The final total demoralization of the Jewish people during their enslavement in Egypt is reflected in Shemot 6:9.

And Moshe spoke in just this way (he related all that HaShem had Instructed him to say[1] to the children of Israel, and they did not listen to Moshe because of “Kotzer Ruach” (shortness of breath/spirit) and “Avoda Kasha” (difficult work).

The people’s disinterest or perhaps even inability to take heart from Moshe’s relaying HaShem’s message this second time appears to be in stark contrast to their original reception of God’s Word, as conveyed by Moshe and Aharon in 4:31.

And the people believed, and they heard that HaShem had Remembered the children of Israel, and that He had Seen their affliction, and they bowed down and prostrated themselves.

It would appear that Moshe’s assumption that the people would ultimately believe neither in him nor in the Word of God—see4:1[2]—if not immediately borne out in Parshat Shemot, is eventually confirmed in Parshat VaEra.

Factors contributing to the people’s not paying attention to Moshe the second time around.

                Yet, the Tora does supply mitigating circumstances—“Kotzer Ruach” and “Avoda Kasha”—that account for this relatively quick reversal on the part of the people,  when they go from viewing their immediate futures in optimistic terms to despairing of all remedies for their dire plight. Reading the Tora in a straightforward manner, however intensely the Jews may have been laboring prior to Moshe’s arrival, the “hard, breaking work”[3] becomes even more acute as a result of Pharoah’s negative response to the request to allow the Jews to travel for three days in order to worship HaShem in the desert. Shemot 5:7-9 describes the new demands that will be made of the Jewish slaves in order to combat their apparent “laziness” (5:8, 17), i.e., while their production quotas will remain unchanged, they will from this point on have to also obtain the raw materials by which to fabricate the bricks that they are commanded to make. Consequently, if they had little spare time for themselves prior to Moshe’s arrival, their lives now become even more desperate. They not only figuratively, but even literally have no time to listen to anything that will cause them to lose focus from their onerous tasks at hand. They tell Moshe and Aharon (5:21) that as a result of the ill-fated negotiation with Pharoah, the Egyptians, by means of the intensified work requirement, now have a better pretext than ever to beat Jewish slaves to death for failure to meet production expectations. Consequently, if all things had remained “equal” the people would have continued to believe in HaShem’s Promises of Redemption, contrary to Moshe’s expressed cynicism; however, either because they were literally too exhausted to stop and listen to Moshe and Aharon’s words a second time, or they realized that should additional attempts be made to try to convince Pharoah to allow them to leave Egypt even for a short time, their situation might deteriorate even further, if they valued their own lives and the lives of their families, they simply couldn’t afford  to take these Divine Promises seriously. Consequently, rather than criticizing the Jews for displaying a lack of belief, the Jewish people could be viewed more charitably at this point as being under extreme duress,[4] with at least a figurative “gun being held to their respective heads” by the Egyptian ruler. Midrash HaGadol[5]  applies to the verse describing the Jews’ unwillingness to take seriously that God was Prepared to finally redeem them, the statement, “MiKan Ein Adam Nitfas Al Tza’aro” (from here it can be concluded that an individual should not be held accountable for what s/he does or says while experiencing severe trauma).[6]

Not having time to reflect prevented the people from taking Moshe’s second appearance seriously. 

                A more psychologically subtle approach to the people’s inability to listen to Moshe the second time that he comes to them, is offered by RaMBaN and Sephorno. RaMBaN writes that as a result of the constant pressure applied by the Egyptian taskmasters, “Lo Yitnum LiShmoa Davar VeLaCheshov Bo” (they would not permit them to hear a matter and think about it.) Sephorno feels that they would not only have paid attention to Moshe’s message had the work not been as difficult, but they would have been able to reflect upon it, understand it and accept its implications. Consequently, what is at issue is not whether Moshe was perfunctorily “listened to” by the people, but rather was he “heard”, i.e., was there opportunity, interest and even energy to take his words to heart, to analyze them, to ask questions in order to achieve clarity with regard to what was being proposed. Particularly concerning matters of belief and faith, as well as what lies in store for a people that has been long oppressed, hearts and minds will not be altered by a brief oral presentation in the midst of an intolerable workload and fear for one’s life. Whereas they were ready the first time that Moshe came to take seriously and deeply believe the possibility that the time for Redemption has arrived, when the process not only failed to begin, but was perceived as retrogressing, with even worse conditions being imposed upon the Jews, they decided that there was no point in thinking about these promises any further. In order to have faith, the believer needs to have confidence in his leaders as well as in God Himself; when their hopes were raised, only to have them resoundingly shattered, the Jews were reluctant to trust and believe again, perhaps as a defense against being let down in the future. 

Shabbat as a day of reflection and study.

R. Yaakov Kaminetsky[7] explains the deterioration of the Jews’ situation and their inability or lack of interest in taking God’s Promises seriously in Shemot 6 in terms that offer guidance for our contemporary experience of living as Jews in a society that does not always reinforce the values of our tradition. The commentator references several Midrashim with regard to the Jews’ observance of Shabbat during their years in Egypt.[8]  With respect to Shemot 2:11 (an aspect of which was discussed in the essay on Parshat Shemot  http://text.rcarabbis.org/parashat-shemot-coming-of-age-and-searching-for-oneself-by-yaakov-bieler/  ), Shemot Rabba 1:28 states that not only did Moshe empathize with the harsh labor imposed upon his brethren, as explained by RaShI, but that he also tried to do something about it.

“He saw/understood[9] their burdens”—He saw that they had no rest. He went and said to Pharoah, “Whoever owns a slave, if the master does not allow him to rest one day per week, he will die. So too with your slaves, if you do not leave them alone one day per week, they will die.”[10] He said to him, “Go and institute for them in accordance with what you have said.” Moshe then went and instituted for them the day of Shabbat as a day of rest.

Shabbat was not only a day to recover from the physical strain of slavery.

Once it is established that the Jews rested on Shabbat at least during  the time leading up to Moshe’s demands that they be released from slavery,[11] the Rabbis imagined that they would have spent at least part of their Shabbatot engaged in textual study.[12]  It is intriguing to consider what those texts may have been. One possibility based upon an event taking place later at Sinai, is that these texts were the history of the Jewish people up until the Exodus. Shemot 24:7 recounts how a “Sefer HaBrit” (book of the covenant), which according to RaShI was the Tora text from Beraishit until the giving of the Tora at Sinai, including the commandments given at Mara—see Shemot 15:28, RaShI—was read to the people prior to their declaring “Na’aseh VeNishma” (we will do and we will hear/understand). If this is the case, then the delight of the enslaved Jews might have originated from passages such as Beraishit 15:14, where Avraham is told at the “Brit Bein HaBetarim” (the Covenant between the Pieces) that eventually the oppressors of the Jews would be judged and that the Jews would emerge from their servitude with great wealth, as well as Beraishit 50:25 in which Yosef evidences a high level of certainty that God would Redeem His People, the question not being “if”, but rather “when”.

A novel suggestion regarding the object of Shabbat study by the Egyptian slaves.

R. Kaminetsky suggests a different hypothesis as to the identity of the scrolls that the Jews studied on Shabbat. He argues that Psalm 92, entitled “Mizmor Shir Le’Yom HaShabbat” (A Poem for the Day of Shabbat), seems to not contain any reference to Shabbat aside from its title.[13] [14] Furthermore, RaShI on Bava Batra 14b, in which are listed the multiple authors of the book of Tehillim, including Moshe, offers the following comment: Moshe wrote Psalm 90, entitled “Tefilla LeMoshe”, as well as the next eleven Psalms in accordance with their order.” As soon as it is posited that Psalm 92 was authored by Moshe, that allows for the possibility of his having distributed it, along with the other Psalms attributed to him, to the Jews for their study during the period of their enslavement.[15]   R. Kaminetsky contends that the rationale for calling this Psalm one designated for Shabbat was because it was a key element in the people’s Shabbat study while they remained in Egypt. He thinks that a verse that was particularly meaningful to Jewish slaves and that gave them the strength to continue on under such adverse conditions was the final verse: (92:16) “To declare that the Lord is Just; He is my Rock, and there is no unrighteousness in Him,” a form of “Tzidduk HaDin” (justifying the judgment).  They would tell themselves from week to week that no matter what was happening, HaShem must have a Reason for Bringing this about, and that only trust in God was what was needed under these circumstances.[16]  By extension, the commentator continues, another of the scrolls that was studied carefully during the years in Egypt was the book of Iyov, whose authorship Bava Batra 14b also attributes to Moshe. The problem of theodicy certainly could have been on the minds of the Jews at that time, and the fact that God eventually heals Iyov and restores his life to normalcy may similarly have been of comfort to the Egyptian slaves.

The end of Shabbat Tora study led to the inability to believe Moshe’s optimistic predictions?

                But when Pharoah increases their labor as a result of Moshe’s asking that they be allowed to worship in the desert, not only could they no longer rest on Shabbat; they also lost their opportunity to think about and study the scrolls that gave them hope and confidence in a better future.[17] Once they lost even that glimmer of optimism that studying Psalms and Iyov supplied, concludes, R. Kaminetsky, they were unable to listen to Moshe’s words when he came a second time. Furthermore, in light of the Rabbinic tradition that the vast majority of Jews ended up not wishing to leave Egypt, but rather chose to remain, and died during the plague of darkness, would things have been different had they too participated in these studies and religious deliberations? Would they have continued to dream of a better future, rather than choosing to throw in their lot with their non-Jewish neighbors?

Conclusion.

                What does emerge from ideas such as these is the importance of not only being able to take a break from one’s work so that s/he does not become enslaved both mentally and physically, however important that work might be thought to be, but also to spend time on Shabbat engaged in relevant, inspiring spiritual activities, not least of which is Tora study. If this is what helped Jews survive the major portion of the Egyptian exile, then the potency of such learning for assuring that our own lives will continue to have meaning wherever we live and whatever we do, is clear and should be a significant component of each of our lives.

And God spoke to Moshe saying to him, ‘I am HaShem’. And I Appeared to Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov in the manifestation of “Keil Shaka” and by My Name “Yud-Keh-Vav-Keh” I was not known to them. And I have Fulfilled My Covenant with them to Give them the land of Canaan, the land of their sojournings in which they sojourned. And I have also Heard the cries of the children of Israel that result from the Egyptians enslaving them and I Remember My Covenant. Therefore say to the children of Israel, “I am HaShem, and I will Take you out from under the burden of Egypt, and I will Save you from your work, and I will Redeem you with an outstretched arm and with great judgments. And I will Take you to me to be a nation and I will Be to you for a God, and you will know that I am the Lord your God, Who Takes you out from under the burden of Egypt. And I will Bring you to the land that I Raised My Hand to Give it to Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov, and I will Give it to you as an inheritance, I am HaShem.”

[2] And Moshe answered and said: “But, behold, they will not believe me, nor hearken unto my voice; for they will say: The LORD hath not Appeared unto thee.”

Midrashim take Moshe to task for stating that the people would not believe him and ties the signs that HaShem Instructs him to perform in order to convince the Jews and Pharoah of Moshe’s Divine Mission, also implied rebuke for Moshe’s lack of faith in his co-religionists:

Shemot Rabba 3:12

“And Moshe answered and said: “But, behold, they will not believe me…” At that moment Moshe spoke improperly. The Holy One, Blessed be He, Said to him: (Shemot 3:18) “And they will listen to your voice”   and he said: (Ibid. 4:1) “And they will not believe me.” Immediately HaShem Responded to him in kind. He Gave him signs in accordance with his words. See what is written afterwards: (Ibid. 2) “And HaShem Said to him: ‘”MahZeh” (what is this) in your hand?’ And he said: ‘A staff.’’’ That is to say “MiZeh” (from this; the Midrash is punning on the word, reading it according to an alternate vocalization, substituting a Chirik for a Patach) in your hand you are worthy to be punished, for you have cast false aspersions upon My Children. They are believers, the children of believers: “Believers” because it is said, (Ibid. 31) “And the people believed”; children of believers because it is said (Beraishit 15:6) “And he (Avraham) believed in HaShem”. Moshe took on the act of the Serpent who spoke evilly against His Creator, as it is said, (Ibid. 3: 4)”Because God Knows”. As the serpent is punished, so you will eventually be punished. See what is written: (Shemot 4:3) “And He Said: ‘Cast it to the ground.’ And he cast it to the ground and it became a serpent.” Because he did an action of the Serpent, therefore he was shown a serpent, as if to say, you did the action of this. (Ibid. ) “And Moshe fled from before it.”

Midrash Tanchuma, Parashat Shemot, #20

Another interpretation: “And it will be if they do not believe you…” “And they will not believe me…” The Holy One, Blessed be He Said to him: (Shemot 4:2) “What is this in your hand?” (Ibid. 3) “And He Said: ‘Cast it to the ground…’”

He Said to him: You are saying “Lashon HaRa” (evil statements) concerning My Children (the Jewish people—see 4:22.)  Just as in the case of the Serpent Who said Lashon HaRa—see Beraishit 3:4-5—I Punished him with Tzora’at (a skin disease; although there is no explicit reference in the biblical text to the Serpent being afflicted with such a condition, since Tzora’at is paradigmatically associated with Miriam’s act of Lashon HaRa directed at her brother Moshe—see BaMidbar 12:10—it  stands to reason that the Serpent was likewise afflicted), you too, (Shemot 4:6) “’Put now thy hand into thy bosom.’ And he put his hand into his bosom; and when he took it out, behold, his hand was leprous, as white as snow. ” The Holy One, Blessed be He Said to him: You said concerning My Children that they weren’t believers, (Ibid. 9) “And it shall come to pass, if they will not believe even these two signs, neither hearken unto thy voice, that thou shalt take of the water of the river, and pour it upon the dry land; and the water which thou takest out of the river shall become blood upon the dry land.” The Holy One, Blessed be He Hinted to him a hint…Said R. Shmuel bar Nechemia: He Hinted you will meet your end by means of water, as it says (BaMidbar 20:10) “And Moses and Aaron gathered the assembly together before the rock, and he said unto them: ‘Hear now, ye rebels; are we to bring you forth water out of this rock?’” (One view as to why God Decreed at this point that Moshe would not enter Canaan was because he had once again spoken ill of the Jewish people by referring to them as “rebels”.    

Yet it is clear from Shemot 6:9 that the people did not believe Moshe when he made promises of redemption for a second time. Perhaps since they saw that his original promises did not come to fruition, they were justified in their skepticism of similar promises. Consequently this is not a reflection that the people lacked faith and the ability to believe; it was in Moshe as the initiator of the process of redemption that they had lost trust based upon his previous failure.

[3] See 1:11, 13; 2:23.

[4] The operant Halachic principle would consequently be: “Ones Rachmana Patrei” (an individual under duress is pardoned by Heaven), e.g., Avoda Zara 54a.

[5] Quoted in Tora Shleima, vol. 10, ed. R. Menachem Kasher, Beit Tora Shleima, Jerusalem, 5752, p. 15.

[6] Bava Batra 16b draws the same conclusion from Iyov 34:35, where rather than categorizing his rants against the Divine as evil, he is described as simply devoid of knowledge, i.e., he is incapable of thinking straight under these circumstances.

[7] Emet Le’Yaakov, R. Jacob Joseph School Press, New York, 5751, pp. 262-3.

[8] The assumption that the Jews observed Shabbat while in Egypt flies in the face of the well-known Rabbinic theme that they had become idolaters and had stopped observing their religious traditions. E.g.,

RaShI on Shemot 12:6

“And ye shall keep it (the Paschal lamb) unto the fourteenth day of the same month; and the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall kill it at dusk.”

This is an expression of inspection that (the Paschal sacrifice) requires four days of inspection regarding any blemishes prior to slaughter (i.e., some blemishes only arise after some time elapses. Consequently in order to assure that the potential sacrifice is free of such blemishes, it has to be obtained several days prior to the time of slaughter and carefully watched). And what was the reason that its taking was required to take place four days prior, something that was not made a requirement for subsequent observances of the Paschal sacrifice ritual? R. Matya ben Cheresh said: Behold the text states (Yechezkel 16:8) “ ‘Now when I Passed by thee, and Looked upon thee, and, behold, thy time was the time of love, I Spread my skirt over thee, and Covered thy nakedness; yea, I Swore unto thee, and Entered into a covenant with thee,’ Saith the Lord GOD, and thou becamest Mine. ”  The time for the fulfillment of the oath that I Swore to Avraham that I will Redeem his offspring has arrived. But they did not have to their credit the performance of Mitzvot that would render them deserving of redemption. As it says there (Ibid. 7) “I Cause thee to increase, even as the growth of the field. And thou didst increase and grow up, and thou camest to excellent beauty: thy breasts were fashioned, and thy hair was grown; yet thou wast naked and bare.” And He Gave them two Commandments, the blood of the Paschal sacrifice (that was to be applied to the doorposts in order to ward off the Plague of the Firstborn) and the blood of circumcision, that they engaged in circumcision on that very night, as it says (Ibid. 6) “And when I Passed by thee, and Saw thee wallowing in thy blood, I Said unto thee: ‘In thy blood, live; yea, I Said unto thee: In thy blood, live’”, blood being mentioned two times (corresponding to two separate Commandments involving blood, (ironically, Midrashim such as VaYikra Rabba 32:5 posit that the Jews deserved redemption for among other things, not having changed their names or their language. Yet beyond maintaining their cultural identity, their religious identity, at least according to this RaShI and other sources like it, went by the wayside.)  And it also says, (Zecharya 9:11) “As for thee also, because of the blood of thy covenant I Send forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water.” And since they were deeply involved with idolatry, he (Moshe) said to them:  (Shemot 12:21) “Then Moses called for all the elders of Israel, and said unto them: ‘Draw out, and take you lambs according to your families, and kill the Paschal lamb,” (an implication that the Jews should reject the Egyptian objects of idolatrous worship.) Draw your hands back from idolatry and take a lamb for the purpose of a Commandment.

One could probably say that the “Shabbat” that they observed was devoid of religious meaning and was simply a day when they rested from their work. The fact that Shabbat is one of the Mitzvot that may have been introduced to the people at Mara prior to Sinai—see Shabbat 56b—suggests that any previous Shabbat observance was incomplete at best.

[9] In the same manner as the root “Sh-M-A” (to hear) is explained as connoting hearing cognitively, or understanding, so too is the root “R-A-H” (to see) interpreted as representing a level of cognitive “seeing” or understanding.

[10] The Midrash presumes that Pharoah did not wish to exterminate the Jews. That is not clear from some of the policies that were instituted. If the male children were to be killed, as per Pharoah’s order that would certainly severely reduce the slave population. Furthermore, Rabbinic sources claim that another hindrance to Jewish population growth or even replacement, was the taskmasters attempting to prevent husbands and wives from spending any more time together than absolutely necessary. An approach that would reconcile such sources with the Midrash being presently considered is that rather than trying to wipe out the Jews, the Egyptian ruling class’ intent was to keep them a small enslaved minority within greater Egypt so that menial tasks could be assigned to them, and therefore preserving those who were alive was in Egypt’s best interests.

[11] Shemot Rabba 5:18 conjectures that following Pharoah’s rejection of Moshe and Aharon’s first proposal and his order to increase the difficulty of the Jews’ tasks, their ability to rest on Shabbat was revoked. 

“Increase the work for the people”—this teaches that they (the Jews) had in their hands scrolls which they would delight in from one Shabbat to the next, and on the basis of their studies they believed that the Holy One, Blessed be He, will Redeem them. This was possible because they were resting on Shabbat. Pharoah said to them, “‘Increase the work for the people so that they will work in it and will not rejoice in words of falsity.’ You shall neither delight nor rest on the day of Shabbat.”

[12]Several Rabbinic sources maintain that a goodly portion of Shabbat should be devoted to Tora study, particularly by those who are unable to study during the week. E.g., RaMA on Orech Chayim 290:2 :

Laypeople who do not engage in Tora study during the workweek, should engage in such study on Shabbat even more than the scholars who study Tora throughout the week. The scholars should spend extra time with respect to eating and drinking (i.e., physical pleasures), since their enjoyment during the week is their studies (i.e., spiritual pleasure).

[13] A Psalm, a Song. For the Sabbath day. It is a good thing to give thanks unto the LORD, and to sing praises unto Thy Name, O Most High; To declare Thy Lovingkindness in the morning, and Thy Faithfulness in the night seasons, With an instrument of ten strings, and with the psaltery; with a solemn sound upon the harp. For Thou, LORD, hast Made me glad through Thy Work; I will exult in the works of Thy Hands. How great are Thy Works, O LORD! Thy Thoughts are very deep. A brutish man knoweth not, neither doth a fool understand this. When the wicked spring up as the grass, and when all the workers of iniquity do flourish; it is that they may be destroyed forever. But Thou, O LORD, art on high for evermore. For, lo, Thine Enemies, O LORD, for, lo, Thine Enemies shall perish: all the workers of iniquity shall be scattered. But my horn hast Thou Exalted like the horn of the wild-ox; I am anointed with rich oil. Mine eye also hath gazed on them that lie in wait for me, mine ears have heard my desire of the evil-doers that rise up against me. The righteous shall flourish like the palm-tree; he shall grow like a cedar in Lebanon. Planted in the House of the LORD, they shall flourish in the Courts of our God. They shall still bring forth fruit in old age; they shall be full of sap and richness; To declare that the LORD is Upright, my Rock, in Whom there is no unrighteousness. 

[14] RaShI interprets the Psalm as dealing with the World To Come, and since Shabbat is referred to as “MeiEin Olam HaBa” (the essence of the World To Come) there is a connection between Shabbat and the Psalm. However, this would appear to not necessarily be in consonance with the simple meaning of the Psalm, a case where the question may be better than the answer.

[15] If Moshe was writing and distributing Psalms prior to his murdering an Egyptian and running to Midian, this implies a high level of Jewish sophistication prior to his encounter at the Burning Bush in Shemot 3:2 ff. And if it is posited, as we have in the essay for Shemot referenced above in the body of this essay, that he may have been only thirteen years old at the time of his flight, this suggests that he became conversant in these matters at an extremely young age. Of course, it is not necessary to reconcile all Midrashim, and it will prove impossible to do so on occasion. Nevertheless such speculations are intriguing and interesting.

[16] In a footnote (fn. 46), the editor of Rabbi Kaminetsky’s Chumash commentary notes that he once explained that the reason for the citation of the Exodus from Egypt in the Shabbat Kiddush liturgy is because it was the observance of Shabbat that kept the Jews from despairing during their years of enslavement.

[17] See fn. 11.

Here are four key points:

1. Tzeniut is a broad Jewish value whose practical expression is opposition to unnecessary and meretricious self-exposure, whether of the body or of the soul.  It relates to all people, male and female alike, and all of life.  Reducing it to a code for women’s dress and actions reflects an unhealthy obsession, equivalent to reducing love to an expression of (exclusively male) lust.

2. Tzeniut is intended to preserve and expand the domain of intimacy.  Intimacy is constructed by exclusivity of exposure, by sharing things about oneself that one does not share broadly.  People with inadequate emotional boundaries are less capable of achieving relationship though emotional sharing, and people with inadequate physical boundaries are less capable of achieving relationship through physical intimacy.

3.  Tzeniut is intended to preserve the integrity of personal space – physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual.  People who “spill” emotionally compel others to respond to them – to feel pity when they express suffering, anger when they express betrayal, and the like.  This legitimately feels like a violation.  The same is true of unwanted touch, or of unwanted visual erotic stimulation.

4. Tzeniut is one value in the complex web of Jewish values, which must constantly negotiate its place in that web.  It can be trumped, or attenuated, when it comes into conflict with other Jewish values.  From the halakhic perspective, once tzeniut is correctly defined as unnecessary self-exposure, it becomes clear that it should not be applied mechanically, but rather on the basis of a sensitive and dynamic understanding of the necessary. 

It should be clear that excessive tzeniut can be pathological.  People who never share their emotions do not experience ultimate intimacy, but rather intractable loneliness.  People who never react to others’ emotions do not become fully developed selves, but rather stunted and selfish.  The goals of tzeniut can only be fulfilled in a society that fosters intimacy and empathy. 

Similarly, in the erotic realm tzeniut is intended to maximize the space for marital intimacy, not to make husbands and wives chary of each other’s bodies, and to give people autonomous control of their sexuality, not to disassociate them from their physical selves.

With these understandings in hand, we can approach the question of how the value of tzeniut should play out in halakhic practice with regard to women’s public dress, voice, etc.

My starting point is a Talmudic passage in Tractate Taanit(23a-b).  The gemara there records that a delegation of rabbis observed a set of peculiar practices of the great but enigmatic Abba Chilkiyah, grandson of Choni the Circlemaker.  Among these was that when he returned from laboring in the fields, his wife would go out to the city gate to greet him in her best Shabbat clothing.  When the rabbis asked Abba Chilkiyah why she behaved so, he responded “so that I will not look at other women”.

Now the subtext of the story, the implicit challenge of the rabbinic delegation, is why Abba Chilkiyah justifies his wife’s behavior rather than reproving her for being immodest.  After all, while preventing him from looking at other women, is she not causing other men to look at her? 

The answer is that Mrs. Abba Chilkiyah has the right, perhaps even the obligation, to do what is necessary for her own marriage, regardless of the effect on other men.  In this regard she is not the halakhic exception, but rather the rule: all wives have the right and obligation to make themselves attractive to their husbands, even though this will inevitably increase their attractiveness to other men as well. 

But why should this be so?  Here we need to recognize that Halakhah does not directly obligate women to dress or behave modestly, however that is defined[1].   Rather, such obligations emerge from laws

1. regulating whether people, male or female,  can perform a set of ritual acts, such as making blessings, in the presence of people, male or female, who are exposing parts of their body that are defined halakhically as erva
2. regulating whether people, male or female, can perform a different but largely overlapping set of ritual acts in environments that are likely to stimulate them to erotic fantasizing
3. permitting men to divorce without a ketuvah, or forbidding men from remaining married to, women whose immodest behavior suggests the likelihood of adultery
4. forbidding people, male or female, to enter or remain in situations that are likely to result in illicit sexual liaisons
5. forbidding men to enter or remain in situations that are likely to result in a purposeless seminal emission
6. requiring at least men, and possibly women, to study Torah whenever possible

Indeed, we need to recognize that Halakhah does not directly obligate women to dress or behave modestly[1], however that is defined.  Such obligations emerge instead via the obligation v’lifnei iver lo titen mikhshol – “you must not place a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus19:14), The Talmudic Rabbis understood this verse metaphorically as creating a covenant of mutual responsibility, with the specific consequences that Jews are responsible not to create circumstances that cause others to violate prohibitions, preclude them from performing ritual obligations, or distract them from the study of Torah.  Each of these consequences is readily conceptualizable as an obligation to respect the others’ space.    

Now the “stumbling block” argument is always a potentially dangerous weapon.  Here is an illustration: The Talmud states that lifnei iver forbids fathers to give corporal punishment to grown children (Moed Qatan 17a), because this will cause the children to rebel and therefore violate their obligations to treat their parent with honor and reverence.  But what if children will rebel even when asked to perform minor household chores?  Worse, what if children learn this rule, and then give credible preemptive notice that they will disobey any parental command – does this effectively bar any exercise of parental authority?  If I tell my neighbor that if she ever cooks broccoli again, I will be driven to eat a cheeseburger – can I control her diet by claiming potential spiritual injury?

The answer is of course not – Halakhah does not allow one person to take advantage of the covenant of mutual responsibility so as to prevent another from living a normal fulfilling human life.  By the same token, Jewish law does not allow men to use erotic lifnei iver to prevent women from living normal fulfilling lives.

Now what constitutes a normal fulfilling life?  It should be clear that this is a sociologically dependent category.  In some societies it may be necessary to jog in public, but not in others; in some societies it may be necessary to sing in mixed company, but not in others; and so on.  It is likely that in each society, whatever is done habitually will have minimal erotic impact, and have minimal capacity to express intimacy.  None of these societies is intrinsically preferable according to Jewish law, so long as they are fully compatible with taking the obligations and values listed above with great seriousness.

Tzeniut is more easily implemented in a homogeneous society, where expectations of dress, behavior, and fulfillment are largely made by consensus.  It becomes much harder in a heterogeneous society, and harder still at the intersection of sharply distinct homogeneous cultures, where each side has difficulty even imagining why the other might see a particular behavior as an assault on psychological space, or conversely, as an infringement of normal human fulfillment.  

But people of good will negotiate such situations while making every effort to find solutions that serve everyone’s interests.  By contrast, thugs beat up their opponents and try to make them leave or hide.  No one who properly understands tzeniut could believe that physical, psychological and emotional assault, i.e. violent intrusions on the space of others, are viable means of implementing the values behind it.  The thugs in Beit Shemesh should be condemned by all those who hold tzeniut dear, not because they are overzealous, but because their understanding of tzeniut is warped. 

In the Talmud, however, this appears not to have been so, or at the least the Talmud displays deep theoretical interest in the status of meat slaughtered by incompletely observant slaughterers.  The first five folios of Maskehet Chullin (2a – 6a) discuss meat slaughtered by those who eat nonkosher meat to defy G-d (מומר אוכל נבילות להכעיס), and alternatively, those who eat nonkosher meat because they cannot resist temptation (מומר אוכל נבילות לתיאבון), and finally, those who are Kuthim (כותים).  For the purposes of this discussion we will define Kuthim as Jews who belong to an ethnically distinct group and whose Jewish practice is uniform but does not conform to accepted rabbinic norms.

With regard to the last two groups, the Talmud ideally requires supervision, at various levels.  What, however, if the slaughtering took place unsupervised?  One opinion in the Talmud is that, should one find a Kuti post-slaughter, one should feed him an olive-sized piece of the slaughtered animal[1] – if he eats it, you can eat from that animal as well, and if not, not.

The Talmud subsequently cites a beraita which states the same law in a parallel case.  If one comes upon a Kuti who has slaughtered a brace of birds, one gives him the head of one bird to eat – if he eats it, you can eat them all, and if not, not.[2] The Talmud discussion begins with some macabre humor[3], but then gets to a question that begins to reveal the Rabbis’ construction of Kuthi ideology and practice– how do we know that Kuthim require birds to be ritually slaughtered?

Why is this question asked about birds, but not about animals?  Rashi explains[4] that the verb zavach is used in the Torah with regard to animals, but not with regard to birds, which are included via a Rabbinic interpretive move.  We assume that the Kuthim accept the written Torah, but not Rabbinic interpretation.

But the Talmud concludes that this distinction is unsustainable.  Unless they accept Rabbinic interpretation, why would Kuthim necessarily engage in Halakhically acceptable methods of slaughter?   There are any number of halakhic requirements for kosher slaughter that are not explicit in Torah[5].  Rather, the Kuthim must accept the Rabbinic interpretation of any mitzvah they practice, although they do not practice all mitzvoth.  Therefore, just as they accept and practice the Rabbinic definition of kosher slaughter – and therefore we can eat any slaughtered meat they eat – so too they accept the Rabbinic scope of the obligation of slaughter – and therefore we can eat any slaughtered birds they eat.  Indeed, one opinion in the Talmud is that Kuthim are more reliable than Jews with regard to the practice of those mitzvoth they accept[6].

The puzzle here is why one needs to watch the Kuthi eat, rather than simply asking him/her whether the meat is kosher.  One might suggest that, since they do not accept all mitzvoth, they are invalid witnesses, and so we need their action rather than their speech.  Rashi, however, offers a different understanding.  Rashi says that Kuthim do not practice the metaphorical mitzvah “lifnei iver lo titen mikhshol” = “before a blind person you must not place a stumbling block” – they understand it purely literally, as a ban against placing a stone in the path of a blind person, rather than as a prohibition against causing a person to sin, whether by temptation or by deception[7].  They therefore see nothing wrong with feeding nonkosher meat to another Jew.

In the Rabbinic imagination, then, credibility is not necessarily a function of validity to testify.  Rather, if Kuthim believed that misleading a fellow Jew into sin was sinful, we would believe their statement that a given piece of meat was kosher, so long as they were knowledgeable enough to make such a statement competently.  We would believe them because we could trust them to live up to their own standards, even when those standards did not consistently conform to ours.

This is, of course, a situation common in modernity, and the presumptive invalidity of non-shomer Shabbat Jews as witnesses creates all sorts of infelicities, indignities, and injustices.  One common solution is to distinguish different types of testimony, and claim that formal invalidity should be distinguished from formal lack of credibility.  People who are not halakhically observant, but known to be honest, can then be believed regarding financial issues, even if they cannot, for example, serve as the ritually necessary witnesses who sign a halakhic divorce.  This solves some crucial difficulties – it would, for example, enable a beit din to judge a case between a shomer Shabbat and non-shomer Shabbat Jew without presumptively believing the shomer Shabbat when the parties’ stories conflict[8].  But it does not allow one to eat the food that a Jew who doesn’t keep kosher serves, even when they guarantee that it is kosher to your standards.  It does not allow one to use a Torah scroll borrowed from a nonobservant Jew, even if they promise that it is repaired by an observant scribe whenever errors are noticed.  And so on and so forth.  We do not even have the luxury of relying on the Talmudic method for believing Kuthim, as on the whole non-Orthodox Jews explicitly reject Orthodox Halakhah, both in principle and in practice,  even with regard to those mitzvoth they regularly practice.

I suggest, however, that we do have a new phenomenon, which we might in traditional terms call
“anti-Kuthim”, and in contemporary language “pluralists”.  These are Jews who keep one mitzvah above all, namely lifnei iver, which they define, not quite Rabbinically, as an obligation never to cause someone else to violate their own principles.

It seems to me that the Talmud recognizes that one can derive reliable information from the actions of people who consistently follow their own principles, even if we cannot formally believe their statements.  It follows then that we can believe people whose principle is pluralism when they competently tell us things which have implications for our own actions, even if their own actions tell us nothing.

I wonder if, to think boldly and imaginatively, we might consider creating a formal status for “shomrei lifeni iver”, who would be required to learn enough about various fields to be able to competently assure their fellow Jews that a given action would be in consonance with their values and/or halakhic positions.  This would, for example, require nonobservant Jews and halakhically undereducated Jews to learn the intricacies of kashrut and Shabbat, and observant but socially underaware Jews to learn about the intricacies of fair trade and labor relations issues.  Holders of this status would not be required to aid or abet anyone else’s values, but only to be conscious of and honest about not doing so.

Advocates of Jewish pluralism often cite Mishnah Yebamot 1:4’s statement that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel married one another despite halakhic disagreements about whether particular relationships generated children who were mamzerim, ineligible to marry ordinary Jews.  This is used to challenge halakhic Jews failure to accept nonhalakhic practice, or Orthodox refusal to accept nonorthodox practice.  The Orthodox response is to note that the Talmud to that Mishnah[9] says that the two Houses did not accept each other’s rulings, but rather trusted one another to fully disclose any such issues.  One might argue legitimately that the Mishnah speaks only of trust among the halakhically committed; nonetheless, it seems to me that the suggestion above fulfills its spirit.[10]

[1]ג. אביי אמר: הכי קתני: הכל שוחטין ואפילו כותי. במה דברים אמורים? כשישראל עומד על גביו; אבל יוצא ונכנס – לא ישחוט; ואם שחט – חותך כזית בשר ונותן לו; אכלו – מותר לאכול משחיטתו; לא אכלו – אסור לאכול משחיטתו

[2] ג: תנו   רבנן   שחיטת   כותי   מותרת   במה   דברים   אמורים   כשישראל   עומד   על   גביו   אבל   בא   ומצאו   ששחט   חותך   כזית   ונותן   לו   ואכלו   מותר    לאכול   משחיטתו   ואם   לאו   אסור   לאכול   משחיטתו   כיוצא   בו   מצא   בידו   דקוריא   של   צפרים    קוטע   ראשו   של   אחד   מהן   ונותן   לו   אכלו   מותר   לאכול   משחיטתו   ואם   לאו   אסור   לאכול   משחיטתו

[3]  ד. מצא   בידו   דקוריא   של   צפרין   קוטע   ראשו   כו’   אמאי   ליחוש   דלמא   האי   הוא   דהוה   שחיט   שפיר   אמר   רב   מנשה  במכניסן   תחת   כנפיו    ודלמא   סימנא   הוה   יהיב   ליה   בגויה   אמר   רב   משרשיא   דממסמס   ליה   מסמוסי

[4] ד. ד”ה אין שחיטה משום דלא כתיב זביחה בהדיא אלא בבקר וצאן דכתיב וזבחת מבקרך ומצאנך ואנן ילפינן בהקישא לקמן (כז:) מזאת תורת הבהמה והעוף

[5] ד. ולטעמיך   שהייה   דרסה   חלדה   הגרמה   ועיקור   מי   כתיבן

[6] ד. רשב”ג   אומר   כל   מצוה   שהחזיקו   בה   כותים   הרבה   מדקדקין   בה   יותר   מישראל

[7] ג. דאע”ג דהוחזקו בה לעצמם אין מקפידין אם יאכלו ישראל נבילות דלית להו לפני עור לא תתן מכשול (שם /ויקרא/ יט) אלא כמשמעו שלא יתן אבן בדרך עור להפילו

Rashi’s position is solidly grounded on Talmud Niddah 57a, where the Talmud explicitly challenges the Mishnah’s giving credibility to Kuthim on the ground that they do not accept lifnei iver, and responds that they are believed only when their actions demonstrate that their words are true.  Note, however, that in Niddah the actions seem to back up the words, whereas in Chullin the actions seem to be sufficient even if the Kuthi is silent.

[8] In practice, I think most batei din would simply invoke legal mechanisms, such as engaging in pesharah rather than din, that enable them to judge credibility ad hoc rather than by formal criteria.  But in practice few non-observant Jews go to batei din for financial issues, and the absence of formal protections makes it hard to recommend that they begin doing so.

[9] יבמות יד. דמודעי להו ופרשי והכי נמי מסתברא דקתני סיפא כל הטהרות וכל הטמאות שהיו אלו מטהרין ואלו מטמאין לא נמנעו עושים טהרות אלו על גבי אלו [דף יד עמוד ב] אי אמרת בשלמא דמודעי להו משום הכי לא נמנעו אלא אי אמרת דלא מודעי להו בשלמא ב”ש מב”ה לא נמנעו דטמאות דב”ה לב”ש טהרות נינהו אלא ב”ה מב”ש למה לא נמנעו טהרות דב”ש לב”ה טמאות נינהו אלא לאו דמודעי להו שמע מינה ומאי אולמיה דהך מהך מהו דתימא צרה קלא אית לה קמ”ל

[10] A different mode of dealing with this issue is based on the concept of קים לי בגויה, which may be theorized by saying that one can have so much personal faith in somebody else, or in youru relationship with them, that their testimony becomes your own knowledge, and therefore they do not need formal halakhic credibility.  This position is developed with regard to kashrut in Igrot Moshe 1YD65 (see blow).  However, it seems to me that aside from the standard disclaimers that Rav Moshe puts on this teshuvah, namely that it applies only in highly difficult circumstances, the application of this teshuvah is probably limited to cases where one has direct personal knowledge of, and a close relationship with, the person one wishes to trust in matters of kashrut.  My effort here is to construct a rationale that can be socially effective.   My thanks to Rabbi Mordy Friedman for requiring me to make this distinction explicitly.

ולכן הנכון לע”ד למה שבארתי זה כבר דבר חדש דאף אם לא היה הדין דע”א נאמן באיסורין מ”מ מי שמכירו בברור וקים ליה בגויה בידיעה ברורה שאינו משקר היה רשאי לאכול ממה שאומר שהוא היתר, משום שאין נכנס זה בגדר נאמנות אלא בידיעה עצמית שהוא כראיה ממש. והוכחתי זה מכתובות דף פ”ה דקים לי בגוה מלתא הוא אף לממון. (בחדושי בארתי זה באורך. וגם אמרתי בזה במה שבמדינתנו מצד סדרי המדינה אין להאבות החלושים והזקנים שום עצה לחיותם אלא ליזון על שלחן בניהם ובנותיהם שהם בעוה”ר מצד הנהגת המדינה עוברים על הרבה איסורים ומחללים שבת ויש גם כופרים בה’ ובתורתו ואין נאמנים על איסורים שנמצא שא”א להאבות החלושים והזקנים עצה איך לאכול דבר מבושל, שיש להקל באם האב יודע וקים ליה בגוה דבתו וכלתו שלא תכשילהו באיסורין משום דמכיר טבעה בידיעה ברורה כגון שניסה אותה או שראה שמזהירתו מאיסורין מחמת שאינה רוצית לצערו או מחמת טבעה שאינה רוצית להעביר אחרים על דעתם אז יכול לסמוך עליה ולאכול מה שמבשלת בעדו משום שאין זה נאמנות אלא ידיעה עצמית כראיה ויש לסמוך ע”ז בשעה”ד וצער גדול כזה).

            In Rambam’s Haggadah, however, the text begins בבהילו יצאנו ממצרים.  ‘בהלה’ is a translation of the Biblical חפזון, and seems to mean something like “hurry under stress”.  This makes the opening a straightforward reference to Devarim 16:3:

לא תאכל עליו חמץ שבעת ימים תאכל עליו מצות לחם עני כי בחפזון יצאת מארץ מצרים למען תזכר את יום צאתך מארץ מצרים כל ימי חייך:

You must not eat chametz over it – for seven days you shall eat over it matzot, bread of oni, because it was in chipazon that you departed the Land of Egypt, so that you will remember the day of your departure from the Land of Egypt all the days of your life.

            It is possible that the absence of this opening is an error in our texts, although if so the error precedes Rambam, as our text is found in the Siddur of Rav Amram Gaon.  But (see on this Rav Kasher’s הגדה שלמה) the problem here, as in many Biblical texts, is determining the referents of the prepositional phrases.  Devarim 16:2 and 3 put together read as follows:

וזבחת פסח ליקוק א-להיך צאן ובקר במקום אשר יבחר יקוק לשכן שמו שם:

לא תאכל עליו חמץ שבעת ימים תאכל עליו מצות לחם עני

כי בחפזון יצאת מארץ מצרים למען תזכר את יום צאתך מארץ מצרים כל ימי חייך: 

You will sacrifice a Pesach to Hashem your G-d, flock and cattle, in the place where Hashem your G-d will choose to have His Presence dwell there. 

You must not eat chametz over it  –

for seven days you shall eat over it matzot, bread of oni,

because it was in chipazon that you departed the Land of Egypt,

so that you will remember the day of your departure from the Land of Egypt all the days of your life”

Grammatically, the term chipazon may relate either specifically to the command to eat matzah and not chametz, or else to the Pesach sacrifice.  The evidence that it relates to the Pesach sacrifice is Shmot 12:11:

וככה תאכלו אתו מתניכם חגרים נעליכם ברגליכם ומקלכם בידכם ואכלתם אתו בחפזון פסח הוא ליקוק:

Thus you must eat it – your loins girded, your shoes on your feet, and your staffs in your hands.  And you must eat it in chipazon – it is a Pesach to Hashem.

This seems to indicate that the eating of unleavened bread is certainly not an essential component of chipazon, and this might lead someone to object that Rambam’s Haggadah makes an unwarranted connection, and remove the opening.

Why should this matter, though?  Isn’t eating unleavened bread is in any case part of the recollection of the “stressed haste” with which we left Egypt?  Not necessarily – Mishnah Pesachim 9:5 tells us that while the Pesach of Egypt was eaten in chipazon, subsequent Pesachs, should not be, perhaps even must not be.  The immediate evidence for this halakhic position, as brought in Mekhilta, is “’you must eat it in chipazon’” – it, but not others”.  This seems to indicate that while the entire Pesach ritual recalls the chpazon with which we left Egypt, it is not intended to recreate that chipazon.  If matzah were in fact a recreation of chipazon, then, it would be inappropriate to eat them with the Pesach.  That we eat matzah at the Seder is therefore evidence that matzah is not associated with chipazon, and therefore Rambam’s text is problematic.

Why should the Torah not wish the chipazon to be recreated?  One possibility is the controversy as to who, exactly, was in a “stressed hurry” to have the Jews leave Egypt.  Various midrashim suggest that it was the Jews, the Egyptians, and/or Hashem!  If we take the last approach, which is many ways the most interesting, chipazon may be a reference to the idea that redemption from Egypt was urgently necessary, and came prematurely, because the Jews would otherwise have descended into “the 50^th gate of tum’ah” and become permanently unworthy of redemption.  Perhaps this is not an aspect of the Exodus that we wish to recall at the Seder, at least not at its outset, despite the principle that “we begin with shame”.

Another reason to not recreate chipazon may be the description of Ultimate Redemption in Yeshayahu 52:12:

כי לא בחפזון תצאו ובמנוסה לא תלכון כי הלך לפניכם יקוק ומאספכם א-להי ישראל:

For you will not depart in chipazon, and you will not go in the manner of fleeing, because Hashem goes before you, and one One who gathers you is the G-d of Israel.

This verse, as noted by many midrashim (but not Radak), seems to see the chipazon with which we left Egypt as a flaw in that redemption.  Perhaps the Pesach is supposed to look both forward and back, and we do not recreate those aspects of the Pesach that did not foreshadow ultimate redemption

            These two rationales are intriguingly combined in a fascinating Midrash Sekhel Tov on the Song of the Sea (attached but not translated).  Exodus 15:12-19 is written in a grammatical form that obscures present and past, but there seems to be a perhaps anachronistic mention of the Temple as an ultimate goal, and the verses can be read as suggesting that the inhabitants of Canaan have already been struck dumb by the passage of the Children of Israel among them.  The verse Sekhel Tov focuses on is 15:13, “You have guided with Your chessed this nation which You have redeemed; You have directed them with Your strength to Your holy dwelling-place”.  “Your chessed” suggests that this was undeserved – but when had Hashem redeemed the Jews, let alone taken them to His holy dwelling-place?   Sekhel Tov posits that Hashem took the Jews to the Temple Mount (on the wings of eagles: see Shmot 19:4) on the night of Passover, where they brought and ate the Pesach sacrifice, and then returned them to Egypt in time for the Plague of the FirstBorn.  While Hashem was in chipazon lest they return too late, in His chessed He did not hurry them.

            In this reading, we did not leave Egypt with chipazon at all, although we did eat the Pesach while G-d waited, patiently, but kebyakhol stressed.  And so it would certainly be inappropriate to begin the Seder by saying that we left Egypt in chipazon, and that the matzah recalls that.

            In a Chassidic mode, we might suggest that the underlying message of this reading of the poetry of Exodus is that redemption can only happen to those who have already experienced it – the Jews could not leave Egypt unless they had a true understanding not only of what they were leaving, but where they were going.  Thus in the narrative of Exodus it is clear that true redemption cannot occur until Sinai, and perhaps not even then, until the message of Torah has been fully understood as well as heard.  This is a useful cautionary note with regard to contemporary dreams of redemption, but may we merit that complete understanding speedily and in our days, and strive toward it regardless.

“נחית בחסדך” –

דומה לו “וינחם אל מחוז חפצם” (תהלים קז ל), “וינחם בענן יומם” (שם עח יד)

ולשון נחיי’ היא כאדם המפרש בים וקם סער עליו, או כיוצא בשיירה ותעה ורדפוהו ליסטין, ונזדמן לו אוהבו והוליכו והנחהו בשלום למחוז חפצו,

לכך נאמר “נחית בחסדך” –

שלא היו בידינו מעשים טובים ומצוות, אלא חסד עשית עמנו ונחיתנו:

“עם זו” –

כלומר עם זה, ולשון זכר היא,

ודומה לו “עם זו יצרתי לי” (ישעי’ מג כא):

“עם זו גאלת” –

במה גאלתם, בכופר שנתתה מצרים בתמורתם:

“נהלת” –

אין נהילה אלא נהיגה בלט,

ודומה לדבר “אתנהלה לאטי” (בראשית לג יד), “אין מנהל לה” (ישעי’ נא יח), “וינהלם בלחם”       (בראשית מז יז), וכל דומיהן:

“בעזך” –

בתוקף שלך, שאע”פ שאתה עזוז וגבור, לא היתה מדביקתו ללכת במרוצה, אלא כמחזיק ביד בנו    ומכה לו לאט,

ולא עוד, אלא שנהילתך היתה עריבה ביותר, שנשאתנו בעוזך על כנפי נשרים בשעה קלה והבאתנו             במצרים בלילי הפסח:

“אל נוה קדשך” –

למקום בית המקדש, דכתיב ביה “נוה שאנן אהל בל יצען” (ישעי’ לג כ),

ואכלנו שם הפסח,

והחזרת לנו למצרים מיד,

ואע”פ ששכינתך היתה נחפזת לכך, דכתיב “ואכלתם אותו בחפזון” (שמות יב יא), לנו לא החפזתה בכך:

 Recently Rabbi Dov Linzer published a statement (Appendix A), cosigned by many other rabbis, on the subject of halakhah and braindeath.  Agudath Israel of America’s office subsequently issued an unsigned statement (Appendix B) that took very sharp issue with Rabbi Linzer’s statement.  I am party to neither statement, nor do I intend in this piece to comment on the larger brain death controversy, although I have orally – and will shortly in writing – address the substance of the brain death issue.  Instead, I will discuss the methodological issues raised by this dispute, which are worthy of exploring in their own right.[1]

My goal here, therefore, is to frame the issues in a way that makes both sides as comprehensible as possible, and perhaps to explain where conflicts of sensibilities create flashpoints that prevent each side from understanding the other.

1.  Rabbi Linzer’s Statement

Rabbi Linzer’s statement, as I understand it, is compatible with the following procedural arguments:

A.

1) Some highly significant poskim, as well as the current Av Beit Din of the RCA, have ruled that one or another standard of neurological death can be recognized by Halakhah.  Their authority is sufficient to prevent an outside observer from declaring that someone acting on the basis of such a ruling is acting non-halakhically.

2) Bracketing the question of which position is correct, the non-metaphysical (e.g. utilitarian) consequences of acting on the proposition that brain death is a halakhically sufficient criterion for death are superior to the consequences of acting on the opposite assumption.

3) Therefore, rabbis who do not see themselves as competent to decide this issue on its formal halakhic merits, when consulted on the issue by laypeople, should either indicate their utilitarian preference for the braindeath position, without framing that as a psak, or else encourage those laypeople to consult poskim who decide the issue in that direction.

B.

1) It is possible to make a formal halakhic argument that permits the receiving of organs taken from brain-dead patients even if one formally forbids the removal of such organs.

2) In practice, if not in principle, this would mean that the outcome of halakhah would be that halakhic Jews would allow their lives to be saved through the killing of others, but not allow themselves to be killed to save others in the identical circumstances.

3) Furthermore, most major organ donations are only possible at present if one accepts the brain death standard.  Therefore, if broadly accepted, this argument would lead to the halakhic community receiving many more organs than it donated.  This would generate at least the appearance that we considered our lives more valuable than those of others.

4)  Because of both 2) and 3), we must reject 1) in practice, regardless of its formal plausibility.  This rejection can be grounded either in:

a) a claim that when a formally plausible halakhic argument leads to a morally untenable outcome, one must adopt alternative plausible halakhic arguments if they exist, or

b) a claim that while the argument may be correct if evaluated in the abstract and/or in every individual case, following it in practice as a communal policy would be a violation of chillul Hashem and/or run the risk of generating violent anti-Semitism (mishum eivah).  These principles are overriding with regard to this issue. 

1.  Agudath Israel’s Responses

Agudath Israel’s responses, as I understand them – possibly somewhat charitably – can be reframed as follows:

A. 

1) Rabbis and laypeople alike can only consider practical consequences as a halakhic factor within the framework of halakhah.  If one cannot formulate those consequences in formal halakhic terms, they are halakhically irrelevant.

2) Therefore, if one is faced with a halakhic question which one is incapable of resolving on the merits (either as a rabbi or as a layperson), one’s only legitimate options are to refer the question either to the greatest available legal decisor (posek), or else to the decisor to whom one usually asks legal questions.  One is not entitled to consider the merits of the question at all when considering where to refer the question.

B.

1) Several great decisors have in fact adopted the position that one can receive organs taken from brain-dead patients even though one would not be allowed to agree to the donation of one’s own organs in the reverse situation.

2) It is unacceptable to assert that following any halakhic position adopted by a great posek, let alone the majority of great poskim, is immoral.

1. Who Should Make The Decisions?

I have the following brief glosses and comments on these issues, which I hope to address more fully elsewhere.

 A key issue here is the locus and structure of halakic authority.  Here are two possible models:

A.  

The ideal mode of halakhah is that all decisions are made by the best decision maker = greatest posek (legal decisor).  For practical reasons, that posek may choose to delegate or leave residual authority in the hands of lessers.  However, such authority is immediately withdrawn once that decision maker has addressed an issue.

Accordingly, the first task of lesser or non-poskim when facing halakhic decisions is to determine whether a greater posek has addressed the issue.  If multiple greater poskim have addressed the issue, and disagreed with one another, the remaining issue is purely procedural – which greater posek has jurisdiction.  No lesser figure has any right to address the substance of any issue which has been addressed by one or more greater figures.

B.

The ideal mode of halakhah is that all decisions are made by autonomous individuals.  This ideal is constrained in practice by the need for some issues to be addressed collectively, and by the halakhic incompetence of many individuals.  However, when the formal halakhic issues have been addressed by competent scholars, and the results can plausibly be seen as intellectually inconclusive, and there is either no need or no possibility for collective action, decision making reverts to the autonomous individual.

I note that the first model loses much of its attractiveness if one does not presume that great Torah scholarship and formal halakhic decision making skill are directly correlated with excellent moral intuition and pragmatic judgment.  On the other hand (my thanks to my dear friend Dov Weinstein for making this point well), the second model significantly devalues halakhic scholarship as a religious goal for individuals, and is likely to produce a largely ignorant community with a small and cloistered Torah elite, whose products are generally seen as irrelevant.[2]   

2) 

Further Ruminations

1) One could resolve the substantive dispute between the two statements by asserting that the relevant gedolei haposkim (great legal decisors) only allowed the reception of organs taken from brain-dead patients in isolated individual cases.  Those poskim might agree with Rabbi Linzer’s practical conclusion were the question made one of communal policy, and particularly were it to become a question of publicly known communal policy.

2)  It is worth considering whether the morality or immorality of a given halakhic decision rests exclusively on its outcomes, on its reasoning, or on a combination of the two.  For example – one might reach the take-but-don’t-donate position on the ground that most organs will be taken from non-Jews by non-Jews, and

a) Jews have no obligation to sacrifice a chance at survival so as to avoid entanglement in intra-Gentile violence, or rather

b) Gentiles have the autonomous halakhic right to define death as they please, regardless of how halakhah defines it for Jews, and therefore Jews have no right to impose the halakhic definition on Gentile transplant surgeons removing organs from Gentiles.

Should our moral judgment of the same practical decisions change, depending on whether the actor offers the first or second rationale?

3)  I think it is clear that throughout history, great poskim have disagreed with each other in strong terms, and framed their disagreements in moral as well as intellectual terms.  In that sense, I strongly reject the claim that all rulings of great poskim lead to outcomes that are objectively morally acceptable; it seems to me that the great psokim of the past at least generally thought otherwise.  Accordingly, I think that an individual who acts immorally on the basis of such a pesak may be immoral b’shogeg (accidentally), or even b’ones (as the result of force majeure), but their action remains immoral regardless.

4)  We live in a time when, ba’avonoteinu harabim it is not difficult to produce examples of talmidei chakhamim with significant moral blind spots, with those blind spots affecting not just their personal behavior but the content of their Torah.  One can in theory deny this by arguing tautologically –

a) since they are great scholars, it follows that their actions cannot be immoral, and thus our evaluations must be incorrect, or else

b) since our evaluations of their actions are correct, they must in fact not be great scholars.

But I at least cannot make this argument with integrity.  I furthermore contend that to completely delegate moral judgment – to say naaseh venishma unconditionally to another human being – is to betray the core responsibility of being tzelem Elokim and ben berit.  This is true with regard to all issues, and independent of whether one sees the central moral issue regarding brain death as focused on euthanasia, lifesaving, particularism, or reciprocity. 

APPENDIX A

We, the undersigned Orthodox rabbis and rashei yeshiva affirm the following principles with regard to organ donation and brain stem death:

First and foremost, the halakhic definition of death is a long-standing debate amongst gedolei haposkim, and it should not be forgotten that, among others in the U.S. and Israel, the former Chief Rabbis of Israel, R. Avraham Shapira and R. Mordechai Eliyahu, zikhronam li’vracha, and, yibadel li’chayim, Rav Gedalia Dov Schwartz, the av beis din of the Beit Din of America, are proponents of the position that brain stem death constitutes the halakhic definition of death.

Both positions, that brain stem death constitutes death, and that only cardiac death can define death, are halakhically viable. This remains so even in light of the findings of the President’s Council on Bioethics in 2008.

With regard to this long-standing debate, and its critical implications for organ donation, we affirm our position that:

1. Brain stem death is a halakhically operational definition of death.  As such, organs may be removed for transplantation under strict halakhic supervision and guidance.

2.  In light of the serious moral issues and profound lifesaving potential presented by the possibility of organ donation, we strongly recommend that rabbis who are rendering decisions for their laity on this matter demonstrate a strong predisposition to accept the halakhic view of the gedolei haposkim who define the moment of halakhic death to be that of brain stem death, or that they refer their laity to rabbis who do so. 
 
3. Even as we adopt the brain stem definition of death, we emphasize that the greatest of care is needed in applying this definition in practice, and that safeguards are necessary to insure the organ removal is done in accordance with halakhic principles.  Each person should consult with his or her rabbi and appropriate medical professionals to understand how this determination of death is made, and how to ensure that the appropriate procedures will be in place.

4. Rabbis and laity who follow the position that brain stem death is not considered to be halakhic death should be aware that it is medically possible to donate certain body parts after cardiac death and that it is a mitzvah to do so. Thus,

    a. It is both halakhically permissible and desirable and ethically mandated for every Jew to be an organ donor consistent with his or her definition of halakhic death.

    b. Rabbis and community leaders must do all in their power to communicate this responsibility to the community, and to encourage all Jews to sign organ donor cards, in line with their halakhic definition of death.

5.  To adopt a restrictive position regarding donating organs and a permissive position regarding receiving organs is morally untenable.  Such an approach is also highly damaging to the State of Israel, both internally and in regards to its relationship with the larger world, and to the Jewish People as a whole.  This approach must thus be unequivocally rejected by Jews at the individual and the communal level.

Appendix B

This statement appeared in today’s HaModia:

12 Shevat, 5771
January 17, 2011

Statement from Agudath Israel of America

The recent “Rabbinic Statement Regarding Organ Donation and Brain Death” signed by several score “Orthodox rabbis and rashei yeshiva” is decidedly unorthodox in its approach to the halachic process. In fact, it makes a mockery of that process, by asking other rabbis to accept one particular halachic view regarding a complex issue pertaining to matters of life and death on the grounds that the times, in the signatories’ estimation, require a certain result.

The statement, signed by congregational and campus rabbis and chaplains, duly acknowledges the halachic controversy over “brainstem death” – the diagnosis that a patient’s brainstem has irreversibly ceased functioning. But it goes on to note that forbidding the removal of vital organs from “brain dead” patients – the considered opinion of major halachic authorities of past years and the present – would have “critical implications for organ donation.” And so, the statement’s signers “strongly recommend that rabbis who are rendering decisions for their laity on this matter demonstrate a strong predisposition to accept” the alternative view. Or, if their consciences do not allow them to do so, that they at least “refer their laity to rabbis” who have no such reservations.

For anyone, rabbi or layman, to decide that a perceived outcome should determine what halachic approach to take is something usually associated with Jewish movements outside of Orthodoxy.

Organ donation can and does save lives. Halachic authorities have ruled that, under certain circumstances and with proper safeguards, it is permissible and indeed laudable to be a live donor, and to bequeath organs after death. But defining death is a crucial halachic matter, not one to be “decided” on the basis of what some consider a societal need.

Compounding the statement’s offensive embrace of a halachic position based on an extra-halachic rationale is its derision of those who take “a restrictive position regarding donating organs and a permissive position regarding receiving organs.” That halachic position, held by a majority of major poskim today, is derided by the statement as “morally untenable,” and “must thus be unequivocally rejected by Jews at the individual and the communal level.”

No. What must be unequivocally rejected by Jews, at least those who care for the honor of Torah, are attempts to manufacture “halacha” to personal specifications and the disparagement of true halachic authorities.

[2] It is likely worth correlating these models with Yitro’s suggestion, and Mosheh Rabbeinu’s somewhat altered implementation, of a tiered judicial system.  An underlying issue here is why, if one believes that the formal halakhic conversation on this issue is indeterminate, one should not simply apply the formal category of safeik (legal uncertainty) and follow the procedural rules generated by that category.  I cannot treat this issue in depth here, but an analogy may be useful.  The rule “halakhah kedivrei hameikil b’eiruvin” (the law always follows the lenient side of controversies with regard to certain legal constructions) cannot be applied in advance, or else the lenient side wins all controversies simply by existing.

G-d created the human in His image

In His image He created him

Male and female He created them

G-d blessed them

G-d said to them: Be fruitful and multiply; fill the land and subdue it; dominate the fish of the sea and the birds of the heavens, and every wild thing that swarms on the land[1].

 How can the anonymous Mishnah, and eventually the Halakhah, contend that the obligation of procreation applies to men and not to women?  Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah’s incredulous response to the anonymous Mishnah: “Scripture says about both of them “G-d blessed them, saying to them: ‘Be fruitful and multiply . . . ‘!?” seems compelling.  This question has generated extensive discussion for at least 2000 years (see the Talmudic discussion appended below with translation) including at least one contemporary book.  Explanations of the Halakhah take two essential forms: literary and ideological.  That is to say, some try to demonstrate that the Halakhah really fits well into the verse, whereas others seek to find a rationale for the Halakhah that justifies reading the verse implausibly.

Our focus this week is on the approach of Rabbi Meir Simkhah of Dvinsk (1843-1926) in his Biblical commentary Meshekh Chokhmah (hereafter MC), appended with translation at the end of the essay.  He offers a reading and two rationales, all of which are noteworthy.  We’ll discuss the reading first and then the rationales.

MC notes that human beings are blessed/commanded to procreate three separate times in Genesis: 1:28, 9:1 and 9:7, and 35:11.  Of these, the first two are grammatically plural, whereas the third is singular.  This by itself is not at all troubling, as the third is spoken directly to an individual Yaakov. 

Rav Yosef (Yebamot 65b) claims that 35:11 is the source for the exclusion of women; he does not tell us how to reconcile this with 1:28 or 9:1-7.  Meshekh Chokhmah reasonably assumes that Rav Yosef sees 35:11 as superseding 1:28.  The remaining difficulty is 9:1-7, and here MC makes the sharp observation that the addressees there are “Noach and his sons”, specifically, with no mention of their wives, even though the wives have appeared in the previous lists of humans leaving the ark.  MC therefore concludes that between 1 and 9 the commandment was narrowed to males.  35:11 is singular because it addresses a single male, Yaakov, whereas 9:1-7 remains plural since it is addressing multiple males, Noach and his sons.

I have a few points that may advance this analysis.  Genesis 1:22 also contains a command “(you plural) be fruitful and multiply”, to various creatures, but at that point no mention has been made of creature genders.  Moreover, the plural of that command likely refers to only some of the nouns included in the antecedent; the command is to be “fruitful and multiply” in the water, whereas the antecedent nouns include both water creatures and birds.  Indeed, the following phrase specifically instructs birds to multiply in the land[2].  Similarly, then, the command to human beings may refer to the species, without taking cognizance of gender, and the antecedent of the plural pronoun in 1:28 may be “adam-human” alone, not “zakhar unekeivah – male and female”. 

If this argument is reasonable, MC can argue that 1:28 is deliberately ambiguous; while in immediate context it most likely applied to both genders, it was written so as to allow for a later understanding as limited only to males.

Having established that the halakhic reading is reasonable – if one assumes a progression – we are left to explain why the progression happened.  MC’s two suggestions are: 

1. Childbirth was originally painless, and therefore the commandment applied to men and women equally.  Chavah’s sin generated as punishment the pain of childbirth, with accompanying risk to life.  G-d does not impose unreasonable demands on His creatures, and demanding that women experience that pain, and take that risk, would be unreasonable.  Therefore He removed the obligation from women.
2. It is against human nature to reject the beloved in favor of the unloved, and humans generally marry the ones they love.  If women were obligated in procreation, then Halakhah would require them to divorce their husbands after ten years of childless marriage.  This would be unreasonable.  Since polygamy is permitted, this argument does not apply to men, who can marry an additional wife after ten childless years.  MC here is building on the halakhic tradition’s decision not to make men divorce their childless wives and marry a more fertile woman when polygamy is impossible or, as in our day, halakhically proscribed by the decree of Rabbeinu Gershom.

The second suggestion leaves open the question of why polygamy is permitted and polyandry forbidden; Deborah Klapper notes that one might argue in reverse that polygamy is permitted only because of the command to procreate, so as to avoid forcing men to divorce their childless wives[3].  We can also ask whether we are using a cannon to shoot a flea.  Why not maintain the commandment but eliminate the consequence, in other words allow childless women to remain married to the men they love and simply pray for a better outcome? 

            It is the first suggestion that we will focus on, however.  Let’s begin by noticing that this is not an offhand exegetical insight, but rather takes on the character of an extended halakhic argument.  MC marshals a large set of halakhic materials to establish that a proposed Halakhah must meet the standard of “Her ways are ways of Pleasantness,” and that imposing childbearing would fail that standard.  It seems to me that he is not arguing that the text compels his reading, but rather that the standard requires the adoption of such a reading.

            MC also seems to shift back and forth as to whether it is the pain, the risk, or the combination of pain and risk that generates the conclusion that procreation cannot be mandatory for women.  In our day the risk is much less, and anesthetics often have significant impact – should that affect the halakhah?  In practice it is very difficult to move halakhah that dramatically, from one side of a Tannaitic dispute to another[4].

            Another halakhic challenge to MC’s suggestion is that some medieval authorities suggested that women are in fact rabbinically obligated to procreate[5]. 

            I want here to play out what I see as a reasonable halakhic implication of MC’s position, in the area of birth control[6]. 

If G-d cannot demand that women have children, kal vachomer men cannot demand this of them.  Indeed, no one suggests that a woman is obligated to marry a man so as to enable the man to fulfill his obligation of procreation.

Therefore, it cannot be prohibited for women to use birth control.[7] 

            When engaged couples come to ask rabbis “the birth control question”, then, it is proper to frame the issue as follows:  Of course the woman can use (some types of ) birth control.  The real question is whether the man can marry her in the knowledge that she will practice contraception[8].  In this perspective, the proper halakhic calculation is whether not marrying her, or divorcing her, is likely to improve his chances of being in a procreative marriage over time.  Generally, I suspect, the answer is no.

            Of course, this discussion only addresses the question of coercion.  MC makes clear that procreation is a good, and rabbinic literature is replete with gender-neutral encomia to procreation.  Furthermore, some rishonim believe that women are rabbinically obligated to procreate[9], and others construct a quasi-obligation to participate in the mitzvah, recognizing that men cannot (or at least in their time could not) fulfill it without women’s participation.  In other words, saying that a woman may use (some types of) contraception – even saying that she has the right to such use – does not imply that she ought to.  Furthermore, I tend to adopt the pastoral maxim that “If you’re not ready to greet children with joy, don’t have sex”, since no means of contraception is perfectly reliable.     

[Editor's Note:  For a sampling of various halakhic opinions on birth control, see here, here, and here.]  
 

תלמוד בבלי מסכת יבמות דף סה עמוד ב

\מתני’\

האיש מצווה על פריה ורביה, אבל לא האשה;

רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר: על שניהם הוא אומר (בראשית א’) “ויברך אותם א-להים ויאמר להם [א-להים] פרו ורבו …”!?

\גמ’\

מנא הני מילי?

אמר ר’ אילעא משום ר’ אלעזר בר’ שמעון: אמר קרא: (בראשית א’) “… ומלאו את הארץ וכבשוה” – איש דרכו לכבש, ואין אשה דרכה לכבש.

אדרבה!? וכבשוה תרתי משמע!?

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק: “וכבשה” כתיב.

רב יוסף אמר מהכא: (בראשית ל”ה) “אני א-ל ש-די פרה ורבה”, ולא קאמר ‘פרו ורבו’.

ואמר רבי אילעא משום ר’ אלעזר בר’ שמעון: כשם שמצוה על אדם לומר דבר הנשמע, כך מצוה על אדם שלא לומר דבר שאינו נשמע.

רבי אבא אומר: חובה, שנאמר: (משלי ט’) “אל תוכח לץ פן ישנאך; הוכח לחכם ויאהבך”.

וא”ר אילעא משום רבי אלעזר בר’ שמעון: מותר לו לאדם לשנות בדבר השלום, שנאמר (בראשית נ’) “אביך צוה וגו’ כה תאמרו ליוסף אנא שא נא וגו’”.

ר’ נתן אומר: מצוה, שנאמר (שמואל א’ ט”ז) “ויאמר שמואל: איך אלך? ושמע שאול והרגני! וגו’”.

דבי רבי ישמעאל תנא: גדול השלום, שאף הקדוש ברוך הוא שינה בו, דמעיקרא כתיב (בראשית י”ח) “ואדוני זקן”, ולבסוף כתיב “ואני זקנתי”.

“רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה אומר” –

אתמר: רבי יוחנן ור’ יהושע בן לוי:

חד אמר: הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה;

וחד אמר: אין הלכה כרבי יוחנן בן ברוקה .

. . .

מאי הוה עלה?

ת”ש: דאמר ר’ אחא בר חנינא אמר ר’ אבהו אמר ר’ אסי: עובדא הוה קמיה דרבי יוחנן בכנישתא דקיסרי, ואמר: יוציא ויתן כתובה.

ואי ס”ד לא מפקדה, כתובה מאי עבידתה?!

דלמא בבאה מחמת טענה,

כי ההיא דאתאי לקמיה דר’ אמי.

אמרה ליה: הב לי כתובה!

אמר לה: זיל, לא מיפקדת.

אמרה ליה: מסיבו דילה, מאי תיהוי עלה דהך אתתא?

אמר: כי הא ודאי כפינן.

ההיא דאתאי לקמיה דרב נחמן.

אמר לה: לא מיפקדת!

אמרה ליה: לא בעיא הך אתתא חוטרא לידה ומרה לקבורה?

אמר: כי הא ודאי כפינן.

יהודה וחזקיה תאומים היו – אחד נגמרה צורתו לסוף תשעה, ואחד נגמרה צורתו לתחלת שבעה.

יהודית דביתהו דר’ חייא הוה לה צער לידה.

שנאי מנא ואתיא לקמיה דר’ חייא.

אמרה: אתתא מפקדא אפריה ורביה?

אמר לה: לא.

אזלא, אשתיא סמא דעקרתא.

לסוף איגלאי מילתא.

אמר לה: איכו ילדת לי חדא כרסא אחריתא,

דאמר מר: יהודה וחזקיה אחי פזי וטוי אחוותא.

ולא מיפקדי?! והאמר רב אחא בר רב קטינא א”ר יצחק: מעשה באשה אחת שחציה שפחה וחציה בת חורין וכפו את רבה ועשאה בת חורין?!

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק: מנהג הפקר נהגו בה.

Talmud Yebamot 65b

Mishnah

The man is commanded regarding fruitfulness and multiplication, but not the woman;

Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah says: Scripture says about both of them “G-d blessed them, saying to them: ‘Be fruitful and multiply . . . ‘!?

Talmud

What is the Biblical source of Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah’s position?

Said R. Ilaa in the name of R. El’azar son of R. Shimon: Scripture says “. . . and (you plural) fill the land and (you plural) subdue it” – it is the way of the man to subdue, and not the way of the woman to subdue.

Just the opposite should be derived from that clause, as it says “(you plural) dominate it”!?

Said Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: It is written without the vav for the plural (although pronounced with).

Rav Yosef said: From here: “I am E-l Sha-ddai: (You singular) be fruitful and multiply”, rather than saying ‘(You plural) be fruitful and multiply’.

Another thing Rabbi Ilaa said in the name of R. El’azar son of R. Shimon: “Just as there is a mitvah upon a person to say something that will be heeded, so too there is a mitzvah on a person not to say something that will not be heeded.

Rabbi Abba said: This is (not merely a mitzvah but rather) and obligation, as Scripture says: “Do not rebuke a scoffer lest he hate you; rebuke a sage and he will love you.”

Another thing Rabbi Ilaa said in the name of R. El’azar son of R. Shimon:  A person may alter (the truth) for the sake of peace, as Scripture says: . . .

R. Natan said: It is a mitzvah to do this, as Scripture says . . .

The House of Rabbi  Yishmael taught the following beraita: “Great is peace, for even The Holy Blessed One alters the truth for the sake of peace . . .

“Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah said: Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah

An Amoraic dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi:

One said: The halakhah follows Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah;

The other said: The halakhah does not follow Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah.

. . .

What was said about this issue?

Come hear the following evidence: R. Acha bar Chanina said R. Avahu said R. Assi: A case (of a woman suing for divorce because she was long-term childless) came before Rav Yochanan in the public meeting house in Caeserea, and he said: The man must divorce her and pay her ketubah.

And if you were to think that woman were not commanded, why would he have to pay the ketubah (since she sued for divorce without sufficient justification)?!

Maybe she came with a sufficient rationale,

            As in the case of a woman who came before R, Ami.

            She said to him: Award me my ketubah!

            He told her: Go away! You are not commanded (to procreate).

            She said to him: In my old age, what will happen to this woman?

            He said: In such a case we certainly compel (the man to divorce her).

A(nother such) woman came before Rav Nachman:

He said to her: You are not commanded!

She said to him: Does not this woman need a walkingstick for her hand and a shovel for burial?

He said: In such a case we certainly compel (the man to divorce her).

(Yehudah and Chizkiyah were twins, one of whom was complete at the end of nine months, the other at the beginning of the seventh.)

Yehudit the wife of R. Chiyya had a painful childbirth.

She changed clothes and came before R. Chiyya.

She said: Is a woman commanded regarding being fruitful and multiplying?

He said to her: No!

She went and drank a sterilizing potion.

In the end this became known.

He said to her: If only you had borne me one more full stomach,

as Mar said:Yehudah and Chizkiyah were twin brothers: Pazi and Tavi were twin sisters.

Are women really not commanded!? But said R. Acha son of R. Ketina said R. Yitzchak: A true story: A woman who was half slave and half free, and they forced her master to free (her enslaved half on the ground that otherwise she could not marry)?!

Said R. Nachman bar Yitzchak: They behaved lewdly with her.

משך חכמה לבראשית ט:ז

1)      “פרו ורבו וכו’” –

2)      לא רחוק הוא לאמר הא שפטרה התורה נשים מפו”ר וחייבה רק אנשים כי משפטי ה’ ודרכיו דרכי נועם וכל נתיבותיה שלום ולא עמסה על הישראלי מה שאין ביכולת הגוף לקבל,

3)      ומכל דבר האסור לא מנעה התורה בסוגה ההיתר, כמו שאמרו פרק כל הבשר (חולין קט סע”ב),

4)      ומשום זה לא מצאנו מצוה להתענות רק יום אחד בשנה, וקודם הזהירה וחייבה לאכול,

5)      וכן לא מנעה המשגל מכל בריה לבד ממשה רבינו (שבת פז) לפי שלא היה צריך לגודל מעלתו ולזהירות גופו,

6)      ויותר מזה, במלחמה, בעת הנצחון, לגודל החום והרחבת הלב, ידע א-ל דעות כי אז לא יתכן לעצור בעד הרוח בעת חשקו באשה יפ”ת, והתירה התורה יפ”ת א”א, וכמאמרם (קדושין כא סע”ב) לא דברה תורה אלא כנגד יצה”ר,

7)      וכבר האריך בזה מחבר אחד,

8)      ומצאנו איך היה זאת לאבן פינה לאבות הקבלה, שפטרו מיבום מי שמתו בניו אח”כ משום דרכיה דרכי נועם (יבמות פז:).

9)      וא”כ נשים שמסתכנות בעיבור ולידה, ומשום זה אמרו מיתה שכיחא – עיין תוס’ כתובות פ”ג ע”ב ד”ה מיתה שכיחא – לא גזרה התורה לצוות לפרות ולרבות על אשה,

10)  וכן מותרת לשתות כוס עיקרין, וכעובדא דיהודית דביתהו דר”ח סוף הבא ע”י,

11)  רק לקיום המין עשה בטבעה שתשוקתה להוליד עזה משל איש (עיין ב”מ פד רע”א ורש”י ד”ה כי כאיש לשון אחר וכו’), ומצאנו לרחל שאמרה (בראשית ל) “הבה לי בנים ואם אין מתה אנכי”,

12)  ובזה ניחא הך דאמר רב יוסף סוף פרק הבא ע”י דאין נשים מצוות בפו”ר מהכא “אני א-ל ש-די פרה ורבה”, (בראשית לה, יא), ולא קאמר “פרו ורבו” (בראשית א, כח) –

13)  היינו, דבאדם וחוה שבירך אותן קודם החטא, שלא היה צער לידה, היו מצוות שניהם בפו”ר ואמר להם פרו ורבו,

14)  אבל לאחר החטא, שהיה לה צער לידה (בראשית ג, טז) והיא רוב פעמים מסתכנת מזה עד כי אמרו (נדה לא:) אשה נשבעת שלא תזדקק כו’,

15)  לכן בנח, אף דכתיב “ויאמר להם פרו ורבו”, הלא כתיב קודם “ויברך את נח ואת בניו”, אבל נשיהם לא הזכיר, שאינם בכלל מצוה דפו”ר,

16)  וביעקב קאמר “פרה ורבה” (בראשית לה, יא),

17)  וזה נכון, ובמהרש”א סנהדרין נ”ח (נט: סד”ה גמרא והרי פ”ו) הניח זה בויש ליישב וכוון לזה ודו”ק.

18)  עוד יתכן לאמר בטעם שפטרה התורה נשים מפו”ר –

19)  משום דבאמת הלא הטביעה בטבע התשוקה, ובנקבה עוד יותר, כמו שאמרו (קדושין ז) טב למיתב טן דו וכו’,

20)  ודי במה שהיא מוכרחת בטבע,

21)  וע”כ דעיקר המצוה היא כמו דתנן ביבמות (סא: במשנה) לא יבטל אדם מפו”ר אא”כ יש לו בנים כו’, דאם נשא אשה ולא ילדה, מחוייב ליקח אשה שיש לה בנים,

22)  ומדרך התורה לבלי לגדור הטבע,

23)  וכיו”ב אמרו “דרכיה דרכי נועם” כמוש”כ,

24)  ולכן לגזור על האשה כי תנשא לאיש ולא יוליד תצא מאהוב נפשה ותקח איש אחר – זה נגד הטבע לאהוב השנוא ולשנוא האהוב, ורק האיש שיכול לישא עוד אחרת עליו הטילה התורה מצוה,

25)  וזה המשך המאמרים שאמר ר’ אלעזר בר”ש סוף פרק הבא ע”י, ודו”ק.

Meshekh Chokhmah Genesis 9:7

1)      “Be fruitful and multiply” –

2)      It is not implausible to say that the reason that the Torah exempted women from “be fruitful and multiply”, obligating only men, is that the laws of Hashem and His ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are peaceful, and so it did not impose a burden on the Jew that the body cannot accept.

3)      With regard to every prohibition, the Torah left the permissibility of something in the same category unobstructed, as per Chullin 109b.

4)      For this reason we find no commandment to fast other than one day a year, and prior to that fast the Torah commands and obligates eating,

5)      and similarly it did not withhold copulation from anyone other than Mosheh Rabbeinu (Shabbat 87), since owing to his great spiritual height and his body’s punctiliousness, he had no need for.

6)      More than this, in war, at a time of victory, owing to the great fever and breadth of heart, the G-d Who Knows Minds knew that it would be unreasonable to constrain that spirit.at the time that he lusts for “the attractive captive”, and the Torah permitted even a married “attractive captive”, as per the Sages’ statement: “The Torah here spoke taking into account the evil inclination”.

7)      A different author has already addresses this at length[10].

8)      We have found this to be a cornerstone for the Greats of the Tradition, as they excluded from the institution of levirate marriage a woman whose child from her first husband died after her remarriage on the ground that “Her ways are ways of pleasantness”. (Yebamot 87b).

9)      Accordingly, since women are endangered by pregnancy and birth, to the point that the rabbis said “Death is common” – see Tosafot Ketubot 83b – the Torah did not decree the command of being fruitful and multiplying on women.

10)  They are also permitted to drink a sterilizing potion, as per the case of Yehudit the wife of Rav Chisda on Yebamot 65b.

11)  However, so as to sustain the species, He put in her nature a desire to procreate stronger than that of men (see Bava Metzia 84a and Rashi thereupon)[11], and we have found Rachel saying “Give me children!  If not, I am dead” (Breishit 30).

12)  On this basis, we can explain well the statement of Rav Yosef on Ketubot 65b that the exemption of women from the commandment of being fruitful and multiplying derives from Genesis 9:7 “I am E-l Sha-ddai; you (singular) be fruitful and multiplying”, rather than you (plural) as in Genesis 1:28 –

13)  because Adam and Chavah, who were blessed before the sin, when childbirth was not a travail, were both commanded to be fruitful and multiply, as He said to them:You (plural) be fruitful and multiply,

14)  But after the sin, childbirth became a travail (Genesis 3:16), and she is usually endangered by this to the point that the Sages say (Niddah 31) “A woman swears never to engage in intimate relations again”[12],

15)  so regarding Noach, even though Scripture writes “You (plural) be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 9:1), that clause is preceded by “He blessed Noach and his sons”, without mentioning their wives, because they were not included in the command to be fruitful and multiply,

16)  and regarding Yaakov He said “you (singular) be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 35:11).

17)  This is correct, and when Maharsha to Sanhedrin 59b ends his presentation of the singular/plural differences among these verses by saying “but these can be resolved”, he refers to what I have said.

18)  It is further reasonable to say regarding the reason that the Torah exempted women from being fruitful and multiplying –

19)  That indeed He embedded this yearning in nature, and to a greater extent in women, as the Sages say (Kiddushin 7) “Women think it is better to be married to any man”[13],

20)  and her natural compulsion is sufficient,

21)  as certainly the essential mitzvah is as presented in Mishnah Yebamot 61b “A man must not remove himself from being fruitful and multiplying unless he has sons”, so that if he married a woman and she has not given birth, he is obligated to marry a woman who can have children,

22)  and it is the way of Torah not to fence in nature,

23)  and along these lines the Sages say “Her ways are ways of pleasantness”, as I wrote above,

24)  and therefore, to decree on a woman that if she is married to a man and he doesn’t sire, that she should leave the love of her soul and marry another man – this is against nature, to love the hated and hate the beloved, so it is only on the man, who can marry another woman in addition to this first wife, that the Torah imposed the commandment.

25)  This is implied by the flow of the statements of R. Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon on Yebamot 65b.[14]   

[2] Although not to be fruitful

[3] There might also be an economic concern for the wife here, as childless divorced women would have no family to support them in their old age.

[4]Perhaps MC also factored the experience of pregnancy as such into his suggestion.  Regardless, we must be very careful, when making this argument, to be pellucid that it does not generate a right of abortion.  The principle “her ways are ways of pleasantness” does not prevent G-d from demanding that we surrender our lives on occasion; demands that are unreasonable in one context are reasonable in another., and preventing fertilization is not the same issue as terminating a fetus. 

[5] I discuss the question of women’s rabbinic obligation, which remains a contentious halakhic issue, in my series on Kibbud Av VaEim.

[6] My approach here owes much to the broad approach of Rabbi Yehudah Herzl Henkin to issues of gender, but does not to the best of my knowledge follow his specific halakhic prescriptions on this issue.

[7] So long as they use means that do not violate prohibitions, such as one against self-castration. 

[8] The question of whether, once married, he can have marital relations with her, is one of means rather than of principle.  He has an obligation of onah regardless, and so cannot even use her lack of fertility as an excuse for avoiding marital relations.  Some barrier methods raise issues of hashchatat zera for him, but there are certainly methods that are unproblematic in this regard.

[9] MC is of course aware of this.  This obligation is offered to explain why we might coerce men to enable women to marry; I suspect that MC would argue that the standard for excusing women from the obligation should be low.

[10] I would much appreciate any insights with regard to this reference.          

[11] In context this may refer to sexual rather than procreative desire

[12] In context this may relate to pain rather than danger

[13] This statement has implications in other halakhic contexts that I hope to address in writing soon.

[14] Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon is first cited as bringing a prooftext for the exemption of women, and then for saying that “Just as there is a mitzvah to say things that will be heeded, so too there is a mitzvah to not say things that will not be heeded”.  The second statement has no obvious contextual relevance.  Meshekh Chokhmah is apparently arguing that the second statement is the ground of the first, in other words that R. Elazar son of R. Shimon thinks that Hashem exempted women because they would find it very difficult to obey.  Note, however, that R. Elazar’s prooftext rests on a claim that it is not the way of women to conquer/subordinate others, and therefore one can accept Meshekh Chokhmah’s structural reading but contend that R. Elazar son of R. Shimon has a different understanding that Mesheskh Chokhmah of why such a command would likely not be well-heeded.

“ויקח קרח” – פרשה זו יפה נדרשת במדרש רבי תנחומא.

“ויקח קרח” – לקח את עצמו לצד אחד להיות נחלק מתוך העדה לעורר על הכהונה,

וזהו שתרגם אונקלוס “ואתפלג” – נחלק משאר העדה להחזיק במחלוקת,

וכן (איוב טו, יב) “מה יקחך לבך” – לוקח אותך להפליגך משאר בני אדם.

דבר אחר:

“ויקח קרח” – משך ראשי סנהדראות שבהם בדברים,

כמו שנאמר (במדבר כ, כה) “קח את אהרן”, (הושע יד, ג) “קחו עמכם דברים”:

. . .

מה עשה? עמד וכנס מאתים חמישים ראשי סנהדראות, רובן משבט ראובן שכיניו, והם אליצור בן שדיאור וחביריו וכיוצא בו,

שנאמר “נשיאי עדה קריאי מועד”, ולהלן הוא אומר (במדבר א, טז) “אלה קרואי העדה”,

והלבישן טליתות שכולן תכלת. באו ועמדו לפני משה. אמרו לו: טלית שכולה של תכלת, חייבת בציצית או פטורה?

אמר להם: חייבת.

התחילו לשחק עליו: אפשר טלית של מין אחר חוט אחד של תכלת פוטרה, זו שכולה תכלת לא תפטור את עצמה?!

 ספר הזכרון

כלומר: כל ענין קרח, לפי שכל מה שכתב בה הרב ז”ל רובו בתנחומא

 גור אריה

מפני שקשה לו לשון “ויקח” שלא היה לו לכתוב כאן

ומתרץ: פרשה זו יפה נדרשת וכו’, ואגב דרשה דהתם נדרש לשון ויקח כמו שמפרש אחריו . . .

מזרחי

כלומר: שהוא קרוב לפשוטו של מקרא, ולא נצטרך לפרשו לפי פשוטו כמנהגו בשאר מקומות.

 לבוש האורה

נ”ל דה”פ: קשה לרש”י “ויקח קרח” ולא כתיב את מי לקח או מה לקח . . .

ומתרץ: על כרחך אין המקרא הזה אומר אלא דרשני, ועל זה אמר רש”י ויפה דרשהו במדרש ר’ תנחומא – בדרש שהוא קרוב לפשוטו. ואומר אח”כ: ומהו הדרש? . . .

 מהרש”א

ואיכא למידק: וכי לא ראה רש”י שום דרש יפה כי אם זה?

ובשפתי דעת תירץ דכך פרושו:

לפי שכל דרש צריך שיהיה לו שום רמז בפסוק בפי’ המלות, חוץ מדרש זה, לפי שסתם הפסוק לקיחתו,

כי אמר “ויקח קרח” ולא פירש מה לקח,

אם כן מסתמא דעת הפסוק לומר לך שכל הדברים השייכים אל המחלוקת, את כלם לקח לסעד,

וא”כ מעתה הרשות נתונה לכל דורש לומר את זה לקח או את זה – אע”פ שאין הדבר מפרש בקרא, מ”מ נקרא יפה נדרש, כי בזה רצה הכתוב.

ומטעם זה רבו הפירושים בלקיחה זו:

כי יש אומרם לקח את עצמו לצד אחר, ויש אומרים לקח ראשי סנהדראות, ויש אומרים לקח טליתות,

כמבואר כל זה במדרשות.  וק”ל.

Rashi

“And Korach took” – This parshah is darshened well in the midrash of Rabbi Tanchuma.

“And Korach took” – he took himself to one side, to be separated out from the midst of the congregation so as to raise a challenge to the kehunah,

And this is the meaning of Onkelos’ translation “and he separated” – he separated from the rest of the congregation to be firm in dissension,

And similarly “why does your heart take you” – take you to separate from the rest of humanity.

Another interpretation:

“And Korach took” – he drew along the heads of Sanhedrins among them with words,

            as Scripture says: “Take Aharon”, and “Take words with you”.

. . .

What did Korach do?  He caused to enter 250 heads of Sanhedrin, mostly from his neighbors the Tribe of Reuven, namely Elitzur ben Shdeiur and and his peers and the like, as Scripture says here “nesiei eidah kri’ei moed”, and there “eileh kruei haeidah”, and dressed them in tallitot all of tchelet.  They came and stood before Mosheh.  They said to him:  A tallit all of tchelet, does it require tzitzit or not?

He said to them: It requires tzitzit.

They began mocking him: Is it possible that for a tallit of a different color, one thread of tchelet suffices, but this which is all of tchelet is not sufficient for itself?

 Sefer HaZikkaron

As if to say: the entire matter of Korach, since of all that Rashi wrote, most is in the Tanchuma

Gur Aryeh (Maharal of Prague)

Because he was bothered by the word “and he took”, which it should not have written here,

and he responds: “This parshah was darshened well etc.”, and following the derashah there, the word “and he took” is darshened as he explains afterward

Mizrachi

As if to say: that is close to the peshat of Scripture, and we will not need to explain it in accordance with its peshat, as is Rashi’s custom in other places

Levush haOrah

It seems to me that it should be explained thus: Rashi finds “and Korach took” difficult, when it does not write who or what he took . . .

And he responds: You are compelled to concede that “this verse says nothing other than darshen me”, and it is in this context that Rashi says “and they darshened it well in the midrash of R. Tanchuma” – with a derash that is close to its peshat.  And he says afterward: And what is the derash? . . .

Maharsha (citing, with some omissions near the end, from Siftei Daat)

One might ask on close reading: Has Rashi seen no well-done derash other than this?

In Siftei Da’at he answered that it should be interpreted thus:

Since all derash needs to have some hint in the verse at the level of translation, other than this derash, since the verse made Korach’s taking unspecified,

Since it says “and Korach took” and did not specify what he took,

Therefore presumably the intent of the verse is to say to you that all things relevant to the dispute – he talk all of them for support,

Therefore now that permission has been granted to each doresh to say that he took this or took that – even though the matter is not explicit in the text, it is called well-done derash, because this is what Scripture wished.

For this reason interpretations of this taking have become numerous:

For some say that he took himself to one side, and others say that he took the heads of Sanhedrins, and others say that he took tallitot,

as is all explained in the midrashot, and this can be easily understood.

Anaylsis:

How should one parse a professed pashtan’s praise of a particular derash?  In the case of Rashi’s introduction to Parashat Korach, Mizrachi argues that one should understand it as a statement that this midrash reads the text more like pshat than usual, so much so that it makes a separate pshat-commentary unnecessary.  Levush HaOrah takes a somewhat different tack, suggesting that the verse invites derash, which here was done in the right way, i.e. a way close to peshat.  But I will focus this week on the relationship between peshat and derash in the interpretation cited by Maharsha from Siftei Da’at.

Siftei Da’at suggests that the verse, by saying that “Korach took” but leaving what he took unspecified, implies at the level of peshat that Korach took everything relevant.  This, he says, means that the derash, when supplying concrete details of what Korach took, is not bound by the constraint of evidence – anything that plausibly would have supported Koach’s aim is legitimately included, even if it is nowhere hinted in the text.

It’s not clear to me how radically Siftei Da’at intends this statement.  But it seems clear to me

a)       that he sees midrash as a creative act of exegesis rather than as the transmission of an oral tradition that exists independently of the text, and

b)       that he does not require midrashim to be historically true, or at the least that he understands at least some midrashim as speculations about the past based on purely textual, often slim, evidence.

I wonder to what extent he, and by extension Maharasha, would have been disturbed by anachronisms in Biblical interpretation.  Must Korach have taken with him only crowd-control items that were available in the Wilderness back then, or could a contemporary doresh include a megaphone on the list?  Did he carry his shtreimel with him, or his kippah srugah?

            Also – does Siftei Daat require a specific positive statement of broad inclusion to legitimate speculative derash about details, or is license granted to provide via derash any details not spelled out in the text?

            All this adds up to the question of whether, granting that chumash is historically accurate, it is important for us to experience it in that way, or whether we can even seek out ahistorical understandings, such as children’s editions in which the Patriarchs and Matriarchs wear clothes that mark them as members of particular contemporary Jewish circles. 

Modern Orthodoxy tends to insist

a)       that preserving historical context is crucial to properly understanding chumash;

b)       that peshat and derash use different modes of reading narrative, and

c)       that peshat is more congenial to Modern Orthodoxy. 

I suggest that we instead see peshat and derash as different expressions of the same mode of reading narrative, with derash concretizing its speculations into specific narrative claims; that historical context is often useful, but absolutely necessary only when making historical claims; and that a confident Modern Orthodoxy would be engaged in developing its own derash-interpretation.

            It is probably necessary to add that I sharply distinguish derash, a mode of close reading, from derush, which often involves forcing complicated texts into a limited set of preapproved slogans.  Derush has its place as well, and Modern Orthodoxy needs to develop its set of slogans and associated texts, so that, for example, everyone knows that the story of Moshe saving Yitro’s daughters teaches us that Jews must stand up against any injustice perpetrated against anyone anywhere.  There is also a mode of derush, such as that of R. Yitzchak Hutner in Pachad Yitzchak, which develops very complicated and sophisticated lessons by seeing the rabbinic corpus, halakhic and nonhalakhic, as a coherent whole within which abstract contradictions can be resolved casuistically.  My comments above relate only to derash. 

            In that context, I welcome suggestions as to what Korach took along with him.

ארבע מדות באדם:

האומר שלי שלי ושלך שלך –                         זו מדה בינונית;

ויש אומרים זו מדת סדום;

שלי שלך ושלך שלי –                                  עם הארץ;

שלי שלך ושלך שלך –                                 חסיד;

שלי שלי ושלך שלי –                                   רשע:

 ארבע מדות בדעות:

נוח לכעוס ונוח לרצות –                              יצא שכרו בהפסדו;

קשה לכעוס וקשה לרצות –                                     יצא הפסדו בשכרו;

קשה לכעוס ונוח לרצות –                           חסיד;

נוח לכעוס וקשה לרצות –                           רשע.    

 ארבע מדות בתלמידים:

מהר לשמוע ומהר לאבד –                            יצא שכרו בהפסדו;

קשה לשמוע וקשה לאבד –                           יצא הפסדו בשכרו;

מהר לשמוע וקשה לאבד -                            חכם;

קשה לשמוע ומהר לאבד –                            זה חלק רע.

 ארבע מדות בנותני צדקה:

הרוצה שיתן ולא יתנו אחרים –                       עינו רעה בשל אחרים;

יתנו אחרים והוא לא יתן –                             עינו רעה בשלו;

יתן ויתנו אחרים –                                       חסיד;

לא יתן ולא יתנו אחרים –                              רשע.

 ארבע מדות בהולכי לבית המדרש:

הולך ואינו עושה –                                      שכר הליכה בידו;

עושה ואינו הולך –                                      שכר מעשה בידו;

הולך ועושה -                                            חסיד;

לא הולך ולא עושה –                                   רשע.

 ארבע מדות ביושבי לפני חכמים: ספוג ומשפך משמרת ונפה

ספוג –                                                     שהוא סופג את הכל;

משפך -                                                  שמכניס בזו ומוציא בזו;

משמרת -                                                שמוציאה את היין וקולטת את השמרים;

ונפה -                                                    שמוציאה את הקמח וקולטת את הסולת.

Avot 5:11

Human beings have one of four characters:

Easy to anger and easy to appease –  his loss is paid for by his gain;

Hard to anger and hard to appease –  his gain is used up paying for his loss.^[1]

Hard to anger and easy to appease –   a pious person

Easy to anger and easy to appease -   a wicked person

שו”ת אגרות משה חלק או”ח א סימן נד

בענין ת”ח שאינו קשה כברזל לפי’ הרגמ”ה =הרבינו גרשום מאור הגולה= י”א מנ”א תשי”ז.

מע”כ ידידי תלמידי הרה”ג מוה”ר אפרים גרינבלאט שליט”א.

מה שהקשה ידידי על פירוש רגמ”ה בתענית דף ד’ בהא דא”ר אשי כל ת”ח שאינו קשה כברזל אינו ת”ח, שהוא שאינו קשה לרצות מהא דתנן בפ”ה מאבות מי”א שחסיד הוא קשה לכעוס ונוח לרצות.

הנכון לע”ד דהם שני ענינים, דבתענית איירי שיהיה קשה כברזל להיות עומד על דעתו כשהוא סובר זה לאמת לפי הדין וההלכה, שבזה אם כעס על אלו שלא רצו לעשות כדעתו, אם יהיה נוח לרצות הרי יאמרו שמה שנוח לרצות אינו מצד מעלת מדותיו אלא מחמת שמתחלה לא היה לו לכעוס שיודע בלבו שאין האמת כדעתו אך שאינו רוצה להודות בפירוש שטעה, ויבא מזה מכשול בדין זה וגם בדינים אחרים שלא יחושו להוראותיו שיאמרו שאינו ת”ח הראוי לסמוך עליו.  

ומדויק לפ”ז לשון רב אשי שאומר שאינו ת”ח, דלכאורה מה שייך זה לחכמתו והיה לו לומר שלא טוב עושה, אבל הוא משום שזהו הטעם שבזה יעשה שיאמרו עליו שאינו ת”ח ואין לסמוך על הוראותיו והנהגותיו ולא יהיה התועלת שיש בעיר מת”ח, ונמצא שבאמת הוא לגבי זה כאינו ת”ח.

וכן ניחא מה שא”ר אבא לרב אשי אתון מהתם מתניתו לה אנן מהכא מתנינן לה אבניה ברזל אל תקרי אבניה אלא בוניה, שלשון זה משמע שהוא ממש כמו שאמר רב אשי ורק שדורש מקרא אחר, והא לכאורה הוא ענין אחר לא שאינו ת”ח אלא שדרש מהקרא דאבניה ברזל שת”ח צריך להיות כברזל וידעינן רק שאם אינו כברזל אינו עושה כראוי. דבשלמא קרא דדריש רב אשי מוכפטיש יפוצץ סלע שייך לדרוש דאינו ת”ח, דהא מצייר הת”ח שהוא כפטיש משמע שאם אינו כפטיש אינו בציור ת”ח, אבל קרא דאבניה ברזל נאמר רק שהת”ח שלה מתנהגים כברזל, שמשמע רק שהוא חסרון בהנהגת הת”ח ולא שבזה מתבטל ממנו שם ת”ח. אבל הוא כדבארתי, שמה שא”ר אשי שאינו ת”ח הוא לענין התועלת לגבי עלמא שילמדו ממנו אינו כת”ח שיטעו מזה להחשיבו שאומר ומתחרט בלבו ולא בפיו ואין לסמוך עליו, וזהו גם מה שא”ר אבא דת”ח שנחשבו בונים הוא שיודעים מהם העולם איך להתנהג בדרך התורה, וזהו שפרש”י ת”ח מקיימי עולם בבנינייהו, וכשלא יקשו כברזל ויהיו נוחין לרצות להעוברין על דעתן שיטעו לחשוב שהוא מפני שהתחרט בלבו הרי לא יבנה שוב שלא יסמכו עליו להתנהג כמותו. ונמצא שאומרים תרוויהו דבר אחד אך משני פסוקים.

ומתני’ דאבות מיירי בכעס על דבר שעשו שלא כהוגן שהוא מפורסם וידוע גם לעלמא וגם להעושה שהוא מעשה רע שלא יטעו כשיהיה נוח לרצות שהוא מתחרט בלבו אלא יבינו שהוא ממדה הטובה שמתנהג משום שצריך להתנהג ברצון ונחת עם הבריות.

ועיין ברבנו יונה שם שכתב שלא אמר שלא יכעוס כלל לעולם כי לפעמים צריך האדם לכעוס לקנאת ה’ כפינחס לכן אמר קשה לכעוס שיש לו לכעוס אך בקושי הפעמים וג”כ טוב להתרצות מיד בעוד כעסו עליו ולא אחר שיסור כעסו מעליו אלא בשעת הכעס ממש הוא נוח לרצות, כי זוהי ממדת החסידות וטוב לבב עיי”ש. הרי פי’ שהכעס של החסיד הוא לקנאת ה’ כפינחס ומ”מ מתרצה מיד בשעת הכעס, והוא משום שהוא דבר מפורסם למעשה רע וליכא שום חשש במה שיתרצה מיד שיבינו הכל שהוא ממדת החסידות וטוב לבב, אבל אם הדבר אינו מפורסם לדבר רע כהא דמעשה פינחס אף שהוא ג”כ לצורך שיתנהגו בדרך הטוב, אין לו להתרצות מיד משום שאפשר אדרבה יצא מזה מכשול שלא יחושו לדבריו כמו שלא הי’ ת”ח כדלעיל.

וניחא מה שמסיק רבינא בתענית /ד/ אפ”ה מיבעי ליה לאינש למילף נפשיה בניחותא שנאמר והסר כעס מלבך, שמשמע שלא פליג על רב אשי, משום דכיון דאיירי ברוצה להנהיגם בדבר טוב שלא ידעו מעצמם ודאי אם כבר כעס אין לו להתרצות בקל כמו שא”ר אשי מטעם דבארתי, אבל מתחלה צריך למילף נפשי’ בניחותא, היינו שיבקש דרך איך להורותם ולהנהיגם בניחותא שנא’ והסר כעס מלבך, שהוא עצה שיעץ קהלת לת”ח שאף כשיש תועלת מכעסם יראו איך שאפשר להסר הכעס ולבקש דרכים אחרים להורותם בניחותא, שאם יעשו בדרך הכעס הרי לא יוכלו להסירו תיכף כדי שלא יטעו לומר שנתחרטו בלבם, ואם הי’ הכעס לקנאת ה’ לדברים מפורסמים כהא דפינחס הרי צריך לעשות זה דוקא בכעס להראות שצריך להתרגש לכבוד ה’.  

ועיין ברמב”ם מה שלכאורה יש סתירה ממש”כ בפ”א מדעות ה”ד על הא דכתב בפ”ב ה”ג בענין הכעס והלח”מ עמד בזה.

ולע”ד בפ”ב נקט הא דרבינא שכתב וילמד עצמו שלא יכעוס ואפילו על דבר שראוי לכעוס עליו, והוא כדפירשתי שלא פליג על רב אשי ובעצם ראוי לכעוס עליו שהוא לש”ש, אבל מ”מ ילמד עצמו לבקש דרכים אחרים אם אפשר והם בדברים שאין מפורסמים להעומדים שם שהוא דבר שצריך לכעוס עליו ורק שממה שכועס על זה ילמדו שיש בזה צורך. אבל בדברים המפורסמים שהוא דבר רע, הוא דבר גדול שראוי לכעוס עליו שכתב בפ”א שע”ז ג”כ לא יהיה נוח לכעוס אם אפשר שלא להרגיש שעשה בזה דבר רע אף שהוא הרגיש ויכול להסביר שהוא דבר רע דכיון דאפשר שאחרים לא הרגישו לא יאמרו שעשה זה לש”ש אבל בזה לא יהיה כמת שאינו מרגיש כלל דכיון דהרבה ירגישו יאמרו שא”צ למחות, אלא יתנהג באופן בינוני, שאם האומדנא הוא שהרבה ירגישו שראוי לכעוס עליו צריך לכעוס.

. . .

Igrot Moshe OC1:54

Regarding my dear friend’s question against Rabbeinu Gershom’s comment on Taanit 4 that Rav Ashi’s statement that “any talmid chakham who is not hard as brass is not a talmid chakham’ refers to a scholar who is not hard to appease, but Avot 5:11 says that a pious man is one who is hard to anger but easy to appease –

The correct explanation in my humble opinion is that there are two different matters – Taanit refers to one who is hard as brass in standing by his opinion when he considers it true according to the law and practice, as in such a case if he has expressed anger toward those who did not wish to act in accordance with his opinion, if he is appeased easily, they will say that his easy appeasement does not reflect his good character but rather a recognition that his original anger was unjustified, as he knows in his heart that his position was untrue, and does not wish to concede explicitly, and this will cause a stumbling block with regard to this law and with regard to other laws, as they will not be concerned for his rulings and will say that he is not a talmid chakham who can be relied upon . . .

Whereas Avot refers to anger about something that was done inappropriately, in which everyone knows, even the perpetrator, that it was evil, so they will not err when he is easily appeased and think that he regrets in his heart, but rather they will understand that it is out of good character, that one must behave with grace and pleasantness with people . . .

See Rabbeinu Yonah thereupon who wrote that it does not say that he should never get angry at all, ever, because at times a person must get angry out of zealotry for G-d, like Pinchas – therefore it says “hard to anger”, because he does need to get angry, with difficulty, occasionally . . .

 And this fits well with Ravina’s conclusion in Taanit that “Nonetheless, a person should teach himself calmness, as Scripture says ‘and remove anger from your heart’”, and the implication is that he does not disagree with Rav Ashi, because since it is discussing a circumstance in which he is trying to guide them to recognize a good they did not recognize on their own, certainly if he had already gotten angry he should not be lightly appeased, as Rav Ashi said and I explained, but initially one should teach oneself calmness, meaning that one should seek a path to teach and direct them calmly, as Scripture says “and remove anger from your heart” – this is advice from Kohelet to scholars, that even if their anger would be effective, they should look for ways of removing the anger and seek ways to teach calmly, because if they do it in the way of anger, they will not be able to remove it immediately so that others will not err and think that they have regret in their hearts, but if their anger is out of zealotry for G-d about matters that are popularly known to be wrong, such as that of Pinchas, one has to do this specifically with anger, to show that one needs to be emotionally invested in the Honor of Hashem.. . .

Analysis:  
            David Hume wrote that “Reason is, and ought to be, only the slave of the passions”.  But being the servant of multiple masters requires one to use judgment, as the wills of the masters will inevitably conflict – this argument against polytheism applies as well to the passions.  Thus it is no contradiction to Hume when Maimonides argues that the expression of emotion should be rationally regulated, as one always needs to decide which passion currently deserves expression.  I think they can push on together even beyond that and suggest that not only the expression but the experience of emotions should be regulated, although the nature of the regulatory mechanism would require negotiation.

            Some seem to suggest that Rambam actually wished to eliminate emotion entirely, and permitted only its appearance.  Rambam’s self-contradictions regarding anger leave much room for eisegesis. Against this, R. Mosheh here offers what I would call a much more mature model, in which the capacity to feel anger specifically is a religious necessity.  R. Mosheh also offers a theory of effective religious leadership that will be the focus of our learning this week.

            To resolve an apparent contradiction between Avot 5:11 and Rabbeinu Gershom as to whether being hard to appease when angry is a virtue or rather a vice, R. Mosheh posits a tiered system of community management for scholars.

a)      When there is public misbehavior, but even most perpetrators would acknowledge that their behavior is wrong, the scholar must express anger but be easily and rapidly appeased. 

b)      When there is public misbehavior and the public believes itself justified, a scholar should seek to find modes of response that do not require anger.  However, if anger turns out to be necessary, the scholar must be difficult to appease, lest the public conclude that he changed his mind and their behavior was indeed legitimate.

I suggest that Rav Moshe, in contrast to Rambam, seeks to regulate the expression of anger rather than to suppress its experience.  Rav Moshe assumes that scholars ought to feel anger at violations of Torah; however, whether to express it should be a pedagogic decision.  Thus it is necessary to respond with anger when the public misbehaves knowingly, because it is important to teach the public that they ought to be experiencing the anger that the scholar is experiencing.  If the scholar feels no anger, he is a poor role model.

            However, anger is not inherently warranted when people misbehave and cannot recognize that they are defying G-d, either because anger will be ineffective in changing their opinions, or else because anger is an appropriate emotional reaction only to defiance, or violation of the honor of G-d.  If it is nonetheless chosen for instrumental purposes, it must be sustained so that the public can recognize that the opinion is firmly held.  Sustaining anger has a cost to the scholar’s character, however, which should encourage scholar to find other pedagogic means. 

            Rav Mosheh’s underlying assumptions are that being a talmid chakham is inherently a leadership position, and that scholars must recognize that they are responsible not only for giving correct answers but for conveying them with effective pedagogy.

יוסי בן יועזר אומר: יהי ביתך בית ועד לחכמים, והוי מתאבק בעפר רגליהם, והוי שותה בצמא את דבריהם:

 רוח חיים לאבות א:ד

1. יהי ביתך בית ועד כו’ -
2. יתכן לפרש כי במ”ח דברים שהתורה ניקנית בהם, כמבואר לקמן, א’ מהם הוא המחכים את רבותיו ע”י שאלותיו החריפים וממילא רווחא שמעתתא
3. והנה הלימוד נקרא מלחמה,כמ”ש “מלחמתה של תורה”;
4. א”כ גם התלמידים לוחמים יקראו
5. וכמו שאמרו חז”ל “לא יבשו וגו’ כי ידברו את אויבים בשער
6. אפילו אב ובנו הרב ותלמידו נעשו אויבים זא”ז ואינם זזים משם כו’
7. ואסור לו לתלמיד לקבל דברי רבו כשיש לו קושיות עליהם
8. ולפעמים יהיה האמת אם התלמיד, וכמו שעץ קטן המדליק את הגדול
9. וז”ש יהי ביתך בית ועד לחכמים.
10. והוי מתאבק מלשון “ויאבק איש עמו”, שהוא ענין התאבקות מלחמה
11. כי מלחמת מצוה היא
12. וכן אנו נגד רבותינו, הקדושים אשר בארץ ונשמתם בשמי מרום המחברים המפורסמים וספריהם אתנו -
13. הנה ע”י הספרים אשר בבתנו בתינו הוא בית ועד לחכמים אלה, הוזהרנו ג”כ וניתן לנו רשות להתאבק וללחום בדברי’ ולתרץ קושיתם ולא לישא פנים לאיש רק לאהוב האמת,
14. אבל עכ”ז יזהר בנפשו מלדבר בגאוה וגודל לבב באשר מצא מקום לחלוק, וידמה כי גדול הוא כרבו או כמחבר הספר אשר הוא משיג עליו, וידע בלבבו כי כמה פעמים לא יבין דבריו וכוונתו.  ולכן יהיה אך בענוה יתירה
15. באמרו “אם איני כדאי אך תורה היא וכו’”
16. וז”ש הוי מתאבק כנ”ל אך בתנאי “בעפר רגליהם”, ר”ל בענוה והכנעה ולדון לפניהם בקרקע.
17. “והוי שותה בצמא את דבריהם” . . .  ר”ל שותה ועדיין צמא.
18. או יאמר יהי ביתך בית ועד כו’ – ואף אם אינך מבין בעצמך
19. ומשל ליכנס לחנותו של בושם שקולט את הריח
20. ואף אם אינך מבין והנך מתאבק אך בעפר רגליהם, עכ”ז תהיה שותה בצמא את דבריהם

 Mishnah Avot 1:4

Yose ben Yoezer said: Your house ought to be a meetinghouse for the sages, and wrestle in the dust at their feet, and drink their words with thirst. 

Ruach Chayyim (R. Chaim Volozhiner) to Avot 1:4

1. “Your house ought to be a meetinghouse for the sages” –

2. It is possible to explain (this by saying) that among the 48 things by which Torah is acquired, as is made clear later (in Avot Chapter 6), one of them is by adding wisdom to one’s teachers through his sharp questions, so that the content of Torah inevitably expands.

3. Now the study (of Torah) is called combat, as in the expression “the combat of Torah”;

4. Therefore the students too must be called combatants,

5. as the Sages said: “They will not be shamed etc. when they speak with enemies in the gate –

6. even a father and his son, a rav and his student, become enemies one to the other, but do

not move from there (until they love one another),

7. and it is forbidden for a student to accept the words of his teacher when he finds difficulties

with them –

8. and sometimes the truth is with the student, as when a small branch that kindles the larger –

9. and this is what is meant by “Your house ought to be a meetinghouse for the sages”.

10. “Mit’abek” is from the same root as “And a man was mit’abek with him”, which refers to

11. the hit’avkut of combat, for this is a combat of mitzvah.

12. We are situated similarly with reference to our teachers,

13. the holy ones whose bodies are in the ground but whose souls are in the exalted heavens, the famous authors, whose books are with us –

14. Now via the books which are in our houses, our house becomes a meetinghouse for those

sages, we are also commanded and given permission to wrestle and engage in combat with their words and to resolve their difficulties and not to show favoritism to any man, rather to just love the truth,

15. but with all this one must be cautious for the sake of one’s soul lest he speak with arrogance

and expansiveness because one has found a basis for dispute, and imagine that he is as great as his teacher or as the author of the book which he is challenging, rather he must know in his heart that sometimes he has not fully understood the author’s words and intent. Therefore he should take an attitude of great humility, saying “Although I am not worthy, nonetheless it is Torah etc.”

16. This is the meaning of “wrestle”, just on the condition that it is with “the dust of their feet”,

meaning with humility and submissiveness, arguing in their presence while sitting on the

ground at their feet.

17. “And drink their words with thirst” – . . . this means drink but always remain thirsty.

18. Or perhaps the meaning of “Your house ought to be a meetinghouse for the sages” (is that

that you should do this) even if you yourself do not understand (their conversation).

19. A parable: To enter the store of a perfumer, because you absorb the aroma.

20. Even if you don’t understand, and you are only engaged/even encrusted with the dust of their feet, despite all this you must drink their words thirstily.

R. Chaim Volozhiner’s translation of “mit’abek” as “wrestling” (lines 10-11), and subsequent unpacking of the wrestling metaphor, is justly famous, and generally accurately so.  My goal is largely to put this reading in the context of his full comment here, and to cast some light on a few of its lesser-known elements.

One issue that should leap out is that R. Chayyim, despite being the disciple of the Vilna Gaon, does not sharply distinguish between actual and literary teachers.  That is, he does not see it as essential for teachers to have the right of reply to their students. What is necessary is the attitude of humility, not the formal expression of it, and students are entitled – even obligated – to hold their opinions against those of their teachers even when the teachers are not present to defend themselves. It seems clear to me that the context here is practical halakhah. R. Chaim would presumably set standards of minimum competence here, and of relative competence, and I doubt that he genuinely means to forbid accepting the psak of one’s rebbe when one has relatively minor (albeit outstanding) intellectual difficulties with it, but nonetheless the rhetoric is striking.

On the other hand, R. Chaim begins by speaking of students’ contributions as valuable because they enhance the learning of the teacher, rather than independently worthwhile. They are the small twig that kindles the larger – the students’ flame, in and of itself, would just go out. Here he comes from Rav Yochanan’s description of Resh Lakish’s role on Bava Metzia 84a – “He would ask 24 challenges, and I would give him 24 resolutions, and the content of Torah would inevitably expand” – and it’s not clear that this framing applies well to dialogues with books.

One way of pushing this question is to focus not on the wrestling metaphor, but rather on Yose ben Yoezer’s first charge, to make one’s home the meetingplace of sages. R. Chaim understands this, in contemporary terms, as encouraging one to assemble a library. If one reads this only as the precondition for wrestling, very well, but it seems to me that the form of the Mishnah requires it to be independently worthwhile. But is there a point in assembling a library of books with which one does not engage?

This issue is perhaps highlighted by R. Chaim’s less famous alternate reading, that one should make one’s house a meetingplace for sages even if one will understand nothing of what they say, and merely be covered with their footdust, and drink their words thirstily even if uncomprehendingly.  Here he introduces the metaphor of the perfumery, but while one might argue that simply experiencing the sages in their home territory is of great value, it’s hard to say that of books.

At the same time, the mere presence of books does have an impact on the children of the house, and there is value – a value always in tension with our horror of idolatry – in having visible and tangible symbols of our values. Furthermore, books are less likely to let us down badly, especially once we have come to know them well. Upon witnessing any case of rabbinic corruption, there is a real temptation to retreat into dialogue with books.

Here is one way of expressing the tension I’m trying to convey. R. Chaim imposes a serious charge on students – they must challenge their teachers. This is what Rav Yochanan valued unto death in Resh Lakish, and when students fail this responsibility, they share the blame for their teachers’ failures.

But R. Chaim does not, at least not here, create a similarly dynamic responsibility for teachers toward students. Teachers can wait for students to challenge, and then simply react.

Students who never challenge will simply never grow. This may not be problematic when the relationship is human – it is in the nature of students, perhaps part of the definition of authentic disciplehood, to seek correction from their teachers, and everyone has the obligation to find a teacher, “aseh lekha Rav.”  But what happens when teachers prefer to see themselves as students? When rather

than opening themselves to challenges, they feel accountable only to deceased authors, and thus spend their time in one-way dialogue with ancient books? Here humility can become an impenetrable screen for arrogance, and books cannot call them to account.

 שולחן ערוך אורח חיים סימן תקמו סעיף ה

עושה אשה כל תכשיטיה במועד; כוחלת ופוקסת (פי’ מחלקת שערה לכאן ולכאן רש”י), ומעברת סרק על פניה, וטופלת עצמה בסיד וכיוצא בו; והוא שתוכל לסלקו במועד; ומעברת שער מבית השחי ומבית הערוה, בין ביד בין בכלי, ומעברת סכין על פדחתה

 תלמוד בבלי מסכת מועד קטן דף ט עמוד ב

ועושה אשה תכשיטיה

תנו רבנן: אלו הן תכשיטי נשים: כוחלת ופוקסת ומעבירה [שרק] על פניה ואיכא דאמרי מעברת סרק על פניה של מטה

רמב”ם הלכות יום טוב פרק ז הלכה כ

מותר ליטול שפה בחולו של מועד, וליטול צפרנים ואפילו בכלי, ומעברת האשה השיער מבית השחי ומבית הערוה בין ביד בין בכלי, ועושה כל תכשיטיה במועד, כוחלת ופוקסת ומעברת סרק על פניה וטופלת עצמה בסיד וכיוצא בו והוא שתוכל לקפלו במועד.

Men are forbidden to shave on chol hamoed, so as to ensure that they shave before the first yom Tov. According to Shulchan Arukh 546:5, however, women may do all cosmetic necessities on chol hamoed.  This general statement is followed by a list of specifics relating to makeup, hair arrangement, and hair removal, with the last being “she may draw a knife across her forehead”; this may refer to shaving eyebrows, but the use of “knife” rather than “razor” is anomalous, so there is a possibility that it refers to trimming bangs. 

            Shulchan Arukh is rooted in Mishnah Moed Kattan 8b and a beraita on Talmud Bavli Moed Kattan 9b, with one key difference being that the beraita’s language may imply that it is offering a comprehensive list of permitted cosmetics, whereas the Shulchan Arukh seems clearly to be providing only examples.  This may be a function of the other key differences, which are the inclusion of removal of underarm hair and the permission of drawing a knife across the forehead; the first comes from Rambam rather than directly from the Talmud that was in front of Beit Yosef, although it seems clear that the latter at least was in Rosh’s Talmud, and the former may have been in Rambam’s.  Regardless, no one’s Talmud text listed everything that Shulchan Arukh permitted.

            Shulchan Arukh, therefore, is compelled to read the list in the Talmud as non-comprehensive, and has no basis for assuming that his list is comprehensive.  Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that the cosmetic techniques of his time differed somewhat from those of the Talmud, and that he had no interest in banning the new techniques. 

            Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to argue that had he believed haircutting and head shaving to be permissible, that would have made the list.  This diyuk (deduction on the basis of close reading) is the basis for forbidding women’s haircutting on chol hamoed.  Mishnah Berurah, for example, writes:

(טז) ומעברת שער מבית השחי וכו’ – אבל מראשה אסור גילוח ותספורת בחוה”מ באשה כמו באיש [הגר"א ופמ"ג]:

Our purpose here is to decide whether this reading, and the authorities behind it, are dispositive. 

 Examining the Achronim:  Pri Megadim

Let’s look first at Pri Megadim.

פרי מגדים תקמו:ט

“ומעברת” –

עמ”א (כלומר שמעברת השער בסכין).

ומשמע לגלח ראשה אף באשה אסור בחה”מ כמו באיש,

אף על גב דל”ש בה נוול, דאדרבה שער באשה בראשה נוי,

ושער פדחתה מותר בסכין דקישוט הוא.

Pri Megadim suggests that the list of permitted activities specifically excludes headshaving, but concedes that he doesn’t understand why the prohibition should apply to women; after all, we should discourage women from shaving their heads before Yom Tov, rather than encouraging them.

            At first glance, Pri Megadim does indeed seem to support the prohibition.  However, more careful examination shows that he forbids headshaving but never mentions haircutting.  Why not?  There are three possibilities:

a)      He sees haircutting as identical with headshaving, and therefore feels no need to mention it

b)      He does not consider haircutting relevant to women

c)      He specifically intends to permit haircutting.

Of these, c) seems implausible, as if haircutting is permitted, the diyuk that headshaving is forbidden is undermined; and a) seems implausible, as if haircutting actually improves women’s appearance, and is forbidden, there is no mystery as to why the decree applies to them, with headshaving included within the decree as the equivalent of a bad haircut.  That leaves b) – but is it really plausible that Pri Megadim could not imagine women simply cutting their hair?  The answer to that is yes, as per the following Rosh.

רא”ש מסכת מועד קטן פרק ג סימן נג

תניא באבל רבתי (פ”ז): \כל ל’ יום אסור בתספורת אחד ראשו ואחד זקנו ואחד כל שער שיש בו ואשה מותרת בנטילת שער לאחר שבעה,

וגרסינן בפרק החולץ (דף מג א) בענין:

רבי יוסי אומר: כל הנשים יתארסו חוץ מן האלמנה מפני האיבול, וכמה איבול שלהן? שלשים יום. אמר רב חסדא: ק”ו – ומה במקום שאסור לכבס ולספר מותר לארס, שלשים יום של איבול שמותר לספר ולכבס, אינו דין שמותר לארס?

וש”מ שהאשה מותרת בנטילת שער כדקתני באבל רבתי, וכן כתב בה”ג דאשה מותרת בנטילת שער. וקשה לדברי האלפסי: דאי אשה מותרת בנטילת שער לאחר שבעה, דלמא שריא נמי בשבת של ט’ באב?!

ועוד, דנטילת שער שמתיר באבל רבתי באשה היינו ע”י טיפול סיד כדי שלא תתגנה על בעלה, ותספורת לא שייך להזכיר באשה דמגדלת שער כלילית!?

ועוד הקשה הרמב”ן ז”ל: דהל”ל שאסורה לספר ולכבס ומותרת ליארס, וגבי ל’ יום של איבול היה צריך להזכיר שמותרת לספר ולכבס, דתניא: “האשה מותרת בנטילת שער לאחר ז’”, שאין הדבר ידוע ופשוט כל כך להקשות סתם בלא הזכרת הברייתא!?

ורש”י לא גרס התם “לספר” אלא “לכבס”, והכי פירוש: שאסור לכבס שבת של ט’ באב, דאסורין ללבוש כלים מכובסים אפילו ישנים ואפילו אינם מגוהצים, ל’ של איבול, דאינם אסורים אלא בכלים חדשים מגוהצים,

וכן עיקר:

While the comparison to demonesses seems out of place, and in its original context does not seem intended to flatter, Rosh clearly states that women simply do not cut their hair, and therefore failure to mention that case proves nothing one way or the other.

            One might nonetheless argue that since Pri Megadim applies the decree against headshaving to women, it naturally extends to cover haircutting as well.  But this would be a misconception, I believe.  The Halakhah according to Pre Megadim, rather, is that the decree banning cosmetic procedures on chol hamoed never applies to women.  It is  precisely because headshaving detracts from their appearance that it can be applied to them, even though, as he concedes, it does so purely mechanically.  Thus I suggest, contrary to Mishnah Berurah, that there is at the least no evidence that Pre Megadim bans haircutting for women on chol hamoed.

Gra

            We move on, then, to the Gra

גר”א תקמו:ח

“ומעברת האשה שיער מבית השחי ומבית הערוה בין ביד בין בכלי” –

גירסת הרי”ף: “ומעברת סרק על פניה, וא”ד ומעברת סכין על פניה שלמטה”,

ובירושלמי שם: “נוטלת שערה וצפרניה ומעברת כלי על פניה.  א”ר יודן אבוי דר’ מתניה: בלשון נקי היא מתניתא”, ר”ל פניה שלמטה.

והאי “נוטלת שער” אינה תגלחת, מדל”ק “ומספרת” או “מגלחת”, אלא בגוף קאמר,

וכמ”ש תוספות במו”ק יח.

וכן פירשו המפרשים מ”ש באבל “והאשה מותרת בנטילת שער וכו’”.

אע”ג שהרמב”ם שם מתיר, היינו משום סוגיא דהחולץ שאמרו: “מה במקום שמותר וכו’”,

ועיין בטור יו”ד סי’ שצ,

אבל כאן, משום שלא יכנסו לרגל כשהן מנוולין, והך גזירה ג”כ באשה,

וא”א דקאי על בית הערוה – הא קאמר אח”כ “ומעברת וכו’”!  אלא על בית השחי,

ומדקאמר “ומעברת סכין” וקאמר “ונוטלת שערה וצפרניה”, מותר בין ביד בין בכלי כמש”ל סי’ תקלב וז”ש “בין וכו’”.
Unlike Pri Megadim, Gra explicitly forbids haircutting.  His evidence is the same diyuk.  However, Gra apparently sees the decree against haircutting as directly applicable to women; in other words, he knows of and forbids cosmetic haircutting for women on chol hamoed.  The questions remaining are the strength of his evidence and whether there are explicitly contrary authorities.

            A primary point here is that Gra is not primarily engaged in psak – rather, he is engaged to justify Shulchan Arukh’s permission to shave underarm hair.  He suggests that Shulchan Arukh reached this conclusion by process of elimination: the Talmud Yerushalmi permits נטילת שיער, and this cannot refer to head hair owing to the decree, and pubic hair is mentioned separately, so only underarm hair is left.

            Gra knows that Shulchan Arukh is only citing Rambam in this regard, however.  This makes his claim that נטילת שיער refers only to body hair weak, as while he cites Ashkenazic authorities who interpreted the phrase in that way regarding Sheloshim, Rambam himself permits women to cut their hair during shloshim.

            Tosafot Moed Kattan 18a does explicitly ban haircutting during Sheloshim, although it is hard to understand why the issue is discussed there in Tosafot, which is focused on nailcutting.  But Tosfot Yevamot 43a seems to permit, and in general the discussion there demonstrates that נטילת שיער is used to include haircutting.

            But while Gra’s evidence is weak, his authority stands.  

Aruch Ha-Shulchan

But here we turn to Arukh haShulchan:

ערוך השלחן תקמו”ז

ועושה אשה כל תכשיטיה לקישוט הפנים במועד, בין ילדה בין זקנה,

והיינו שכוחלת בצבע, וכן נותנת כחול בין עיניה כדי שתהן נאות, ופוקסת – והיינו מחלקת שערה לכאן ולכאן ומתקנת שערה חוץ לצעיף, ונותנת חוטין של בצק דק על פניה להאדים הבשר, ומעברת סרק על פניה, וטופלת עצמה בסיד וכיוצא בו להשיר השיער,

ודווקא שתוכל לסלקו להסיד במועד, דאז מקבלת תענוג מזה, דבשעה שהסיד על פניה מצטערת קצת, אך אח”כ שמחה היא לה, ולכן אם השמחה תהיה במועד מותר, ואם לאחר המועד אסור,

ומעברת שיער מבית השחי ומבית הערוה בין ביד בין בכלי, ומעברת השיער שעל פדחתה בסכין.

וכל אלו קשה לעשותן קודם המועד, שתקלקל,

ואפילו בלא זה א”א להחמיר על אשה בתכשיטיה, שכל שמחתה היא בתכשיטיה וזהו עונג יו”ט שלה,

אבל האיש אסור לו מיני תכשיטין במה שיש בהן מלאכה,

דגם בלא”ה אין לאיש להרבות בקישוטין ותכשיטין משום “”לא ילבש גבר שמלת אשה”, כמ”ש ביו”ד סי’ קפב.

Arukh HaShulchan seems to state that by definition the decree cannot apply to women, even with regard to cosmetic activities they could have completed before yom tov.  While he never mentions haircutting, it seems clear that he would permit it, and that he argues fundamentally with Gra.

            Finally we turn to Ritva.

ריטב”א מועד קטן דף ח עמוד ב

עושה אשה תכשיטיה במועד פי’ שזה צורך הגוף הוא וכעין אוכל נפש ולפיכך עושה כדרכה ובלא שינוי ובטירחא רבה ולא גזרו בה שמא תכנס לרגל מנוולת דקשוט מילתא דצריכא כל יומא ויומא הוא ועוד שאין דרכן להשהות

Ritva supports Arukh HaShulchan against Gra, let alone Magen Avrohom, by saying that the decree intentionally excluded women from its ambit.  It follows that Gra is a shitat yachid (minority position).  Furthermore, a rule of psak is that the authority of precedent is greatly diminished when new evidence is presented that was not available to the original decisors, and to my knowledge the Ritva was not available to the Gaon.  Accordingly, b’mechilat kvod the Gra and with trepidation, it seems to me that at least bish’at hadchak women may have haircuts on chol hamoed.

Meta-Halakhic Questions      

May women have their hair cut on chol hamoed?  On a technical halakhic level, I argue above that the answer is yes.  What I want to do here is discuss four metahalakhic questions relative to this specific issue.

            The first – and this is perhaps the safest topic we can choose to discuss this generally explosive question – is what sort of attitude we should have toward gender distinctions in Halakhah.  Here I must acknowledge that this framing – which assumes that gender distinctions constitute a discrete category, toward which a consistent attitude is appropriate – is borrowed from American constitutional law’s notion that various distinctions can be subjected  to loose, intermediate, or strict scrutiny.  But I think it offers a valuable tool to poskim, and I specifically favor subjecting potential Jew-Gentile distinctions in interpersonal halakhot to strict scrutiny.

            This cannot, however, be the case with regard to gender in Halakhah – there are simply too many areas in which the distinction is deeply ingrained, and others in which such distinctions flow inexorably from physical differences.  But there is nonetheless room for some form of scrutiny, especially when potential rulings seem to assume psychological or intellectual differences between men and women.

            The second question is whether we ought to evaluate potential gender distinctions primarily in terms of their outcomes or rather in terms of their reasoning.  What are we to do if the best way to reach the solution we see as most compatible with justice and with properly recognizing the tzelem Elokim in every human being is to utilize a legal rationale that seems sexist or even misogynist?

            For example: Some understandings of the exegetical basis for the exclusion of women from the obligation to procreate can easily be criticized as sexist: “It is the way of men to conquer, but not the way of women”.  To counter this critique, a posek might seek to play up the positions that see women as rabbinically obligated.  But a primary effect of the exemption is to prevent women from being halakhically coerced into procreative sex, and generally to give them halakahic control of their sexuality, and this effect can be undone by the position that they are rabbinically obligated.

            The third question is the extent to which we are willing to concede that past halakhot simply cannot be extended to current circumstances – the differences are just too great.  This issue presents differently with regard to d’oraita law, where we are committed to the position that the Torah’s Author foresaw all future circumstances and legislated accordingly, and d’rabbanan law, where we have no such theological commitment.  Thus, for example, Rav Moshe Feinstein takes the position that doing otherwise prohibited labor via preset electric timers often falls into a category of “appropriate to forbid but not actually forbidden”, on the ground that the Talmudic Rabbis were unaware of electricity and therefore could not have legislated regarding it.

            The fourth question is the extent to which we are willing to undo past authoritative rulings, especially those of Rav Yosef Karo in Shulchan Arukh, on the basis of our considerably larger-than-his library of the works of the rishonim and of variant manuscripts of all rabbinic texts.  The potentially destructive effects of allowing such overturning can be seen in halakhic civil law, where plaintiffs can succeed only if the defendant has no plausible defense.  A primary task of halakhic civil jurisprudence, therefore, is to eliminate positions from the discussion, and this the Shulchan Arukh accomplished admirably; the standard rule is that positions not mentioned in the Shulchan Arukh are halakhically irrelevant in civil matters.  And yet, it is hard to allow rulings that no longer accord with the weight of textual evidence to stand, especially when they seem to us to have deleterious consequences.

Meta-Halakhic Answers

            Let me give very brief answers to these questions, in reverse order, in the expectation that there will be many occasions to discuss them in more detail and depth in the future.

4)                     We should resist the temptation to establish a bright line in this area and argue that the Halakhah must be determined either by pure historical/interpretational truth, as we understand it, or else by pure halakhic process establishing irreversible precedent.  Rather, we should take the nuanced position that precedent generates significant but not infinite inertia, varying with its antiquity and the weight of the authorities who establish it, which can be overcome by some compelling combinations of contrary evidence, practical need, and moral intuition.

            In the case of women’s haircuts on chol hamoed, the weight of precedent seemed to me extremely weak and the contrary evidence quite strong.  I did not see a real issue of morality involved, and practical need would be a function of specific cases only.

3)         I think there are actually three positions possible here:

a)      Laws should be seen as inevitably extending to whatever new circumstances seem to present the same issues.

b)      Laws can only extend to circumstances that could plausibly be seen as having been conceived of when the law was made

c)      Laws may or may not be extended to cover new circumstances at the discretion of contemporary decisors, subject to the willingness of the community to follow them when they exercise that discretion.  In such cases, it should be evident, what are formally judicial decisions are in practice legislative acts.

I favor the last approach.  In the case of women’s haircutting, the question then became whether we should extend the decree made regarding men to women.  It seemed to me that this was probably extending the wrong rabbinic ray, that we should instead extend the exceptions for cosmetic bodyshaving and tweezing et. to this case

2)                     Here again we should avoid bright-line answers.  There are times, circumstances, and issues in which it is appropriate to focus on symbols; I cannot think of any non-extreme case, for example, in which I would pasken based on the sometime principle that “women’s wisdom is only with the shuttle” – maybe to be matir an agunah.  But as a general rule it is wiser to focus on results, although one must always recognize that the results of a halakhic ruling are not just the immediate case, but also all cases for which that case will become precedent.

                        In our case,  it is not clear to me that the presumption that women’s happiness often depends on their sense of their own appearance is sexist, although taking the extreme formulation of Arukh haShulchan that “their entire happiness is in their adornments” literally rather than hyperbolically might be sexist.  But I take it hyperbolically, and therefore am comfortable using Arukh haShulchan’s consequent ruling as precedent.

1)      I suggest that the standard should be that the proposed distinction has a purpose plausibly defensible in non-sexist terms and the proposed distinction should plausibly relate to genuine differences in the religious, political, social or other experience of men and women.  In this case, the desire to make women’s yom tov experience happier is certainly defensible in non-sexist terms, and I suggest that it plausible relates plausibly to the different norms and expectations governing male and female hair grooming and growth in our society.

Accordingly, I see no barrier to ruling permissively on this question

Chag kasher v’sameiach