicted with “Tzora’at” and he will be separated and subject to public exclusion until he will be unable to further engage in the conversation of the wicked which is scoffing and Evil Speech…

[8] On Nitai HaArbeili’s comment in Avot 1:7 “…and do not despair concerning punishment”, R. Abraham Twerski (Visions of the Fathers, Sha’ar Press, 1999, p. 37) writes,

            …Although it sometimes tests the strength of one’s faith, we should know that the ways of God are ultimately just, even when we are unable to understand why reward or punishment are meted out in certain ways. It is at this time that we must surrender to the ultimate Wisdom of God.

…We may not understand why suffering occurs. The Chofetz Chaim referred to the epic of Joseph and his brothers, and pointed out how they were repeatedly bewildered by all that transpired. When Joseph revealed himself to them and said, “I am Joseph”, everything suddenly fell into place and was understood. Similarly, the Chafetz Chaim said, when God will Reveal Himself to us at the Redemption, and say, “I am God”, all of the heretofore unanswerable questions will be answered at once.

In Parashat Shmini, immediately after the tragic deaths of Aharon’s two sons, Nadav and Avihu (VaYikra 10:1-2), the removal of their bodies (10:4-5), and instructions regarding the manner in which the Kohanim (priests) are and are not to mourn (10:6-7), a Divine Directive is given  to Aharon and his surviving sons regarding their future working in the Mishkan (Tabernacle):

VaYikra 10:8-9

And HaShem Spoke to Aharon[1] Saying:

Wine and intoxicating liquids do not drink, you and your sons with you, when you enter the Tent of Meeting and you will not die. It is an eternal statute for your generations.

                The positioning of this instruction so that it follows on the heels of the account of the deaths of Nadav and Avihu, leads some commentators[2] to speculate that the deceased priests had been inebriated at the time that they entered the Tabernacle, and it was their impaired judgment that led them to present a Halachically inappropriate fire upon the altar, which in turn made their lives forfeit.

However the manner in which verses 10 and 11 are to be understood in relation to verse 9 is not readily apparent. 

“U’LeHavdil” (AND to distinguish) between the holy and the non-holy, and between the ritually impure and the ritually pure.

“U’LeHorot” (AND to teach) the Jewish people all of the statutes that HaShem has Spoken to them by means of Moshe.

Once the phrase “It is an eternal statute for your generations” is placed at the end of verse 9, the reader readily thinks that the matter is closed, and that the principle that the Tora has just completed establishing is that in order for Kohanim to stay alive, they must not enter the Tabernacle in a state of inebriation. But the usage at the start of the next two verses of the conjunction “U’” (and) implies that somehow these subsequent verses are extensions of verse 9. What do these verses add to our general understanding of the issue at hand?

Ritual and judicial activities that require clarity of mind.

                RaShI (10:10) suggests that verse 10 is supplying the REASON why the “Kohen” must not be impaired when he enters the Mishkan, i.e., because he must be able to distinguish between sacrificial rituals that are proper as opposed to those that are improper, whether from the perspective of the manner in which the act is carried out—what is holy and what isn’t—or the ritual status of the objects being sacrificed—that which is pure as opposed to impure. And as for verse 11 wherein Halachic decision-making is discussed, RaShI claims that an additional context, not necessarily associated with the Tabernacle,[3]   is being introduced by the Tora at this point.  Just as the priest is not to engage in Divine Service when he is unable to discern the difference between proper and improper sacrifices, so too priests,[4] or anyone else for that matter,[5]  who are called upon to render Halachic decisions,  are prohibited from making such decisions while unable to think clearly. Although RaShI points out that a complete equation between a priest’s serving in the Tabernacle and a Halachic expert answering questions of Jewish law cannot be proposed, since although an inebriated  Kohen entering the Mishkan is guilty of a capital offense, the same is not true of the Dayan/Posek (Halachic decisor) who, in a similar condition, answers a question posed to him,[6] [7] the consideration of even the possibility (the Hava Amina) that the two roles can be compared draws attention to the basic commonality between engaging in the Temple ritual and deciding issues in Jewish law, i.e., the need for clear-headed, rigorous and ongoing discerning and distinguishing thought processes.

Clarity is required not only within the Temple and court precincts, but also in non-specialized contexts.

 The end of Parashat Shmini discusses yet another area, independent of the Temple and the court in which being able to decide what is permitted and what is not,  is crucial—the general laws of Kashrut.

VaYikra 11:46-47

This is the law of the domesticated animal and the fowl and all the living forms of the undomesticated animals that swarm in water and all the living forms that swarm on land.

“LeHavdil” (To distinguish) between the ritually impure and between the ritually pure, and between the type of living thing that can be eaten and between the type of living thing that cannot be eaten. [8]

Whereas, in VaYikra 10, Havdala is made pertinent to priests and Dayanim/Poskim, who constitute relatively small, elite groups within the greater collective of the Jewish people, the language in VaYikra 11, with respect to the laws of Kashrut, would appear to extend to all traditional Jews, at least those who are not vegans or vegetarians.[9] Furthermore, by expanding the emphasis upon and importance of clear-cut decision-making to include even laws of Kashrut that non-specialists are expected to engage in on a daily basis, it could be contended that all aspects of the Halachic lifestyle for all Jews, regardless of birthright or intellectual expertise, will require maximal  capacity for this type of thinking. Should it not then logically follow  that restrictions upon activities that compromise one’s capacity for thinking clearly and thereby observe Halacha properly,  equally apply to everyone, rather than be directed only to Kohanim and Dayanim/Poskim? [10] Will an individual be able to engage in meaningful Tora study, a Mitzva that applies at all times,[11] once he has deliberately allowed his brain to become addled? Don’t we all have to carefully analyze how we conduct our lives in order to determine which action constitutes a Melacha and which does not in terms of Shabbat and Yom Tov? Isn’t it necessary to sort out ethical, moral business practices from those that are unacceptable Halachically?  When considering appropriate topics for conversation, won’t one have to make informed and subtle decisions regarding what is permitted and what falls under the rubric of Lashon HaRa? Even the distinction raised by RaShI between the drunk Kohen and the impaired Posek with respect to whether the violator is subject to execution, becomes moot when one considers that some Shabbat violations from which all Jews are enjoined are also punishable by death,[12]  as are certain types of speech, e.g., blasphemy,[13]  and acting as a plotting witness in a capital trial.[14]     It would appear therefore that the only reason why the Tora stresses that the Kohen avoid such behaviors to a greater extent than other Jews is because the priest’s regular and ongoing responsibilities vis-à-vis the Tabernacle/Temple are so extremely sensitive and complex, and, unlike the day-to-day activities of other Jews, the Kohen discharges his commanded tasks usually on behalf of other individual Jews or the entire Jewish people in a particularly holy locale biblically designated as HaShem’s “Seat on Earth”,[15]  that extra precautions are called for. Consequently, the Kohen’s lack of preparedness to carry out his duties as a result of his inebriation is considered a more egregious affront to HaShem and His Service, than the parallel unfitness of others. Yet if the Tora also points out that HaShem Wishes for the entire Jewish people to serve as (Shemot 19:6) “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation”, it should not be surprising that just as the priestly class is expected to be ready to engage at all times in considerable sorting out between that which is permitted and prohibited, so too are we all. And if a substance that deprives one of the wherewithal to think clearly will prevent him/her from meeting his/her responsibilities, it stands to reason that such indulgences are to be avoided.[16]  

The Kohen’s ritual tasks translated to a non-Temple era.

                Aside from general areas of Jewish law where a lack of cognitive clarity would render an individual unable to properly make the types of decisions necessary in order to carry out his/her Halachic obligations, a strong case can be made for avoiding inebriation in those ritual areas specifically intended to serve at first as alternate forms of,[17]  and subsequently, as substitutes for[18]  the Temple Service. Prayer in particular, even before the destruction of the Temples, appears to be very bound up with the sacrificial cult.

Berachot 26b

R. Yehoshua ben Levi said: The prayers were established to correspond to the Daily Sacrifices….

It was taught in accordance with R. Yehoshua ben Levi:

Why is it said that one can pray the morning prayer only until noon? Because the Daily Morning Sacrifice was offered up until noon. Rabbi Yehuda said: Until four hours into the day…

And why is it said that one can pray the afternoon prayer only until evening? Because the Daily Afternoon Sacrifice was offered up until evening. R. Yehuda said: Until Pelag HaMincha (the last quarter of the daylight period on any given day)…

And why does the evening prayer have no fixed upper time? Because the limbs and fats that were not consumed on the altar by evening are offered throughout the night without a fixed upper limit…

And why are the Musaf prayers appropriate throughout the daylight period? Because the Mussaf sacrifice was offered at any time throughout the day. R. Yehuda said until seven hours into the day…

Once the Temple and its sacrifices were no longer an option for the Jewish people, even more significance was attributed to prayer as a substitute method for coming close[19]  to HaShem, as articulated by Hoshea (14:3) “Take with yourselves WORDS and return to HaShem; All say to Him: Forgive sin and receive goodness, and LET OUR LIPS TAKE THE PLACE OF THE COWS.” If engaging in such practices, particularly prayer, is to be viewed as carrying out variant or vicarious forms of Temple worship, then it would logically follow that just as the Kohen is enjoined from inebriation whenever the possibility of performing the true Avoda (service) presents itself, then those who are now acting in the Temple Kohen’s stead[20] should likewise conscientiously avoid ingesting substances that will precipitate such a state. Such an approach throws additional light on the following formulation of RaMBaM:

Mishna Tora, Hilchot Tefilla and Nesiat Kapayim 4:17

One who is Shikur (inebriated) should not pray because he will be unable to summon up the requisite intention/concentration. And if this individual should proceed to pray anyway, his prayer is an abomination. Therefore it will be necessary for him to pray once more when the drunkenness has worn off.

One who is Shatui (drunken) should not pray, but if he prays, the prayer is valid.

What defines a Shikur? One who is unable to speak properly in the presence of a king.

What defines a Shatui? One who can speak properly before a king and who does not err.

Nevertheless, since he has consumed a Revi’it (3.7-4.3 oz.) of wine, he should not pray until the effects of the wine have worn off.

Similar to religious practices in the synagogue representing the Temple service, the same can be said about a central domestic activity.

                Finally, it is most ironic to reflect upon Jewish tradition’s equation of the table upon which one eats and drinks (!) with the altar of the Temple. 

Menachot 97a

(Yechezkel 41:22) “And the ALTAR, three cubits high, and two cubits long, was of wood. And it had corners; and its length and its walls were of wood. And He Said to me: This is the TABLE that is before the Lord.” He begins to speak of an altar, and he concludes by speaking of a table? R. Yochanan and R. Elazar both said: While the Temple is functioning, the altar atones for a person. And now, when there is no functioning Temple, the table of a person atones for him.

                Avudharam explains why what one does at his/her dining table can have such a spiritual affect:

Birchat HaLechem, Zimun, Birchat HaMazon

…And this is with respect to what is stated there “Everyone who spends a long time at his table will have his life lengthened.” And the reason for this is that when one sits for a lengthy period at his table, a poor person will come and will benefit from what is on that table. And there is no greater charity than this, as it is stated, (Mishlei 10:2) “And Tzedaka saves from death.” And behold the table in the house is like the altar in the Temple. Just as the altar atones, so does the table atone.  Implements of iron (like knives) shorten the days of man, and therefore it is not appropriate to leave such implements during the time of Birchat HaMazon on the place of atonement that lengthens the days of man.

Does the table being equated with the altar imply that those who are sitting around that table are taking the place of the Kohanim? And if so, are there limits in terms of the spirit if not the letter of the law, with regard to the quantity of intoxicating substances that  one should consume even in the privacy of one’s own home, at his  own table? The subtext for such a question is how far and how literally ought one to take an analogy?

                Shemot 7:8; 12:1

                VaYikra 11:1; 13:1; 14:33; 15:1.

                BaMidbar 2:1; 4:1, 17; 14:26; 16:20; 19:1; 20:23.

[2] E.g., RaMBaN on VaYikra 10:9 quoting VaYikra Rabba 12:1.

[3] Although eventually, the Sanhedrin HaGedola (the Supreme Court) would be located in the Lishkat HaGazit (the Chamber of Hewn Stone), there is no indication that during the period of the Tabernacle, that a court per se was associated with it. From Shoftim 4:5, it appears that Devora’s seat of judgment was separate from the location of the Mishkan. Shmuel, in addition to his home at Rama, is described as going from town to town to judge the people, rather than their exclusively coming to him at the site of the Mishkan.

[4] E.g., Devarim 17:9. Another area that requires the judgment of a Kohen is determining whether an individual is first suffering from Tzora’at (a skin condition that requires quarantine), and then at what point, if ever, this individual has been cured. See VaYikra 13:2 ff. 

[5] When Yitro makes his original suggestion to Moshe as to how to delegate judicial authority in Shemot 18:21, there was no mention that judges should be exclusively the province of the Kohanim. Furthermore, when Moshe actually picks individuals to fill this role in Shemot 18:25 and Devarim 1:15, again no mention of trying to choose exclusively Kohanim is to be found.

[6] RaShI cites BaMidbar 18 as a proof text, but he is in fact only paraphrasing the actual Tora text.  The words that he quotes in fact appear in two different verses in this chapter: 18:7 contains the phrase, “You and your children with you” while “And you will not die” appears at the end of 18:32. Nevertheless, the verses in Chapter 18 speak only of errors in the Divine Service rather than with regard to rendering Pesak Halacha, leading RaShI to conclude that the consequences for violations of VaYikra 10:10-11 are not identical.

[7] Nevertheless, two Rabbinic sources illustrate that the stakes are high within judicial contexts:

Shabbat 10a

Every judge who renders a judgment that is completely true, even (if he does so) for a short period of time, the verse treats him as if he is a partner with the Holy One,  Blessed Be He, in the act of Creation.

Ibid. 139a

R. Yose ben Elisha says: If you see a generation that is beset by many troubles, inspect the Jewish judges. For all disasters that happen in the world, happen only because of Jewish judges…

[8] In terms of my personal experience in the capacity of a community Rabbi, by far the majority of the questions that congregants ask have to do with errors that were made with respect to Kashrut in the home.

[9] Even R. Meir, who, according to Chullin 11b-12a, would ordinarily not eat meat because he was never certain that some sort of disqualification had been obliterated by the act of Shechita (ritual slaughter), would still have to eat Korban Pesach and other Kodashim (meat from sacrifices), rendering it literally impossible for an observant Jew during the Temple period to be a strict vegetarian.

¹⁰ While a person deliberately imbibing intoxicating drink, or impairing himself via drug use could clearly be seen as a personal shortcoming with respect to being able to carry out the requirements of a Halachic lifestyle, what can be said about sleep deprivation? Should it be argued that it is as much a Mitzva to get sufficient rest as it is an Aveira to consciously cause oneself to lose clarity due to the influence of artificial stimulants?

[11] Yehoshua 1:8.

[12] Shemot 31:14,15; 35:2.

[13] VaYikra 24:14.

[14] Devarim 19:19.

[15] Yeshayahu 6:1.

[16] Many years ago, a relative of mine who was an Israeli policewoman adamantly insisted that an Israeli who took drugs was guilty of a form of “treason” against the country since it was every citizen’s responsibility to be on the alert for possible terrorist activities, an alertness that would be impaired under the influence of drugs.

[17] During Temple times, the Yisraelim of a particular Mishmar (lit. “watch”; one of 24 shifts of Jews who took turns carrying out the Divine Sacrificial Service) and Ma’amad would pray and read the Tora in   houses of worship in Yerushalayim at the same time that their Kohanim and Levi’im coreligionists would be sacrificing and playing music in the Temple. These practices paralleled the Temple services and in effect allowed Yisraelim to be somewhat proactive rather than completely passive during the performance of these rites. The following appears in the CD Rom edition of the Encyclopedia Judaica, “Synagogue”:

 … the arrangements of the Mishmarot and Ma’amadot were that while the Mishmar of Priests and Levites and the Israelite representatives were present during the weekly rota of service of their Mishmar in the Temple, the remaining members of the Ma’amad who did not accompany the members of the Mishmar to Jerusalem gathered in their local synagogues for prayer and fasting (Ta’an. 4:2).

[18] E.g., Mishna Sukka 3:12 re taking the four species throughout the days of Sukkot;

             Talmud Pesachim 115a re eating Matza together with Maror at the Seder;

             Talmud Menachot 66a re the manner in which the Mitzva of counting the Omer is to be fulfilled;

              Pesikta Zutrata on Shemot 16 #29:

                                    And from the time that the Temple was destroyed, we are not able to achieve atonement via sin offerings, but rather by means of repentance, regret, fasting, and corporeal punishment.

[19] The root of the word “Korban” (sacrifice) is “Karov” or close.

[20] While one might contend that it is the Shliach Tzibbur (the congregational prayer leader) who most closely resembles the Kohen in the Temple in the sense that the institution was intended to allow for those who were illiterate to vicariously fulfill the Commandment to pray by listening and affirming the prayers being recited, just as the Priest offered up sacrifices that non-Kohanim were not able to, the fact that those who are literate do not have to depend upon a Shliach Tzibbur suggests that each person, regardless of whether they are literally a Kohen or not, as well as women and other instances of personal status, e.g., converts, the offspring of Kohanim who married those who were prohibited to them, an individual with one of the twenty-four physical disqualifications that applied to Priests, etc., that were not allowed to perform the Temple service, serves as a figurative “Kohen.”

The first time that Aharon puts on the clothing of the high priest, the Kohanim and the Mishkan (Tabernacle) are being dedicated, as described in Parashat Tzav (VaYikra 8:7-9). The eight garments designated for the high priest to wear while performing the Avoda (sacrificial service), whose fabrications are articulated in exacting detail in Parashiot Tetzave (Shemot 28:4-43) and Pekudei (Shemot 39:2-31), are finally put to use when the Mishkan begins to serve as the focal point for the Jewish people’s sacrificing to HaShem in this week’s Parasha.

The High Priest’s Breastplate.

                Clearly, the most mysterious and evocative of the various garments worn by the Kohanim (priests) in general and the Kohen Gadol (high priest) in particular, is the Choshen (breastplate). It consists of woven panels front and back (Shemot 28:15; 39:9), to which are affixed twelve precious and semi-precious jewels, each representing one of the twelve tribes of the Jewish people (28:17-20; 39:10-13). Upon each of the stones is carved the name of the tribe which it represented (28:21; 39:14). And in between the two woven panels, behind the rows of jewels, is placed the Urim VeTumim (lit. lights and wholeness) (28:30; VaYikra 8:8).[1]   

Are the Urim VeTumim intrinsic to the Choshen, or are they considered a separate entity?

                From VaYikra 8:8, it appears that the Urim VeTumim, rather than serving as merely one of many necessary component of the Choshen, is in fact the most important part of the breastplate,[2] or at least the component that “activates” its capacity for God Sharing Communications with the high priest, as explicitly indicated later in BaMidbar 27:21.  In contrast to the full descriptions in Shemot of what the Choshen consists of, in VaYikra all details are omitted, e.g., how it is woven, the twelve stones, etc. with the exception of the Urim VeTumim:  “He (Moshe) put into the Choshen, the Urim VeTumim”.[3]  Furthermore, in BaMidbar 27:21, the word “Urim” replaces Choshen altogether, “…And he will ask him regarding the judgment of the ‘Urim’ before HaShem…” implying that just as Urim VeTumim is more important than Choshen, Urim is more important than Tumim.

Urim VeTumim as a vehicle for Prophecy.

That the Urim VeTumim are not merely just another part of the Choshen, but in fact constitute a means for human beings to determine the Divine Will, is outlined in BaMidbar 27:21.  After informing Moshe that his student, Yehoshua, will succeed him as leader of the Jewish people, HaShem adds that Yehoshua will be expected to consult with the high priest who in turn will be guided by Messages from HaShem via the Urim VeTumim, before making important decisions. The Tora writes, “And before Eliezer the priest he (Yehoshua) will stand, and he (Eliezer) will ask by means of the judgment of the ‘URIM’ before HaShem…” It would appear that since the close relationship enjoyed by Moshe with HaShem was not to be replicated in lesser prophets like Yehoshua, a substitute had to be found whereby certain major decisions would not be made exclusively by the Shofet (Judge)[4]  or Melech (king), but would be subject to Divine Input. BaMidbar 27:21 is structured as a Kellal U’Prat[5] with a general statement (Yehoshua will ask questions of Eliezer who will in turn ask HaShem) followed by specific examples of the types of situations calling for these types of consultations: “…According to what issues from his (the high priest’s) mouth they (the Jewish people) will GO OUT and according to what issues from his mouth they will COME IN, he and all of the Children of Israel with him, and all of the congregation”. On the one hand, the Rabbis interpret these phrases in terms of going to war, indicating that engaging in optional, expansionist wars (as opposed to either religiously mandated wars against the seven Canaanite nations and Amalek,[6]  or defensive wars which need no consultation,[7]) will require the Divine Imprimatur Delivered by means of the Urim VeTumim:[8]

Yerushalmi Shabbat 2:6

“According to the ‘Seder’ (order) of the Urim” is not stated here, but rather the “’Mishpat’ (judgment) of the Urim”. This is to teach that when the Jewish people goes out to war, the Beit Din (court) on High sits in judgment of them whether they will be victorious or defeated. From here one learns that the Satan accuses specifically during times of danger.[9]  

The Urim VeTumim therefore provides “insider” information regarding the chances of the Jews succeeding in their expansionist military operations. Since Jewish theology presumes that wars cannot be won unless God is Assisting the Jews in their efforts,[10] should it be determined that the war will be lost due to either the lack of merit on the Jewish side (Devarim 19:8-9 states that greater Israel will be realized only if the Jews adhere to HaShem’s Commandments), or because those currently inhabiting the land are not deserving of being displaced from it (see Beraishit 15:16), it would be foolhardy to needlessly and futilely risk lives.

Additional contexts during which the Urim VeTumim would be called into play.

                In addition to times of war, the redundant language at the end of BaMidbar 27:21, “…He and all of the Children of Israel with him, and the entire congregation”, is interpreted Rabbinically to indicate who would be entitled to pose questions about other topics to the Urim VeTumim:

Yoma 73b

It is taught (in a Mishnaic source):

“He”—this is a reference to the king;

“And all of the Children of Israel with him”—this is a reference to the priest who accompanies the Jews in battle;

“And all of the congregation”—these are the men of the Sanhedrin (the high court).

All of this is to teach that the Urim VeTumim is consulted only by the king, the head of the court, and anyone else upon whom the community is dependent.

Apparently there was a concern that once people would have available to them this “direct line” to HaShem, they would expect that relatively trivial questions ought to be addressed, or for that matter, issues of law that should properly be adjudicated by means of majority rule by the judges of the time, would be made dependent upon Divine Resolution, as exemplified in the confrontation between R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua in Bava Metzia 59b. The Urim VeTumim therefore was to be consulted only in very specific instances when the welfare of the entire nation was at stake.

A specific example of the usage of the Urim VeTumim for a non-military issue.

One such extremely important juncture in Jewish history when according to the Rabbis, the Urim VeTumim played a crucial role, was the manner by which the high priest Eliezer   was able to predict which particular portion of Canaan would be turned over to a particular one of the twelve tribes for settlement. While the verses in BaMidbar 26:53-56 emphasize that a lottery system was employed to distribute the land to the various tribes, the account in Yehoshua adds a phrase that precipitates an interpretation that the Urim VeTumim were involved in the distribution process as well. In Yehoshua 18:10 it is stated, “And Yehoshua cast lots for them in Shilo ‘Lifnai HaShem’ (before God), and there Yehoshua divided the land to the children of Israel according to their divisions.” Whereas any lottery in its own right, assuming that it is conducted honestly, should remove suspicions of impropriety and unfairness with regard to the results, the addition of the phrase “before God” suggests that an extra religious dimension was added in order to allay feelings that “the fix was in”. The division of the country among the tribes was potentially a source of great discord and even violence. Were a prophet, even the likes of Moshe, let alone someone of lesser spiritual standing such as Yehoshua, to attempt to pronounce in God’s Name the allocation of specific parcels of land of unequal size, location and quality to particular tribes, there is no reason to think that the unpleasant accusations of nepotism, favoritism and other biases that accompanied the appointments of Betzalel[11]  and Aharon[12]   to positions of importance, would not surface again.[13]   RaShI on BaMidbar 26:24, based upon the Talmud in Bava Batra 122a, describes how a “double blind” system consisting of an ostensibly random lottery combined with predictions based upon the Urim VeTumim was utilized to convince the Jewish people that the distribution of Canaan was in fact Divinely Ordained:

…Elazar, the priest, would be dressed in the URIM VETUMIM. (Note that this text also does not mention the term “Choshen”.) He would predict, based upon Divine Inspiration, (i.e., using the Urim VeTumim) “When such-and-such a tribe is chosen, such-and-such a portion will be chosen along with it.” The names of the tribes were inscribed on twelve separate lots, and twelve portions of land were inscribed on another twelve lots. The lots would be mixed in a box, and the head of a particular tribe would put his hand into the box and extract two lots. Invariably he extracted the lot with the name of his tribe along with the lot of the portion of land that had been predicted would be given to this tribe…[14]  

It would appear from the texts in BaMidbar and Yehoshua that there was no subsequent dissension regarding the land division, and therefore the various measures adopted in order to convince the people that they had been dealt with fairly had the desired affects.

What was the activating element of the Urim VeTumim?

                So what exactly are the Urim VeTumim that were placed in the “Choshen”, and how was the High Priest thereby enabled to receive Divine Communications with regard to going to war, distributing land and other important decisions that would affect the Jewish people as a whole?  RaShI, on Shemot 28:30 and VaYikra 8:8, defines the Urim VeTumim as the mystical power generated by the Shem HaMefurash (lit. the Explicit Name), i.e., the Tetragrammaton in written form.

                We encounter the supernatural power of the Tetragrammaton, the most intense and specific version of the Divine Name,[15]   in two other Midrashic contexts in Shemot:

a.   When Moshe slays the Egyptian taskmaster whom he encounters administering a potentially fatal beating to a Jewish slave (Shemot 2:12), Shemot Rabba 1:29 cites a Rabbinic position that rather than laying a hand on the Egyptian, all that Moshe did was invoke the Tetragrammaton.[16]   

b.   The staff by which Moshe initiates many of the plagues is referred to in Shemot 4:20 as the “Mateh Elokim” (the staff of God). Midrash Sechel Tov 4:20 contends that the staff was particularly associated with God and therefore was able to cause various supernatural phenomena, because the Shem HaShem (the Name of God) was engraved upon it. 

                In terms of an association between the Shem HaMefurash and human beings discerning the Divine Will which more closely parallels the usage of the Urim VeTumim discussed in BaMidbar, a popularly known reference appears in “Eleh Ezkera” (lit., these I remember), one of the central “Piyutim” (liturgical poems) read on Yom HaKippurim. We are told how ten great Tannaim (Rabbinic scholars from the period of the Mishna) are tortured to death by their Roman captors. When they originally are informed of the evil decree, the Rabbis ask for time to verify whether their fates have been irrevocably sealed in Heaven:

“Give us three days, until it can be known whether this has been decreed from on High. 

If we find that we are truly guilty and sinful, then we will comply with this decree that must be based in Mercy.”

They all feared, trembled, and shook, and they finally turned their eyes upon R. Yishmael, the High Priest, with the expectation that he would invoke “HASHEM” (the Name) and thereby ascend to their Master, in order to know whether the decree originated from their God.

Rabbi Yishmael purified himself and pronounced “HASHEM” with great trepidation. He ascended to the Heavens and inquired of the “man” dressed in simple white linen,

And he said to him, “Accept upon yourselves, holy beloved ones, because I have heard from ‘behind the curtain’ that you are trapped in this matter.”

What was the process by which God’s Will was Communicated via the Urim VeTumim?

                Once we establish the identity of the Urim VeTumim, and its power to help an individual like the high priest to understand the Will of HaShem, what is assumed concerning the manner in which the Choshen would optimally function? According to Yoma 73b, when the Urim VeTumim, the Tetragrammaton is placed into the Choshen, questions that were posed would generate a response whereby various letters of the names of the tribes engraved onto the twelve stones[17] would either be visually highlighted (light up, as implied by “Urim” [lights]) in a particular sequence or, in a jumbled sequence that would  first attract the high priest’s mental attention, and them require him to properly unscramble the anagram.[18]  From the series of letters that would present themselves in this manner, messages would be spelled out such as, “Aleh VeHatzlach” (rise up and be victorious). 

An additional human element may be required.

                It is also possible that the term “Urim VeTumim” does not connote a single entity, but rather a synergy between two separate and extremely different existences. Commentators such as Rabbeinu Bachaye insist that the term Tumim (wholeness) describes not so much the Choshen or the Tetragrammaton, but rather the qualities required of the high priest in order to be able to recognize and then interpret the Divine Message that HaShem may Wish to convey. If the Kohen Gadol is not sufficiently holy, then just like not everyone is able to receive prophecy, so too not every high priest is able to utilize the Choshen for divining purposes.  Consequently, as in so many other aspects of Jewish law, ideally, a partnership has to be struck between God and a human being, be it in terms of bringing the world to a higher state of physical perfection, exercising judicial wisdom so that property ends up with its rightful owner, and/or understanding and then publicizing God’s Will with regard to some aspect of Jewish political or military life. The view in the Talmud that during the second Temple, there was no Urim VeTumim, just as actual prophecy ceased at about the same time, probably had more to do with the level or lack thereof of the high priests of the time, than the physical Choshen. One could always physically recreate this garment according to all of the specifications listed in our primary sources, and even place the Tetragrammaton within it; yet there may not be anyone who is worthy of serving as God’s Partner and receiving and interpreting messages from the Urim VeTumim.

[2] While the Urim VeTumim almost have a “stand-alone” quality in the sense that the Tora talks about Moshe placing them “within” the Choshen implying that the Choshen is considered complete even without the Urim VeTumim, in all of the listings of the priestly garments, e.g., Shemot 28:15-30; 39:8-21, the Urim VeTumim are subsumed under the category of the Choshen.  In fact, in the latter instance, the Urim VeTumim is not mentioned at all. While the Urim VeTumim might be necessary in order for the Choshen to function in a particular manner, nevertheless with regard to whether or not the Kohen Gadol was fully clad in the garments required for him to perform the Divine Service in the Tabernacle, it could be concluded that the Urim VeTumim were not necessary for satisfying this requirement.

[3] The Tora could have simply said that Moshe placed the Choshen upon Aharon, without stressing how he inserted the Urim VeTumim into the Choshen.

[4] The leaders that the Jews had during the periods described in the books of Yehoshua and Shoftim were essentially military figures who led the people intermittently during times of warfare. Shmuel is the last Shofet and the institution of kingship begins with Shaul, followed by David, both anointed by Shmuel.

[5] The fourth of the hermeneutic principles listed by R. Yishmael, appearing at the end of Korbanot section of Shacharit,  e.g., see The Koren Siddur, p. 55.

[6] It could be argued that the wars against the Seven Nations and Amalek are also defensive in the sense that were the Jews to live in Canaan alongside these morally reprehensible societies, their lifestyle would become corrupted as well. RaMBaM writes in Mishna Tora, Hilchot Melachim 6:4 that were these nations to agree to accept the Seven Noachide Commandments, among other social restrictions, they would be allowed to remain in Canaan since they no longer posed a moral and religious threat to the Jews.

[7] The source that for defensive wars, no special Divine Authorization is required is an expansion of   Shemot 22:1, whereby regarding someone breaking into your house whose intentions are unknown to you, you are permitted to kill him, in accordance with the principle “HaBa LeHargecha Hashkeim VeHargo” (one who comes to kill you, rise up early and kill him first). If this is so with respect to a single individual, it is all the more pertinent when the entire Jewish people is under threat from external attack.

[8] David consults God presumably via the Urim VeTumim on a number of occasions prior to military action, e.g., I Shmuel 23:2, 4, II Shmuel 5:19.

[9] If the Heavenly Court is sitting in judgment, then it is assumed that the trial will involve prosecution and defense. Satan is typically depicted as the prosecutor not only in Rabbinic literature but even in Iyov 1:6 ff.

[10] The paradigm for such a view is the original war against Amalek:

Shemot 17:11 : “And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand, that Israel prevailed; and when he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed.”

Mishna Rosh HaShana 3:8 : And did the hands of Moshe succeed in war or fail in war? But rather it is to tell you that as long as Israel would look upwards and make their hearts subservient to their Father in Heaven, they would prevail; and if not, they would fall…

[11] See Midrash Tanchuma, Parshat VaYakhel, Siman 3.

[12] See BaMidbar 16-17.

[13] While a literal reading of the desire of Reuven, Gad and half of the tribe of Menashe to remain outside of Israel so that they could take over the grazing land of Sichon and Og was due to their great herds (BaMidbar 32:4), could an underlying motivation for their request be that they did not have confidence in the objectivity of the distribution system of the land of Canaan, and therefore preferred to operate on the principle, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush”?

[14] RaShI goes on to claim an even more supernatural aspect to the process of assigning land to tribes by interpreting the phrase in BaMidbar 26:56 “Al Pih HaGoral” which is an idiomatic expression connoting that the division will be done BY MEANS of a lottery, extremely literally and asserting that the lots “spoke” (“Al Pih” literally means by their “mouths”) and exclaimed “I am the lot for such-and-such a tribe which has been apportioned such-and-such a piece of land”; “I am the portion of land for such and such a tribe.” Whereas on the one hand, some could view such an assumption as begging credulity, if it served to quell dissent and discord among the tribes, then it would more than serve its purpose!

[15]While HaShem has many Names associated with Him, the Tetragrammaton is considered in a class by itself, while all other names are defined as Kinuyim (secondary names). Examples of Halachic implications for the different sorts of names of HaShem include: a) For which Divine Name is one considered in violation of the prohibition of blasphemy? b) With regard to which Divine Names is one supposed to be careful in terms of the creation of “Sheimot” (written documents that must be buried rather than discarded in some less respectful manner) and c) Is one allowed to take American currency into the bathroom since the motto “In God we trust” is inscribed upon it? Etc.

[16]RaShI on Shemot 2:14, reads carefully the comment made the following day by the Jew whom Moshe tries to restrain from beating his coreligionist, “…Are you (Moshe) SAYING that you will kill me?”, and contends that the use of the verb “to say” in connection with taking someone’s life suggests that this was Moshe’s method for eliminating his enemies. Particularly were we to assume that Moshe was only thirteen when he went out to see the condition of his brethren—Shemot 2:11 employs the phrase “And the ‘Yeled’ (boy) grew up…”, an expression that RaShI in other places interprets to connote reaching puberty, e.g., Beraishit 25:27—attributing the death of the Egyptian to uttering the Divine Name would make it more understandable how a boy of barely thirteen could have ended the life of a brutish, mature adult. While the example of David dispatching Golyat with nothing more than a slingshot can serve as a paradigm for such a confrontation, no particular weapon is explicitly mentioned with respect to Moshe. Furthermore, since the latter is first emerging from a supposedly comfortable life growing up in Pharoah’s  palace at this point, in contrast to David, who had been a shepherd for so many years needing to protect the flock from powerful predators, it would not necessarily stand to reason that Moshe would have acquired the skills necessary to successfully take on both the taskmaster as well as the adult Jew, unless we assume a metaphysical special talent.

[17] The assumption that the letters spelling out the names of the various tribes would provide a full alphabet for spelling out messages is challenged by the Gemora and commentaries when it is noted that the letters “Chet”, “Tet”, “Tzadi” and “Kuf” are not included in the names of the twelve tribes. To alleviate this difficulty, the Gemora posits that in addition to the names of the tribes, the names of the three forefathers, Avraham, Yi-TZ-CHA-K and Yaa-K-ov, as well as the phrase “Shiv-T-ei Yeshurun” (the tribes of Jeshurun, an ancient form of Yisrael) were also engraved on the stones.

[18] This latter view serves as the basis for the Vilna Gaon’s  hypothesis in Aderet Eliyahu on I Shmuel 1:13-16, that Eli’s accusation of Chana’s being drunk was due to a false solution of a message from the Urim VeTumim:

He (the High Priest Eli) inquired by means of his Urim VeTumim and the letters that either bulged out or lit up were: “Heh”, “Chuf”, “Shin” and “Reish.” And he unscrambled them to means “Shikora” (a drunken woman)—“Shin”, “Chuf”, “Reish”, “Heh”; but the true solution was “Kesheira” (worthy, appropriate) “Chuf”, “Shin”, “Reish”, “Heh”.

Although detailed laws governing sacrifices first appear in Shemot with regard to the  Pascal sacrifice (12:3 ff.), and then more comprehensively starting with the beginning of VaYikra (1:2 ff.), it is from the accounts of offerings in Beraishit[1] that we can discover the underlying motivations that should inform the myriad details of sacrifice ritual. In Shemot and VaYikra only the technical means by which a particular sacrifice is chosen and offered on the altar are listed; what brings a person to want to make such an offering, and how s/he might feel during the course of its presentation to HaShem can best be derived from the anecdotes of the “Avot” (forefathers).  While it could be maintained that the individuals who are credited with founding Judaism, i.e., Avraham, Sara, Yitzchak, Rivka, Yaakov, Leah and Rachel, were religious geniuses and therefore what was clearly understood by them would not necessarily be totally comprehensible to those that would come after them down through the ages, on the other hand, the recognition that the Tora sees fit to record their actions with respect to sacrifices would suggest that not only should the principle of “Ma’asei Avot Siman LaBanim” (the deeds of the forefathers are precursors for their offspring) be invoked regarding what HAPPENED to them, but also how they THOUGHT and RELATED to HaShem by means of the actions initiated by them which manifested their respective personal spirituality.

What motivation underlay the very first sacrifice recorded in the Tora?

From a literal perspective, the initial plant and animal sacrifices recorded in the Tora are brought by Kayin and Hevel in Beraishit 4:3-5.  In light of HaShem’s Acceptance of Hevel’s sacrifice and Rejection of what Kayin offers, it appears that what the former was thinking and trying to accomplish spiritually was Considered by God more acceptable and worthy of emulation. But what exactly constitutes the motivation behind Hevel’s sacrifice is left to the reader to reflect upon and attempt to determine. Traditional commentators speculate regarding what the world’s first male siblings might have been thinking that led to animal and plant sacrifice.[2]

The sacrifices of the first brothers suggest overall attitudes towards life.

Klee Yakar (Beraishit 4:3) offers a sophisticated description of a fundamental theological disagreement between Kayin and Hevel which manifests itself not only in the quality of sacrifice that each brings,[3] but also in the very livelihoods that they had earlier decided to pursue and from which their sacrifices derive. The commentator posits that because Kayin did not believe in an afterlife, but rather maintained that the this-worldly life was all that one had to look forward to, the older brother decided to acquire and possess real estate, literally a piece of  “Olam HaZeh” (this world).  Because of his concern with “this worldliness”, Kayin cared only about possessions that were essentially immoveable and immutable. Hevel, in contrast to his brother, was primarily focused upon his spiritual dimension, and therefore was interested in a means of supporting himself which would lend itself to wandering and lengthy periods of contemplation. As a result of Hevel’s emphasis upon “Olam HaBa” (the world to come), places and objects were of only passing, utilitarian interest to him. Consequently, becoming a herder allowed him to move whenever and wherever he wanted for as long as he wished.

Based upon his assumptions regarding their respective attitudes towards “Olam HaZeh” and “Olam HaBa”, and, by extension, their views regarding possessions, Klee Yakar then posits why each of the brothers gives the sacrifice that he does: Individuals like Kayin, who are enamored of their possessions, essentially feel that they ought to horde whatever they have and produce, and use these things exclusively for their own personal enjoyment. Such individuals are reluctant to be charitable to others, and prefer, instead, to live only for themselves. Admittedly, once they grow older, and infirmity and thoughts of mortality inevitably begin to set in, the commentator asserts that people like Kayin may begin to attempt to emulate the lifestyles of their more spiritual brethren, and at that point begin to engage in the fulfillment of Commandments and acts of kindness. Yet, as a result of a lifetime spent indulging themselves, it is difficult for Kayin and those like him to act wholeheartedly in this manner, and therefore at best, they will part only minimally and begrudgingly with some of their least prized possessions—hence the disparity in quality between the produce of Kayin and the lambs of Hevel. Such a perspective enables the commentator to account for the adverbial phrase introducing the sacrifices brought by Kayin and Hevel, (Beraishit 4:3) “VaYehi MiKeitz Yamim” (and it was at the end of days—of their, the brothers’, lives), i.e., Kayin would never have even brought a relatively inferior sacrifice in the first place had he not begun to worry about his impending demise.[4] Hevel, never having developed a deep attachment to any of his possessions, can easily and even eagerly offer the best of what he has.

Applying Klee Yakar’s hypothesis re Kayin and Hevel to those offering sacrifices as well as committing resources to the performance of Commandments at later points in time.

Klee Yakar’s approach based upon the specific case study of Kayin and Hevel, can then be extended to anyone subsequently bringing a voluntary sacrifice.[5] [6] When looking at the example of Kayin, it can be concluded that sacrifices may be brought out of fear of impending death or at least the realization of one’s ultimate mortality, in an attempt to appease one’s Creator when finally coming to grips with the finiteness of human life. Perhaps because such an individual has previously not developed a true spiritual sensibility, and therefore may be prone to offering sacrifices of inferior quality, all sorts of objective requirements for wholeness and perfection re the offerings that one may bring to the Tabernacle or Temple are demanded by the Tora in order to not allow poor quality sacrifices to be brought. Examples of such rules include the disqualification of animals with blemishes (e.g., VaYikra 22:20-21; Devarim 15:21; 17:1) and the rejection of sacrifices that have been obtained with funds associated with less than wholesome activities (Devarim 23:19). It is hard to imagine that a truly spiritual individual would have to be commanded to avoid giving anything other than the best of what he has; such directives would appear to be needed by those who have trouble “getting it”. And b sed upon the Sefer HaChinuch’s oft-cited principle[7] that by engaging in proper external actions, there is the possibility that proper values will be internalized over time, those with “Kayin-like” inclinations might perhaps be brought around to Hevel’s sensibility by complying with the Tora’s high standards for sacrifices.

Klee Yakar’s Hevel paradigm, on the other hand, allows us to understand that for some, offering sacrifices is a means of simultaneously expressing their anti-materialism as well as a highly developed sense of spirituality and devotion to HaShem. Such individuals would tend to want to give everything away for higher purposes, and sometimes might even have to be protected from such self-abnegation by laws limiting the upper amounts that one is allowed to spend upon optional Mitzvot and Tzedaka, as in the following Halachic sources:

Tur, Yoreh De’ah #249.

The amount (of “Tzedaka”) that is appropriate to give is as follows:

a)  If an individual has the means, then he should give in accordance with the needs of the poor (however much that might be)—see Devarim 15:8.

b)  If an individual cannot afford meeting all of the needs of the poor, how much must he give?

1)  No more than 1/5 of his possessions is considered fulfilling the Commandment of Tzedaka in the most praiseworthy manner.

2)  1/10 of one’s possessions is the average manner by which the Commandment is to be fulfilled.

3)  Giving less than 1/10 is indicative of a parsimonious individual.

4)  It states in the Talmud Yerushalmi (Pe’ah 1:1 [15b]) that the first year (that one earns an income), 1/5 is given from the principle. Subsequently, 1/5 can come from the interest/profit.

5)  In every year afterwards, a person should not give less that 1/3 Shekel per year, which is 1/6 ounce of silver, and if he gives less than this, then he has not fulfilled the Commandment to give Charity at all.

Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 656:1:

If a person acquires an Etrog (to fulfill the Commandment of Four Species on Sukkot) that is worthy for the Mitzva but is very small, and afterwards he finds a larger one, it is a worthy act to spend up to 1/3 more “inclusively” (the final total of what one spends should be increased by 1/3 compared to what one originally spent) in order to exchange the first Etrog for the better one.

There are those who say that if one finds two Etrogim to acquire, and one is more beautiful than the other, he should buy the more beautiful one as long as it does not cost more than 1/3 more (inclusively) as compared to the other.

RaMA:

With respect to a person who has no Etrog, or cannot perform some other Mitzva that is time-sensitive, it is not necessary for him to spend a great fortune in order to acquire the necessary ritual object in order to fulfill the Commandment, as it is said, (Ketubot 50a) “One who spends a great deal, should not spend more than 1/5”. This is with respect to a positive Commandment. But with respect to a negative Commandment, one should spend all that he possesses before he transgresses.[8]

While Hevel may have brought his best, i.e., the first-born and the fattest of his herd, his predilection for self-sacrifice did not lead him to bring ALL of his sheep, and thereby renouncing all of his possessions. Kayin can be faulted for not sacrificing enough; but it is also important to stress that the counterbalance should not be so extreme that it becomes an expression of asceticism and total other-worldliness. While never bringing a “Korban” is reprehensible, turning all of one’s possessions into “Korbanot” is equally to be avoided.

Another commentator’s understanding of Kayin’s motivation.

HaK’tav VeHaKabbala also uses the phrase (Beraishit 4:3) “VaYehi MiKeitz Yamim” as a springboard for developing his understanding of the motivations for the sacrifices of Kayin and Hevel.  But, instead of suggesting that the phrase is alluding to   human mortality, this commentator invokes a Midrash in order to define what sort of “end of days” are being referred to:

Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer, Chapt. 21

…The night of the (future) Yom Tov of Pesach arrived.

Adam said to his sons (Kayin and Hevel), “In the future, on this night, the Jewish people will be offering their Pascal sacrifices. You too should offer sacrifices before our Creator.”

Kayin brought as a sacrifice from what was left over from his food, parched corn and flax seeds.

And Hevel brought from the first-born of his flock and of the fattest of the sheep whose wool had not been sheared…[9]

The commentator contends that since according to Bava Metzia 106b, the middle of the month of Nissan, when Pesach occurs, is the beginning of the spring harvest,[10] the words “Keitz” (end) and “Ketzir” (harvestà end of the growing season) are intimately related to one another conceptually by virtue of their sharing the letters “Kuf” and “Tzadi”. Furthermore, the act of harvesting is also a process whereby the stalks of grain are shortened (“Katzar”).

Aside from HaK’tav VeHaKabbala’s impressive inventory of additional words that share similar connotations, the assumption that the offering of sacrifices are particularly appropriate during periods of harvesting one’s crops provides an additional context for understanding what may motivate one to offer sacrifices. Farming has always entailed considerable delayed gratification. From the time that the land is prepared for planting, the many stages required for the successful growth of crops as well as the manifold threats to their successfully coming to fruition and ripening, require considerable “Emuna” and “Bitachon” (faith and trust) to serve as counterbalances to the angst and tension that generally accompany agricultural activities. So many things are simply beyond the farmer’s control: will it rain sufficiently; will insects destroy the fruits and vegetables; will fungi and other diseases devastate the year’s harvest; will there be an early frost? Even once everything is ready for picking, will anything happen that will occasion portions of the crop to be lost? Consequently, when all has been successfully harvested, not only can the farmer first begin to appreciate the largesse that is his, but he can finally breathe a sigh of relief that all of the manifold fears and dangers did not come to pass. For someone at that point not to acknowledge his debt of gratitude to HaShem after all that has taken place, would constitute a considerable manifestation of ingratitude and self-absorption. But when it comes time to choose what ought to be offered, if all that a person is ready to part with is what he thinks that he can best do without, as opposed to sharing the choicest and the best, a study in the psychology of how one ought to acknowledge having come through a difficult period becomes apparent. Perhaps the difference in approaches of Kayin and Hevel in light of HaKetav VeHaKabbala’s interpretation can be categorized as a question of emphasis with regard to the partnership between God and man in all earthly endeavors—do I give myself the bulk of the credit when a project is successfully completed, and therefore HaShem’s Role is no more than secondary and simply Enabling, OR must I recognize that whatever I may accomplish, this is primarily the result of God’s Intervention and therefore He is due the bulk of the credit.  A person busy patting himself on the shoulder will not think of sacrifice; the individual who genuinely appreciates God’s Hand in his success, will not think of not expressing his appreciation, and sacrifice answers such a need.

“Turning the clock back” and positing that Kayin and Hevel’s father, Adam, was the first to offer sacrifices.

The Midrash cited above by HaK’tav VeHaKabbala attributes to Adam HaRishon the idea of sacrifices, despite the fact that within the text of Beraishit, there is no indication that anyone other than Kayin and Hevel initiate this practice. Yet no lesser Rabbinic light than RaMBaM posits that not only may Adam have verbally encouraged his sons to sacrifice as suggested by Pirkei D’Rabbi Eliezer, but that he himself engaged in offerings to HaShem, thereby linking sacrificing to God with the first human being described in Chumash.

Mishna Tora, Hilchot Beit HaBechira 2:2

And it is a tradition that is widely held (lit. “in the hands of everyone”) that the place in which David intended to build and upon which Shlomo actually built the altar (of the First Temple), the granary of Aravna (II Shmuel 24:16),  was the same place where Avraham had built the altar upon which he sacrificed Yitzchak (Beraishit 22:9); the same place where Noach had built an altar upon his emergence from the Ark (Beraishit 8:20); the same place wherein Kayin and Hevel offered their sacrifices (Beraishit 4:3); [11] AND IN THIS PLACE ADAM HARISHON OFFERED UP A SACRIFICE WHEN HE WAS CREATED, AND IT IS FROM THIS PLACE THAT HE WAS CREATED (!),[12]as the Sages said, (a paraphrase of Yerushalmi Nazir 7:2, 35b)[13] “Adam was created from the place of his atonement.”[14]

An option or a necessity?

Once it is suggested that not only did Adam himself sacrifice but that it was intrinsic to his nature as a result of his having been created from the very material that would eventually constitute the altars of the Temples, sacrifice is no longer to be viewed as an idiosyncratic practice of certain individuals in the Bible that was finally institutionalized at Sinai, and everyone else being able to “take it or leave it”, but rather a necessary and intrinsic characteristic of human nature from the “get go”.  If Adam was the one who told Kayin and Hevel to sacrifice, he must have been educating them as to their existential natures. Repentance and atonement are part and parcel of the human condition. By virtue of having been given free choice by HaShem—Chava appears to exercise it BEFORE she eats from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, by virtue of CHOOSING to eat from it in the first place[15] —man has the capacity to sin and therefore will have to be given the means by which to atone for these expected shortcomings. Furthermore, Adam HaRishon must have been the first to bring a sacrifice as a SIN offering in an effort to atone for the transgression that resulted in him and his wife being banished from the Garden of Eden.

The implications for subsequent offerings once we posit Adam as an inherent and natural sacrificer, would include that the urge to sacrifice wells up from the depths of the human being who shares a literal affinity with both altar and sacrifices. A sacrifice speaks to our inadequacies and we are trying to both acknowledge them and gain forgiveness for them. Whereas RaMBaN on VaYikra 1:9 has argued that the individual bringing the sacrifice should imagine him/herself as being offered up but for God’s Grace and Capacity for forgiveness (see http://text.rcarabbis.org/competing-visions-of-the-purpose-of-korbanot-by-yaakov-bieler/ ), the line of reasoning suggested by the Yerushalmi and RaMBaM, which posits that man has a more personal connection with the altar than with what is placed atop it, promotes the idea that atonement is not alien or artificial, but rather lies at the heart of man’s very nature.

[2] The Tora does not disclose the motivations of either Kayin or Hevel with respect to the offerings that each presents. It is to be noted that Kayin is the brother who initiates the sacrifices, with Hevel appearing to merely copy his older sibling’s action (Beraishit 4:4 “VeHevel Heivih GAM HUH…” [And Hevel ALSO brought]), although the latter ends up doing Kayin “one better” with respect to the quality of the sacrifice. Only the slightest hint can be detected in Beraishit 4:4-5. The text does not state merely that HaShem accepted the sacrifice of one and not the other, but rather “And God Turned towards Hevel and his sacrifice; and towards Kayin and his sacrifice He did not Turn…” By stressing that what was being evaluated was not only the offering, but the individual offering it, the text suggests that in addition to the act being performed correctly, it must be accompanied with proper intention and motivation. However, the precise nature of that motivation is not delineated.

[3] Kayin brings “MiPeri HaAdama” (from the fruits of the ground) which, in contrast to Hevel’s “first-born and fattest animals”, lacked any sort of superlative adjective or noun. No notice would have been taken of the implications of the “non-description” of Kayin’s sacrifice had there not been another sacrifice with which to compare it. But in light of the contrast in descriptions, Kayin’s sacrifice is retroactively understood by the Midrashim and commentators to not only not be the best that Kayin had available, but that it was actually comprised of below-average vegetables and crops. The Rabbis declare that what Kayin presented as a sacrifice was of inferior quality; food stuffs for which Kayin had no personal need or use.

[4] While Klee Yakar’s  approach is certainly creative, to assert that Hevel experienced intimation of mortality would appear difficult to posit since at least no human being to this point had actually died. Although HaShem’s original threat to Adam regarding what would happen should he not heed the warning to avoid eating from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil—(Beraishit 2:17 “But of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof. thou shalt surely die”), as well as the basis for the decision to banish Adam and Chava from the Garden of Eden—(Ibid. 3:22 “And the LORD God said: ‘Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the Tree of Life, and eat, and live for ever‘”), suggest that Adam was informed at least theoretically that his life and that of his descendants would be finite, would they contemplate their actual ends as long as someone doesn’t actually experience the end of human life? Consequently, Klee Yakar’s approach would appear to be more homiletical intended to drive a point home to humanity in general, than an understanding that captures the actual sensibilities of Hevel at the moment of offering his sacrifice.

[5] With the exception of two specific instances, i.e., Avraham who is Told by HaShem to offer Yitzchak as a sacrifice (Beraishit 22:9) and Yaakov who offers sacrifices in fulfillment of a vow that he makes upon leaving the land of Israel (Beraishit 28:20-22; 35:1, 14), when the “Avot” usually offer sacrifices, they do so voluntarily rather than out of a sense of obligation. See Beraishit 12:7; 13:4, 18; 26:25; 28:18; 31:45. What the relationship might be between motivations underlying voluntary sacrifices as opposed to those that are obligatory is worthy of speculation.

[6] Examples of optional sacrifices include: Peace offerings (VaYikra 3:1-17), Thanksgiving offerings (7:12-15; 22:29-30), and those that are brought as the result of oral vows (7:16-17).

[7] See for e.g., Sefer HaChinuch’s explanation for  Mitzva 16, “Not to break a bone of the Pascal sacrifice”.

[8] Transgressions of Jewish law can take two basic forms:

a)  “Shev V’Al Ta’aseh” (lit. sit and do not do) or “Bitul Aseh” (the cancellation of a positive Commandment), i.e., passive non-compliance with a positive Commandment, e.g., a refusal to recite Kiddush on Friday night;

b)  “Kum VeAseh” (lit. rise up and do), i.e., an active violation of a negative prohibition, e.g., performing one of the 39 categories of forbidden creative physical activities on Shabbat.

Actively violating a prohibition is viewed by Jewish legal tradition as a more egregious challenge to HaShem’s Authority than passively choosing not to fulfill a positive Mitzva.

[9] The extra detail included by the Midrash to the effect that the sheep had never even been sheered, furthers the impression of Hevel’s intuitive spirituality. He apparently recognized that if an object is to be dedicated to God, not only must it be desirable in its own right in terms of appearance, but that it should not have been put to any other purpose prior to its dedication. In this regard, Hevel’s sacrifice parallels one of the requirements for the “Para Aduma” (the Red Heifer) in BaMidbar 19:2, as well as the animal utilized in the “Egla Arufa” (the calf whose neck is broken) ritual in Devarim 21:4.

[10] A ritual indicator of Nissan’s marking the spring harvest is the Omer Sacrifice whose offering on the second day of Pesach allows the usage of “Chadash” or winter wheat, crops that were first planted after the previous year’s Pesach. See VaYikra 23:14.

[11] No reference is made to the construction of an altar by Kayin and Hevel as in the other instances cited here. RaMBaM is merely being faithful to the biblical verses which in the other instances note that altars were constructed.

[12] RaMBaM is identifying the “Even Shetiya” [the rock from which Jewish tradition claims the entire universe was formed—see Yoma 52b—and which is located on the top of “Har HaBayit” (the Temple Mount) with Beraishit 2:7.

[13] The full text of the passage in the Yerushalmi reads:

Said R. Yehuda ben Pazi: He Took a spoonful (of dust/earth) from the place of the altar and created with it Adam HaRishon.

He Said, “If only he will be Created from the place of the altar, and thereby he will be able to continue to exist.”

This is what is meant when it is written, (Beraishit 2:7) “And HaShem Formed the man of dust from “HaAdama” (the earth).” And it is written, (Shemot 20:21) “An altar of “Adama” (dirt) you shall make for Me.” Just there (in Shemot) the reference is to an altar, so too here (in Beraishit) the reference is to an altar.

[14] In Guide for the Perplexed 3:46, RaMBaM presents a critique of sacrifices. Consequently, his comment in Mishna Tora is somewhat surprising in light of RaMBaM’s apparent articulated disdain for Korbanot in the Guide. Some say RaMBaM wrote the Guide for the “Perplexed” and that the “real” RaMBaM is to be found in the Mishna Tora. Others suggest that there was an internal schism within the scholar with regard to scholarship and religious tradition. It would appear that if RaMBaM truly believed ChaZaL’s contention that HaShem Created man in such a way that he would be particularly predisposed to sacrifices, then how can it be said that He Objected to the offering of sacrifices, other than perspective assumed by the Nevi’im who intimated that while HaShem Wanted sacrifices, He was Displeased when the people offering them abused them.

[15] Beraishit 3:6 recounts: “And the woman saw that the tree was GOOD to eat and that it was DESIREABLE visually and it was PLEASANT with regard to intelligence…” If the negative aspect of partaking from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil was that one would FIRST become aware of aesthetic considerations that could cloud moral judgment, then how was she seduced into eating from the Tree in the first place?

One of the main preoccupations of the Jewish Oral Tradition is to identify textual bases for many of the laws that are detailed in the Mishna and Talmud, but which do not appear to be explicitly mentioned in the Written Tradition of the Tora. The disproportionate relationship between the respective quantities of certain subject matter contained in Chumash as opposed to Talmud is poetically stated in the Mishna:

Mishna Chagiga 1:8

The remission of vows[1] “floats in the air” and it has nothing upon which to rely (in terms of clear Biblical sources).

The laws of Shabbat,[2] “Chagigot”[3] and “Me’ilot”[4] they are like “mountains hanging by a hair”. There is very little text and a great deal of law…

Nevertheless, the assumption that the laws of the Oral Tradition designated as “MiD’Orayta” (of Tora origin and status),[5] despite their not being explicitly written down in the Bible, were originally revealed to Moshe on Sinai during the forty days that he spent atop the mountain immediately after the Ten Commandments were given (Shemot 24:15-18), appears to underlie the attempts to identify Biblical textual sources for these laws. Otherwise, many of the directives of the Mishna and Talmud could be subject to the critique that they were first created by the Rabbis, rather than originating from a Divine Source, and therefore in certain respects are to be considered less binding[6] and not as crucial to proper Jewish observance.

Applying these assumptions to a central  aspect of Shabbat observance, the prohibition against performing “Creative physical activity”–Melacha.

Tractate Shabbat turns to the beginning of Parshat VaYakhel when it seeks out a Biblical textual support for the concept that there are 39 “Avot Melachot” (chief categories of prohibited creative activity on Shabbat)^[7] as well as what sort of specific action is considered a violation of the Tora prohibition against engaging in “Melacha” on this holy day.

Shabbat 70a

The Rabbis taught (in a Baraita):^[8] R. Natan says: (Shemot 35:3) “You shall not ignite a fire in all of your habitations on the day of Shabbat.”—What is the Tora coming to teach (i.e., why is this particular “Melacha” that is prohibited on Shabbat and Yom Tov being singled out for mention at this point in the Tora text)?

Because it says,

(Shemot 35:1-2)

And Moshe gathered together the entire congregation of the Children of Israel and he said to them: ‘Eileh HaDevarim‘ (these are the things–plural) that HaShem Commanded to do them.

Six days you shall do “Melacha” (creative physical activity[9]–singular), and on the seventh day, it will be to you holy, a Shabbat of Shabbats for HaShem; anyone who performs during its course (the seventh day) “Melacha”, will die.

“Devarim“; “HaDevarim”; “Eileh HaDevarim” (these are three individual superfluities of language,[10] each evoking a hermeneutic interpretation). 

RaShI

“Devarim” implies (due to its plural form at least) 2;

“HaDevarim” implies (due to its being an “article” indicating specificity) 1;

“Eileh” has a numerical value of (“Aleph” = 1; “Lamed” = 30; “Heh” = 5) 36.

Altogether, 2 + 1 + 36 = 39.

These (the antecedents of “Eileh HaDevarim”, which we assume Moshe was informing the Jewish people about concerning the manner by which they were to observe Shabbat) are the 39 “Melachot” that were told to Moshe at Sinai.

One might think that (in order to be considered in violation of the prohibition to avoid performing “Melacha” on Shabbat,) you would have to perform all 39 (different actions) during the course of one “forgetting”?^[11] (Since “Melacha” is written in the singular in 35:2, once we define “Melacha” as referring to 39 different activities, then it is possible that only when all 39 have been performed, is the individual finally transgressing “Melacha”!)

The Tora comes to teach: (Shemot 34:21) “Six days you shall work, and on the seventh day you shall rest; from ploughing and harvesting you shall rest.” (Since the Tora picks out these two examples of the 39 “Melachot” and lists them separately, one could conclude that just as these are listed apart from the general rule against performing “Melacha” in Shemot 35:2, implying that each of these actions is considered transgressions of the prohibition against violating Shabbat in their own respective rights, the same would be true with respect to the other 37 remaining individual actions on the list in Shabbat 73a).

But one still could conclude that regarding ploughing and harvesting one would have to bring two separate sacrifices,[12] but until one violates all 37 of the others (during a single “forgetting”), no sacrifice would be required?

The Tora comes to teach: (Shemot 35:3) “You shall not ignite a fire in all of your habitations on the day of Shabbat.”

The prohibition of igniting was included in the preceding verse (“Six days you shall do ‘Melacha’ and on the seventh day, it will be to you holy, a Shabbat of Shabbats for HaShem; anyone who performs during its course ‘Melacha’ will die”).^[13]

So why “did it go out” (i.e., why was igniting mentioned specifically, if it had just been alluded to in 35:2 “…Kol HaOseh Bo Melacha Yumat” as part of the entire group of “Melachot”, along with the other 38 “Melachot”)?

To connect (the remaining “Melachot”) to itself and to say to you: Just as igniting is a chief category of “Melacha” and one is responsible (to bring a sacrifice for its inadvertent violation) for itself alone (and not in combination with the other “Melachot”), so too with regard to each of the other chief categories of “Melacha” one is responsible for each unto itself (to bring a sacrifice in the event of its inadvertent violation).

The Jerusalem Talmud contains an alternative interpretation to Shemot 35:1 in order to provide a different means for associating the 39 “Melachot” with a Biblical verse.

Talmud Yerushalmi Shabbat 7:9

We learn in a Baraita:[14] The Rabbis of Caesaria said: A “Siman” (hint, reference, mnemonic device) for the 39 “Melachot” on Shabbat stemming from the Tora—“Eileh” (this source focuses exclusively on the pronoun at the beginning of the phrase in 35:1, and pays no attention to the word “HaDevarim” that follows as the Babylonian Talmud cited above had done). “Alef” = 1; “Lamed” = 30; “Heh” = 8 (?),[15] the Rabbis not refraining from interpreting a “Heh” as if it were a “Chet”, resulting in the sum total of 39.[16]

In addition to the “Gematria” analyses of Shemot 35:1 that are recorded in the two Talmudic traditions identified with Babylonia and Israel, the Talmud Yerushalmi employs an alternate approach based upon “word-counting” for justifying the existence of 39 chief categories of “Melacha” on Shabbat:

Talmud Yerushalmi Shabbat 7:2

R. Shmuel bar Nachman in the name of R. Yonatan: These correspond to the 40 minus 1[17] instances of the term “Melacha” that are written in the Tora…[18]

R. Yosi b. Rebbe Bun in the name of R. Shmuel bar Nachmani: These correspond to the 40 minus 1 instances of the terms “Melacha” and “Avoda” that are written within the context of the Tabernacle.[19]

What does introducing the people to the laws of Shabbat in great detail before instructing how to fabricate the Mishkan suggest spiritually?

However, all of these various interpretations justifying the existence of 39 chief categories of “Melacha” prohibited on Shabbat proceed from the premise that just before Moshe gave the people the instructions regarding how to fabricate the Tabernacle,[20] its various implements and the clothing to be worn by the Kohanim, very complex detail regarding the laws of Shabbat first had to be imparted. While the particular activities that were acutely necessary for the construction of the Tabernacle, become the very same things that are prohibited for Jews to perform on Shabbat, the psychological and theological connection between Shabbat and Tabernacle is explored in the following Midrash:

Midrash MiKitvai Yad HaGeniza (Tora Shleima, VaYakhel, p. 3, #7)

When the Holy One, Blessed Be He, Spoke to Moshe, He first Told him about the Tabernacle, and afterwards Commanded him concerning Shabbat. Why? Because it was obvious before the Holy One, Blessed Be He, that Moshe would be observant of Shabbat. Therefore He Told him first regarding the Tabernacle. But Moshe knew that among the Jewish people, there were some who were lacking in seriousness. He said: It I tell them about the Tabernacle first, they will build it both on Shabbat as well as during the week. For this reason he preceded to warn them about Shabbat first, as it is said, (Shemot 35:1) “And Moshe gathered…” and this is placed alongside of (Ibid. 2) “Six days you shall do ‘Melacha’…”  The “Melacha” that they are to do for six days is the “Melacha” of making the Tabernacle, and on the day of Shabbat they are not to do any “Melacha” (including working on the Tabernacle). From where do you know that the reference to doing “Melacha” for six days in this context is specifically with respect to the Tabernacle? Because they were already commanded to observe Shabbat from their experience at Sinai (Shemot 20:7-10). Here it is specifically in connection with the Tabernacle that Moshe is mentioning Shabbat. For this reason he mentions to them Shabbat followed by the Tabernacle.

Conclusion.

One might have thought that the proper place to discuss the 39 chief categories of “Melacha” is when Shabbat is first introduced. However, the Midrash is claiming that in order to be effective, the lesson of Shabbat has to be accompanied by practical, “hands-on” examples rather than via purely theoretical lists and teachings. The lesson of not going out on Shabbat beyond the furthest boundaries of the encampment was taught by means of the restrictions placed upon gathering the Manna in Shemot 16:27-30. So too the definition of “Melacha” is presented in conjunction with the directives for constructing the Tabernacle. The heuristic methodology being utilized is “Michlal Hein Ata Shomeia Lav” (from the implication of what you may/must do [for the six days during which building the Tabernacle is permitted]) you will learn what is prohibited to be done (on Shabbat). Usually, over time, one obtains more skill and experience with regard to how to perform the tasks that are incumbent upon him. It is counterintuitive for man, once he “gets the hang” of the “Melachot” that he must perform, to suddenly stop for a day and bring to a halt  the process with which he had been working so hard to familiarize himself. Apparently, while building and then regularly visiting a Tabernacle is a high form of Divine Service, an even higher one is refraining from building and constructing in order to contemplate HaShem and His Universe. Furthermore, this is a lesson particularly important for slaves to learn. Their entire existence had been defined by the work of their hands. This is what gave them purpose and their existence meaning. God suddenly Demands that the Jewish people realize that action without understanding and reflection is worthless and meaningless, and that one’s industry must periodically and regularly be shut down in order to be able to be in tune with oneself.

[2] An aspect of these laws will be the focus of the rest of this essay.

[3] Festival sacrifices to be brought during the Pilgrimage Festivals of Pesach, Shavuot and Sukkot. Nowhere in the Bible is the word “Chagiga” mentioned. The obligation to bring special sacrifices in honor of the festivals is derived from inferences found in VaYikra 23:41 and Devarim 16:16; yet this is the subject matter of the entire tractate “Chagiga”.

[4]Consequences of illegal appropriations by private individuals of property belonging to the Tabernacle/Temple.  The only textual reference to this category can be found in VaYikra 5:15-6; yet this is the subject matter of the entire tractate of “Me’ila”.

[5] Naturally, we are referring to the contents of the Oral Tradition that is identified as “D’Orayta” (with Tora standing), in contrast to “D’Rabbanan” (of Rabbinic origin). Material that summarizes Rabbinic legislation, such as decrees to distance people from transgressing Tora law, or to meet certain situational needs during particular historical epochs, while sometimes being associated with biblical texts in order to help remember them (“Esmachta”), there is no pretense being made in such cases that the laws are Toraitic rather than Rabbinic.

[6] Although the obligation to observe Rabbinically legislated laws also stems from the Tora—Devarim 17:10-11—nevertheless, in certain situations when e.g., one finds himself obligated simultaneously to fulfill Toraitic and Rabbinic Commandments, the Tora Commandment trumps the Rabbinic one. Similarly, when one is in doubt regarding whether he has already properly fulfilled a Commandment, with regard to Tora law, he has to assume the worst and repeat the performance, while Rabbinic Commandments do not have to be repeated and it is assumed that they were properly fulfilled.

^[7]Shabbat 73a:  1) Planting seeds; 2) ploughing; 3) harvesting; 4) making sheaves; 5) threshing; 6) winnowing; 7) separating; 8) grinding; 9) sifting; 10) kneading; 11) baking; 12) sheering wool; 13) whitening it ; 14) combing it; 15) dying it; 16) spinning it; 17-20) weaving operations; 21) tying a knot; 22) untying a knot; 23) sewing two stitches; 24) tearing in order to sew two stitches; 25) trapping a deer; 26) slaughtering it; 27) skinning it; 28) salting the skin; 29) tanning it; 30) scraping it; 31) cutting it; 32) writing two letters; 33) erasing in order to write two letters; 34) constructing; 35) deconstructing; 36) extinguishing a fire; 37) igniting it; 38) striking the final hammer blow; 39) carrying from one domain to another.

^[8]A textual source from the period of the Mishna, but which was excluded by R. Yehuda HaNasi from his work, the Mishna.

[9] HaKetav VeHaKabbala on Shemot 35:1, quoting R. Naftali Hirtz Weisel, defines “Melacha” as opposed to “Avoda” (work) as follows:

“Avoda” includes all actions that a person engages in, even if such actions do not require special knowledge or wisdom, do not change anything among his actions, and do not improve anything, e.g., carrying loads of stones, running from one place to another, to carry the clothing of one’ s teacher as he goes to the bathhouse, and to help him dress, and other actions along the same lines that are acts of a servant, and that is precisely the sense of the word “Eved” (servant, which shares the same root as “Avoda”). None of these actions could be categorized as “Melacha”. And throughout the Biblical text you will not find these actions called “Melacha”.

The term “Melacha” relates to an action that innovates something among natural things, and changes them via the action into something that they previously were not. By means of this innovation, the object becomes improved, whether it is an act of building, or even an act of destruction, it always changes. And when there is inherent within the action an improvement in the state of the world/ society, this is “Melacha”. Therefore erasing in order to write, deconstructing in order to build, are considered “Melachot”. For every “Melacha” there is study and knowledge concerning when and how properly to carry the action out. For this reason “Melacha” applies to all actions associated with the act of Creation for the sake of inhabiting this world and improving it that Hashem Created to do. Agricultural activities are therefore “Melacha”, ploughing, seeding, etc. Because HaShem, may He be Blessed, Prepared for all these activities a specific time and a specific set of practices, and a person must conduct himself in accordance with these preparations, and only then will his activities prove successful. One who destroys by his actions is not considered to have done anything, because his actions do not result in an improvement of the world. For this reason, the Rabbis have said (e.g., Beitza 13b; Bava Kama 26b): The Tora prohibits (with regard to Shabbat and Yom Tov) only “Melechet Machshevet” (lit. thoughtful, premeditated “Melacha”—based upon Shemot 35:33, where this is the phrase used for the activities that will be utilized in order to construct the Tabernacle). Consequently all actions that are purely destructive are not considered Tora violations (on Shabbat and Yom Tov).

What results from this, in my opinion, is a rule:  Every Divine Action that He Performed over the course of the six days of Creation are to be called “Melachot” rather than “Avodot”.  For this reason it is written (Beraishit 2:2) “…And He Rested on the seventh day ‘MiKol Melachto’ that He Did”…

Behold all of the activities that HaShem, may He Be Blessed, Prepared for the sake of man during the Creation are numerous. Some of them are functions of the earth, seeds, plants, all for man’s consumption; some are related to his needs such as his implements and clothing, like creating things out of wood and metal, sewing, dying, and the like; and some are for his abodes, like building, etc. And these are the 39 chief “Melachot” that were received by ChaZaL and taught in the chapter known as “Kellal Gadol” (the 7^th chapter of Tractate Shabbat). And they were received as part of the category known as “Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai” (law that was given to Moshe at Sinai). The Wisdom of God Included in this list of 39 all of the many “Melachot” that are known, any not being mentioned are defined as “Toldot” (derivatives) and are included under the rubric of these chief “Melachot”…

For this reason, regarding the Mishna listing the 39 Melachot (Shabbat 73a), the Talmud does not ask the question “Mena Lan” (from where [in the Written Tradition] do we know that these categories of activity are prohibited on Shabbat). All of them are included within the general prohibition of not doing “Melacha” (see e.g., Shemot 20:9; 35:2; VaYikra 23:3).

(The commentator does note that the last “Melacha” in the list of 39, “carrying” does not fit the general definition that he posits, and therefore the Talmud does ask with respect to it: [Shabbat 96b] “’Carrying’, where is it written in the Tora that it is prohibited?”)

[10] The manner in which I typically explain why the Oral Tradition makes so much of apparently “extra” language, is what I have termed, “The Law of Conservation of ‘Pesukim’”. According to this “principle”, the working assumption of Biblical commentators is that the Tora text is as laconic as it possibly could be. Consequently, every sentence, line and even letter needs to be accounted for.

^[11]The Talmud is considering the number of sacrifices one would have to offer in the event that s/he inadvertently violated Shabbat. With regard to inadvertent violation, the actions have to take place while the individual is in a state of not being aware that it is Shabbat and that these activities are therefore prohibited. In the event that there are multiple transgressions, they would be all considered a single action assuming that the person continues to not know that it is Shabbat. However, if for some time the individual were to subsequently realize that it was Shabbat, only to forget once again, then the separate “forgettings” would necessitate separate sacrifices since the transgressions are interrupted by the temporary realization of the prohibitions of the day.

[12] The Talmud’s discussion regarding how to understand the interrelationship between a general rule (“Don’t do ‘Melacha’”) and individual examples of actions included under this rule (“Don’t do ploughing, harvesting, igniting a fire) is in effect an exploration of one of the 13 hermeneutic principles attributed to R. Yishmael and listed in a Baraita at the beginning of the Sifra (Midrash Halacha on VaYikra)—see ArtScroll Siddur, pp. 50-1:

#8 Anything that was included in a general statement (e.g., Do not do “Melacha”) but then was singled out from the general statement in order to teach something (e.g., Do not do ploughing, harvesting, igniting), was not singled out to only teach about itself, but to apply its teaching to the entire generality (e.g., you don’t have to transgress all 39 categories in order to first be considered in violation of the prohibition against doing “Melacha”, but rather transgressing even one of them alone is sufficient).

Since the Baraita refers to a single element that is listed separately from the rule, ambiguity is created when there are multiple exceptions as in our case (the Tora lists not only igniting, but also ploughing and harvesting). Are the several exceptions to be deemed a rule unto themselves, or can they also serve to define the general rule. While a verse that lists two exceptions (ploughing and harvesting) may have to be considered a separate rule, dividing “Melacha” into two groups of 37 and 2, this is more difficult to say in the case of a single exception, as in the case of igniting. Furthermore, there are some who wish to claim that the “ploughing and harvesting” mentioned in Shemot 34:21 is in fact referring to activities prohibited during the Sabbatical Year as opposed to an individual Shabbat, thereby resulting in “igniting” being the only case of “Melechet Shabbat” that is separated from the general rule of not doing “Melacha” and thereby fitting better into R. Yishmael’s hermeneutic rule.

^[13]This is in contradistinction to the verse containing the examples of ploughing and harvesting, where Shemot 34:21 stands alone, and is clearly not a continuation of what immediately precedes it–

Shemot 34:20

And a first-born donkey you will redeem with a sheep. And if you do not redeem it, and you will break its neck. Every first-born son you will redeem. And you will not appear before My Face (i.e., come to Jerusalem for a pilgrimage Festival–Pesach, Shavuot and/or Sukkot) empty-handed (i.e., without bringing the appropriate Festival sacrifices).

[14] Material dating from the period of the Mishna, but which was not included in R. Yehuda HaNasi’s compendium. Hence, “Bar-aita”, i.e., “Bar” = outside, i.e., statements that were left out, that remained on the “outside”.

[15] In this instance, not only is the esoteric homiletic approach of “Gematria” (calculating the numerical value of letters) being utilized, but the value of “Heh” is patently misrepresented. Starting from the beginning of the alphabet: “Alef” = 1; “Bet” = 2; “Gimel” =3; “Daled” = 4; “Heh” = 5; “Vav” = 6; “Zayin” = 7; “Chet” = 8!  However, looking upon the shapes of these two letters respectively, the “Heh” ה, and the “Chet” ח, one can understand why the letters would be interchanged when there is some lesson to be drawn, as apparently in this case. The physical difference between the two letters is a small line connecting the lower half of the left-hand leg of the “Heh” to the top horizontal line. ShLaH HaKodesh (Shemot, Parshat Bo, Derech Chayim, Tochechot Mussar) utilizes this comparison in a most topical context to this time of year:

Commentators have already gone on at length regarding the symbolism of “Chametz” and “Matza” that they correspond to the two inclinations in man. “Chametz” is the despised
”fermenter” and leavening is a reference to the “leavening in the dough”, i.e., the evil inclination that leads to arrogance and sin. The body of man is like dough in which is mixed flour and water. Man is made of a comparable mixture like this, and the evil inclination causes the dough to “rise”. “Matza” reflects the influence of the good inclination that causes man to be subservient and humble and prevents him from “rising to the top” which is the quality of “Matza”. He is then subservient to his Creator and does not come to sin. This is a manifestation of (Tehillim 34:15) “Turn from evil and do good.” And the difference between the letters comprising “Chametz” and those making up “Matza” is only the closure (connecting the leg of the “Heh” to the roof of the letter, thereby turning it into a “Chet”). This hints at the comments in Menachot 29b—“Why is the leg of the ‘Heh’ disconnected? This hints at the penitent reentering the world from the side (through the space between the leg and the roof). And they ask, “Why does he not reenter from the bottom (i.e., the Talmud projects the image that the individual who sins falls out of the world and therefore plunged through the open space at the bottom of the “Heh” symbolizing the world of order and Mitzva compliance)?” The Talmud answers, “Such an opportunity would not arise; no Divine Assistance would be provided (i.e., the assumption is that in order to repent, one must take a more arduous path than what led to sinning in the first place. And while the desire to repent will precipitate God’s Help, nevertheless the journey will be a challenging one).” Consequently in “Matza” there is a “Heh” that represents repentance; in “Chametz” there is a “Chet” that is sealed from above (if the individual is unrepentant, there is no path by which he can “rejoin” the world).

Interpretations regarding the various shapes of the Hebrew alphabet also appear in Shabbat 104a. 

Tora Temima on Shemot 20:12 #82 suggests, however, that the interchanging of these letters for homiletical purposes has more to do with the portion of the mouth by which they are pronounced, rather than the shape of the letters. The commentator proceeds to list numerous instances where such an interpretation is made, demonstrating that this is a common Midrashic “move”: Yerushalmi Peah 1:5; Berachot 30b; Ibid. 35a; Shabbat 32b; Ibid. 55b; etc. See also fn. 12 regarding alternate interpretations for Shemot 34:21.

[16] Whereas the Derasha in the Bavli whereby the Gematria of “Eileh” is combined with inferences drawn from “HaDevarim” appears to remain within the boundaries of homiletic and hermeneutic interpretation, the calculation of a “Chet” in place of a “Heh” would appear to beg credulity to a greater extent. Even the citations supplied in Tora Temima that are listed in fn. 15, do not take the “Gematria” of “Chet” and replace that of “Heh”, but rather involve word plays whereby a word spelled with a “Heh” is read as if there was a “Chet” in the text. When Tora Temima mentions that “Heh” and “Chet” are pronounced from the same region in the mouth, it seems to me that this would account for a “Derasha” of interpretation rather than one of calculation. In fact, the entire issue of whether there are in actuality 39 chief categories of “Melacha” seems to me to be somewhat of an artifact in light of the extreme overlap with regard to “Melachot” dealing with selecting. It would appear that among the 39 “Melachot” listed in Shabbat 7:2 (see fn. 7), 6) winnowing, 7) separating and 9) sifting all achieve the same purpose with only slight differences in methodology. So it could have been legitimately maintained that there are only 37. Furthermore, there is a controversy with respect to igniting as to whether it is a full-fledged “Melacha” resulting in “Karet” (ritual excision) for its violator, or whether it constitutes no more than a “Lav” or “Lo Ta’aseh” (negative prohibition) maximally punishable by lashes. If it is not a full-fledged “Melacha”, then perhaps it should not be included in the group, leaving us with only 36 “Melachot”, etc. it appears that the Oral Tradition saw something special about the number 39 (see fn. 17) and therefore made sure that there would be 39 elements in the list, as well as “Derashot” based on Biblical text that would support such a number of “Melachot”.

[17] The curious manner in which the number 39 is represented in the Talmud, i.e., 1 less than 40, paraphrases the language in Mishna Shabbat 7:2 “The chief categories of ‘Melacha’ are 40 minus 1…” Commentators suggest that referring to the number 39 in this manner parallels an interpretation of Devarim 25:3 “He shall be struck 40 times, not a single time will be added…” that appears in Mishna Makkot 3:10 “How many times is he struck? 40 minus 1, as it says, ’40 times’—a number that is close to/approaches 40…” Among the explanations that Tora Temima on Devarim 25:3 offers for the Mishna’s interpretation of the verse is that since in the previous verse, 25:2, the phrase “in accordance with his evil” appears, the Tora is suggesting that each case of corporeal punishment is to be evaluated separately, taking into consideration the physical ability of the convicted criminal to withstand the beating as well as other factors. Consequently, 40 lashes is the outer limit, and the maximum should therefore be up to 40, which allows for the possibility that some individuals will receive considerably less than even 39. Consequently, while referring to 39 as 40 minus one does not have intrinsic significance for the laws of Shabbat, it is another way in which the Oral Tradition can reinforce the principle of the upper limit of the number of lashes that can be administered to someone found guilty by the court of violating certain Tora laws.

[18] Unfortunately, there are more than 39 times that “Melacha” is used in the Tora, 62 by my best count. If we eliminate references to non-Shabbat contexts (e.g., Yosef coming in to do his “Melacha” in Beraishit 33:14; references within the context of ritual impurity in VaYikra 7:24; 11:32; 13:48, 51; and discussions of the various Pilgrimage Festivals, Rosh HaShana and Yom HaKippurim, we can arrive at 40 instances. Since the Talmud presents the idea as “40 -1” times that “Melacha” is written in the Tora, “Midrashic license” could be invoked to justify this interpretation. 

Beraishit    2:2 (2X), 3.

Shemot     12:16; 20:8, 9; 22:7, 10; 31:3, 14, 15 (2x); 35:2 (2x), 21, 24, 29, 31, 33, 35 (2x); 36:1-3, 4 (2x), 5-6, 7 (2x), 8; 38:24 (2x); 39:43; 40:33.

VaYikra     23:3 (2x).

Devarim    5:12-13.

[19] With respect to “Melacha”, the verses from the list in fn. 16 that would be relevant are: 31:3, 14, 15 (2x); 35:2 (2x), 21, 24, 29, 31, 33, 35 (2x); 36:1-3, 4 (2x), 5-6, 7 (2x), 8; 38:24 (2x); 39:43; 40:33, all told 27.  Consequently 12 instances of “Avoda” would have to be added to complete the requisite 39. In fact 13 references are extent, once again resulting in 40 from which 1 has to be subtracted:

Shemot     27:19; 30:16; 32:13; 34:21; 35:21, 24; 36:1, 3, 5, 38:21; 39:32, 40, 42.

[20] Although the Tora first mentions the Tabernacle in Parshat Teruma, Shemot 25, many commentators assume that the Tora’s presentation of these events is not in chronological order. Here is one example of such an approach.

RaShI on Shemot 35:1 “And Moshe gathered”

This takes place the day after Yom HaKippurim when Moshe came down from the mountain…

(It is assumed that Moshe finally rejoins the Jewish people on Yom HaKippurim after 3 40 day periods on Sinai and presents them with a new set of Tablets, replacing those he smashed in Shemot 32 on Shiva Asar B’Tammuz. Consequently RaShI writes on Shemot 34:29 “And it was when Moshe descended”—“When he brought the last Tablets on Yom HaKippurim.” Commentators who agree with the assumptions articulated by RaShI therefore conclude that the Mishkan concept was first shared with the Jewish people only at this point, after they had been granted forgiveness for the sin of the Golden Calf, despite its earlier references in Parshiot Teruma and Tetzave prior to the sin. Although Shabbat does not appear in connection to the original descriptions of the Tabernacle that is to be built, its mention now by Moshe prior to the beginning of the actual construction is deemed of particular significance.)

The latter portion of the book of Shemot is almost entirely devoted to aspects of the construction of the Tabernacle as well as the fabrication of the clothing of the priests who are to enact the Divine Service within it. RaMBaN on 31:2 lists three compelling reasons why the ability of the people in general, and that of Betzalel, the orchestrator of the entire project, in particular, to be able to manufacture the various articles mandated by God, should be considered as nothing short of miraculous:

a) The occupations of the Jews in Egypt exclusively involved heavy manual labor.[1]  Yet the skills needed for constructing the Tabernacle and the priestly garments involved high levels of skilled artisanship, including delicate carpentry,[2] casting, sculpting, and constructing various implements out of both precious[3] and ordinary metals,[4] preparing and incorporating various jewels into articles of clothing,[5] weaving patterned cloth from wool, cotton and linen,[6] dying these cloths various colors,[7]   and working with furs and leather.[8] Where and when did anyone among the Jewish people have the opportunity to learn and perfect these various skills, given that they had been enslaved for 210 years[9] before being redeemed?

b) Furthermore, 31:4, 5; 35:31-33 do not allow us to assume that different individuals served as the master craftspeople for each of these areas of skill. The Tora insists that at least Betzalel, if not also Ohaliav, was astute in ALL of the plastic arts required to transform the Mishkan from a Divine Command into a material reality. How could a single individual be such an extraordinary “Renaissance man”? Betzalel seems to have had neither predecessor, nor anyone after him who has replicated such a collection of talents.

c) The commentator adds that even were we to assume that these skills had been known to the Jews prior to their enslavement by the Egyptians, once people engage in the type of manual labor described in the Tora as being assigned to the Jews, hands ordinarily thicken to the point where the requisite dexterity necessary to execute these fine motor skills disappears, and the work becomes impossible to be carried out. So who were the individuals that in the end fabricated the various parts of the Mishkan according to the guidelines set out by Betzalel and Ohaliav?

The artisans came from all of the tribes.

According to the Rabbinic tradition that the tribe of Levi was not required by the Egyptians to work throughout the Jewish servitude,[10] in deference to their priestly and scholarly status, it might have been understandable if the artisans for the Tabernacle came exclusively from the Levites. However, the Tora specifically states that Betzalel derives from the tribe of Yehuda (31:2; 35:30; 38:22), Ohaliav, his assistant comes from Dan (31:6; 38:23), and everyone else engaging in making the various implements and clothing are not designated as belonging to any specific tribe (31:6; 35:10; 36:1,2,4,8), suggesting that they at least could have come from any and all of them.

The artisans were not gender-specific.

Another possibility to attempt to account for at least RaMBaN’s questions a) and c), would be to posit that Jewish women, who most likely were excused from the brutal physical labor expected of the men,[11] became, by default, the artisans of the Tabernacle. But when we note that women are specifically mentioned as the weavers and furriers (35:25-26), it would seem to imply that those who worked with wood, metal, and jewels were men.

The artisans were drawn from the Jewish people rather than the Eiruv Rav.

A final possibility might be that the artisans originated from the “Eiruv Rav” (the mixed multitude) who accompanied the Jews out of Egypt.[12] While on the one hand, we see that at least some of them were capable of working with gold when it came to manufacturing the infamous Golden Calf,[13]  and that Shlomo certainly relied on non-Jews in order to construct the Beit HaMikdash,[14] wouldn’t one have expected the Biblical text to be more forthright in noting such a reality, rather than shrouding the issue in ambiguity? Can and should a distinction be drawn between the Jewishness of the individuals required for fabricating the Mishkan, as opposed to the Temple? But it must be noted that in this regard, as opposed to the hypotheses concerning whether those working on the Tabernacle were Levites or women, the involvement of members of the Eiruv Rav is not something that can be obviously refuted using Biblical references.

The biblical text attributes to the artisans a  type of “Ruach HaKodesh”.

 A manner in which the RaMBaN’s queries can be directly addressed from a “Peshat” (literal rather than homiletical) approach, becomes apparent when we pay careful attention to the Tora’s oft-repeated assertion that the individuals who built the Mishkan were literally Divinely endowed with “Ruach Elokim” (the Spirit of God), (31:3; 35:31) and/or “Chachma” (wisdom) or alternatively “Chachmat Lev” (wisdom of the heart) (28:3; 31:6; 35:26, 35; 36:1,2). Consequently, the manufacture of the Mishkan and the priestly garments can be attributed to a partnership between God and humanity not only in terms of man fulfilling a series of Divine Commandments, but God enabling individuals to be able to physically perform the actions that such artisanship requires, which otherwise, under normal circumstances they would be incapable. The talents of these people could be understood as a particular form of prophecy—R. Adin Steinsaltz[15] has suggested that Shimshon’s feats of strength were a form of physical prophecy—Shimshon’s actions certainly speaking as loudly if not louder than the words of many others, including legitimate prophets—and therefore the fashioners of the Mishkan would qualify as “artistic prophets.”

Viewing artists as “possessed”.

Artistic activity on the part of humanity has always been cause for wonder and speculation. The ability to create as well as carry out and perform works of classical beauty in the realms of art, music, dance, literature, and design have fascinated thinkers throughout history. What allows particular individuals to stand head and shoulders above others who have striven to produce similar works of beauty? Can such talents that appear to be manifestations of a certain genius, be understood to nevertheless be entirely a function of a mortal sensibility and ability? Is there anything supernatural, theologically significant about these aspects of ostensibly human endeavor and accomplishment?

Such a question is particularly striking when one recognizes that the arts have not only been harnessed for ethereal, spiritually inspiring endeavors. They have also been used to create repulsive, immoral, shocking contributions to culture and civilization. If “Ruach Elokim” and Divine “Chachma” are the means by which the Mishkan was constructed, what is to be said for the talents that allow human beings to produce art that is idolatrous, licentiousness, and deeply offensive? The first reference to music in the Tora is the innovation of Yuval ben Lamech, who is described as (Beraishit 4:21) “the father of all that handle the lyre and the flute,” and whom RaShI immediately accuses of applying his artistic talents to idolatry. Is the ability to produce art therefore an inherently neutral human quality, much as is intelligence, strength, courage, diligence, etc., and it is a function of free choice when one decides to create something holy or profane, or does the artistic endeavor, at least from time to time, benefit from a unique “Siyata D’Shmaya” (Assistance from Heaven), as apparently it does in the case of the Tabernacle, where the product of the art transcends normal artistic activity, and even the fabricator/artisan is transformed, at least temporarily,[16] into a type of “Keli B’Yad HaShem” (an instrument in the Hand of God)?[17]    

Human abilities of all types as Divine Endowment.

While the “intelligences”[18] of Shlomo and Betzalel are clearly extraordinary, Jewish liturgy calls upon us to recognize that all talents and abilities that we have, be they intellectual, artistic, organizational, culinary, etc., should be attributed to God, rather than to ourselves. In the first blessing of the middle portion of the weekday Silent Devotion, when we request that God enhance our intellectual capacities, we recite, “You (God) Have Graced man with knowledge and Have Taught the human being understanding. Please Continue to Grace us from Yourself with knowledge, understanding and intellectual ability. Blessed are You, Who Graces with knowledge.”[19] In this sense, it would appear that Betzalel possessed a better perspective regarding the origins of his abilities, than did Shlomo. Whereas Shlomo is criticized by the Rabbis for circumventing Tora commandments due to his sense that someone of his intelligence could decide when a particular Mitzva applies or doesn’t apply—see Sanhedrin 21b—Betzalel’s very name connotes “one who is in the shadow of God,” which according to Berachot 55a indicated that he anticipated God’s Will in the matters of the Mishkan even before being informed of It. And rather than therefore trying to supersede the Divine Directives, as Shlomo did, Betzalel felt fulfilled by deliberately and accurately carrying out the Commandments. Perhaps this is why we no longer hear of Betzalel once his tasks were completed. He did not overreach his potentials and abilities, but rather stayed within the realms for which he had been specially fortified, enabled, and particularly well-suited.  In Avot 4:1, Ben Zoma comments that the truly happy individual is the person who is “Sameach BeChelko”, who is happy with his/her lot. It is worthy to note that this may not only apply to one’s material possessions, but to one’s abilities and talents as well, and Betzalel may have been a case in point.

How should one approach a particular talent with which one discovers that s/he is endowed?

Finally, one wonders what one’s responsibilities are once one discovers that he possesses some sort of extraordinary talent, if we were to regard that talent as truly “God-Given”. Is it one’s responsibility to develop that talent even if he does not want to—perhaps he is not prepared to put in the time and effort particularly if there are other pursuits in which he has greater interest and a sense of fulfillment—since this would otherwise constitute “Bal Tashchit” (the Tora value not to let one’s possessions go to waste)—see e.g., Shabbat 140b. Just as a prophet is not supposed to suppress his prophecy,[20] if artistic talent is just a different form of prophecy, then is it appropriate to suppress or at least not develop it? What do you think?

[2] E.g., 25:10, 13.

[3] E.g., 25:11-13, 17-20.

[4] E.g., 26:1, 11; 27:2, 3.

[5] E.g., 28:9, 17-20.

[6] E.g., 28:6.

[7] E.g., 26:31.

[8] E.g., 26:7, 14.

[9] See RaShI on Beraishit 42:2.

[10] See Shemot Rabba 5:20; RaShI and RaMBaN on Shemot 5:4.

[11] According to Shemot Rabba 1:12, the women were tasked to take water and food to the men working in the fields.

[12] Shemot 12:38; BaMidbar 11:4.

[13] Melachim I 7:13-14. Did Chiram, the individual who was Betzalel’s counterpart in the building of the First Temple, have two Jewish parents? The description of his father is open to question. 5:15 implies that the other workers on the project were most probably not Jewish.

[14] RaShI on Shemot 32:4.

[15] Biblical Images: Men and Women of the Book, Basic Books, New York, 1984, pp. 111-12.

[16] It is interesting to consider why these talented people disappear—at least we are not told about them in the biblical text—once the Mishkan is completed. Did God Remove His Divine Inspiration from these individuals so that they no longer were capable of making additional creative contributions to the Jewish people?  Ironically, Chur, Bezalel’s father, also disappears from view, after being listed as someone comparable to Aharon—see 17:10 and 24:14, as well as Sanhedrin 7a.

[17] In the same manner that God uses Pharoah, Sancheirev, and Nevuchadnezar to further His Grand Plan for humanity in general and the Jewish people in particular, could the same be said about artisans like Betzalel and Chiram? And when HaShem specifically Endows Shlomo with Chachma—see Melachim I 2:12; 5:9—to what extent does the king retain his free choice as opposed to thinking that those choices were taken away, or at least somewhat modified, by his supernatural gift? Why don’t we view the three books traditionally attributed to Shlomo, Shir HaShirim, Mishlei and Kohelet, as Divine Artistic creations rather than controversial works, two out of three of which were almost excluded from the biblical canon?

[18] Howard Gardner has developed an approach to education that posits that multiple intelligences can be detected among various people. These intelligences include: linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal. (See Multiple Intelligences: The Theory in Practice, Basic Books, New York, 1993). Consequently, the kind of intelligence that Shlomo may have had would be fundamentally different from that of Betzalel. But it is a difference in kind, not in degree.

[19]The same idea is manifest in the blessings recited upon encountering brilliant Jews and non-Jews:

Blessing upon seeing a Tora scholar:

Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has Shared of His Wisdom with those who revere Him.

                Blessing upon seeing an outstanding secular scholar:

Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has Given of His Wisdom to flesh and blood.

One wonders why upon encountering genius in other areas, e.g., culinary accomplishment, the arts, athletics, etc. comparable blessings are not required. If Tora scholars were the only group that qualified for such a religious response, it would be understandable that our amazement is limited to those whose extraordinary abilities are devoted to pursuing an understanding of God’s Revelation and the tradition that is based upon it. But once this is expanded to non-Tora pursuits, why should cognitive human excellence be the only area in which we acknowledge God’s Influence? Someone who acknowledged this type of Divine Excellence in man, although without necessarily reciting a blessing was R. Kook:

When I lived in London, I would visit the National Gallery, and the paintings that I loved the most were those of Rembrandt. In my opinion, Rembrandt was a saint. When I first saw Rembrandt’s paintings, they reminded me of the rabbinic statement about the creation of light. When G-d created the light, it was so strong and luminous that it was possible to see from one end of the world to the other. And G-d feared that the wicked would make use of it. What did He do? He secreted it for the righteous in the world to come. But from time to time, there are great men whom G-d blesses with a vision of the hidden light. I believe Rembrandt was one of them, and the light of his paintings is that light which G-d created on Genesis day.– Interview, Jewish Chronicle, 9 September 1935

http://www.orot.com/art.html

[20] See Sanhedrin 89a. Yona is the example cited by the Gemora of such a prophet.

According to Rabbinic tradition, the Purim festival marks not only an historical occasion when Jews overcame anti-Semitism[1] and assimilation[2] and asserted their religious and cultural identities,[3] but it also constitutes a manifestation of the eternal struggle between the paradigmatic forces of Yaakov and Eisav. The tug-of-war for spiritual and physical superiority between these key Biblical personalities begins according to the Rabbis in utero (!)  (Beraishit 25:22-23),[4] underlies the “selling” of the birthright (25:29-34),[5] and comes to a head with the misappropriation of a father’s blessing (27:1 ff.).[6]  The competition and outright enmity between Yitzchak and Rivka’s children is understood to persist not only throughout the fraternal twins’ own lifetimes,[7] but well into the future, with their spiritual descendants continuing the struggle down through the ages.[8]

Purim practices as a fulfillment of the Mitzva to obliterate the memory of Amalek.

                Haman, at least figuratively, if not literally,[9]  is assumed to be the descendent of Amalek, who in turn is the progeny of Eisav/Edom (Beraishit 37:1, 12). Therefore by the Jewish people, i.e., Bnai YAAKOV, publicly reading Megillat Esther on Purim, we might not only be fulfilling the general religious principle of Pirsumei Nisa (publicizing Divine miracles) which equally would apply to activities like recounting the details of the Exodus on the first nights of Pesach,[10] lighting the Chanukia on Chanuka,[11] and sitting in the Sukka on Sukkot,[12] but also, at least by inference, the more specific requirement of our need to paradoxically[13] remember Amalek in order to obliterate both his treachery as well as his opposition to HaShem’s Ascendency in the world—see Shemot 17:16.

Fulfilling the Commandment to destroy the memory of Amalek verbally outside the context of Purim.

                However, since the connection between Haman and Amalek is implied rather than clearly stated in the biblical text, no one suggests that reading the Megilla on Purim, which according to Megilla 18a is mandated by the verse in Esther 9:28,[14] is the sufficient means by which to fulfill the obligation of remembering  Amalek, the Mitzva stated in Devarim 25:17. When the Tora instructs us “Zachor Et Asher Asah Lecha Amalek” (Remember what Amalek did to you), interpreters of the Bible try to define how to specifically comply with the Tora’s admonition. The most widely accepted view has led to Jewish tradition institutionalizing the incorporation of the reading of this commandment on the Shabbat preceding the Purim festival.[15]  In his essay on the four special Tora readings that lead up to the Pesach holiday, Shekalim,[16] Zachor, Para,[17] and HaChodesh,[18] R. Shlomo Zevin[19] notes that once the Midrash Halacha, Sifra, on VaYikra 26:3, as well as Megilla 18a, categorically state that the “remembering” that is being commanded in the Tora is a verbal, rather than an exclusively mental activity, some sort of reading or recitation is required. While the listing in the Weekday prayer book immediately after the Shacharit services[20] of six Biblical passages which call upon Jews to remember seminal events during their formative history—1) Devarim 16:3 the Exodus from Egypt;[21] 2) Ibid. 4:9-10 receiving the Tora at Sinai;[22] 3) Ibid. 25:17-19 Amalek’s treachery and brutality;[23] 4) Ibid. 9:7 the sin of the Golden Calf;[24] 5) Ibid. 24:9 Miriam’s speaking badly of Moshe;[25] 6) Shemot 20:8 the holiness of Shabbat[26]—suggest that such remembering should take place at least once daily, additional emphasis has been placed upon remembering Amalek to the point that a special Tora reading is dedicated to this purpose on the Shabbat immediately preceding Purim.

Study as a form of remembering.

                Yet, not all agree that the means by which to fulfill the commandment of Zachor is by reading a special Maftir (additional Tora portion at the end of the regular Parshat HaShavua) in the synagogue. A particularly intriguing view summarized by R. Zevin, is that of RA’aVaD and HaRaSh MiShantz, who in their commentaries to Sifra, state that Zachor is fulfilled by the STUDY of the laws of Megillat Esther and Purim,[27] rather than by reading the Tora passage describing the battle with Amalek, or for that matter, only the contents of the Megilla itself, which can be understood to portray yet another Amalekite attack against the Jews. Their view is reminiscent of the Haggada’s instructions regarding how to respond to the Wise Son, who after asking a rather sophisticated, philosophical question,[28]  is told to go study the laws of Pesach, concluding with how one is not supposed to eat anything at the Seder after the consumption of the Paschal sacrifice.  

                Keeping in mind that many differences can be pointed out between the Purim and Pesach holidays,[29] it is curious to note how the interpretations of the commentators on the Sifra as well as the composers of the Pesach Haggada, suggest that Tora study rather than a recitation of a Biblical text, ought to be the response to the historical events that we are commemorating during these two festivals of redemption.[30]  In both instances, in Egypt as well as in Persia, the Jewish people faced an enemy who was bent upon genocide. And in both cases, the Jews were saved from the plots that were designed to destroy them.  Perhaps it should be inferred from these two independent calls to engage in Tora study, that to simply read an account of historical events, to reenact them, or even engage in philosophical speculation as to the meaning of various rituals and practices associated with them, do not fully capture the implications of these events for long-term Jewish survival. Even if we were saved from some dire fate in the distant past, it is appropriate to assume that the redemption experienced by our ancestors is either legitimized or delegitimized on the basis of how we are living our lives today.  Whereas remembering and reading historical accounts focus primarily upon the past, learning and fulfilling Halachic commandments and traditions are very much functions of present and future, reflecting our realization that if we have survived the attacks of Pharoah and Amalek, it was in order to live lives committed to Tora and Mitzvot. [31] [32]  To the extent that attacks against the Jewish people are also attacks against HaShem Who has thrown in His lot with us, our overcoming these threats are justified if our commitment to Halacha, namely the Ways of HaShem, is similarly reconfirmed both theoretically and in practice. If anything, Shabbat 88a suggests that based upon Esther 9:27, the Jews may have become committed to Tora and Mitzvot even more deeply after their redemption in Persia, than when they stated, (Shemot 24:7) “Na’aseh VeNishma” (We will do and we will hear) at Sinai.  

Conclusion.

Even as we listen carefully to the Tora reading on Shabbat Zachor, let us also make sure that serious and devoted Tora study is also part and parcel of our living refutation of the Amalek’s of the past, present and future.

[2] Megilla 12a faults the Jews for participating in Achashveirosh’s party either in terms of consuming food and drink or engaging in idolatry. Such actions would certainly represent the degree to which they had become integrated into Persian society. The fact that Esther was able to hide her ethnic identity merely by withholding the information when asked, also suggests that there were no outward indications that she was Jewish. In contrast to such activities, Mordechai’s public refusal to bow to Haman (Esther 3:2) stood out as a statement of an unyielding Jewish identity to the degree that it reputedly led—perhaps Haman was looking for an excuse to exterminate the Jews—to  Haman’s campaign to make the empire “Judenrein.” 

[3] A powerful statement is made in the Talmud to the effect that the experience in Persia led the Jews to confirm their religious commitments more wholeheartedly than what had transpired at Mt. Sinai:

Shabbat 88a

“And they stood under the mount:” R. Abdimi b. Hama b. Hasa said: This teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, Overturned the mountain upon them like an [inverted] cask, and Said to them,’If ye accept the Torah, ’tis well; if not, there shall be your burial.’

R. Aha b. Jacob observed: This furnishes a strong protest against the Torah (since those who are in violation could claim that it had never been willingly accepted, but rather under duress, and “Ones, Rachmana Patrei [actions undertaken under duress, the individual is considered exempt from the Judgment of Heaven]).

Said Raba, Yet even so, they re-accepted it in the days of Ahasuerus, for it is written, (Esther 9:27) “[The Jews] confirmed, and took upon them [etc.]:” [i.e.,] they confirmed what they had accepted long before.

[4] “And the children struggled together within her; and she said: ‘If it be so, wherefore do I live?’ And she went to inquire of the LORD. And the LORD Said unto her: Two nations are in thy womb, and two peoples shall be separated from thy bowels; and the one people shall be stronger than the other people; and the elder shall serve the younger.” 

RaShI on Beraishit 25:22.

 …And our Rabbis interpreted the text “ויתרוצצו” based upon the root “running”. When she (Rivka) would pass the doorway of the Yeshiva of Shem and Ever, Yaakov would run and try to come out; when she would pass the doorway of idolatry, Eisav would try to come out.

Another interpretation: They were fighting with one another and struggling regarding the inheritances of This World and the World To Come.  

[5] “And Jacob sod pottage; and Esau came in from the field, and he was faint. And Esau said to Jacob: ‘Let me swallow, I pray thee, some of this red, red pottage; for I am faint.’ Therefore was his name called Edom. And Jacob said: ‘Sell me first thy birthright.’ And Esau said: ‘Behold, I am at the point to die; and what profit shall the birthright do to me?’ And Jacob said: ‘Swear to me first’; and he swore unto him; and he sold his birthright unto Jacob. And Jacob gave Esau bread and pottage of lentils; and he did eat and drink, and rose up, and went his way. So Esau despised his birthright.”  

[6] While it is difficult to justify Rivka and Yaakov’s plot to obtain what they thought was the special blessing that had originated with Avraham which appeared to them was being given by Yitzchak to Eisav, a close reading of the story reflects how misguided the entire enterprise actually was. Even when Yaakov and Eisav had already received their individual blessings, Yitzchak bestows upon Yaakov a second blessing which clearly appears to be Avraham’s blessing:

Beraishit 28:1-4

And Isaac called Jacob, and blessed him, and charged him, and said unto him: ‘Thou shalt not take a wife of the daughters of Canaan. Arise, go to Paddan-aram, to the house of Bethuel thy mother’s father; and take thee a wife from thence of the daughters of Laban thy mother’s brother. And God Almighty Bless thee, and Make thee fruitful, and Multiply thee, that thou mayest be a congregation of peoples; and give thee the blessing of Abraham, to thee, and to thy seed with thee; that thou mayest inherit the land of thy sojournings, which God Gave unto Abraham.’ 

[7] This is starkly demonstrated in the “cold peace” established between Yaakov and Eisav when they meet after several decades—Beraishit 32:4-33:17.

[8] Such was the prophetic prediction that Rivka received in Beraishit 25:23. The pronouncement has and continues to manifest itself in the struggles between Rome, its contributions to Western civilization on the one hand,  and the state of the Jews and Judaism on the other.  See, for e.g., Avoda Zora 2a-3b.

[9] Nowhere in TaNaCh is Haman’s actual lineage listed. Therefore, in contrast to the original Amalek who is clearly identified as the grandson of Eisav (Beraishit 36:12), to claim that Haman genetically belongs to the Amalekites is a harder case to make. Esther 3:1 records his identity as Haman ben Hamdata HaAggagi. Agag happens to be the name of the Amalekite king (Shmuel I 15:8) who, after Shaul fails to kill him when he defeats the Amalekites, is dispatched by Shmuel (v. 32-33). However, it is not conclusive even from this incident that Aggagi = Amaleki. Nevertheless, the practice to commemorate Amalek’s attack upon the Jews on the Shabbat prior to Purim with the reading of Devarim 25:17-9, as well as the Tora passages that are read on Purim morning prior to the reading of Megillat Esther Shemot 17:8-16 leave little to the imagination regarding at least the spiritual association, if not the actual genealogical connection, made between Amalek and Haman. RaMA on Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, 690:17 associates the practice to drown out mention of Haman as well as writing Haman’s name on the soles of one’s shoes and then rubbing the name out by stamping one’s feet, as possible fulfillments of the commandment to obliterate Amalek’s name in Shemot 17:15.

[10] As evidenced by the final paragraph in the Pesach Hagada before the first portion of Hallel is recited:

 Therefore we are obligated to give thanks and to praise and to extol and to glorify and to raise up and to aggrandize and to beautify and to declare triumphant to He Who Performed for us and our forefathers all of these miracles and Took us out from servitude to freedom, and from subjugation to redemption, and from desolation to happiness, from mourning to celebration, and from darkness to a great light, and we will say before Him, “Hallelu-ka”.

[11] The second blessing that precedes the lighting of the Menora is unambiguous in this regard: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who Performed miracles for our ancestors in those days, at this time. 

[12] VaYikra 23:43 “That your generations may know that I Made the children of Israel to dwell in booths, when I Brought them out of the land of Egypt: I am the LORD your God.”

[13] It is curious that the more direct manner by which to obliterate the memory of Amalek, i.e., simply don’t discuss him in any context, is replaced by reading and remembering the history of Amalek on numerous occasions throughout the year—Parashiot BeShalach, Ki Tetze, I Melachim 15, Parashat Zachor and Purim. To think that making noise during the mention of Haman’s name when it is read as part of Megillat Esther, serves as the only means for fulfilling the Mitzva to obliterate Amalek’s name appears ironic and paradoxical.

[14] “And that these days should be remembered and kept throughout every generation, every family, every province, and every city; and that these days of Purim should not fail from among the Jews, nor the memorial of them perish from their seed.”

[15] See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 685:7. The fact that the Halacha is prefaced by R. Yosef Karo’s qualifying “Yesh Omrim…” (there are those who say…), while not exempting those who punctiliously wish to be in compliance with the Halachic tradition and will take this as a Tora-mandated obligation, nevertheless pointedly indicates that there are other views regarding how to carry out this Mitzva.

[16] Shemot 30:11-16.

[17] BaMidbar 19:1-22.

[18] Shemot 12:1-20.

[19] HaMoadim BeHalacha, Avraham Tzioni, Tel Aviv, 5726, p. 191.

[20] E.g., ArtScroll p. 176.

[21] “Thou shalt eat no leavened bread with it; seven days shalt thou eat unleavened bread therewith, even the bread of affliction; for in haste didst thou come forth out of the land of Egypt; that thou mayest remember the day when thou camest forth out of the land of Egypt all the days of thy life.”

[22] “Only take heed to thyself, and keep thy soul diligently, lest thou forget the things which thine eyes saw, and lest they depart from thy heart all the days of thy life; but make them known unto thy children and thy children’s children; the day that thou stoodest before the LORD thy God in Horeb, when the LORD said unto me: ‘Assemble Me the people, and I will Make them hear My words that they may learn to fear Me all the days that they live upon the earth, and that they may teach their children.’”

[23] “Remember what Amalek did unto thee by the way as ye came forth out of Egypt; how he met thee by the way, and smote the hindmost of thee, all that were enfeebled in thy rear, when thou wast faint and weary; and he feared not God. Therefore it shall be, when the LORD thy God hath Given thee rest from all thine enemies round about, in the land which the LORD thy God Giveth thee for an inheritance to possess it, that thou shalt blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven; thou shalt not forget.”  

[24] “Remember, forget thou not, how thou didst make the LORD thy God Wroth in the wilderness; from the day that thou didst go forth out of the land of Egypt, until ye came unto this place, ye have been rebellious against the LORD. “

[25] “Remember what the LORD thy God Did unto Miriam, by the way as ye came forth out of Egypt.”

[26] “Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.”

[27] In several places in the Talmud, e.g., Megilla 29b, we are instructed to study and discuss the laws of Pesach thirty days before the holiday. An alternate view maintains that two weeks should be devoted to such pursuits. Whether or not Pesach is unique in this regard due to the myriad laws and complications that are associated with it, a parallel to the idea that time should be spent studying the Tora associated with Purim in the interests of reflecting upon, among other things, the wiping out of Amalek.

[28] Devarim 6:20 “…What are these testimonies and statutes and laws that the Lord our God Has Commanded You?” generally understood to be a request for being told the “Ta’amei HaMitzvot” (the reasons for the commandments) of at least the practices being carried out at the Pesach Seder, if not a more far-reaching discussion of Mitzvot in general that has been precipitated by the rituals of the Seder.

[29]               Pesach                                                                  Purim

          1)     MiD’Orayta                                                         MiD’Rabbanan.

          2)     God explicitly, involved in Chumash.             God not mentioned in Megillat Esther.

          3)     Issur Melacha on Yom Tov.                              No Issur Melacha.

                                4)     Overt miracles.                                                            Hidden miracles.

                                5)     Mitzvot Sippur Yetziat Mitzrayim, Matza,                Mishloach Manot, Matanot

         Avoiding Maror, Arba Kosot.                                    LeEvyonim, Kriyat HaMegilla.

6)     Dressing up at Seder as if ready to leave.              Costumes.

7)     Relatively limited groups at the Seder.                   BeRov Am Hadrat Melech. 

                                Etc.           

[30] The common theme of redemption that is shared by Purim and Pesach is reflected in the Talmudic discussion concerning when a leap year occurs and there are two Adar’s in which one is Purim to be observed, i.e., the 14^th of Adar Rishon or the 14^th of Adar Sheini? Megilla 6b succinctly answers “Mesamech Geula LeGeula Adif” (juxtaposing one redemption [Purim] next to another one [Pesach] is to be preferred).

[31] See, e.g., commentaries on Shemot 13:8, particularly RaShI’s interpretation. 

[32] This concept is sharply symbolized by God’s Response to Moshe upon being asked for a sign that the Exodus will succeed. In Shemot 3:12, Moshe is told by God, “…And this will be to you the sign that I Have Sent you: when you take the people out of Egypt, you will serve God on this mountain.” Tradition claims that the site of the burning bush where Moshe received the prophecy to engage in the redemption was Mt. Sinai—see RaShI—upon  which the Jews will eventually receive the Tora. Consequently, the indication that the Exodus is meaningful is the ultimate receiving and consequent fulfillment of Tora directives and values.